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ABSTRACT 
What is gender? What is the meaning of gender in law? At first sight, these questions 
seem easy to answer, but the analysis and use of the concept of gender gives a very 
different picture. The concept of gender has credit in the fight for equality but, is it 
still useful to fight sex discrimination?  
This work tries to answer these questions exploring the concept of gender and its 
development within feminism. There are two main points of analyses, the 
construction of the concept tied to the notion of sex difference entrenching sex and 
gender in an indissoluble relation and, the development of the concept of gender 
within feminism.  
The concept of gender develops to become many things: the synonym of women, 
sex, social sex or even socio-cultural oppression. With regard to women, gender is a 
paradox: they have become neutral and equal subjects even if still keeping certain 
aspects of their womanhood. The concept of gender has also travelled into law 
incorporating the term, with its ambiguities in legislation. National and international 
laws have imported the same feminist ambiguities and the compulsory binary of 
sexual difference with the use term gender.  
The assumptions about sex and gender materialize in the reading of bodies 
legitimized by law. The relation between sex and gender is ruled by a gendered 
reading of the body. The restricted sexed depiction of the bodies interplay with the 
concept of gender producing inclusions and exclusions and ruling the bestowing of 
rights and responsibilities. The interplay of sex and gender with the feminist and the 
legal discourse continue to produce exclusions and hinders the possibilities of 
Queering the subject in society and in law. In relation to the subject, the concept of 
gender reifies the binary of sex and gender roles constraining further developments 
in the achievement of equality.  
The language of gender is exhausted thus the need of moving forward and look 
at new concepts that might depict the actual world.  
  
4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I survived! That’s my feeling right now. Indeed, this project has been a long and 
stressful process with many ups and downs and also many bad and good times. Now, 
I choose to remember the ups and the good times that helped me to carry this project 
through. Focusing on the positive gives me the energy to finish this page, probably 
the most important of the thesis. I succeeded thanks to the help and time of many 
people who I want to thank.  
Undertaking this PhD has been a life-changing experience for me and I can say 
that all started reading Anu Pylkkänen’s book, Trapped in Equality. It certainly 
served me as an epiphany. Suddenly, there was light. What started as an analysis of 
human trafficking and prostitution became an essay on the concept of gender. I 
certainly owe the idea of this thesis to Anu Pylkkänen’s.  Thank you Anu! 
This 180 degrees’ turn in the project also takes me to thank my supervisor, Prof. 
Johanna Niemi. Supervisors are surely not very happy when their supervisee 
suddenly decides to change topic. Still, Johanna kindly supported me. I am very 
grateful to Johanna who believed in me. I am deeply grateful to her for guiding me 
and encouraging me to carry on through these years. I really thank her also for 
allowing me to focus on my research and forget about the most painful part of 
academia, funding. Thanks to her, I was part of two projects funded by the Academy 
of Finland that allowed me to focus full-time on my research. I must also thank her 
for her kindness when the stress was so high that I was about to throw the towel.  
I want to thank to the pre-examiners, Maria Drakopoulou and Jeff Hearn who both, 
very kindly, dedicated some of their precious time to read this project and give 
comments to improve the text. I must also thank to Prof. Eva Maria Svensson for her 
critics to this project that made me realized how controversial it is dealing with gender.  
I also want to thank all the participants in the ASLA project, Anu Isotalo, Pia 
Eskelinen, Minni Leskinen, Marjo Rantala, Juho Aalto, Maryka Kytola, Pia Holm 
and Aleida Lujan who supported me and helped with comments and discussions. Our 
monthly meetings were fundamental to get the needed boost of energy to push this 
project forward. 
I have to thank also to some of my colleagues at the University of Helsinki 
because writing this thesis has been a process which, from an administrative point of 
 5 
view, started at the University of Helsinki and finished at the University of Turku. 
At the University of Helsinki I enjoyed very good discussions with colleagues, 
especially with Paul Tiensuu who introduced me to Deleuze. In retrospect, I realize 
that these discussions with Paul have played a key role in my thesis. So, thank you 
Paul, this project is what it is because of your great knowledge of Deleuze. From 
Helsinki University, I also want to thank Samuli Miettinen who welcomed me to the 
University of Helsinki and made me feel part of the fifth floor; thank you Samuli for 
your kindness. I want to thank to Fernando Losada for his encouragement and 
wonderful lunch times and to Guilherme Vasconcelos for his wonderful comments 
and for giving me access to his thesis which was very useful.  
Then in the category of colleagues - friends I must say that the acquaintance with 
Sonal Makhija has been an extra benefit of this thesis as we have become friends and 
shared many good laughs. I must also mention Aleida Lujan with whom I share ideas 
and language, and I am not only referring to our common mother tongue. I must also 
mention Teija Rantala who brought me some light during the feminist seminar times. 
I have also been teaching in both, University of Helsinki and Turku and I must 
say that it is what I enjoyed the most. I need to thank my students who played an 
important role in the turn that my thesis took. Their questions, doubts, affirmations 
and debates showed me the controversies and misunderstanding within the fields of 
feminism and gender.  
And of course, very accountable for my survival are my friends Pilar Salmeron, 
Maria Facal , Irene Poza, Marta Cantero and Anu Kinnunen with whom I have shared 
my moments of deep anxiety but also of big excitement. Their presence was very 
important in a process that is often felt as tremendously solitaire. They kept me in 
contact with the world and provided me with an exciting and fun social life. The 
good laughs and their indefectible friendship helped me to get to the end of this 
project. I also have to mention, Ana Berrocal who became my best sauna companion 
and made me laugh even during the worst times. 
I am also very grateful to Matt Gleeson for his amazing contribution when 
helping me with the editing of the thesis. I must say that working with him made me 
enjoy my thesis again and, I hope we will continue working together in the future.  
This project has put my marriage to the proof and we survived. So I want to thank 
my husband for being always there for me even when I became unbearable.  
Thanks to all of you because you helped me to become a stronger and better 
person! 
This monograph has been written in the research project ASLA: Actors, 
Structures and Law, funded by the Academy of Finland, decision 312497. 
February 2020 
Amalia Verdu Sanmartin 
6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................. 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... 6 
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 11 
1.1 The Problem with the Concept of Gender .............................. 11 
1.2 Research Questions ............................................................... 15 
1.3 Theory and Methodology ........................................................ 17 
1.3.1 Theory ......................................................................... 17 
1.3.2 Methodology ............................................................... 22 
1.4 Sources .................................................................................. 29 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis ........................................................... 30 
2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPT OF GENDER ...... 33 
2.1 Terms, Words and Concepts .................................................. 34 
2.2 The Process of Production of Concepts ................................. 36 
2.2.1 The Transformation from Threesome to Twosome ...... 38 
2.2.2 The First Process, or the ‘Genderization’ of the 
Term Gender ............................................................... 40 
2.2.3 The Second Process: From the ‘Gendered’ term 
Gender to the Concept of Gender ............................... 44 
2.2.4 The Influence of the English Language Term in 
Other Languages ........................................................ 46 
2.2.5 The Third Gender ........................................................ 51 
2.3 The Polysemy of Gender ........................................................ 52 
2.4 Binary Language and Sexuality .............................................. 53 
2.5 Biopolitical Gender ................................................................. 55 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 60 
3 THE CONCEPT OF GENDER IN FEMINIST THEORY ............ 62 
3.1 Gender and Sex: The Medical Background ............................ 65 
3.2 Feminism and Gender ............................................................ 67 
3.2.1 Defining Sex and Gender ............................................ 69 
3.2.2 Feminist Contributions to the Evolution of the 
Relation between Sex and Gender .............................. 70 
3.2.3 An Analysis of the Relation between the Concepts 
of Gender and Sex in Feminism .................................. 71 
3.2.3.1 The Modern/Postmodern Framework in the 
Feminist use of Gender ................................ 72 
 7 
3.2.3.2 Two Approaches to the Relation between 
Sex and Gender ............................................ 74 
3.2.4 The Nature/Culture Framework of Sex/Gender............ 75 
3.2.5 The Role of Sexuality as Identity in the Sex/Gender 
Relation ....................................................................... 78 
3.3 The Problematic Sex-Gender Relation ................................... 80 
3.3.1 The Cultural Aspect of Sex .......................................... 81 
3.3.2 The Role of Language in Maintaining the Relation 
between Sex and Gender ............................................ 84 
3.3.3 The Use of the Term and the Concept of Gender in 
Feminism ..................................................................... 84 
3.4 A Gendered Classification of Feminist Theory ........................ 85 
3.5 The Conflation between Feminist Theory and Law ................. 88 
3.5.1 Gender Reform Feminism ........................................... 92 
3.5.2 Gender Resistance Feminism ..................................... 94 
3.5.3 Gender Rebellion Feminism ...................................... 100 
3.5.4 Gender Revolution .................................................... 110 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 121 
4 GENDER AND LAW ............................................................... 123 
4.1 Law is… constructed ............................................................ 124 
4.2 Law is politics: CLS and feminism ........................................ 126 
4.2.1 Feminist Critique of Law: Legal Jurisprudence .......... 129 
4.2.1.1 Feminist critique of the Duality of Norms ..... 130 
4.2.1.2 Patriarchy and its relation to the 
foundational discourse of law ...................... 132 
4.2.1.3 The sexist gendered male law .................... 133 
4.3 Law as Culture: Writing Against the Culture ......................... 134 
4.4 The Sex and Gender Distinction in Law ................................ 139 
4.4.1 From Sex to Gender in Law ....................................... 140 
4.4.2 Gender: A Political Concept Becomes a Legal 
Concept ..................................................................... 141 
4.4.3 Sex and Gender as Legal Concepts .......................... 144 
4.5 Sex and Gender in Legal Texts ............................................ 148 
4.5.1 Sex and Gender in International Legal Texts ............. 151 
4.5.2 Sex and Gender in EU Law ....................................... 160 
4.5.2.1 Sex equality in the EU ................................. 161 
4.5.2.2 Shifting to Gender: The Combined Effect 
of Directives and Treaties ........................... 162 
4.5.2.3 After the Treaty of Lisbon ............................ 166 
4.5.2.4 The Role of the European Court of Justice . 167 
4.6 The New Era of Gender in International Law ........................ 171 
4.7 What Is the Law Asking? ...................................................... 175 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 179 
5 THE BODY ............................................................................. 182 
5.1 Female Corporeality: The Body without Mind ....................... 182 
5.2 Approaches to the Body in the Gender Feminist 
Classification ........................................................................ 184 
8 
5.3 Empowering the Female ‘Fleshy Materiality”: Mothering 
sexuality ............................................................................... 188 
5.4 Constructing Body Language ............................................... 191 
5.5 Towards the new “Corporeal Turn” ....................................... 193 
5.6 The Difference within the Multitude ...................................... 195 
5.6.1 Butler’s and Braidotti’s Approaches to Difference ...... 197 
5.6.2 Changing the Point of Departure in the Construction 
of Difference .............................................................. 201 
5.7 The Body of the Law ............................................................ 203 
5.8 The Female Body in Law ...................................................... 205 
5.9 Is There a Corporeal Turn in Law? ....................................... 209 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 211 
6 THE PATRIARCHY OF GENDER .......................................... 214 
6.1 The Concept of Patriarchy .................................................... 215 
6.2 Patriarchy and Gender ......................................................... 216 
6.3 Critiques ............................................................................... 218 
6.4 Problems in the Relationship Between the Concepts of 
Patriarchy and Gender ......................................................... 219 
6.5 The Power of Patriarchy ....................................................... 222 
6.6 Gender in Law under the Spell of Patriarchy ........................ 225 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 233 
7 QUEERING THE SUBJECT: THE TIME FOR REVOLUTION 235 
7.1 The Role of Essentialism in Preserving the Subject ............. 236 
7.1.1 Essentialism in Feminism .......................................... 237 
7.1.1.1 The Role of Cathexis, False 
Consciousness, or Ideological 
Determination ............................................. 239 
7.1.1.2 The Role of Essentialism (Cathexis) in 
Reshaping Law ........................................... 244 
7.2 Deconstruction and Feminism .............................................. 248 
7.2.1 The Subject in the Process of Deconstruction – 
Reconstruction .......................................................... 249 
7.2.1.1 Reconstructing the subject in feminism ....... 250 
7.2.1.2 The role of the body in the reconstruction 
of the subject .............................................. 251 
7.3 The Legal Person ................................................................. 253 
7.3.1 Constructing the Legal Person .................................. 253 
7.3.2 A Gendered or a Sexed Legal Subject ...................... 255 
7.3.3 Sexing the Modern Subject of Law ............................ 256 
7.3.3.1 The natural person as the pattern of the 
legal person ................................................ 256 
7.3.3.2 The role of the history of law ....................... 257 
7.3.4 The Feminist Role in the Construction of the 
Essentialist Modern Legal Person ............................. 260 
7.4 Towards the Postmodern Subject ........................................ 262 
7.4.1 Feminism and Gender: Sabotaging the Postmodern 
Subject in Law ........................................................... 264 
 9 
7.4.2 The Role of Gender ................................................... 265 
7.4.3 The Role of Feminism ............................................... 267 
7.5 The Twofold Problem: The Category of Women and the 
Gender Binary ...................................................................... 268 
7.5.1 The Category Woman – Killing the Subject ............... 269 
7.5.2 The Binary of Sex ...................................................... 271 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 274 
8 RECONSIDERING SEX AND GENDER: THE FUTURE ........ 276 
8.1 Law’s Legitimization of Exclusions ....................................... 278 
8.2 Toward a Post-Gender Approach? ....................................... 279 
8.3 Time for Change .................................................................. 286 
8.3.1 Overcoming the Binary of Sex through Language ..... 286 
8.3.2 Overcoming the Binary of Sex in Law ........................ 288 
8.3.3 Eliminating the Concept of Gender: Another 
Strategy ..................................................................... 289 
8.4 Imagining New Concepts: Time for GENEX ......................... 290 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 293 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................... 297 
 
  
10 
 
 11 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an exploration of what is problematic with the use of gender in law and 
feminism, and the effects of the interplay of these discourses with that of law. This 
thesis engages in the legal philosophical analysis of the basic category of sex and of 
the concept of gender that was transmitted into law. 
Teaching a course on gender and law and the contact with the students allowed 
me to understand the confusion between sex, gender and feminism in academia that 
is also widespread in the general public. When asked about my teaching subject—
gender and law—everyone would automatically assume that I was teaching about 
feminism or women, and only a few would raise other subjects such as queer. 
Gender has become a concept of general use for feminism.1 The concept of 
gender emerges as a key factor in fighting discrimination, oppression, and 
domination. But while the use of gender as a tool for analysis fosters the inclusion 
of women in law as equals, it also generates another debate about what the concept 
itself means.2  
We must look not only at law to understand how the concept has been developed 
and used, but also at the interplay of law with other disciplines such as philosophy, 
anthropology, psychology, medicine and sociology, as all of them have contributed 
to the field of law and the discourse on gender. Therefore, this thesis uses an 
interdisciplinary approach to gender and law and discusses themes that belong to the 
domain of legal theory, philosophy of law, feminism and social theory.  
1.1 The Problem with the Concept of Gender 
Many feminists have already addressed the problematic concerning the concept of 
gender.3 For Baden and Goetz, the contradictions and problems with the understanding 
of the concept of gender in feminism consistently extend to the effects of the political 
 
 
1  Deborah L Rhode, ‘Feminist Critical Theories’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 617. 
2  Mary Hawkesworth, Feminist Inquiry: From Political Conviction to Methodological 
Innovation (Rutgers University Press 2006). 
3   For example, Judith Butler, Elizabeth Spelman, Moira Gatens, Elizabeth Grosz, and 
Teresa De Lauretis. 
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character of the concept of gender, which allows different interpretations, even within 
feminism, of the construction of identity and its relation to culture, nature, biology and 
the body. 4 These different interpretations have been part of the richness of feminism 
but also a source of ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions.5 The concept of 
gender is not universally agreed-upon, for each feminist epistemology creates different 
ontologies of gender and the result is an ambiguous concept. Feminists study gender 
1) as a social construction, 2) in terms of the binary divide into sex and gender, and 3) 
in terms of the relation between gender and sexuality.6  
All of these approaches are framed by the relation between sex and gender; in 
this relation, sex first appeared as biology and gender as culture, and later both 
concepts were understood as a part of culture.7 These approaches to the relation 
between sex and gender might be divided into that of modern feminism and that of 
postmodern feminism.8 This seems a very simple and general division but it 
facilitates the understanding of the development of the concept of gender in 
 
 
4  AM Goetz and S Baden, ‘Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]? 
Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing’ (1997) 56 Feminist Review 3. 
5  ibid. 
6  Victoria Robinson and Diane Richardson, Introducing Gender and Women’s Studies 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015).  
7  Due to the complexity of the debate about feminism and gender as methodology and 
the complex relation between gender and sex determining the meaning of gender, it is 
important to clarify my position on this. I understand that feminisms focus on women 
as political subjects and on gender as a social construction or system of power. In my 
understanding feminism as a movement or theory(s) has only women as political 
subjects. It understands and treats gender within a binary and rather as a system of 
hierarchical power. The different strands of feminism approach the concept of gender 
differently and the evolution of the concept of gender in feminism is a result of a 
constant questioning of the concept. However, as I will explain in the following chapter, 
I do not consider masculinities or queer theory within the field of feminist studies even 
if both are mainly considered as feminism. I would say that masculinities and queer 
theory use feminist methodology to address gender as a cultural construction of sex. 
Both movements and theoretical approaches include women as political subjects. In 
masculinities theory the focus is on men although still looking at their relation to 
women while queer studies approach to all people as political subjects independently 
of their sex, even trying to bur the sex binary.  Thus, regarding the feminist 
methodology, I agree that feminist methodology is a critical approach to research and 
following Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland, the feminist methodology can be 
engendered addressing the construction of the binary of sex and, thus, going beyond 
asking the women question.  
8  In my understanding of the modern I follow Tuija Pulkkinen, who says, “I define the 
modern and the postmodern as modes of thought or thinking attitudes, not as periods 
of history; societal formations, aesthetic styles, or cultural phenomena.” Referring to 
the postmodern, she says, “Most generally the postmodern attitude is defined as 
antifoundational” In Tuija Pulkkinen, The Postmodern and Political Agency (Revised, 
Sophi,University of Jyväskylä 2000) 1,37.  
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feminism and its use in law.9 Modern feminism is founded on an empirical 
epistemology of the biology (genitals) of the body. Therefore, it is important to 
critically approach the analytical categories of feminism to reveal to what extent 
biological epistemology has played a role in feminist theories and how it has affected 
the person before the law. This division also allows one to address the problematic 
between gender and law as contemporary law and its person, considered as modern. 
It is difficult to address law as postmodern, even less the legal person. 
The problem of gender extends to the use of the term gender in law. Feminists 
have developed theories in all disciplines, including law; the influence of feminism 
in law is evidenced by the transformation of law to include women and by the 
incorporation of the term gender and the concept of gender into legislation. 
However, both national and international laws have imported feminist ambiguities 
in the use of the term gender. Several international norms against female 
discrimination or gender discrimination have introduced the term gender without 
providing a clear explanation of the concept. For instance as highlighted by Jane 
Adolphe, the UN texts recognize four different uses of the term gender stemming 
from different feminist theories , “(1) gender as a social construct; (2) gender as a 
cultural aspect of femininity and masculinity, but based on the biological sexes, male 
and female; (3) gender as synonymous with women and sex, or women and children; 
and (4) gender meaning the two sexes, male and female, within the context of 
society”10 The complexity addressed by Jane Adolphe increases when one explores 
the approaches of Georgina Waylen, Karen Celis and Johanna Kantola, who state 
that “the account of what gender is, what sex is, what sexuality and race are, and how 
they are all interrelated is constantly contested and developing”.11  
Analysing the term gender in law, its lack of conceptual independence becomes 
visible, as it usually appears accompanied by a “surname”: gender equality, gender 
justice, gender mainstreaming, and gender discrimination.12 The surname effect 
attaches gender to a political context and some scholars13 have claimed that the 
 
 
9  For this division see Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (Aspen 
Law & Business 1999).This division is developed in the coming chapters. 
10  Jane Adolphe, “‘Gender’ Wars at the United Nations,” Ave Maria Law Review, 11, no. 
1 ( 2019). 
11  Georgina Waylen and others, ‘Gender and Politics:Concepts and Methods’, The Oxford 
Handbook of Gender and Politics (Oxford University Press 2013) 18. 
12  Gender tends to be attached to another term, or applied to another realm of thought or 
study. 
13  Among the works by such scholars are: Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (A&C 
Black, 2005); Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in 
Contemporary Feminist Theory (Columbia University Press, 2011); E. A Grosz, Sexual 
Subversions: Three French Feminists (Sydney; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1989); Moira 
Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality (1) (London, Routledge, 2013).  
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concept’s political essence might be one of the reasons for its ineffectiveness. They 
reveal that gender is a political category that has been transposed into law to serve as 
a legal category, something that might explain the problem of the term gender in law. 
Gender seems to have the effect of leaving the sex dichotomy untouched, maintaining 
a sexed legal subject and thus hindering the development of equality.14 This is a 
problem already addressed by some feminists who point out the essentialism 
impregnating the concept of gender.15 
This confusion is reinforced by the need to define oneself as a sexed subject in 
order to find a home in one of the feminist strands or within the queer movement. 16 
The gender categorization, contested and criticized by some feminists and the queer 
movement, has ultimately been adapted to the needs of the specific political subject 
of each movement.  
To understand how gender contributes to or constrains the options for achieving 
equality, it is imperative to understand the meaning and use of gender, especially in 
law.17 I argue that the concept of gender, in all its forms, not only produces 
exclusions but also works against the political subject of feminism, women.18 
Supposedly, the concept of gender helps to transcend sex differences, but if the legal 
subject remains untouched and unquestioned, it remains sexed and framed by the 
fixed dichotomy of sex. Women and men are attached to their roles within the binary. 
 
 
14  Judith Lorber, ‘Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality, 
and Gender’ (1996) 66 Sociological Inquiry 143; Karen Fletcher, ‘Beyond Dualism: 
Leading Out of Oppression’ (2006) 41 Nursing Forum 50; Surya Monro, ‘Transmuting 
Gender Binaries: The Theoretical Challenge’ (2007) 12 Sociological Research Online. 
15  Joan Eveline and Carol Bacchi, ‘What Are We Mainstreaming When We Mainstream 
Gender?’ (2006) 7 International Feminist Journal of Politics 496; Gudrun-Axeli Knapp, 
‘Race, Class, Gender. Reclaiming Baggage in Fast Travelling Theories’ (2005) 12 
European Journal of Women’s Studies 249; Judith Squires, Gender in Political Theory 
(Polity 1999).  
16   Chrys Ingraham, ‘The Heterosexual Imaginary: Feminist Sociology and Theories of 
Gender’ (1994) 12 Sociological Theory 203; Francisco Valdes, ‘Unpacking Hetero-
Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation to Its 
Origins’ (1996) 8 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities; Jonathan Katz, The Invention 
of Heterosexuality (University of Chicago Press 2007).  
17  This is a fact already pointed out by Paul B. Preciado, who, in “El Manifiesto Contra-
sexual,” stating the importance of concepts such as gender and sexual difference when 
researching sexuality, saying, “[A]l pensar sobre la sexualidad yo me encuentro hoy 
frente a un imperativo conceptual semejante [to Marx’s]. Todo parecería indicar que yo 
debería afrontar esta tarea partiendo de nociones como género o diferencia sexual. (My 
own translation, since there is no official translation of this text in English: I face a similar 
conceptual imperative when I approach sexuality. It seems that I should face this task 
starting from concepts such as gender or sexual difference.”) The conceptual imperative, 
as she herself refers in her book, is similar to Marx’s approach when he was initiating his 
Grundrisse, in Paul Beatriz Preciado, Manifiesto Contrasexual (Opera Prima, 2002) 17. 
18  This statement is developed and analysed in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
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“Woman” still signifies womanhood; mother, daughter, and wife; a figure to be 
protected.  
My argument is that the evolution of the term gender into a concept entailed 
beliefs about the natural character of the binary of sex and the materiality of the body, 
even in the case of postmodern feminism. The regression to old patriarchal values 
that we can witness today in many societies might be related to the hidden traditional 
values embedded in the concepts of gender and sex.  
My objective is to highlight how the relation between sex and gender guides the 
development of the concept of gender and keeps gender and sex as natural hindering 
the achievement of real equality19 and, producing exclusions that are legitimized by 
law. However, my argument goes further than merely stating the problem by 
addressing, as explained by Baden and Goetz, the effect of the “contradictions and 
inconsistencies in feminist theoretical and political distinctions between sex and 
gender”.20 
I analyse the notion of gender, its interplay with feminist discourse and the 
discourse of law, and the way in which law understands the concept of gender, as it 
seems that the only constant use of the term gender is as a replacement for the 
concept of sex. I believe that this practice reinforces the sexual duality and constrains 
further developments in the achievement of equality.21 My argument coincides with 
that of Nelly Oudshoorn, who says that the sex/gender distinction “did not challenge 
the notion of a natural body. Although the concept of gender was developed to 
contest the naturalization of femininity, the opposite has happened”.22  
1.2 Research Questions 
The meaning of gender in law is a major problem as the prohibition of gender 
discrimination is embedded in international law, national law and human rights 
principles. This assumption leads to the main question of this research: Is the concept 
of gender useful for fighting discrimination in law?  
The feminist acceptance of the notion of gender combined with the feminist 
approach to the category of woman creates legal strategies aimed at equality that are 
not fully effective in achieving equality; rather, they reinstate the category of woman 
 
 
19  Real equality meaning beyond formal equality. Real equality should be understood as 
equity.  
20  Goetz and Baden (n 4) 12. 
21  I use the concept of equality to refer to equality for all. To be precise, I approach the 
concept of equality as signifying equity in which people are able to freely choose how 
to deal with their lives. Later, when addressing the work of Anu Pylkkänen on equality. 
22  Nelly Oudshoorn, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archaeology of Sex Hormones 
(Routledge 1994) 2. 
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as real.23 Also, inclusion of women comes alongside other exclusions, making it 
difficult to determine how to include without excluding. Moreover, this problematic 
relation reinforces the meaning ascribed to the category woman as one part of a 
binary while continuing to hide the real problematic behind the neutrality of the term. 
These problems tend to be addressed in similar ways within feminism, with scholars 
such as Maynard and Purvis denouncing the substitution of woman by gender or, on 
the contrary, the relegation of woman to the invisible side.24  
To answer the main question requires raising many other ancillary questions, and 
resolving these will help to illuminate the path to the final answer. These ancillary 
questions relate to the paradoxes and interconnections of the different factors and 
conceptual agents in the creation and fighting of discrimination. All these questions 
need to be scrutinized, as they all participate in different dimensions of and 
discourses on the creation and fighting of discrimination. 
In my argument, the following sub-questions will help to guide us toward an 
answer to the main question defined earlier: 
1. How did the term gender become a concept? (Chapter 2)  
2. How is the term gender conceptualized in different feminist 
epistemologies? (Chapter 3) 
3. Is gender an effective category of analysis in law? (Chapter 4) 
4. How does the body relate to gender? Following this, how does the body 
relate to the concept of difference?  (Chapter 5) 
5. What is the relation between gender and patriarchy? (Chapter 6) 
6. Who or what the subject is and how the subject is conceptualized? 
(Chapters 7) 
7. Should we eliminate gender or think about a post-gender world? (Chapter 
8) 
These are questions that require us to understand the concept of gender. For that we 
need to look at its understanding, use and evolution along with feminism, law, and 
the body, as all of them play a role in the development of the concept; it obliges us 
to look to feminist theory, the body and patriarchy, all closely linked to the 
development of gender.  
 
 
23  Postmodern feminists such as Teresa de Lauretis or Rosi Braidotti highlight the way in 
which the meaning of the category woman is socially constructed and the difficulty of 
establishing a line between the constructed and the real.  
24   Mary Maynard and June Purvis, ‘Methods, Practices and Epistemology:The Debate 
about Feminism and Research’ in Mary Maynard and June Purvis (eds), Researching 
Women’s Lives from a Feminist Perspective (Taylor & Francis 2018).  
Introduction 
 17 
1.3 Theory and Methodology 
1.3.1 Theory 
From Modern to Postmodern Theoretical Approaches 
Feminism has a central role in this thesis: its development and use of the concept of 
gender had major effects on the transformation of law and the understanding of 
discrimination. As a thesis on gender, law and feminist theory, this work is mostly 
engaged with feminist theoretical literature.  
Feminism is not a unified movement or theory, as there are many feminisms with 
many epistemological positions within them. In this book, I refer to feminism (in 
singular) when I wish to focus in feminism as a whole movement, and without focusing 
on the different epistemological strands, and to feminisms (in plural) when I wish to 
emphasize the differences between all the different strands of feminism.25 Therefore, 
to approach the variety of feminisms, Judith Lorber’s classification of feminism26 has 
been the framework model that I have used in developing my own  classification of 
feminist approaches to sex and gender in this book. Even if I do not use her exact 
classification, it has inspired me to modify a version of it to use here.   
Probably, acknowledging my legal background, I should have used one of the 
many legal classification of feminism, however that would not have served my focus 
on the concept of gender. Legal feminism looks at equality from different perspectives, 
but my focus was and is not on equality but on gender. I looked for a classification 
with a focus on gender and found Lorber’s classification as the one which allows to 
relate the concept of gender to that of equality and difference alongside the modern 
and postmodern approaches. Moreover, her classification was quite comprehensive 
and grouped many of the different strands of feminism. Nevertheless, it is important 
to say that it is very difficult to grasp together the particularities of each discipline, 
regarding feminism and gender studies. Sociology, Law, Philosophy, Psychology, 
 
 
25  It is also important to note that even if feminism for many authors includes other 
political subjects than woman, in this thesis, I refer to feminism as including theories 
and movements that focus on women as political subjects, as I will point out later in the 
classification of feminism in Chapter 3. On the other hand, as it will be explained in the 
Methodology section gender studies rather focus on the study and inclusion of other 
subjects such as men, trans, LGTBI. This is in my opinion what distinguishes the fields 
of feminist and gender studies. It might be said that feminist methodology is used in 
gender studies. Another important point regarding the difference between the term 
feminism and feminisms is that we must note that there are also important differences 
between Feminism in academia and feminism in activism. 
26  Judith Lorber, Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics (Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
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each discipline has its own classification, language and modus operandi even if all of 
them are interrelated. Therefore, due to the disparities between disciplines and the 
array of feminist strands and gender approaches, my intention was to reflect the 
common points between them and group them in a way to facilitate the understanding 
of the complexities around feminism and gender for the general public and for those 
coming from other disciplines. Therefore, this classification, even if at times too 
simplistic and reductive of the real complexity of feminism, tries to bring closer the 
differences between all the feminist strands in every discipline. Regarding the 
evolution of the concept of gender, I use the work on the concept of gender by the 
Spanish sociologist María Jesús Izquierdo Benito to understand the evolution of the 
term gender into a concept.27  
This thesis is not about equality politics but it is a result of reading a Finnish 
legal feminist, Anu Pylkkänen, to whom I owe the title of this thesis. Among other 
Nordic scholars, she researched equality: formal or substantive equality and, as Anu 
Pylkkänen writes, Nordic feminism ended up “Trapped in equality.”28  
Anu Pylkkänen gives a thorough description of the understanding and effects of 
equality in Finland, which is relevant for other Nordic countries as well even if their 
situation is not precisely the same. Despite the progression from equality only between 
certain men, to equality between all men, to the inclusion of women as equals to men, 
equality still relies on the modern meaning linked to an abstract person.29 This abstract 
person is not so abstract but in fact sexed. Therefore, the concept of equality never 
becomes real equality, as sex plays an important role. After reading Anu Pylkkänen, I 
realized that the situation of gender in law was as paradoxical as the changing 
conception of equality described by Pylkkänen. As is the case with gender, equality is 
a political concept transposed into law.30 Among the similarities between the concepts 
of equality and gender, we find both concepts’ interactions with politics, sociology and 
philosophy, which confer a plurality of meanings. Anu Pylkkänen exposes the plurality 
embedded in the concept as problematic.31  
Pylkkänen highlights the importance of understanding the interaction between 
different disciplines in the use of a concept. This can be applied to the concept of 
gender, both in terms of the high interaction among disciplines involved in the 
concept’s development and in terms of the interaction of law and other disciplines in 
 
 
27  Maria Jesús Izquierdo, ‘Uso y Abuso Del Concepto de Género’ in Mercedes Vilanova 
(ed), Pensar las diferencias (Universidad de Barcelona 1994).  
28  Anu Pylkkänen, Trapped in Equality. Women as Legal Persons in the Modernisation 
of Finnish Law, (Finnish Literature Society 2009). 
29  ibid. 
30  Terrell Carver, ‘Gender’ in Richard Bellamy and Andrew Mason (eds), Political 
Concepts (Manchester University Press 2003).  
31  ibid. 
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which the concept of gender is adopted. It was the problem highlighted by 
Pylkkänen—the lack of attention given to the construction of the person in law—
that made me wonder about the relation between the concept of gender and the 
person as represented in law.  
Connecting Pylkkänen’s conclusions with Butler’s critique of the relation 
between sex and gender and the binary of sex internalized in theory and practice, the 
problems of equality can be seen as a consequence of the linking of equality to the 
binary of sex.  
The influence of postmodernism creates the need to question what we have 
received from previous societies, including values and principles related to sex or 
even categories such as body or woman. These values, principles and categories have 
changed slowly and been incorporated, consciously or unconsciously, in the 
development of new beliefs, ideas or even concepts.  
The relation between gender and sex produces two different approaches to the 
concept of gender reflected in their respective feminist epistemologies and 
methodologies and as explained by Lykke: “Whereas standpoint feminist research is 
guided by the methodological principle that women’s experiences and interests 
should be the focus of research, postmodern feminist research is, conversely, (anti-) 
methodologically grounded in a radical skepticism toward fixed categories such as 
‘woman’/’man’, ‘heterosexual’/’homosexual’, ‘white’/’black’ and so on”.32 
Although she refers to standpoint feminism, she underlines one main aspect ruling 
the division of feminism in modern and postmodern that affects the political subject. 
As she stresses in her text, the main difference affects the methodology of each 
approach: instead of focusing on what women have in common, postmodern 
feminism looks at differences within the same group. Therefore, postmodern 
feminism’s approach leads to a broader reading of gender. 
Lykke points out another important epistemological approach, addressing “the turn 
toward the linguistic, discursive and narrative dimension of society and culture”,33 in 
which language appears as an active element in the creation and construction of fluid 
meanings— an approach that calls subjects and realities into question and may apply 
to the meaning of gender. Therefore, the development of the concept of gender within 
feminism, framed by its relation to sex, intertwines with the approach to the feminist 
political subject of woman/women as well as with the language affecting the 
methodology of research and, consequently, the outcomes of that research.  
I have been inspired by the post- movements (post-feminism, post-modernism, 
post-constructivism, post-structuralism). French sociologists and philosophers, 
including Bourdieu, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze, have been influential on my 
 
 
32  Nina Lykke, Feminist Studies (1 edition, Routledge 2012) 10.  
33  ibid 149. 
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thesis. They have criticized the notion of absolute truth in knowledge and denounced 
the power of society and politics in creating these truths. The critiques raised by these 
authors have led me to question everything I know, including accepted concepts such 
as difference or the natural body 34. 
In this line, I found Deleuze’s concept of difference ground-breaking, as it might 
reveal how artificial binary thinking is. Also, as the concept of gender has been based 
on a linear notion of difference in relation to the biological body instead of to a non-
linear or multiple notion of gender, philosophy is needed: The Deleuzian 
philosophical understanding of difference may lead us to an alternative view of the 
world. In Deleuzian terms, the body seems to be never read from a rhizomatic 
perspective; would, then, a rhizomatic reading of the body shift the understanding of 
other categories such as gender? The answer is: most probably. 
Deleuze’s thought allows us to step away from modern fixed categories to new 
ways of thinking. His understanding of difference allows us to reconfigure and 
understand the body and the relation between sex and gender from a new angle. The 
rhizomatic approach to difference, addressed in chapter 6, allows for a new reading of 
bodies in which the possibilities extend beyond diversity to multiplicity. The body is 
not a binary, or even a diversity, but a multiplicity that cannot be enclosed or delimited.  
Legal Theory 
Kaarlo Tuori’s Critical Legal Positivism is helpful for understanding the intersection 
of the legal discourse with the social and cultural discourses that construct our 
understanding of the law. According to Tuori, legal positivism “conceives of the law 
as a multi-layered phenomenon and extends the positivity of the law to cover not 
only its surface but even the levels of the legal culture and the deep structure”.35  
The surface layer of the law consists of the positivist symbolic normative order. 
This is the layer where the law is formed and applied in routine cases; the focus of 
attention of legal dogmatics. This thesis makes reference to the surface layer in 
discussing how the concept gender is used in key international legal documents.   
The intermediate layer, the legal culture, consists of methodical, conceptual and 
normative elements mostly borrowed from the practical legal knowledge or the 
consciousness of legal actors. This is the layer that hosts doctrines and patterns of 
argumentation. It is the focus of attention not only of legal theory but also of socio-
 
 
34     Acknowledging this approach to the concept of truth makes difficult to use the very 
same term of truth as it brings back the acceptation of certain truth. I must say that when 
I refer to truth I do not believe  in a fixed, clear truth but rather in one as the result of 
the experience and the influence of social, cultural and environmental factors to name 
some of them.  
35  Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Routledge 2017) 319. 
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legal scholars, as, in Tuori´s words, "[w]hile not rejecting the normativity of legal 
science, critical positivism openly acknowledges the role of the 'social-theoretical' 
element, which is transmitted into the law and legal science through legal concepts 
and which is in-built in, e.g. the general doctrines of different fields of law".36 This 
thesis deals with elements of the second layer by discussing the concept of gender as 
one of the central concepts of feminist legal studies.  
However, my position is that the concept of gender is informed by values that 
belong to the deep structure and sustain the relation between sex and gender. Thus the 
importance of the deep structure as Tuori explains, "The threat of a legally-transmitted 
tyranny of values arises if legal regulation encroaches on the strong values on which 
individuals' and groups' identities are based".37 The deep structure of law is the level 
that legal actors are least consciously aware of. Apart from methodical elements, its 
normative elements include broad categories and fundamental principles such as 
human rights.38 The deep structure is the object of legal philosophy, and Tuori sees 
legal philosophy "mainly as a reconstructive enterprise. Legal philosophy of modern 
law attempts to reconstruct its basic categorical and normative structure, i.e. the 
fundamental legal categories and normative principles on which the whole edifice of 
modern law arises, as well as the type of rationality it expresses".39 
Modern feminism has mainly focused its attention on the surface layer of the law 
and the intermediate layer of legal culture, whereas postmodern feminism started to 
question the values and categories deep within the structure of law.40 This thesis 
contributes to the latter project by discussing the construction of the sexed and 
gendered subject made according to principles located in the deep structure of law. 
Tuori´s Critical Legal Positivism also provides a rationale for the relevant legal 
texts. Tuori specifically refers to normative sources when looking into the deep 
structure of law: “Thus, the material for the reconstruction of the deep structure of 
modern law which Habermas has expounded in his Between Facts and Norms, 
consists of the constitutions and other documents produced by western constitutional 
history since, say, the American and the French revolutions, international human 
 
 
36  ibid. 
37  ibid 239.  
38  I disagree with Tuori about locating human rights in this layer. I think human rights 
belong to the second layer. On the other hand, the principles and values that inform 
human rights are part of the deep structure of law.  
39  Tuori (n 34) 284. 
40  I will avoid using the terms post-modernism, poststructuralism, and post-feminism, as 
there are no delimited boundaries between them and no agreement about who belongs 
to one or another. They are quite interconnected and intertwined, sharing many critical 
points. I will use the term postmodern to refer to all the post-movements even if I 
recognize that this is a very general term and there are many differences among all the 
different epistemological strands. 
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rights conventions and the praxis of their application, as well as the legal 
philosophical literature published during the modern age”.41  
1.3.2 Methodology 
I do not restrict myself to a single methodology or theory—if I did, I would only be 
able to address one side of the problem. Although methodology is perceived when 
one reads between the lines in this work, I must address the differences between 
feminist methodology and what is frequently refer to as ‘gender methodology’, 
which I think are important for studying the concept of gender.i As my main aim is 
to understand the performative character of the concept of gender in law, this work 
falls within the area of conceptual analyses. In addition, I find it important to first 
address two other points that are useful in the reading of this thesis: the social 
constructivist approach and discourse analysis. 
Conceptual analysis 
To answer the main question at hand, we must go back to the constructivist analysis 
of concepts which, according to Guilherme Vasconcelos, involves posing three 
questions about a given concept.42 The constructivist approach to conceptual analysis 
is easy to understand when we look at Guzzini’s approach to the concept of power. 
He explains the impossibility of achieving a neutral or descriptive meaning of power, 
and I would argue that this applies equally to the concept of gender.43 I follow his 
logic, which does not focus on the meaning of the concept but rather on “the 
implications of constructivism for doing a conceptual analysis”.44 He states that 
when we analyze supposedly neutral concepts, a neutral or descriptive meaning 
cannot be found because the concept is “always embedded in a theoretical context; 
hence conceptual and theoretical analyses interact with each other”. Guzzini’s 
analysis of the concept of power leads him to state that the “meaning of most central 
concepts in the social sciences is dependent on the theoretical or meta-theoretical 
context in which they are embedded”.45 Therefore, he says “as long as we have to 
live with our meta-theoretical dilemmas, such as the agency-structure debate, 
concepts cannot be neutral”46.  
 
 
41  Tuori (n 34) 291. 
42  Guiherme Vasconcelos, ‘Law as Ouroboros’ (EUI 2012) 2. 
43  Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis’ (2005) 33 
Millennium 495, 5. 
44  ibid 496. 
45  ibid 4. 
46  ibid 494. 
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Following Guzzini’s constructivist conceptual analysis, emphasis is placed not 
on the concept’s meaning but on its performative character—that is, on what the 
concept ‘does,’ as the political role of the concept, for instance gender or power, 
tends to politicise the discourses.47 
The first step is the analytical assessment. In this step, the question to answer is, 
what does a given concept mean? Here the concept must be analyzed in its semantic 
field rather than as a given natural object of knowledge. The second step is to trace 
the performative aspects of the concept, that is, to analyse its uses. The most notable 
use of the concept of gender is in feminism; therefore, it is necessary to understand 
feminism’s use of the concept and the role the concept plays in feminist discourse. 
The intention is not to describe the concept but to understand it practically and 
intellectually besides its dynamic interactions with users and other concepts. To do 
this, it is important to look not just at the concept itself but also at its relation with 
the body and with the discourses of feminism and law.  
The third step is the analysis of the genealogical/conceptual history, which 
addresses the question, how has a specific concept come to mean what it means and 
do what it does? All these three steps, even when they are not explicitly defined, 
provide a recognizable framework for this thesis but as Guilherme Vasconcelos has 
said of his own process: “I shall make a creative use of Guzzini’s conceptual strategy”   
The interplay between social constructivism and discourse analysis 
In the construction of the “truth”, language and discourses have a primary role. I 
believe rather in a constructed “truth” that develops, moves and changes according 
to the needs of a given society.48 My interest lies in the role of discourses in creating 
 
 
47  ibid 495. 
48  This is in accordance with Kuhn’s theses on social constructivism and also with the 
assessment added by Guilherme Vasconcelos: “[W]hat counts as valid knowledge is 
typically determined according to the ´problems´ that the specific community wants to 
address”. These problems are also historically contingent and solidly connected to 
conceptualization issues.” For Kuhn see: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 3rd ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1996); ibid 10. 
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meaning, thus in discourse analysis.49 There is not just one discourse; there is, rather, 
the interplay of many discourses that legitimize and construct the truth as we know 
it. To examine gender, women, sexuality and discrimination, then, the focus shall be 
placed on the interplay of the discourses of law, feminism and gender.  
Regarding discourse analysis, Paul Gee points out that “it is important to note 
that there are many different approaches as none of them, including this one, is 
uniquely ‘right’”.50 Critical discourse analysis (CDA) regards “language as social 
practice, and takes consideration of the context of language use to be crucial. 
Moreover, CDA takes a particular interest in the relation between language and 
power”.51 Wodak and Van Dijk explain that CDA goes beyond researching a 
“linguistic unit per se” to researching and understanding complex social phenomena, 
thus the need for a “multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach”.52  
In accordance with some feminisms, I argue that all discourses are gendered and 
under the influence of patriarchal knowledge. I focus on the term gender and how it 
 
 
49  It is important to say that the terms discourse and discourse analysis are broad terms to 
study in the use of language in texts or in a specific context. There are many different 
interpretations of the notion of discourse among different scholars: for Wodak, 
discourse is the structured form of language in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London, 2001), http://sk.sagepub.com/books/ 
methods-of-critical-discourse-analysis; while for Fairclough, discourse is “a particular 
way of representing certain parts or aspects of the (physical, social, psychological) 
world” in Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of 
Language. (London: Longman, 1995), 358. It can be also defined as anything beyond 
the sentence in Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi Hamilton E., The 
Handbook of Discourse Analysis, 2nd Edition (Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Another 
definition of discourse that relates to my approach is that of Jane Sunderland, who says 
that discourse “is equivalent to broad constitutive systems of meaning (from post-
structuralism) and to knowledge and practices generally associated with a particular 
institution or group of institutions” in Jane Sunderland, Gendered Discourses (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2001) 6. The approach to discourse I use is that of Foucault, for whom 
discourses are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak in 
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (Routledge 2002). Regarding 
discourse analysis then one can refer to the three main categories noted by Deborah 
Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton: “(1) anything beyond the sentence, 
(2) language use, and (3) a broader range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic 
and nonspecific instances of language” in Schiffrin, Tannen and Hamilton E. 
50  Paul Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method (Routledge 2004) 
8. For more about the definition of discourse see: Teun A Van Dijk, ‘Discourse as 
Social Interaction’ in Teun A Van Dijk (ed), Discourse as Interaction in Society, vol 2 
(SAGE 1997); Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of 
Language. Norman (Longman 1995).  
51  Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, Discourse as 
Social Interaction, vol 2 (SAGE 1997) 2.  
52  Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis:History, Agenda, 
Theory and Methodology’, Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. (SAGE 2016).  
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becomes a “neutral” or “power” concept. In Chapter 2 it is described the  confusion 
around the term because of the intersection of its polysemic nature, the different 
feminist readings of the term, and its importation into other languages from 
English.53 Therefore gender, as part of language, hinders the possibility of moving 
beyond gender. That is, the possibility of moving past the exclusions grounded by 
gender and transcending the status quo maintained by gender. 
Discourses construct and constitute subjects and objects within the limits 
imposed by these very same discourses, and the ‘gendered’54 gender discourse plays 
an important role in imposing limits.55 Therefore, as Jane Sunderland posits, “CDA 
is theoretically well placed to seek and identify gendered discourses of a ‘damaging’ 
kind”.56 Our point of departure is the admission that gender is produced by language 
in every discourse and, according to Butler, even the sex/gender distinction is also 
produced this way.57  
Language appears as one of the most important tools in social constructivism but 
it can also have effects. Language is not representational but rather constitutive of 
meaning, objects, and subjects. All categories are constructed; there is no real natural 
or universal essence, only the essence that we believe in and impose on an object, 
subject or thing. Thus, in a social constructivist approach it is difficult to defend the 
notion that there is any kind of essence within the categories of woman, man, or any 
other unitary subject.  
Feminist and Gender Methodology 
The choice between the feminist perspective and the gender perspective, at first, did 
not appear to be fundamental. Most of my colleagues (non-feminists and some 
feminists) advised me that both were the same. Thus, according to them and to most 
of the population, speaking about gender means speaking about feminism. The 
misconception that feminist methodology is the same as gender perspective posits 
gender as an analytical tool of a feminist methodology and the core subject of 
 
 
53  Michèle Riot-Sarcey, ‘The Difficulties of Gender in France: Reflections on a Concept’ 
(1999) 11 Gender & History 489.  
54  Gendered is an adjective that indicates, as Jane Sunderland posits, “that gender may 
have been done to that thing” in Sunderland (n 49) 21.  
55  Becky Francis, ‘An Investigation of the Discourses Children Draw on Their 
Construction of Gender’ (1999) 29 Journal of Apllied Social Physchology 300.  
56  Sunderland (n 49) 11. 
57  Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge 
1999).) 
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feminism.58 The difference between feminism and gender is addresses by  Charlotte 
Wu, a feminist scholar, who has stated that “[g]ender theory is not exactly feminist 
theory, but in many ways it builds directly upon its assumptions and innovations”59, 
indicating that they are related but not the same. Charlotte Wu’s article suggests that 
the general presumption that the feminist perspective is synonymous with the gender 
perspective might be a source of the problems with the misunderstanding in the use 
of the term and concept of gender. Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland have 
already pointed out the inherent problems in the way that feminist methodology 
equates the concept of gender with women or with the relations between women and 
men.60 Following Charlotte Wu, Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland then we 
might say that the use of gender equating  with women or solely the relation between 
men and women reduces the meaning of the concept of gender to the binary 
understanding of sex, and makes gender serve as a mere synonym of sex or refer 
only to women.61 Moreover, the confusion grows over what some scholars refer to 
as gender theory.62 Is there such a thing as gender theory? Is it not just a concept 
used within feminist theory? Does it exist as a definable field of thought? 63 These 
 
 
58  Saying this, I do not wish to refer only to the postmodern approach, which has been 
widely criticised because of the elimination of women as political subjects. Rather, I 
wish to say that gender becomes a central category that tends to equate women and 
gender.  
59  Charlotte Wu, ‘Gender as a Category of Analysis: Reconciling Feminist Theory with 
Feminist Methodology’ (2013) 10 Graduate Journal of Social Science 1, 1. 
60  Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland, Feminist Methodology: Challenges and 
Choices (SAGE, 2002)  
61  Terrell Carver, Gender Is Not a Synonym for Women (L Rienner 1996). 
62  Darlene Juschka, ‘Feminism and Gender Theory’ in Michael Stausberg and Steven 
Engler (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Study of Religion (Oxford University Press 
2017); R Charli Carpenter, ‘Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a 
Nonfeminist Standpoint?’ (2002) 4 International Studies Review 153; Riki Anne 
Wilchins, Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer (Alyson Books 2004). 
Marcela lagarde, a well known latin American feminist scholar, also refers to gender 
theory, noting that Gayle Rubin is its creator in :Marcela Lagarde, ‘El género, 
fragmento literal: “La perspectiva de género”’, Género y feminismo. Desarrollo 
humano y democracia (Horas y Horas 1996). 
63  Marcela Lagarde defines gender analysis by saying, “El análisis de género es la síntesis 
entre la teoría de género y la llamada perspectiva de género derivada de la concepción 
feminista del mundo y de la vida. Esta perspectiva se estructura a partir de la ética y 
conduce a una filosofía posthumanista, por su crítica de la concepción androcéntrica de 
humanidad que dejó fuera a la mitad del género humano: a las mujeres (Gender analysis 
is the synthesis between gender theory and the so-called gender perspective that derives 
from the feminist understanding of the world and life. This perspective originates in 
ethics and leads to a posthumanist philosophy due to its critique of the androcentric 
view/understanding of humanity, which left out half of humankind: women”. In 
Lagarde (n 62) 1.  
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questions seem difficult to answer as the answers will differ within the very same 
field of feminism depending on the discipline. The answer to these questions might 
probably create a heated debate within feminism and gender studies.  
The complexities surrounding feminist methodology are evident as soon as we 
recognize that “feminism is at once a research agenda, a political program, and an 
ideal”.64 My questions concerning different feminist approaches and their relation to 
methodology are not new. ‘Is there a specifically feminist method? Are there 
feminist methodologies and epistemologies, or simply feminist approaches to these? 
Given diversity and debates in feminist theory, how can there be a consensus on what 
constitutes “feminist” methodologies and epistemologies?” 65 As Andrea Doucet and 
Natasha Mauthner explain in their article Feminist Methodologies and 
Epistemologies66, these are questions often raised out of confusion about feminism.  
The debate about the meaning of feminist methodology has gone on for decades 
and the entrance of postmodern feminism has complicated it. Postmodern feminism 
is labelled as an anti-methodology.67 The understanding that feminist methodology 
meant dealing with—or by, for, and about—women, sex, sexuality, or gender is 
narrow, and has already been criticized by many feminist scholars (Maynard, 
Harding, Doucet and Mauthner). There are researchers who follow the principle of 
by, for and about women68 and there are also those who research structures, 
masculinities, power relations, trans, intersex—and they all do feminist research.  
Doucet and Mauthner explain that a feminist methodology goes beyond the by, 
for, and about women: “Feminist research has become a well-used term for the work 
that feminists do when they take on either qualitative or quantitative research that is 
driven by, and aimed toward, a desire to challenge multiple hierarchies of 
inequalities within social life”.69 This perspective can be placed alongside that of 
Naples, who says that “[f]eminist methodology is the approach to research that has 
been developed in response to concerns by feminist scholars about the limits of 
traditional methodology to capture the experiences of women and others who have 
been marginalized in academic research”.70 Naples’s approach is noteworthy, for she 
also points to the inclusion of those whom we understand as other than women.  
 
 
64  Waylen and others (n 11). 
65  A Doucet and Natasha Susan Mauthner, ‘Feminist Methodologies and Epistemologies.’ 
in CD Bryant and DL Peck (eds), The Handbook of 21st Century Sociology. (SAGE 
2007) 36. 
66  Doucet and Mauthner (n 65). 
67  Lykke (n 28). 
68  Feminist standpoint uses this methodology see ibid 147. 
69   Doucet and Mauthner (n 65) 42.  
70  Nancy A Naples, ‘Feminist Methodology and Its Discontents’ in William Outhwaite 
and Stephen P Turner (eds), The SAGE handbook of social science methodology (SAGE 
2007).  
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Nevertheless, as Maynard and Purvis say when accepting a feminist 
methodology, “there is by no means agreement on what this might mean or 
involve”71. The disagreement about the definition of feminist methodology has not 
prevented many from claiming to follow a feminist methodology. Indeed, the 
differences are produced by the different epistemological standpoints that affect the 
questions and methods employed. However, studying feminist research, one may 
find the commonalities that can help to define feminist methodology. Following 
these commonalities, feminist methodology is a critical approach to research or to 
law with a political aim in which the political subject is women. Thus, the general 
aim of this methodology, by asking the women question, is to improve women’s 
position in society or in law, acknowledging the patriarchal foundations of these 
milieux.  
Gender is in fact a tool, a category72, used by feminist methodology to understand 
the sources of discrimination73. Therefore, the use of a gender perspective means the 
keeping in mind of the category of gender. The feminist epistemology one chooses 
to think with changes the approach to gender 74 and to the assumed given relation 
between sex and gender. These different epistemologies are also reflected in a given 
epistemology is reflected in the role of power in sex discrimination. Thus, it seems 
more appropriate, as Caroline Ramazanoglu and Janet Holland posit, to talk about 
engendering methodologies than gender methodology to address the role of gender 
in a certain issue. Engendering methodologies refer to the intent of the research to 
address the role of culture in constructing sex and the categories related to it.75 
 
 
71  Maynard and Purvis (n 24).  
72  Rhode (n 1).  
73  For some scholars the concept of gender has acquired a methodological role in feminist 
theory see: Ruth Wodak, Gender and Discourse (SAGE, 1997). 
74  Defining epistemology as Linda Alcoff does, as a philosophical inquiry into the nature 
of knowledge, what justifies a belief, and what we mean when we say that a claim is 
true. In Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, ‘Introduction: When Feminisms Intersect 
Epistemology’ in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds), Feminist Epistemologies 
(Routledge 1993).  
75  Among the different gender perspectives, some focus on analyzing sex relations, others 
on the power of culture in ruling sex relations or sex, still others on queerness or 
transsexuality (this latter research topic being undertaken by queer studies rather than 
feminism). See the talk by Marie Louise Stig Sorensen, https://www.helsinki.fi/ 
en/unitube/video/0535eb75-fe2c-4fe5-be5d-f58f7a7a88e7. All these approaches refer 
to the concept of gender in relation to sex and sexuality.  Hawkesworth, Feminist 
Inquiry: From Political Conviction to Methodological Innovation (n 2).However, as 
Stevi Jackson has noted, feminism focuses on gender while queer movements focus on 
heterosexuality Stevi Jackson, ‘Heterosexuality, Sexuality and Gender Re-Thinking the 
Intersections’ in Diane Richardson, Janice McLaughlin and Mark E Casey (eds), 
Intersections Between Feminist and Queer Theory (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2006) 16.  
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1.4 Sources 
The literature referenced in this thesis is mainly US American, English, French and 
Spanish. There are four reasons that justify my choices. First, my personal 
experience as a Spanish lawyer and gender scholar, married to a French jurist, has 
made me familiar with the ideas of Spanish (and Latin American), French, American 
and English feminisms and able to read and understand their legal systems. Second, 
the most influential feminist texts are American, English or French, and they set the 
tone that inspired many feminists. Third, I have paid special attention to the concept 
of gender in the Spanish and French literature due to the semantic gap between the 
term gender as used in Spanish and French and as used in English. Fourth, the legal 
texts I have chosen are international law in its English, Spanish and French 
versions.76  
The legal material used in the work at hand consists mainly of international legal 
texts. I have chosen texts that are influential in the introduction and understanding 
of the concept of gender in law—for instance, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) and the European Convention on Human Rights, both foundational 
texts in recognizing gender discrimination. In this line are included the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1967), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979), the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), the ICC Rome 
Statute (1998), and the latest Yogyakarta text on LGBT rights (2006 soft law). 
Central EU Directives—being the most influential tool in Europe to adopt non-
discriminatory measures—and ECJ landmark cases are also looked at. They show 
the steady incorporation of the term gender in law.  
The Istanbul Convention (2011)77 is briefly referred to. It and many soft law 
documents referring to specific issues of women’s rights have not been included. 
The Istanbul Convention in particular uses the term gender-based violence 
throughout but addresses mainly violence against women78. Due to the importance 
of this legal text for feminism in fighting against violence towards women, the 
construction of its basic concepts should be analysed in further work 
 
 
76  As a doctoral student at the universities of Helsinki and Turku I am somewhat familiar 
with Nordic feminist legal scholarship. But as I cannot read original laws, cases and 
legal texts in the Nordic languages, I have not chosen these jurisdictions as a topic of 
study. 
77  Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic 
violence 2011 CETS No.210. 
78  See Istanbul convention or CEDAW.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters in which the main themes are feminism, 
gender, and law: these three main actors need to be read in conjunction with other 
elements such as the body and patriarchy. Every chapter analyses the relations 
between some of them.  
Chapter 1: comprises the introduction and the methodological and theoretical 
research tools used in the deployment of this research.  
Chapters 2–4: I provide the constructivist conceptual analysis of gender to aid in 
understanding the use and meaning of the concept. I look at the process that 
transformed the term gender from a grammatical concept to a category of analysis, 
and at how this process was brought over into languages other than English. I also 
look at gender as a term and concept from the perspective of Agamben’s and 
Foucault’s analysis of the biopolitical. After the meaning of the concept is examined, 
the next step leads to feminist theory. Once the term gender became a concept, 
feminism adopted it as a category of analysis, developing different theories on the 
relation between sex and gender in the understanding of both over time. Looking at 
the relation between sex and gender provides an understanding of the different uses 
of the concept of gender in feminism, allowing us to classify feminisms by their 
approach to gender.  
I describe how the term and concept of gender were smoothly introduced into 
European legal texts, creating the theoretical confusion about sex and gender in 
international and European legal documents. The introduction of gender into law 
implies the adoption of a political category disguised as a legal category to achieve 
feminist goals. This results in a confused understanding of sex and gender within a 
legal context framed by political pressure.  
Chapter 5: I look at different readings of the body and its role in defining sex and 
women. The body is a fundamental element of sex and gender and of the experience 
of subjectivity, sometimes hidden others, limited to a normative reading based on 
sex. The concept of gender has to be studied in relation to the body and what is 
understood as difference and nature. The reading of the body orchestrates the relation 
between sex and gender and transposition of this relation into law. Focusing on the 
relation between the body and gender helps us to investigate the possibility of 
including post-approaches to gender in law. The Deleuzian perspective is needed to 
achieve what you call “post-approaches.” The concepts of gender, sex and the body 
have an interplay with the discourse of law in constructing the subject. In this part, I 
focus on the two different problems already identified by feminism: 1) 
discrimination against women, and 2) the binary of sex.  
Chapters 6, and 7: the chaotic use of gender as a term and concept in legal texts 
contributes to the survival of patriarchal structures. This phenomenon realigns the 
concept of patriarchy and its relation to gender. The concept of patriarchy, once an 
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important category of analysis in feminism, has been substituted by the concept of 
gender. However, this substitution of patriarchy with gender needs to be reassessed. 
Problems arise from the relation between gender and patriarchy that affect the 
understanding of gender in law. 
 I also analyse how the different feminist discourses on the relation between sex 
and gender have had and still have a direct impact on the status of women and all 
others who are still not recognized in law with equal rights and obligations—for 
instance, queer, Trans, or intersex individuals. The feminist discourse has used the 
concept of gender to justify its legal strategies, which also affect the depiction of the 
subject in law. The concept of difference used in these strategies remains within the 
limits of the linear notion of difference, which constrains the full achievement of 
equality, whether as equals or as different. The feminist approach to difference 
reflected in the understanding of the concept of gender affects the depiction of the 
legal person. I discuss the problematic construction of the legal subject that 
constructs itself upon the binary of sex reinforcing the discursive categories of 
womanhood and manhood and still producing exclusions.  
 Chapter 8: I attempt to find new strategies that might achieve inclusive justice 
in society and law. To find solutions that allow choices in which sex does not manage 
individual opportunities, it is necessary to go beyond gender. I propose to move 
towards a post-gender approach79, which implies the elimination of the term gender 
in order to advance beyond the restrictions that the concept imposes. A post-gender 
approach would oblige us to call a particular problem by its name instead of letting 
it hide behind sexist neutrality. Overcoming gender would help to overcome the 
binary and to aid in the inclusion of all others as accepted subjects. A post-gender 
approach, or rather the elimination of gender, would further the inclusion of intersex 
and trans individuals. It would promote the detachment of women from the 
discursive definition of womanhood that still permeates society and law today. It 
would promote advances towards real equality.  
The relations between all the main themes (sex-gender, feminism and law, 
alongside the body and the concept of patriarchy) allow the visualization of the 
different connections between these and other central concepts in feminism, such as 
oppression, essentialism, or sexuality (including sexual orientation). Indeed, all of 
these concepts play a significant role at some point in feminist theories. The concept 
of gender seems to play such a prominent role that it overshadows all other concepts. 
In the realm of law, gender seems to be the only concept that has had an effect, as 
Michèle Riot-Sarcey explains: “La polysémie du mot, l’évolution du sens du 
concept, la certitude partagée par la plupart des observateurs de son importation 
 
 
79  Rosi Braidotti, Gender and Post-Gender: The Future of an Illusion (Feminist Research 
Network 1993).  
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Americaine (gender), ne facilitent pas sa compréhension, moins encore son 
utilisation. Et pourtant, le concept s’impose, mais peu à peu des chercheurs 
commencent à en saisir la pertinence” 80 
 
 
 
80  Michèle Riot-Sarcey, De La Différence Des Sexes. Le Genre En Histoire (Belin 
Larousse 2010). 
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2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF GENDER 
The feminist researcher Marie-Victoire Louis explains the problematic around the 
notion of gender in the following way: “I read that for some, women and men, gender 
was a concept; for others, a piece of equipment, an approach, a basis, a catalyst, a 
component, an analytical category, a condition, a dimension, an area, a stake, an 
epistemology, an ideology, a language, a mechanism, a notion, an analytical tool, a 
paradigm, a perspective, a problematic, a question, a revelator, a role, a system, a 
theme, a variable, a vector of value...”81 Even if all the different perspectives on the 
notion of gender that she names are valid, still it should be questioned why in all of 
these cases gender is mostly understood or analyzed within the limits of the binary 
of sex. This binary has endured, delimiting the notion of gender and reifying beliefs 
about the categories ‘women’ and ‘men’. Understanding the mechanisms that allow 
the binary to survive requires questioning the way in which the term gender came to 
be a concept and the relation that was established with the concept of sex.  
To address this question, the sensible starting point seems to be to trace the term 
gender back to its early usage and explore its development as a concept. The term 
gender had another life before it became a role, a stereotype, a category of analysis, 
a system, a structure, a set of relations, a performance… In fact, the notion of gender 
was originally independent of sex, but it became dependent on sex as it was 
transformed into the concept it currently exists as. Some might state that sex came 
first, followed by gender. Others might differ and say that gender was first, followed 
by sex. The relation between the notions of sex and gender appears similar to the 
chicken-and-egg conundrum.  
In this chapter, I will establish the difference between term, concept and word 
and then analyse the evolution of the term gender from a grammatical category to 
the concept it exists as today. Tracing the evolution of the concept gender helps us 
understand how the binary of sex permeated the term and then the concept. 
Describing the process taken by the term gender in becoming the current-day 
 
 
81  Marie-Victoire Louis, ‘Tell Me, What Does “Gender” Really Mean ?’ (Sisyphe, 2005) 
<http://www.marievictoirelouis.net/document.php?id=737&themeid=877>. 
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concept allows us to understand the link between the concept of gender and sex, and 
the concept’s subsequent development. It also allows us to understand how this term 
has traveled from the Anglo-Saxon language to be included and reconceptualized in 
Scandinavic, Slavic and Roman languages. The importation of the Anglo-Saxon 
term and notion of gender into other languages makes it possible to envision the 
problematic that arises around the notion of gender. 
2.1 Terms, Words and Concepts 
First, it is important to understand the difference between a term, a word and a 
concept. For this end, a good option is to look at the definition given by a dictionary.  
The definition of a term is: “A word or phrase used to describe a thing or to 
express a concept, especially in a particular kind of language or branch of study.”82  
The definition of word given by the Oxford Dictionary online is: “A single 
distinct meaningful element of speech or writing, used with others (or sometimes 
alone) to form a sentence and typically shown with a space on either side when 
written or printed.” “(1.1) A single distinct conceptual unit of language, comprising 
inflected and variant forms”.83 The word is in relation to the signifier and the 
signified.  
There is confusion between term and word, as they can sometimes be used as 
synonyms. However, the best way of understanding the difference between a term 
and a word comes from the statement that a term is always made up of words but a 
word is not always a term. A word is defined in terms of its form and sound, and a 
term is defined in terms of its conceptual content, thus the term has a closer 
conceptual relation to the thing signified. A term is by definition necessarily tethered 
to a concept or to something signified, whereas a word can potentially be free-
floating 
Finally, the definition of concept is: “An abstract idea”; “A general idea or 
understanding of something”; or in more detail, “an idea or mental image which 
corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or 
determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in 
the use of reason or language.”84 
The clarity of these definitions should permit the analysis of gender as a term and 
concept to understand the meaning that is intended when it is used. But, as Kenneth 
Heimar Himma explains, there is not a clear notion of what a concept is, and speaking 
about or analysing concepts is not an easy task. He points out that a concept 
 
 
82  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/term 
83  https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/word 
84  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/concept 
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corresponds to mental elements that allow us to think and name things. He also notes 
the different conflicting definitions of what concepts are, ranging from psychological 
states representing ideas, to abilities of a special kind, to the meanings of words. He 
also highlights the intimate relation between concepts and language, as concepts are 
expressed through language.85 The crystallization of these mental representations 
occurs according to representations of those concepts through language. As Mark 
Johnson claims, “words are arbitrary symbols which, though meaningless in 
themselves, get their meaning by virtue of their capacity to correspond directly to 
things in the world. And rational thought can be viewed as an algorithmic manipulation 
of such symbols”.86 However, if we acknowledge social construction as an element 
that plays a part in the construction of language and meaning, these aseptic definitions 
or the belief in words as ‘arbitrary symbols’ are little help in understanding the 
construction of meaning. A term that has a specific definition might be employed with 
confidence; however, when the term is transplanted or when its meaning changes over 
time, this confidence disappears. The notion of gender has undergone a process of 
transformation becoming a recognized word in language87. The usual strategy in 
understanding the meaning of a word as Raymond Williams points out, is to visit a 
dictionary, although this approach is insufficient for words88 that involve ideas and 
values. Words of this latter, special type have a history that reflects different 
“meanings, conscious changes, or consciously different uses; innovation, 
obsolescence, specialization, extension, overlap, transfer; or changes” that affect their 
regular or dictionary-defined meaning.89  
 
 
85  Kenneth Einar Himma, ‘Conceptual Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Conceptual 
Analysis and Methodology in Legal Theory’ (2015) 26 Revus- Journal for 
Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law 65.  
86  Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and 
Reason (University of Chicago Press 2013); Himma (n 85) x. There is also the work of 
Denis Mareschal, Paul C. Quinn, and Stephen E.G. Lea, The making of human concepts, 
which argues that words and concepts are intertwined and affected by human 
development see: Denis Mareschal, Paul C Quinn and SEG Lea (eds), The Making of 
Human Concepts (Oxford University Press 2010). 
87  As Guillerme Vasconcelos has suggested, Searle’s work on brute facts and institutional 
facts addresses this problematic. The process of construction of a concept depends on 
the brute facts and the institutional facts. For Searle, institutional facts require human 
institutions for their existence and brute facts do not. It is important to note that 
institutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules. The important division 
established by Searle between brute physics or biology and cultural and societal facts 
directly affects the concepts of sex and gender. See Guiherme Vasconcelos, ‘Law as 
Ouroboros’ (EUI 2012); John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Simon and 
Schuster 1995).  
88  A word has a meaning and a form and a term only has a meaning in Izquierdo (n 27). 
89  Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford 
University Press 2014).  
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Terms are concepts that construct language, and, as Lacan and Derrida have 
stressed, there is a strong relation between the meaning of the words that become 
language and what we accept as knowledge and truth. Language is constituted by 
words; these words acquire meanings, which, put together, produce knowledge that 
becomes truth. Knowledge is inherited by society and conforms to the language that 
informs the truth that constructs society.90 Therefore, through the machinery of 
reason, words that involve ideas or values become truths.  
2.2 The Process of Production of Concepts 
There was a process of transformation in which the term gender became a concept 
useful for feminism and other disciplines in explaining sexual orientation or 
behaviors related socially to sex behaviours or sexual orientation. Gender as a 
concept is thus an important category of analysis that has transformed in meaning 
and, concurrently, transformed what we accept as knowledge91 and truth92.  
To understand the concept of gender, it is important to follow its process of 
transformation as a concept. Before the 1950s, the word gender solely described a 
grammatical category93 and the concept of gender as we know it now in all its 
acceptations was unknown. The term gender referred to the inflexion of nouns in 
grammar, still referred to in dictionaries as grammatical gender.94 The term gender, 
still today in grammar, refers to a way of classifying humans and inanimate 
 
 
90  Society understood in a broader sense—that is, including people, law, institutions, 
ideology, culture, etc. 
91  The question of knowledge or what we accept as knowledge is a controversial one. As 
Eva-Maria Svensson puts it: “[I]s there a true foundation for knowledge? Is there an 
ultimate foundation, a point that it is possible to reach where it can be said that 
something is true or not? Or if not, how is it possible to rely on something called 
knowledge?”. In Eva-Maria Svensson, ‘Boundary Work in Legal Scholarship’ in Åsa 
Gunnarsson, Eva-Maria Svensson and Margaret Davies (eds), Exploiting the Limits of 
Law, Swedish Feminism and the Challenge to Pesimism (Ashgate Publishing, Limited 
2017) 37. 
92  Wittgenstein explains that language is a game with fixed rules in which words are used 
in manifold ways, as explained by Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo in Susanna 
Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation’ 
University of Helsinki (2011) <https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/26176>. 
93  As explained by Catharine R. Stimpson, there was a time when only language students 
would research gender as related to grammar. For the definition of “grammatical 
category”: A grammatical category is a set of syntactic features that: 1) express 
meanings from the same conceptual domain; 2) occur in contrast to each other; or 3) 
are typically expressed in the same fashion in https://glossary.sil.org/term/grammatical-
category. 
94  J Richar Udry, ‘The Nature of Gender’ (1994) 31 Demography 561.  
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objects.95As Victoria Bergvall explains, “[G]ender was used to refer to grammatical 
word categories based on, but independent of sex differences”.96 Borrowed from 
linguistics, as the process of transformation analysed in the next sections reflects, the 
term developed into a concept denoting cultural difference in relation to sex. 
Curiously, grammatical gender—a characteristic shared in all languages including 
English—was not restricted to the binary. It seems that its limitation to a binary 
representation was the effect of its linkage to sex. The linkage of gender with sex 
framed by the binary is not casual but a consequence of the power of culture. Gender 
gained importance as a concept over time and by the 80s, the result was an increased 
use of the term gender and a decreased use of the term sex.97  
Izquierdo’s analysis of the distinction between the term gender and the concept 
of gender, and the relation between the two is fundamental to the understanding of 
the concept’s process of formation.98 As Izquierdo explains, one mentally depicts or 
defines reality with concepts and refer to these concepts with words (terms). That is 
to say, we have a term table, which is also a word, table, which depicts a mental idea 
of it (concept): a flat surface with one or more legs or other supports on which you 
can put things. The word refers to the concept, and the concept is a mental 
representation of what we understand as reality99. Therefore, when the word and the 
concept relate to each other, through the relation that they construct between 
language, meaning, and the representation of the reality, they both become part of 
the actual world100. Thereby, 1) the word table refers to something real and actual; 
 
 
95  Rhoda K Unger and Mary Crawford, ‘Sex and Gender: The Troubled Relationship 
between Terms and Concepts’ (1993) 4 Psychological Science 122. 
96  Victoria Bergvall, Rethinking Language and Gender Research: Theory and Practice 
(Routledge 1996) 5. 
97   David Haig, ‘The Inexorable Rise of Gender and the Decline of Sex: Social Change in 
Academic Titles, 1945–2001’ (2004) 33 Archives of sexual behavior 87. 
98  Izquierdo (n 27). 
99  A reality understood as the actual rather than the possible. The actual world is defined 
here as the world we live in with its meanings and descriptions, which may differ from 
the real. In understanding the concepts of real and actual, we must turn to the philosophy 
of Deleuze following Bergson. For Deleuze, the virtual is the possible then real but not 
actual. If we transpose these concepts to the concept of sex, we might say that the actual 
idea of sex in law and society corresponds to the actual but not to the real. The real or 
virtual sex that should represent full inclusion is the possible and real but non-actual. 
See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Columbia University Press 1994). 
100 It is important to establish my stance regarding the understanding of the real and reality: 
for that, as I explained in the previous footnote, I will follow Deleuze’s understanding 
of reality, in which the real differs from the actual. The actual world, defined as the 
world we live in along with its meanings, differs from the real and the possible. See: 
ibid. 
Amalia Verdu Sanmartin 
38 
and 2) the word is real and actual in and of itself too because it exists as a real and 
actual element of language.  
Nevertheless, this relationship is not as smooth as it looks. This is explained by 
Maria Jesus Izquierdo, who advises about the need to carefully look to the established 
relation between words and concepts. She explains, “Si la palabra es una 
representación de la representación y el concepto es una representación de la realidad, 
la palabra como el concepto son a su vez realidad, por eso es doblemente importante 
tener muy presente que las palabras no coinciden necesariamente con los conceptos ni 
los conceptos con la realidad” 101(If the word is a representation of a representation, 
and the concept is a representation of reality, word and concept are real, for this reason 
it’s doubly important to acknowledge that words don’t necessarily coincide with 
concepts or concepts with reality. (Translation Matt Gleeson). 
It is possible to find three main problems that intersect within the relationship 
between a term, and concept. One problem is the polysemia that occurs when a word 
represents different concepts—for instance, what happens when the word ‘table’ 
means either a flat surface with four legs or a set of data? The same word represents 
two different concepts, which might create confusion. Thus, sometimes a mismatch 
occurs between the word and the concept, or between the concepts and reality,102 
which provokes a misuse of the term and the concept. A second problem occurs 
when a word means one thing in one language but relates to another concept in a 
different language. Third, culture has an important say in the construction of a 
concept, which affects the outcome.  
A consequence of these problems is the misconception of ‘gender’, which is 
related to the following issues: 1) in English (and many other languages, such as 
Spanish or French), the term originally related to a grammatical concept implying 
threes (male, female, and neuter) rather than a binary, with culture seeming to act as 
a filter that transforms the concept from a ternary to a binary; 2) the concept has 
different meanings in different languages; and 3) the word refers to various different 
ideas. 
2.2.1 The Transformation from Threesome to Twosome 
The first problem arises from the influence of Western thinking about binaries and 
what we understand as the actual103. The process of transformation gives meaning to 
 
 
101  Izquierdo (n 27) 32. 
102  This is the case when gender is defined to overcome the binary; there is a mismatch 
between the words and the concept.  
103  Note that the meaning of the actual here corresponds to the Deleuzian definition, as 
referred to in footnote 19. 
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the concept in relation to a term, which is itself a word or phrase. As Maria Jesus 
Izquierdo explains, this process can happen in two directions, “from word to object 
and from object to word”. In the first case we are analysing our way of knowing, 
being conscious about the construction of this reality, while in the second case we 
are unconsciously or consciously constructing knowledge.104 
In the particular case of gender, the word/term gender refers to a concept that 
represents the object as having attributes as masculine or feminine105. The term then 
follows a process of actualization, through which a mental representation of an object 
becomes actual. 
 
Figure 1. The elements in the process of construction 
This process sheds light on how gender as a concept places people into categories—
to be precise, into two categories: masculine and feminine. This type of concept falls 
into the category of concepts that are forms of classification or as Izquierdo calls 
them, class concepts .106 The process of transformations happens, as explained by 
Izquierdo, in two different phases: 1) analysis, 2) synthesis. First, the analysis divides 
the chosen object ‘human’, to which the classification “gender” will be applied to, 
into two focusing on differences; this is followed by the synthesis that occurs when 
the concept is constructed to match the reality.107 The word gender becomes a 
 
 
104  Izquierdo (n 27) 32. 
105  Here the process begins with the word, which is the written representation of the term. 
106  Izquierdo differentiates existing types of concepts as individual, relational, class, and 
quantitative. She defines class concepts as those that are applicable to groups or groups 
of individuals susceptible to classification. The most basic way of grouping them is 
division into a dichotomy. See Izquierdo (n 27) 33. 
107  Izquierdo (n 27). 
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twofold concept focusing on the difference that divides a unified object ‘human’ into 
two.  
As Izquierdo explains, the process of analysis implies a mental division. The 
analysis searches for a relevant difference that will allow it to discriminate in order 
to classify objects within a group. The analysis is followed by the synthesis that 
establish the division. This process is explained by Izquierdo through the 
transformation of the term human. The term human is divided into two according to 
sex—this is the process of analysis. The process of analysis uses sex, which appears 
to be the most evident feature by which humans can be classified, as the empirical 
fact that allows for discrimination and classification. Therefore, the term human 
leads to the mental representation of man and woman. In the synthesis, human will 
be reunified to become man and falsely refer to all human beings.108 
As mentioned already, this is the same process followed by the concept of 
gender. In the transformation from the term gender, which refers to the classification, 
to the new concept, a double process happens that constructs the concept through 
difference. The term gender follows the imposition of the empirical fact of sex and 
dualistic thought, thus limiting the representation of the object to the masculine and 
the feminine. The concept of gender is always analysed through the filter of sex. It 
might be also argued that the process of synthesis reconstructs it as sex, and in many 
occasions as woman. 
2.2.2 The First Process, or the ‘Genderization’ of the Term 
Gender 
In the process of transforming into a concept, gender becomes diffuse. In fact, we 
must agree with Catherine Stimpton’s claim that “[t]ogether, the Greek and Latin 
sources of gender connote three big, complicated human activities: first, the general 
trait of classifying people into discrete classes, into one group or another, and then 
marking each group and assigning it characteristics; second, using language, a 
primary tool of this trait, to create and maintain sexual classifications, a specific way 
of marking and characterizing groups; and third, practicing a sexuality that aims to 
reproduce a family or group, to bring the next generation into being. Each activity 
reveals an interaction between nature and culture so intricate that rigidly quantifying 
what is nature and what is culture is a fool’s task.”109 
 
 
108  See quote in Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Verso 1997). 
109  Catharine R Stimpson and Gilbert Herdt, ‘Introduction’ in Catharine R Stimpson and 
Gilbert Herdt (eds), Critical Terms for the Study of Gender (University of Chicago 
Press 2014) 6. 
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The concept of gender110 as used in Feminism appeared by the mid-twentieth 
century.111 Along these lines, Jemina Repo claims that the birth of gender takes place 
in the context of “intersexual case management in the 1950s,” and that from this 
moment we can trace back “a genealogy of gender”112. However, in ‘Gender: A 
Useful Category of Historical Analysis’, Joan Scott highlights how the use of gender 
coinciding with sex had already occurred in France in the 19th century, for instance 
in the Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise in 1876; in England as well, Gladstone 
used the term similarly in the same year.113 Then, Richard Udry too explains in “The 
nature of gender” that gender already coincided with sex in the 19th century. The 
equating of gender with sex during this earlier period points to another genealogical 
possibility114. Significantly, the parallelism between gender and sex highlighted by 
Udry and Scott happens at the same time at which Foucault, in The History of 
sexuality, claims that biopower115 and biopolitical strategies applied to sexual 
deviancy. Moreover, it is even possible to date it earlier in time ( 18th century ) when  
Thomas Laqueur sets the birth of the two-sexes model, as opposed to one-sex model, 
in which women were considered imperfect men116. 
 
 
110  I will use ‘grammatical gender’ to refer to the old, or grammatical, meaning of gender, 
which distinguishes between masculine, feminine, and neuter, and only the word 
‘gender’ when referring to the male or female identity/identities. 
111  Kathleen Canning, Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, 
Class & Citizenship (Cornell University Press 2006). The development of the concept 
in feminism is described in Chapter 3. 
112  Jemima Repo, ‘The Biopolitical Birth of Gender Social Control, Hermaphroditism, and 
the New Sexual Apparatus’ (2013) 38 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 228, 229.  
113  Joan W Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (1986) 91 The 
American Historical Review 1053. 
114  There is a similar use of gender and sex when referring to grammatical gender. 
Grammatical gender is an unsolved puzzle of linguistics, as stated by Benjamin Ide 
Wheeler. It is important to note that he refers to natural gender when referring to sex. 
He also points out how in English it is represented by he, she and it. He defines Genus 
as a grammatical category that manifests itself in morphological divisions …in 
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, ‘Grammatical Gender’ (1889) 3 The Classical Review 390, 2.  
115  Biopower is a new conception of social power that appeared during the 17th, 18th and 
19th centuries. It is a concept widely explained by Foucault, who claims that biopower 
was exercised at the level of life and sex and sexuality, which were modelled and 
normalized to address specific goals. Biopower ruled through the disciplining of bodies 
and the control of the population’s lives; he explicitly refers to it as the power to “foster 
life or disallow it to the point of death” in Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: 
An Introduction (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group 2012). 
116  Thomas Walter Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud 
(Harvard University Press 1990). 
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Therefore, the transformation of the grammatical category into the binary notion 
of gender might be looked at as a moment in the genealogy of gender117.The 
genealogy does not appear in a linear form, but it pinpoints the singularity of the 
events, usually unperceived118. The genealogy of gender requires us to accept that 
there is not essence of gender; thus, in the grammatical category lies an unperceived 
moment in which gender is historically and socially constructed119. Then in the 
1950s, as Jemina Repo states, another moment can be pinpointed in the genealogy 
of gender in which gender continues to deploy its biopolitical role. 
The term, a grammatical category representing the masculine, feminine and 
neuter, quietly readjusts to become a synonym of sex, discarding the neutral 
category120. There are two processes occurring in two different moments: one that 
converts the threesome into twosome121 and then a second one in which feminism 
appropriates the term and reconceptualises it.   
Izquierdo’s process is viable to explain the process of transformation of the 
concept from the grammatical term to the current concept, as in both phases there is 
a moment of analysis and synthesis. Izquierdo’s theory on the transformation of the 
term gender into a concept focuses on the problematic neutrality of the term and is 
 
 
117  Regarding the origin of the category of gender, Benjamin Ide Wheeler explains the 
existence of two different approaches, Greek and Latin philosophy: in one gender is 
devoid of meaning and in the other it is a reflection of sex. He explains how in the 
heroic age of grammar –writing of modern European languages the gender distinction 
permeated by the idea of anthropomorphism was adopted. The result was the reflection 
of natural gender in language with the grammatical devices provided by grammatical 
gender... although, as noted by other linguists, on some occasions a mismatch between 
sex and gender occurred, which for Brugmann proves that gender is not the reflection 
of sex, at least for primitive man. As Wheeler explains, there is no consensus on the 
idea of sex as a starting point for gender in Wheeler (n 114) 3. 
118 Michel Foucault , Nietzshe , la genealogia , la historia. 
119  According to Wheeler, linguistically there is no connection between sex and genus; 
however, it can be noted that at a certain moment, at least in English, both terms become 
synonymous. Sex becomes a reflection of what Wheeler names natural gender. He 
specifies how the neuter gender covers only those concepts that had nothing to do with 
sex in Wheeler (n 114) 8. 
120  Curiously, there is a mismatch between grammatical gender, which represents three 
genders, and social gender, which represents two. Indeed, when referring to people 
there is always an automatic reduction to two in order to parallel the binary of sex. 
There are differences between languages; this equivalence and process appertain 
mainly to the Roman languages. Nevertheless, as I argue in the next subsection, all 
languages have been affected by the use of the Anglo-Saxon term gender, thus the 
importance of understanding the processes that construct the concept  
121  Despite the previous lack of connection, at some point the parallelism between sex and 
‘genus’ appears. Wheeler, through the research made by Wundt, explains that the 
original grammatical gender classification was a value differentiation based not only 
on sex but also on psychological and sociological motives. Wheeler (n 114) 9–10. 
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aware of the systematic use of the word gender as a substitute for sex. She also notes 
the problem of the term gender becoming a generalized term—that is, one that is 
frequently used without rigor as to the concept it refers to – or there are probably a 
hundred ways you could express it. Applying Izquierdo’s process of construction, 
then, the term ‘gender’ as grammatical category follows the first phase: analysis. 
Through this analysis, the grammatical category of three is filtered by the dualistic 
conception of sex as male and female. The empirical fact of sex guides the process 
of analysis. The difference between object (human) is reduced to the limits of 
biology, permitting the parallelism between sex and gender. To be strictly accurate, 
the dividing factor is not sex but rather genitalia.122 The second step—synthesis—
produces a similar term that has been readjusted to the empirical reality: ‘gender’. A 
neutral term becomes sexed and readjusted to the needs or beliefs of the society.   
The unnoticed first process evidences the power of culture. Since ancient times, 
beliefs about the body, sex and sexuality have been driven by patriarchy and culture. 
These beliefs influenced the first process of transformation to steer it toward not the 
possible but the normative actual. Binary thought permeates the process that occurs 
when the term become a new concept. The term is invaded by notions of the natural, 
adjusted to the biology of sex.   
The initial process shows cultural influence, informed by nature, upon the 
grammatical category. It provides a starting point for the birth of the current concept 
of gender during the 1950s, in which the grammatical category has already been 
adjusted to the binary of sex. When this process begins, gender as a category has 
already been reduced from three to two. The term gender used in this second process 
is already ‘gendered’ (or affected by the patriarchal culture) to parallel the binary of 
sex. Sex has been linked to the term gender and constructed a new concept.  
The result of this process is a sexed term that can only produce sexed concepts. 
Regardless of whether the term is considered a product of culture or nature, it 
remains framed by the binary imposed by nature. The paradox lies in the use of this 
term in everyday language and in the complex definition of the word itself123, which 
coincides at once with the sex binary and with a grammatical use that in Romance 
languages (also in German) still envisages three categories. Indeed, the term gender 
as a grammatical category would have helped to blur the binary of sex if the third 
possible category, the neuter, had been acknowledged instead of eliminated124.  
 
 
122  In Chapter 5, I will go through the analyses of the body to explain how sex might go 
beyond genitalia and how now only relates to genitalia. 
123  In fact, this is possible, as Williams notes in his book Williams, Keywords: A 
Vocabulary of Culture and Society (n 89). 
124  Using the understanding of gender as a grammatical category in which masculine, 
feminine, and neuter exist would have allowed the recognition of the third gender a 
long time ago, as has happened recently in Germany.    
Amalia Verdu Sanmartin 
44 
2.2.3 The Second Process: From the ‘Gendered’ term 
Gender to the Concept of Gender 
The concept of gender used in feminism is not the grammatical category of gender, 
but rather a concept related to sex. Sex as biology serves as the foundation for the 
construction of the current concept of gender. Once the term gender becomes sexed 
in its reduction from three categories to two, the second process of analysis and 
synthesis begins. This second process discards the three grammatical categories, 
instead proceeding from a starting point in which sex and gender are linked by the 
binary division into two. This second transformation refers to the fundamental move 
that defines the current general concept of gender, one that carries the idea of ‘social’ 
roles related to masculinity and femininity. ‘Grammatical gender,’ already reduced 
to two, evolves into a new concept that refers to social roles that are different from 
sex but correspond to it.125  
Following the assumption of division, the ‘neutral’ term becomes a gendered one 
even if it still has the appearance of inclusivity126 The term “gender” pretends to be 
neutral in the sense of making no value judgment and avoiding the reference to sex 
to maintain a sense of equality. The transformation of the term into this new concept 
is imbued with the beliefs that inform the binary of sex and the neutrality becomes 
gendered.  
In this  second process of construction, Izquierdo highlights two approaches to 
the classification of gender: 1) binary/discrete, which refers to two genders: 
masculine and feminine; and 2) bipolar/continuum approach, which accepts two 
opposite ends—masculine and feminine—but also acknowledges the variety in 
between.127 This second standpoint challenges the cultural construction of the binary 
of sex and tries to depict the diversity of people, implying the existence of a 
continuum of identities between the masculine and the feminine. The term gender is 
transformed in this case to depict the entire bipolar continuum. However, such a 
depiction of the continuum becomes difficult because when the term gender is 
transformed into a concept, it accepts the institutional facts that establish two sexes. 
The focus on difference produces a binary object. This is the outcome of the implicit 
dualistic thought on which the understanding of difference that permeates the 
concept of sex is based. The binary/discrete depiction that is produced when gender 
 
 
125  Modern times have brought the enhancement of empirical research, and the main 
empirical evidence of sex is the genitals. Therefore, “based on sex” really means based 
on genitalia. 
126   Izquierdo (n 27). 
127  The binary approach is an early feminist approach to gender and the bipolar approach 
is the latest approach. This concordance between the transformation of the concept of 
gender and the feminist approach will be developed in Chapter 3.   
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is associated with the two sex categories hinders the use of the term gender to depict 
the bipolar/continuum approach.  
The continuum has no name and is never visualized, and the word gender 
remains closely associated with the binary. To depict or represent the continuum 
would be a necessary conceptual move in order to separate the concept from its 
condition of being informed by the binary of sex. It would also be a different point 
of departure for the notion of difference that grounds the concept.  
Tracing back the etymology of the term gender, we find that there exists in not 
many languages a term to express it as a continuum.128 The use of gender is limited 
to depicting the masculine, the feminine, and sometimes the neuter (only to refer 
things or animals as in English), but never any possibilities in between.129  
It is important to clarify whether the term gender is used to indicate a 
binary/discrete approach or a bipolar/continuum approach130. The very term gender 
does not lend itself to describing a bipolar continuum. It is necessary to find a new 
term to depict or define the continuum or at least that do not limit the subjects to a 
binary131. The depiction of the concept of gender as a continuum produces a 
mismatch between the term and the concept to the point that gender becomes sexed. 
Therefore, when gender becomes sexed, only the binary/discrete approach to the 
division is acknowledged. The bipolar/continuum option dissolves due to the lack of 
a term to name the continuum, and gender as a continuum has no term of its own to 
define it. The binary ascribed to biological sex continues to determine the continuum, 
keeping gender framed by the binary.  
With regard to this problematic, Butler also highlights the effects of language on 
the fixing of sexed positions132. She posits how language enables this fixing by 
permitting the survival of the symbolic itself, the domain of significability or 
intelligibility. New terms depicting new concepts to represent the multiplicity of 
 
 
128  In fact, there is a rich vocabulary that expresses the different identities and 
representations of the fluidity of gender. However, it is considered a minority 
vocabulary, and thus it is not fully acknowledged or even accepted by society. 
129  Pierre Bourdieu and John B Thompson, Language and Symbolic Power (Harvard 
University Press 1991); Ferdinand de Saussure, Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures 
on General Linguistics (1910-1911) (Elsevier Science & Technology Books 1993); 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours De Linguistique Generale: Edition Critique (Otto 
Harrassowitz Verlag 1989).  
130  Izquierdo defines it as bipolar because of the existence of two ends with an array of 
possibilities in between.  
131  The problem is that any term trying to depict a continuum will always leave someone 
out and would always be delimited but the two extremes.  
132  Butler refers to Lacan and how he notes the existence of a symbolic order that 
“legitimates sexually differentiated fictions as ‘positions’” in Judith Butler and Maxine 
Elliot Professor of Rhetoric Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits 
of Sex (Taylor & Francis 2011) 138. 
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subjects may help to go beyond the binary. On the other hand, the interaction of 
theories and the representation of gender in other languages “where the notions of 
‘sexuality’ and ‘sexual difference’ are currently used instead” 133 might help to unify 
the usage of the term gender and, moreover, avoid the theoretical confusion about 
the relation between sex and gender that affects the meaning of the concept of 
gender. The power of gender, however, seems to hinder the possibility of new terms, 
as the concept of gender is a powerful biopolitical tool still needed to maintain 
normative structures.   
2.2.4 The Influence of the English Language Term in Other 
Languages 
The definition of gender in the Oxford Dictionary reads: “From Old French gendre, 
from Latin genus ‘kind’”; “The grammatical arrangement of nouns, pronouns and 
adjectives into masculine, feminine, and neuter types in some languages”.134 
According to Catharine R. Stimpson, “the English word gender has a history. It 
comes from an older French word, gendre, which, in turn, derives from the Latin 
word genus. The Latin genus has a Greek cognate, genos. Both genus and genos can 
indicate a race, a breed, or a branch of a family, and each has an accompanying 
verb—in Latin gign, in Greek gignomai—referring to birth. A second Latin verb, 
generare, means to beget, to father”135. 
According to Kathleen Canning, “[g]ender is a category of social analysis that 
denotes the relational character of sexual difference”136. She continues by reflecting 
on the historical expansion of the term, which widens to include the cultural or social 
relation between the sexes and the symbolic system in which men and women are 
positioned differently, implying a notion of difference based on sex that is culturally 
imposed. The birth and development of the notion of gender in the English language 
introduced the cultural construction of difference. Feminism took up this definition 
to emphasize the hierarchical difference between the sexes and its relational and 
structural character. This definition spread into many languages, even to those in 
which such a concept of gender did not previously exist.  
In this sense, Rosi Braidotti has stressed how the notion of “gender” is a 
“vicissitude of the English language, one which bears little or no relevance to 
theoretical traditions in the Romance languages. This is because gender found no 
 
 
133  Rossi Braidotti and Judith Butler, ‘Feminism by Any Other Name’ (1994) 6 
Differences: A Journal of Feminist Culture Studies 38. 
134  ‘Oxford Dictionary - Gender’ <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/eng-
lish/gender>. 
135  Stimpson and Herdt (n 109) 6. 
136  Canning (n 111) 4. 
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successful echo in the French, Spanish or Italian feminist movements. If you think 
that in French, le genre can be used to refer  to humanity as a whole (“le genre 
humain”) you can get a sense of the culturally specific nature of the term and, 
consequently, of its untranslatability as well.”137 Toril Moi points out how in 
languages such as French or Norwegian the concept of socially constructed gender 
did not exist but was imported from English138. The term sex was used instead to 
refer to socially constructed roles or differences, and there was opposition to the 
determinism of biology.139 Toril Moi has also remarked how the post-structuralist 
critiques of sex/gender usage come from English-language scholars,140 as this usage 
has still not been adopted by writers in other languages. In German the word for 
gender, Geschlecht, encompasses both sex and gender, erasing the difference 
between the two.141  
The intertwining of terms native to various languages and the English term 
gender, has caused different processes of resignification, as has been pointed out by 
several scholars in AT gender association, On Translating gender and by Nina Lykke 
in her book Feminist Studies, A guide to Intersectional Theory, Methodology and 
Writing142. In these texts, we find a detailed list of relevant terms (even if not 
precisely the same) that existed before importation of the English “gender” and their 
interaction with the imported English term, divided into Slavic, Scandinavic and 
Romance languages, and a description of the influence of feminism in the 
development of the term and concept of gender within each of these languages143. 
Among all the languages investigated, there are similarities and differences. 
There is a similitude between Slavic and Scandinavic languages in the use of one 
single term to refer to sex and gender—for instance, the Danish word ‘køn’, the 
Norwegian ‘kjønn’, the Swedish ‘kön’, the Russian, Croatian and Serbian ‘pol’, the 
Slovenian ‘spol’, the Dutch ‘sekse’. These terms were used to refer to both sex and 
gender, but the evolution of the concept of gender has affected the use of these 
 
 
137  Braidotti refers to Teresa de Lauretis, who stresses the same issue concerning the 
concept of gender and how gender is constructed in close relation to the subject. For 
gender as a subject influenced by society and constructed by different discourses, see 
Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor, Feminism Meets Queer Theory, vol 2 (Indiana 
University Press 1997) 37; Rhode (n 1).  
138  It needs to be emphasized that the acceptation of the culturally driven category of 
gender is an invention of the English language, as the initial meaning of the term only 
applied to grammar. 
139  Toril Moi, What Is a Woman?: And Other Essays (Oxford University Press 2001) 6. 
140  Moi (n 139). 
141  Canning (n 111) 5. 
142  Lykke (n 28). 
143  In understanding the origin of the grammatical category of gender and how it differs 
among language to even not exist see Wheeler (n 114). 
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original terms. There is a similar use of the term gender among the European 
languages, one of which is explained by Rosi Braidotti, who says, ‘When comparing 
the meanings of sex/gender in a number of European languages, it is - in the 
experience of most participants in the ATHENA project - very difficult, if not 
downright impossible to separate sex from gender. In most cases this is due to the 
fact that both meanings tend to be covered by a single term. Where the two terms are 
distinct, this occurs along dividing lines that hardly coincide with those operative in 
English. Therefore, the difficulties of separating sex from gender stand as a common 
feature in the use of the term gender in relation to sex. The other shared feature, 
highlighted by Lykke and also in the AT Gender text, relates to the origin of the term 
gender as a grammatical category in European languages144.  
Lykke identifies three feminist strategies for the resignification of the terms 
[words] in different European languages. First, the addition of the adjective 
“biological” (“biologisk kjønn/ kön/ køn,”) and “social” (“sosialt kjønn/ kön/ køn”), 
mainly in Scandinavian countries; second, the introduction of the term genus instead 
of gender in Scandinavian countries; and third, the borrowing of the English term 
gender, as in Germany or the Netherlands. All of these strategies have their 
supporters and opponents, and the third strategy appears to be the most widely 
accepted145.  
The Slavic and Scandinavic languages share similar situations with similar but 
slightly varying strategies. In both language groups, there is one undifferentiated 
term for gender/sex. The words used in these languages are unsexed terms instead.146 
Meanwhile, influenced by the growth of feminist thought, the English language 
concept of gender became increasingly important, so some kind of adaptation into 
these languages had to be attempted. One is the addition of the adjectives 
sociocultural or biological; the second is the implementation of the term gender. 
Basically the same strategies are adopted in Slavic and Scandinavic languages, with 
the only difference being the use of either “genus” or “gender” as the imported word.  
The situation in the Slavic countries described by Eva Bahovic is the addition of 
the adjective sociocultural or biological, along with directly importing the Anglo-
Saxon term gender. In the case of the adaptation of the term genus into Scandinavic 
languages (mainly Sweden), the word is adopted as the equivalent of the English 
term gender, while the term meaning sex is maintained as kjønn/ kön/ køn. This 
 
 
144  Rossi Braidotti and E Vonk (eds), The Making of European Women´s Studies 
Translating Sex/Gender, vol 1 (ATHENA 2000) <https://atgender.eu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/207/2015/12/Translating-Gender-2012.pdf>. 
145  ibid; Lykke (n 28). 
146  In Swedish, Danish and Norwegian nouns do not have gender but personal pronouns 
do. In Finnish, all persons are referred to as hän irrespective of sex. Sweden is trying to 
anchor the same strategy with the use of hen. 
The Construction of the Concept of Gender 
 49 
strategy meets with differing opinions. For some, such as Karin Widerberg147, the 
strategy is not a successful one (even if the previous strategy of using one term for 
both sex and gender wasn’t successful either). Those who criticize the use of the new 
term ‘genus’ have pointed out the confusion it has created. Moreover, it brings with 
it the previously mentioned problem of reinstating the problematic dichotomy 
between nature and culture. The leading theorist behind the introduction of the term 
genus, Yvone Hirdmann, defends the use of the term and says that this problem can 
be eliminated by using it differently from the Anglo-Saxon gender. She claims the 
use of term genus in a performative way, not emphasizing the differences between 
the sociological and the biological. This strategy is explained and translated by Kari 
Jegerstedt: “genus” is to accentuate the manner in which the two are intertwined. 
Thus, “genus can be understood as changeable figures of thought, “men” and 
“women”—(where the biological difference is always exploited), which creates 
representations and social practices. Hence it follows that biology can also be 
affected/changed—in other words, genus is a more symbiotic category than 
gender”148.  
Still the problem lies in the term’s limitation to depicting the masculine and 
feminine, leaving the binary untouched. The performative effect claimed by 
Hirdmann is also restricted to the binary imposed by the previous dichotomy in 
which the body and sex have a leading role. As explained by Jegerstedt, a Swedish 
journalist named Maria Carlshamre touched upon the real problem, saying, “[T]here 
is no 'sosial kon', 'only male and female bodies on the one hand and, on the other, 
individual human beings who can freely form themselves and change the world'. She 
points out the leading role of the body, of biology which does not allow for 
movement beyond the binary. She denounces the fact that the vision of the individual 
human being is hindered by the use of the term genus. In Sweden, as Lykke posits, 
“Genus’ has become the official way of branding Feminist Studies”149 and, we must 
also add, a strategy that still leaves the dichotomy of sex untouched and links gender 
to women. This is evidenced in cases when the subject is neither woman nor man, 
such as intersex individuals.150 Can we categorize them within the concept of gender? 
 
 
147  Karin Widerberg, ‘Translating Gender’ (1998) 6 NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist 
and Gender Research 133.  
148  Kari Jegerstedt, “A short introduction to the use of “sex” and “gender” in the 
Scandinavian languages” in Braidotti R. and Vonk E (eds), ‘The Making of European 
Women´s Studies’, vol 1 Utrecht ATHENA (2000)  
149  Lykke (n 28) 43. 
150  Intersex is an umbrella term for a variety of congenital conditions where a person’s 
chromosomes, sex glands or anatomy do not develop in a typical manner. Thus, the 
biological sex of an intersex person cannot be clearly defined as either male or female 
at birth, but instead exhibits variations that are inconsistent with the norm in one or 
several ways. https://www.genus.se/en/wordpost/intersex/ 
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In fact, despite the insistence of some feminists that the concept of gender is inclusive 
of all subjects, some are still not visualized. Henceforth, whichever the chosen 
strategy, the binary remains immovable. As claimed by Braidotti, the problem seems 
to come from the “impossible task of separating sex from gender” that appears as a 
common feature among all the languages.  
In the Netherlands, the scholar Esther Vonk celebrates the adoption of the Anglo-
Saxon ‘gender’ as a useful way to avoid biological determinism. However, this 
strategy has been questioned, because the problems of the Anglo-Saxon term in 
reaffirming the dichotomy between nature and culture have been imported along 
with it; indeed, the same problem occurs with the introduction of the term genus in 
some Scandinavian countries. In fact, both strategies are flawed: the first one because 
adding the adjective maintains a fixed understanding of biology within the binary of 
nature/culture, and the second because the notion ascribed to the English term gender 
is also limited to the binary of sex. 
The process of transformation seems to affect many languages and to be accepted 
and left unchallenged by any feminist attempt at resignification. Only feminists who 
address the term in Romance languages, such as Spanish or French, have critiqued 
the political character of the term. Some Spanish scholars, such as Sandra Pereira 
Rolle, suggest that the use of the term gender in its translation to Spanish género, is 
political and not grammatical. It seems sensible to suggest this given the analysis of 
the process that creates the grammatical category of gender. Moreover, the critique 
is in tune with the critiques of the use of the term gender in law that I will later 
analyse in Chapter 4. Despite these critiques, the translation of the term gender into 
the Spanish género or the French genre seems to be the general trend.  
The political character of the chosen term can be observed in other countries such 
as Sweden in which the binary of sex is still explicit151. These differences reveal the 
importance of culture in defining concepts and suggest that the understanding of 
 
 
151  The Swedish Secretariat for Gender Research explains the meaning of the word genus 
“In Sweden, the word for gender –genus– was introduced by a historian named Yvonne 
Hirdman. In a report titled The Gender System: Theoretical Reflections on the Social 
Subordination of Women (1990, in Swedish in 1988), produced in connection with a 
Swedish government inquiry on power and democracy in Sweden, she proposes that 
the concept of genus be used to denote our increasingly complex knowledge about 
what’s ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, and about how what’s ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
is ‘made’. The word gender is used in many different contexts, and consequently, it has 
been assigned many different meanings. Also gender scholars may mean different 
things when they use the term. A good way to begin disentangling this complex concept 
is to distinguish between gender and biological sex. While the latter refers to the 
anatomical/physiological” in https://www.genus.se/en/about-us/ 
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gender is influenced by the culture of the society that tries to define it.152 In fact, as 
Rosen explains, culture is “the capacity for creating the categories of our 
experience”.153 The key feature of these categories is that they appear to be natural 
to the group. New meanings become mixed with already existing meanings, and the 
resulting fabricated meanings or categories seem to be part of our culture, even if 
they have been transplanted into it. 
2.2.5 The Third Gender 
Henceforth, the cultural aspects of the term produces categories that become 
problematic. The cultural factors behind the concept make it difficult to find a 
consistent definition of the term. The problem is complicated, as the lack of a unified 
definition of the concept of gender complicates on account of cultural differences. 
Part of the problem is the question of etymology.154 Unger and Crawford, have stated 
the importance of gender as a linguistic phenomenon, following the interest of its 
“unexamined possibilities because in many Indo-European countries there is a third 
unsexed or neuter category”.155 This brings back the previous analyses departing 
from the term gender as grammatical category in which a third neuter option exists. 
The American sociologist J. Richard Urdy claims in his article “The Nature of 
Gender”, how gender referred to the grammatical inflection of nouns in which a third 
category also appertained and how using gender for the male/female classification 
was a joke because it obliged forced us to discard the possible options beyond the 
male/female.156 Urdy addresses as a joke an important fact already explained in the 
previous section, that the term had already gone through the process of 
transformation —the gendered process—before being adopted by feminism157. 
Certainly, concerning gender, the third neuter category appears to be the 
exception to the masculine vs. feminine divide and the English definition of 
difference. The implicit third neutral category in the term gender seems to facilitate 
 
 
152  In Chapter 2.2, I refer to the power of culture in constructing the meaning of terms to 
law. 
153  Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton University Press 2006) 4. 
154  Riot-Sarcey (n 53). 
155  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113).For a reference to 
English usage, see Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (n 89). 
For the use of the Third gender in other Indo-European countries see: Gilbert H Herdt, 
Third Sex, Third Gender : Beyond Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History (Zone 
Books 1994). 
156  Canning (n 111). 
157  In Chapter 3, there is a detailed explanation of the development of the term and concept 
of gender in feminism.  
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a different thinking about sexual identity158, beyond the binary. The third possibility 
of gender, hypothetically, relates not only to gender identity, but also to sex, 
implying the existence of a third sex159. This category disappeared already in the 
transformation of the concept from a grammatical category to a social category in 
English, although it survived in other languages (German). Appealing as this third 
category may be, it still restrains gender from depicting a continuum and limits the 
possibility of recognizing a gender beyond the binary. Indeed, the third category also 
implies the acceptance of men and women as unified categories, which maintain 
gender within the masculine and feminine, and the third as something in between, 
sharing both possibilities but not accepting any others. In short, the maximum 
number of possibilities available for gender is three, hindering the possibility of 
implying something in between or beyond these three established options or of 
defining sex or gender beyond the male/female binary.160 The use of the neuter 
gender is a way of trespassing the binary barrier; however, it is still far from a 
representation of a multitude of possibilities. 
2.3 The Polysemy of Gender 
The term gender is polysemic within the ‘gender’ research field. The field of gender 
research would seem to be a unified framework for analysis, since, as Rosi Braidotti 
explains, “‘gender’ plays the role of a constitutive concept”. But Braidotti goes on 
to explain, “It does not, however, provide one monolithic framework of analysis”. 
The methodology of analysis affects the theoretical approach to gender; different 
approaches ascribe a variety of meanings to gender, and this plays a fundamental 
role in determining the focus and outcomes of the research. 
Based on this, Braidotti provides a constitutive definition of ‘gender’ that 
acknowledges the complex polysemic character of the concept of gender within the 
research field. For her, “the concept of gender refers to the many and complex ways 
in which social differences between the sexes acquire a meaning and become 
structural factors in the organization of social life. Gender is a cultural and historical 
product, as opposed to an essentialist definition of the physical differences between 
the sexes”. Therefore, in her definition of gender there are key aspects that contribute 
to the term polysemy. Firstly, the opposition between nature and culture—or more 
precisely, the biological versus the cultural; secondly, the difference between the 
 
 
158  Unger and Crawford (n 95).  
159  There are many different theories on the reasons behind the origin of the grammatical 
gender, as will be pointed out in the next Chapter. The equivalence between sex and 
gender is one of many. For more, read Wheeler (n 114). 
160  Izquierdo (n 27). 
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sexes in which the difference of power is implicit; and thirdly, the structural 
character of gender, which sustains society in general.  
These different aspects of gender have been addressed by Sandra Harding, who 
detected three important approaches to ‘gender’: gender as symbolism, gender as 
structure, and gender as individuality or gender identity. This last aspect is what Rosi 
Braidotti, referring to Harding, explains as the aspect of gender that produces 
normative meanings and values. These normative values are framed by binary 
oppositions that are the principles for the distribution of power, and they end up 
infiltrating the notion of gender on a symbolic and structural layer as well. 
In the normative values instated by gender we can find the origin of gender as 
power, this power is exerted in every realm in which the concept of gender appears. 
Therefore, it seems that the polysemy of gender converges in the implicit binary of 
the term. Indeed, Rosi Braidotti is aware of the implicit binary nature of gender. 
Referring to her previous definition of ‘gender,’ she says, “According to this 
definition gender refers primarily but not exclusively to women. Not only does it 
include men, but it also defines 'women' as a very broad and internally differentiated 
category”.161 
2.4 Binary Language and Sexuality 
Language reflects the binary concept of gender, and gender is supported by the 
language of normative sexuality,162 which also implies the binary. As mentioned in 
the description of the transformation of the concept, a bipolar approach to the 
concept of gender implies the representation of a continuum. But the continuum of 
gender is not one of sex or the body, but rather one of external image or identity. It 
is the image that we would like to reflect and that others receive of us. The body, 
even if it plays an active part in the construction of identity, is still limited to the 
binary of sex and does not accept any continuum. Moreover, even if we try to depict 
an external identity different from the binary, we must accept that there is no 
language for the continuum or for the disruptive. The term gender hardly 
acknowledges a continuum beyond the masculine and the feminine or the 
heterosexual and the homosexual. This lack of language hinders the possibility of 
depicting a sex continuum, limiting it to the normative binary of male and female. 
The lack of language hinders the possibility of effectively naming and constructing 
 
 
161  AT gender 
162  Normative sexuality is understood here as normative capacity for sexual feelings, 
normative sexual activity and normative sexual orientation. The normative form of 
sexuality has been represented as heterosexuality. The normative is the set of standard 
rules that designates the binary of sex as the norm and, along with it, heterosexuality as 
the sexual norm. 
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identities not grounded in the binary of sex. A symbiotic connection between the 
meaning of gender, the language of normative sexuality and the depiction of the body 
makes it difficult to escape from the language of the binary. Gender, sex and the 
body stay within the limits imposed by the binary, which is grounded in language.  
The same occurs when we refer to sexuality. The antithesis to heterosexuality, 
namely homosexuality, also implies a binary relation, of two persons, within the 
same sex group. The confusion and merging that occurs between the concepts of 
sex/gender, examined in the previous sections, is imported into other languages 
along with the term gender. As Braidotti puts it, “the imported nature of the notion 
of gender also means that the sex/gender distinction, which is one of the pillars on 
which English-speaking feminist theory is built, makes neither epistemological nor 
political sense in many non-English, western European contexts, where the notions 
of “sexuality” and “sexual difference” are currently used instead”163. The interplay 
of the normative binary attached to the term gender with other terms such as 
sexuality or sexual difference, which might otherwise perfectly refer to other 
possibilities beyond the binary (polyamorous, trans-gay, intersex sexuality), reduces 
the options to a game of binaries.  
As we noted previously in agreement with sociolinguistic researchers, it is 
important to point to the role that the discrete nature of language plays in maintaining 
the dichotomy, as there are no terms to name the “unclear boundaries of reality” 164. 
The inextricability of reality and language is also expressed by Roy Bhaskar, who 
says that “[t]hings exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only 
know them under particular descriptions. Descriptions belong to the world of society 
and of men165; objects belong to the world of nature. We express [our understanding 
of] nature in thought”166. Now, as it stands, there is a conflict between reality and 
language. This conflict is evidenced through the concept of gender, as gender is more 
than a binary; if gender is understood as a continuum, the language we use does not 
depict it in such a way. Obviously, a great deal of imagination is needed when the 
vocabulary hardly exists to represent the diversity167—or rather, the multiplicity—of 
gender beyond the binary.  
 
 
163  Braidotti and Butler (n 133) 38. 
164  Victoria Bergvall, Rethinking Language and Gender Research: Theory and Practice 
(Routledge 2014) 2. 
165  This quote is an example of an author falsely universalizing “men” to mean human 
beings.  
166  Bhaskar (n 108) 250. 
167  There are several terms used by LGBT groups that try to fill the gaps in the 
representation of other genders. 
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2.5 Biopolitical Gender 
Biopolitics and discourse intertwine with gender in their aim to manage and 
discipline life. Gender imposes templates on sex and sexuality to produce and 
reproduce a machinery to control and discipline society. Gender joins sex to 
politicize nature. The notion of gender expresses the politics of sex. The masculine 
gender and the gendered feminine become part of one system: they are the genders. 
The duality of sex merges with the duality of gender, painting the language of 
neutrality in the colours of the binary. The language of gender, while supposedly 
representing neutrality, is politicised to refer to a neutrality of two.  
Addressing the concept of gender as biopolitics168 requires us to understand 
Foucault’s concept of biopower as well as to accept that gender is a gendered 
concept. ii The power over life – biopower- refers to: 1) the anatomo-politics of the 
human body that disciplined bodies, and 2) the biopolitics of the population, the 
regulatory control of populations.169 These two poles developed to the point where 
they grouped together into the great bipolar technology170 that deployed the 
organization of power over life and established a normative heterosexual binary of 
sex as the rule, with all Others outside the norm as deviances. This bipolar 
technology intertwined biology with the disciplining and control of sexuality. 
Foucault focuses on sexuality and shows the tacit acceptance of the division into 
norm (heterosexuality) and rebellion (homosexuality or non-normative sexualities). 
There is a close connection between the biopolitical and biopower, as biopolitics 
becomes a strategy of biopower. Biopolitics takes biopower as its primary 
subject/object and transforms biological life into politics. 
On the other side we find Agamben’s approach to biopolitics. He defines the 
difference between zoë and bios. He defines zoë as natural life and bios as political 
life, and analyses this pair as natural life/political existence, zoë /bios, 
exclusion/inclusion. He goes beyond Foucault’s approach in the understanding of 
biopolitics. For Agamben, biopolitics is more than the mere inclusion of zoë in the 
polis or life becoming the central object of the State. He assumes that this process 
already started in ancient times and was inherited by the subsequent societies. 
Agamben says, “the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the 
 
 
168  Neither Foucault nor Agamben have carried out any analyses or reference to the 
concept of gender.  The links between the concept of gender and the work of Foucault 
and Agamben has been conducted by feminist scholars. 
169  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (1st Americ, Pantheon Books 1978) 139–
140. 
170  Foucault refers to the “bipolar technology.” The term bipolar as used by Foucault 
coincides with Izquierdo’s term binary/discrete. The bipolar is, in Izquierdo’s thought, 
understood as the continuum.  
Amalia Verdu Sanmartin 
56 
exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life -- which is originally 
situated at the margins of the political order -- gradually begins to coincide with the 
political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right 
and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction”171.  
It might be said that zoë might be depicted as nature and bios as culture. Zoë can 
be understood as the natural life that merges with political life, becoming one. It can 
be seen as the grounds for constructing identity. Zoë can be represented as the 
original body with no interpretation performed upon it, a body that exists in itself 
and is not ‘read’ by someone, just the flesh, and bios as the gendered body influenced 
and intersected by biopolitics. We might think about the zoë and bios relation as the 
relation between sex and gender because, as Agamben explains, “there is politics 
because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to 
his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life 
in an inclusive exclusion”172. Therefore, transferred into the language of gender, it 
might be said that zoë might represent sex and bios gender.  
Foucault’s and Agamben’s approaches to biopower and biopolitics intersect in 
the concept of gender. The concept of gender represents abstract power; it is a 
technology of the body as well as a structure. Gender develops from being bios to 
the merging of zoë and bios. Sovereign power controls gender and its meaning 
through its institutions—for instance, in law—limiting it to the binary. This is 
already addressed by Agamben in Homo Sacer when he says, “The present inquiry 
concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional 
and the biopolitical models of power. What this work has had to record among its 
likely conclusions is precisely that the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the 
inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original -- if concealed -- 
nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical 
body is the original activity of sovereign power.”173 The State creates the exceptions 
that are acceptable—for example, by allowing same-sex marriage—but still 
maintains the limits of the natural binary of sex as the normative. The difference 
between the public and the private is part of the biopolitical grounds of society: the 
 
 
171  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Standford University 
Press 1998) 8–9 . It is important to note that in the ancient world bare life was 
tantamount to zoë. However Agamben, if inspired by the ancient division between zoë 
and bios includes another category in life, that of bare life. Within this category he 
includes those who have no legal or political representation( refugees). He says that 
bare life can be understood as the  “threshold in which law constantly passes over into 
fact and fact into law” p.71 
172  ibid 6. 
173  ibid 5. It is also important to note that neither Foucault nor Agamben refer to the term 
or concept of gender in their works. 
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personal is always political because it is a biopolitical construction. Therefore, there 
is a network of discourses interplaying and intertwining with bodies that makes every 
one of us a biopolitical animal. 
Postmodern approach is characterized by a biopolitical approach to sex, and sex 
achieved its highest importance as a political category. Sex came to be thought of as 
a biopolitical tool to discipline and control. Sex became politics, as in the claims of 
Donna Haraway, for whom biology is politics. Haraway and Foucault addressed the 
control and regulation of society through the body from a theoretical perspective, 
and Anne Fausto-Sterling, in Sexing the Body174, contributed with scientific research 
that backs up their more theoretical approaches. Biopolitical sex parallels the concept 
of gender, and the change from sexing the body to the gendered body supposes the 
adaptation of biopolitical strategies to new societies. 
The shift from sex to gender (the term and the concept) shows the power of 
patriarchal sovereign structures such as law and language in maintaining old 
biopolitical strategies and encouraging new ones. Gender (the term and the concept) 
must be addressed in accordance with its biopolitical nature, as it first arrived as a 
complementary term to sex and later came to obtain its own political place. Indeed, 
as Jemina Repo explains, the biopolitical birth of gender meant that “[t]he truth of 
sex was no longer found in the genitals or mind, but in the contingent cognitive 
processes of a behavioral control system”175. The result of the merging between zoë 
and bios, the embodiment of the Cartesian person, will be explained in Chapter 6. 
The biopolitical approach to gender illuminates the political importance of the 
concept of gender and its role in the disciplining and control of bodies. This is shown 
in the research of Jemina Repo, who outlines the birth of the concept of gender in 
the context of the medical disciplines. The transformation of biological sex into 
political gender and the cultural foundations of the concept of sex are further 
explored by Fausto-Sterling in Sexing the Body. According to her, sex, based on 
biological aspects, is converted and transformed to address political needs. Gender 
emerges to join sex in order to socially justify the production of individuals who 
conform to the binary of sex and the appropriate learned behavior. Therefore sex and 
gender turn into biopolitical tools that render the body more governable.176 It is 
important to acknowledge that before gender came to the fore, sex provided the 
grounds for power. Gender appeared later and then, seen as the cultural construction 
of sex, became a biopolitical tool the deconstruction of which is necessary to reveal 
 
 
174  Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of 
Sexuality (Basic Books 2000) 255. 
175  Repo (n 112) 238–244. 
176  Jemima Repo, ‘The Biopolitics of Gender Permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences’ 
(Unigrafia 2011); Repo (n 112) 228.  
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its foundations and powerful effects. The appearance of gender has helped to unveil 
the social power of sex. Gender revealed itself as a biopolitical tool due to its 
acceptation of the fixed binary of masculine and feminine.  
Jemina Repo argues that gender equality policy is biopolitical. She defines 
gender as an apparatus that controls and determines life, reproduction and capital. 
She questions the usefulness of the term due to its connection to neoliberalism. Her 
questioning parallels Anu Pylkkanen’s claims about the limitations of the concept of 
equality, described in Chapter 1. The usefulness of the concept of gender in 
attachment to the concept of equality—gender equality—will be questioned. The 
inclusion of the term gender as a concept entails the transformation of equality 
between the sexes into gender equality. Therefore, Repo claims, the introduction of 
the concept of gender accompanying the terms policy, role, or equality transformed 
the sexed and the binary into the neutral. I would call this a paradoxical 
transformation, because, despite the intended neutrality, gender is still limited to the 
binary imposed by sex. This is an important issue, as the understanding of the 
concepts of sex and gender is the foundation for feminist legal strategies to fight 
discrimination.  
Gender becomes a neutral site in which women are depicted as equals to men 
while the normative machinery of power, or what Foucault called biopower, is still 
maintained. Gender is a key organizing factor of society, with the ability to change 
behaviours in order to adapt the society to actual socio-political needs while 
maintaining the status of sex untouched. Gender was introduced by feminists to 
envision the protean construction of sex discrimination, and later developed further 
to unveil the plastic construction of sex. The adverse effects of the neutral concept 
of gender are a consequence of the hidden and invisible power of patriarchy that is 
embedded in all structures.177  
Feminist theories have developed their understanding of gender to unveil the 
binary relationship between biology and culture that is one of the dangerous effects 
of the use of the concept of gender.178 It appears as a source of power that maintains 
the truth about nature and hierarchy. Besides Jemina Repo, many other feminist 
scholars doubt the validity of the concept of gender. In the words of Palazzi: “Gender 
as a social construction is a ‘compulsory mask’ imposed from above, depending on 
the creation of social hierarchy: it is a fictional construction, without any basis or 
foundation. There is nothing either in front or behind: indeed, power hides behind. 
 
 
177  The relation between patriarchy and gender is analysed in Chapter 6. 
178  Critiques of the nature vs. culture binary arose in postmodern feminism. See: Judith 
Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Routledge 2011).  
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Nature is only presumed, it also being constructed by power just as society”.179 
Similarly to Palazzi, Butler has criticized the way that gender became a tool of power 
that normalized the feminine and the masculine as the normative. This is the event 
that Jemina Repo emphasizes in her claim that gender is a biopolitical tool, due to 
the fact that “gender originated as a new life-administering technology that did not 
replace but operated alongside the apparatus of sexuality”.180 Biopower rests in sex; 
however, the linking between sex and gender transposes the power to gender in its 
attempt to substitute for sex. Gender just becomes sex blurred by the pretence of 
being a neutral term  
The neutral language of gender converts the politically incorrect language of sex 
into the neutral, politically correct language of gender. Biopower acts by invisibly 
adjusting the subject to the normal. The understanding of the normal is normativized 
by the structures and the abstract power that regulate life. The normal is what can be 
named and defined, while not normal cannot be named, as it does not exist—as, for 
instance, those who are called outlaws181. The lack of language to name outlaws 
denies their existence, as they cannot even become the other. In the binary of sex, 
the woman in discourse can still exist as she departs as the Other, which at least 
implies an existence. Therefore, the term gender, after its process of genderatization, 
adapts to support the binary of sex while being politically correct enough and 
wielding enough power to maintain the natural systems. The new language of gender 
does not break with the limitations of the discourse. The concept of gender becomes 
an invisible hidden power, a method of normalization through which the masculine 
and the feminine survive as the norm. It is part of the “biopolitical production” of 
capitalism, which combines economic power with culture.    
  
 
 
179  Laura Palazzani, Gender in Philosophy and Law (Springer Science & Business Media 
2012) 41. 
180  Repo (n 112) 228. 
181  I will use the term outlaws in the way Kate Bornstein uses it; that is, to name the 
unnamed, or those who cannot be said to belong to the category woman or man. Many 
diverse specific subjects fall under the umbrella of the name outlaw, but aren’t given 
more unique names themselves. Kate Bornstein and S Bear Bergman, Gender Outlaws: 
The Next Generation (Seal Press 2010). 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have looked at the transformation of the concept of gender from a 
grammatical term to a conceptual tool. The relationship between sex and gender is 
fundamental to this transformation. Yet, despite its original meaning, which relates 
to the grammatical inflection of nouns set in a threefold frame, the term gender has 
become a concept that places people in two categories. The third, ‘neuter’, category 
has disappeared and forced gender to adapt itself to sex. It seems this is an effect of 
two factors. One, an evident action of binary thinking that predetermines the 
conceptualization of the term gender within the binaries of normative thinking. 
Second, the ascription of sex to the natural empirical binary of sex. The positive 
aspects of this process convert the term gender into a useful concept with which to 
explain the cultural grounds in the process of becoming women and men.  
Nevertheless, among the negative aspects lies the concept’s inability to 
overcome the imposed binary of sex. Moreover, the growing use and acceptance of 
this concept hinders the appearance of new terms to name those who do not conform 
the binary, rendering such subjects invisible. Indeed, these two problems intrinsic to 
the Anglo-Saxon concept of gender travel into other European languages through the 
importing of the term and concept.  
The limitation of the concept of gender to a binary framework also affects the 
intersection between the concepts of sex, gender and sexuality. All of them end up 
staying within the binary limits and culturally imposed heterosexuality.  
If we want to express gender as a continuum, it is difficult to find terms not 
delimited by the binary. The option is to use the term gender as “gender continuum” 
or “gender spectrum” however in both cases the use of the term gender  creates 
confusion between the two different meanings ascribes to its relation to sex keeping 
it delimited to a binary of sex. There is no term to depict other possibilities that are 
real, as defined by Deleuze. The terms we use now restricts us to the actual. There is 
a mismatch with reality because the lack of a term or concept to define the continuum 
makes it unreal. The continuum appears unreal and only belongs to the abstract 
world; it becomes only what is possible but not actual. The concept of gender as a 
continuum only finds its place as an expression of identity detached from the binary 
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of the body. We have a concept of gender as a continuum182 to overturn the mastery 
of the binary acceptation, still attached to a binary body.  
To effectively overcome the binary, it is necessary to have new terms that can 
visualize all those unnamed who exist in the continuum183, to name all the other 
bodies beyond the binary. For that, we also need a new term able to break the binary 
of sex, one that is not sustained by that binary. The reality is that the lack of words 
to depict the materiality of the bodies that are outside of the binary norm hinders the 
acknowledgement of the invisible reality. Language in this case is acting as an active 
biopolitical controller that does not allow space to envision the excluded 
possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
182  This used of the concept of gender is explained in Chapter 3. 
183  In Chapter 8, I will propose the use of new concepts. 
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3 THE CONCEPT OF GENDER IN 
FEMINIST THEORY 
Feminist theories offer an array of positions to explain how women’s subordination 
is historically rooted in every society.184 As Jean Grimshaw notes, “the way feminists 
conceptualize women’s oppression, its causes and the responses to it, varies from 
one feminist ideology to another”.185 In their efforts to improve women’s position in 
society, feminists have employed the concept of gender and explained gender 
relations from various different theoretical perspectives. However, even though the 
development of the notion of gender and its growing use occurred hand in hand with 
feminism, it is crucial, as Jo Shaw suggests, “to distinguish between ‘gender’ and 
‘feminism,’ as asking the question of ‘gender’ does not necessarily have to be 
‘feminist’”.186 There is, indeed, a certain amount of confusion in making the 
distinction, since the term gender seems to have merged with feminism.187 It may 
seem that gender has become the political subject of feminism, which is not the 
case.188 Feminism is a political movement that has influence on and interacts with 
feminist theories, whereas gender is one of the categories or fields of knowledge that 
feminists use in their research. In other words, gender is a feminist tool or category 
of study. Moreover, whereas gender studies is a field of knowledge and study, 
 
 
184  Momin Rahman and Stevi Jackson, Gender and Sexuality (Polity 2010).  
185  Jean Grimshaw, Philosophy and Feminist Thinking (University of Minnesota Press 
1986).  
186  Jo Shaw, ‘Importing Gender: The Challenge of Feminism and the Analysis of the EU 
Legal Order’ (2000) 7 Journal of European Public Policy 406. 
187  This is part of the debate addressed in the Introduction in the methodology section. 
188  Judith Butler, ‘Subjects of Sex /Gender/Desire’, Gender Trouble : Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (Routledge 1999). An example of this merging is the notion of 
gender violence, which in Spanish law is defined as violence against women, as though 
the only recognised victims could be women. 
The Concept of Gender in Feminist Theory 
 63 
feminism is not only a field of knowledge and study but a political movement as 
well.189 
The conflation of feminism and gender further extends to the discussion about 
the natural relationship between sex and gender190, as feminists at first attempted to 
denaturalize this relation, a difficult task due to the interdependence of these 
concepts. In all disciplines, difficulties around gender and sex abound, although they 
became especially evident with the emergence of postmodern theories referring to 
the fluidity of gender beyond the binary, as will be detailed in this chapter. In an 
attempt to further distance the terms from natural relations, postmodern theories has 
contributed to a different approach to the relationship between sex and gender. This 
process of denaturalization has come to include sex, or more specifically, the cultural 
construction of the sex binary191. This different approach has produced a heated 
discussion and, on the part of some mainly religion-influenced scholars, even the 
 
 
189  It is not possible to refer to feminism as only one feminism/ideology or one unique 
school. Rather, there are a variety of approaches, sometimes classified by their 
political ideologies (liberal, radical, Marxist), by waves (for example, first, second, 
and third wave feminism), or by countries of origin, such as French feminism, U.S. 
feminism or Italian feminism. See Alison M Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human 
Nature (Rowman & Littlefield 1983). Later, other authors followed this 
classification, such as Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive 
Introduction (3rd edn, Westview Press 2009). Tong analyses the different feminist 
approaches to oppression and discrimination of women, adding cultural and 
postmodern feminism. For other classifications see: Chris Beasley, Gender and 
Sexuality: Critical Theories, Critical Thinkers (SAGE 2005); Nancy F Cott, Juliet 
Mitchell and Ann Oakley, What Is Feminism? (Pantheon Books 1986); Judith Butler 
and Elizabeth Weed, The Question of Gender: Joan W. Scott’s Critical Feminism 
(Indiana University Press 2011); Marta Calás and Linda Smircich, ‘From the 
´Woman´s Point of View’ Ten Years Later: Towards a Feminist Organization 
Studies’ in Stewart R Clegg and others (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Organization 
Studies (SAGE 2006).  
190  Suzanne J Kessler and Wendy McKenna, Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach 
(Univ of Chicago Press 1985). 
191  Jane Flax, ‘Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory’ (1987) 12 Signs 
621; Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (n 179). 
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depiction of the end of the world192. Therefore, this process suggests overall that the 
use of the term gender in law also needs to be reconsidered. As Celia Amorós claims, 
“[E]n el feminismo conceptualizar siempre es politizar. Por eso es tan importante 
conceptualizar y tratar de conceptualizar bien.”193 
In this chapter, I start by explaining how the concept of gender has travelled from 
the medical sciences into other disciplines. After this brief introduction to the 
concept of gender, I analyse the use of the concept of gender by feminism and 
describe the historical development of feminist theory with a focus on its approach 
to gender. I will divide this chapter in two parts. The first part consists of the analysis 
of the evolution of the concept of gender within feminism, and the second part 
consists of a classification of the different feminist epistemologies, grouping them 
by their attitude toward gender.  
The development of the concept of gender within feminism has involved two 
main approaches. These two different moments in the development of the concept 
are driven by different perspectives on the relation between sex and gender.  In my 
classification, I argue that within postmodern feminism (post-movement in general) 
it is possible to differentiate two groups. One feminist group focuses on diversity 
and the other follows queer theory. Throughout my classification, I also address the 
insights of each feminist epistemology into positive law. This is not a deep analysis 
 
 
192  Michael Bond and Nick Ward, A Bear in Hot Water (IU Derechos Humanos UCM 
1995); Dale O’Leary, The Gender Agenda: Redefining Equality (Vital Issues Pr 1997); 
Murube, ‘La Ideología de Género En Las Conferencias Mundiales de La Mujer 
Organizadas Por Naciones Unidas.’ (Universidad de Navarra 2011); Carmen Maillo, 
‘Las Negaciones de Lo Humano Presentes En La Ideología de Género.’ (Universidad 
de Navarra 2011); Martha Miranda and Dolores López Hernández, Ideología de 
Género: Perspectivas Filosófica-Antropológica, Social y Jurídica (Editorial Promesa 
y Universidad de Navarra 2011). This this new approach itself is seen by its opposition 
as the end of family values, or that opposition has arisen to this new approach on the 
par of those who call it the end of family and principles, as denounced, for example, in 
France by the movement “La manif pour tous” see: www.lamanifpourtous.fr and in 
Spain similar concerns have been raised by the association Hazte oir see 
www.hateoir.org who flet a bus against transsexuals in Madrid in 2017 see 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/03/23/actualidad/1490225852_325943.html. The 
fear comes from what they refer to as the ideology of gender, la ideologie du genre or 
la ideologia de genero, which they claim is against all human values and principles. See 
http://es.catholic.net/op/articulos/41418/cat/447/que-es-la-ideologia-de-genero.html#; 
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2018/02/14/diario_de_espana/1518620038_057366
.html;http://www.lasexualidadimporta.org/quienes-somos/ideologia-de-
genero/;http://www.faith.org.uk/article/gender-theory-and-gender-ideology 
193  The translation is (my own translation): “In feminism, to conceptualize is always to 
politicize. This is why it is so important to conceptualize, and to try to conceptualize 
well " in Celia Amorós, La gran diferencia y sus pequeñas consecuencias para las 
luchas de las mujeres (Universitat de València 2005) 128. 
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of feminism and law, but rather a guide that will help to lead into the next chapter 
dedicated to gender and law.  
3.1 Gender and Sex: The Medical Background 
There are two moments in the development of the concept of gender. The first link 
between gender as grammatical category and the binary marked by sex can be seen 
in the 17th century194. More recently, in the mid-20th century, gender became 
conceptualized as ‘sociocultural sex’. This concept of gender originating from the 
mid-twentieth century is relatively recent.195 This changing understanding of the 
concept of gender has been accompanied by the evolution of the concept in different 
disciplines from sciences to humanities196. 
The anthropologist Margaret Mead is considered the foremother of gender as a 
concept; however, she only used the term “sex roles”. Her two books Sex and 
Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935) and Male and Female (1949) 
explain how societies divide human characteristics into two. Mead used the term 
“sex roles” to provide evidence for the cultural construction of the masculine and 
feminine that later would be defined as gender.197  
The psychologist John Money198 and the psychiatrist Robert Stoller199 later 
altered the term from sex (roles) to gender (roles). Money used the term “gender 
role” to describe the behaviour assigned to men and women. Later, in 1968, 
Stoller used gender as an analytical category to clarify the differences between 
sex and gender.200 Stoller studied the culturally driven experiences of women and 
 
 
194  Udry (n 94).For the development from grammatical category see Chapter 2.  
195  See Peggy Reeves Sanday, ‘Margaret Mead’s View of Sex Roles in Her Own and Other 
Societies’ (1980) 82 American Anthropologist 340; Robert J Stoller, Sex and Gender: 
On the Development of Masculinity and Femininity (Science House 1968); Ann Oakley, 
Sex, Gender and Society (Maurice Temple Smith Ltd 1972). In sociology, the term 
gender became popular through the works of sociologist Ann Oakley, who 
demonstrated that gender roles in our society are acquired via the process of 
socialisation rather than being biologically determined.  
196  Charlene L Muehlenhard and Zoe D Peterson, ‘Distinguishing Between Sex and 
Gender: History, Current Conceptualizations, and Implications.’ (2011) 64 Sex roles 
791. 
197  Delphy explains Margaret Mead’s view on gender and how her term “sex roles” 
developed into the concept of gender. See Christine Delphy, ‘Rethinking Sex and 
Gender’ (1993) 16 Women’s Studies International Forum 1; ‘Penser Le Genre - 
Editions Syllepse’ <http://www.syllepse.net/lng_FR_srub_62_iprod_585-penser-le-
genre.html>. 
198  John Money and Anke A Ehrhardt, Man and Woman, Boy and Girl: Gender Identity 
from Conception to Maturity (N, Jason Aronson Inc Publishers 1996). 
199  Stoller (n 196). 
200  Palazzani (n 180). 
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men. He pointed out the role of culture in assigning different attributes depending 
on a person’s sex, the cultural attributes being more determining than the ones 
based on sex. Therefore, Money and Stoller both stressed the superior role of 
culture over nature. They focused on the initial meaning of gender as a category 
that later was revealed to be a principle that organized society and all aspects of 
people’s lives.201  
The introduction of the concept of sex roles, later gender, helped to explain how 
manhood and womanhood are discursive constructions supported by culture and 
society, and they are not strictly derived from an individual’s sexual 
characteristics.202 The emergence of the concept of sex roles, male and female 
differences were rather justified as an aspect of culture than  “nature”. Nature set the 
rules of biological determinism. Natural law, which came directly from God, 
imposed differences between humans, justifying the subordination of women on 
account of their sexual attributes. The defining characteristics of men as masculine 
and women as feminine were seen as having a biological basis and being immutable. 
Biological determinism traditionally advocated that sex, especially the female sex, 
brought with it an inevitable determination—namely, that only women were able to 
procreate.203 One aspect of women’s procreation, specifically the notion of 
procreation without any active involvement by men, is represented by the Virgin 
Mary204. The view of women as individual procreators condemned them to a unique 
way of life—i.e., motherhood.205  
 
 
201  Following María Viveros Vigoya, who says that the category of gender applies to all 
aspects of life. She writes: “Me referiré, brevemente, a los ámbitos (1) simbólico, (2) 
normativo, (3) institucional, (4) subjetivo y (5) politico (the (1) symbolic, (2) 
normative, (3) institutional, (4) subjective, and (5) political aspects of gender). See 
Maria Viveros, ‘Notas En Torno a La Categoría Analítica de Género’ in Ángela Inés 
Robledo and Yolanda Puyana Villamizar (eds), Ética: masculinidades y feminidades 
(Centro de Estudios Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2000). 
202  There is a significant move from women’s studies to gender studies that has affected 
the language used by scholars, particularly the efforts of some scholars to break the 
dual sex/gender system. See Canning (n 111). 
203  Women are seen as being primarily responsible for procreation (and the only ones who 
carry the child and give birth) which differs from reality they are not the only ones able 
to procreate as men are also involve in procreation. 
204  Julia Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time Signs’ (1981) 7 Signs 13. 
205  This is still an embedded feature of our world today. Most legislation and discourse still 
depict women as the sole procreators. 
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3.2 Feminism and Gender 
The feminist approach to gender has derived from a variety of theories206; feminism 
sought answers to explain oppression of women, and turned to the idea of gender 
discrimination, which entailed looking closely at or using the concept of gender. 
During second-wave feminism207, the concept of patriarchy lived together with the 
concept of gender, which slowly became the main analytical category to understand 
the sources of women’s oppression.208 It was after the publication of Simone de 
Beauvoir’s Second Sex in 1948, which stated that “[o]ne is not born, but rather 
becomes a woman”, that the concept of gender became the most important tool for 
analyzing women’s issues, even if Beauvoir did not name it as such in her texts. 
Simone de Beauvoir´s quotation expresses the power of gender, the social constraints 
that determine who and what a woman is, what her status is, and how she must relate 
to the other sex/gender. The main aim of using this differentiation between sex and 
gender was to help in the effort of detaching sexual subordination and oppression 
from biological inferiority. During the 1970s, gender became characterized as a 
useful concept. Feminism, already a strong movement at this time, foresaw the 
possibilities of employing the concept of gender. The strategic use of gender by 
feminism led to the blossoming of both. Since then, feminist epistemologies have 
utilised the concept of gender in their analysis; however, not all of them use it in the 
same way.209  
 
 
206  The different types of feminism have traditionally been classified as waves or as 
political theories of feminism and law. Natalie Persadie differentiates between feminist 
legal theory and feminist critical theory in Natalie Persadie, A Critical Analysis of the 
Efficacy of Law as a Tool to Achieve Gender Equality (University Press of America 
2012).See also Linda Nicholson, ‘La Genealogía Del Género’ (1992) V Hiparquia. 
207  Second-wave feminism came after the suffragettes’ movement. 
208  As Maria Drakopolou told me this might be an statement because, “Patriarchy refers 
primarily to the mode of organization of social structures and institutions whilst gender 
has a different function and meaning, as indeed the thesis correctly argues. The two are 
not directly equivalent”. However, many times patriarchy is uses as equal to gender and 
“refers to the mode of organization of social structures and institutions” specially before 
the use of gender to analyse identity politics. This is explained in detailed in Chapter 6. 
209  As I will analyse later, it is not until the mid ’70s and the beginning of the ’80s that the 
term gender is adopted within feminism, and mainly in Anglo-American feminism. 
American liberal feminism did not use gender as a term or concept. The term was 
slowly introduced by later feminist movements until it become generalized within all 
different feminisms. Regarding the use of gender to refer to women in UN legal texts, 
see Ali Miller, ‘Fighting over the Figure of Gender’ (2011) 31 Pace L. Rev. 837. 
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The different feminist approaches to gender and its use affect the understanding of 
and approach to specific gendered problems210. A shared belief in the cultural nature 
of gender has guided the analysis of sex and women211. The uncovering of the power 
of culture in society has provoked a shift in the understanding of sex discrimination, 
oppression, and domination.212 The feminist analyses of gender played an important 
role in forcing a transition from the biological determinism of sex to socially 
constructed gender relations.213 The main insight was to distinguish between the 
culturally constructed and the biologically determined, a distinction used to 
dismantle fixed gendered roles in society.214 The feminist approaches to gender215 
highlighted how our assumptions concerning gender roles and relations are culturally 
constructed and grounded in societal allocations of power within relationships, 
culture, politics, and law.  
 
 
210  Katharine Bartlett, ‘Gender Law’ (1994) 1 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 1; 
Patricia A Cain, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories’ (1988) 4 Berkeley 
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211  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113); Goetz and Baden (n 
4); Canning (n 111); P England, ‘The Gender Revolution: Uneven and Stalled’ (2010) 
24 Gender & Society 149; Kathleen Daly, ‘Different Ways of Conceptualizing 
Sex/Gender in Feminist Theory and Their Implications for Criminology’ (1997) 1 
Theoretical Criminology 25. 
212  Anne Phillips, Feminism and Politics (Oxford University Press 1998); Martha Minow, 
‘Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 47; 
Gary Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements: Law and Jurisprudence At Century’s End 
(NYU Press 1996); Cain, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories’ (n 211); 
Drucilla Cornell, At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality (Princeton 
University Press 1998).  
213  Unger and Crawford (n 95). 
214  Discrimination based on biological difference is well explained by Toril Moi in Moi (n 
139) 15.Toril Moi, ‘What Is a Woman? Appropriating Bourdieu: Feminist Theory and 
Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology of Culture’, what is a woman and Other Essays? ((Oxford 
University Press 1999) 15. 
215   Christine Delphy, L’ennemi principal: Penser le genre (Éd Syllepse 2001); Butler, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (n 179); Teresa De Lauretis, 
‘La Tecnología Del Género’, Diferencias. Etapas de un camino a través del feminismo 
(Horas y Horas 2000).  
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3.2.1 Defining Sex and Gender 
The concept of gender emerged in opposition to biological determinism, and this 
implied an intertwining of gender and sex. Moreover, in this intertwining, sexuality 
appears as another concept in close relation to sex and gender; as Eve Sedgwick says, 
they are “three terms whose usage relations and analytical relations are almost 
irremediably slippery”.216 At first sight these concepts seem clear, but on closer 
inspection the boundaries prove misleading, so that the three factors—sex, gender, 
and sexuality—become confused217. 
Understanding the cultural basis of gender, however, required the separation of 
gender from sex. Following the British sociologist Ann Oakley,218 the French 
sociologist Christine Delphy has formulated the following definitions: 
Sex is the genetic, physiological and anatomical characteristics that determine a 
person as a male or female.  
Gender refers to the social differences that are culturally learned. They can 
change over time and be displayed differently in every society. Gender encompasses 
behaviours, roles, the assessment made by others about one, and expectations about 
one’s behaviour. 219 
The definition of these terms indicates the influence of the concept of gender 
imported from the health sciences. Sex has become a medicalized category and 
gender a psychological category influenced by society220. However, despite the 
physically embodied nature of sex, as Mary Hawekesworth claims, sex is something 
more than mere biology. She says, “Sex is also a political category and a legal status 
that determines citizenship rights, educational and employment opportunities, levels 
of income and wealth, and access to prestige and power”221.  
Gender is socially constructed, with attributes assigned according to sex. Indeed, 
at first sight there is a close link between sex and gender that creates what Garfinkel 
calls the natural attitude.222 A natural attitude also extends to another aspect of 
 
 
216  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press 
1990) 27. 
217  Mary Ann Case, ‘Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 
1; Ki Namaste, ‘Genderbashing: Sexuality, Gender, and the Regulation of Public 
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218  Oakley (n 196). 
219  Delphy, ‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’ (n 198). 
220  Sex is about biology and gender about identity and how one feels about him/herself. 
221  Hawkesworth, ‘Sex, Gender, and Sexuality: From Naturalized Presumption to 
Analytical Categories’ in Karen Celis, Johanna Kantola and Weldon S. Laurel (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (2013) 1. 
222  Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Prentice-Hall 1967). 
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nature, sexuality, which is exercised according to the condition of gender. Therefore, 
what is the role of sexuality? First, as with the other concepts, we need to know what 
we are referring to when we address sexuality. Do we refer to sexual orientation or 
desire? Or do we take a more holistic approach, constituted by the total expression 
of who we are—that is to say, the interplay between the body, gender (identity, role) 
and sexual orientation, including one’s values, expressions and behaviours? The 
complexity of this relation, however, gets reduced to the dimorphism of sex, just as 
gender does, assuming the existence of only two sexes or two genders. Along these 
lines, Eve Sedgwick critiques the feminist conflation of sex, gender and sexuality 
and proposes the separation of these three concepts. She offers the axiom, “The study 
of sexuality is not coextensive with the study of gender; correspondingly the study 
of antihomophobic inquiry is not coextensive with feminist inquiry. But we can’t 
know in advance how they will be different.”223 
Nevertheless, despite the later confusion around sex, gender, and sometimes 
sexuality, the introduction of the concept of gender helped to clarify how 
discrimination was grounded in culture rather than biology. 
3.2.2 Feminist Contributions to the Evolution of the Relation 
between Sex and Gender 
The different feminist approaches to the relation between sex and gender would 
come to elaborate more complex definitions of sex and gender than the ones 
previously provided by Delphy.224 The social aspect of gender, in which power plays 
an important role, is integrated into the definition of gender by Laure Bereni, 
Sebastien Chauvin, Alexandre Jaunait, and Anne Revillard in their book 
Introduction aux etudes sur le genre. In it they say, “A partir de ces quatre dimension 
analytiques (construction social, approche relationnelle, rapport de pouvoir, 
intersectionalité), le genre peut être défini comme un système de bicategorisation 
hiérarchisé entre les sexes (hommes/femmes) et entre les valeurs et représentations 
qui leur sont associées (masculin/féminin) ”225. This definition also tries to 
incorporate the understanding of sex as part of the realm of the social, as a cultural 
construction, moving away from the approaches that place sex and gender in 
opposition. In this definition, gender is a social system of division, stressing the 
binary divide and the hierarchy implicit in this binary. Regarding sex, the authors 
 
 
223  Sedgwick (n 217) 27. 
224  See the previously given definitions of sex and gender in the previous section 3.2.1 
Defining sex and gender  
225  Laure Bereni and others, Introduction Aux Études Sur Le Genre (De Boeck Supérieur 
2012) 10. 
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say, “Pour qualifier les positions qu’il constitue (être une femme, être un homme) on 
parlera de ‘sexes’ et non de ‘genres’”226. The two sexes are the resulting categories 
of the social system of division and therefore gender precedes sex. Despite the 
feminist efforts to establish a definition acknowledging the social construction of 
sex, the binary is still implicit in both terms.  
Another interesting definition is provided by Anna Grear: “‘Sex’, it has been 
assumed, refers to an underlying ‘natural’ ‘reality’ of a body sexed as either female 
or male, with vagina or penis, and a general morphology matching the genital 
identity of an individual. ‘Gender’, on the other hand, has often been taken to refer 
to the socio-cultural move from maleness to masculinity or from femaleness to 
femininity.”227 Grear stresses the importance of the genitals in the construction of 
sex, as did Ann Oakley before her, and highlights some important concepts in 
feminism such as ‘natural’, ‘reality’, ‘body’, ‘genitals’, ‘identity’, or ‘masculinity 
and femininity’. All these elements end up being crucial to the feminist analysis and 
playing a primary role in the feminist approach to the relation between sex and 
gender.  
3.2.3 An Analysis of the Relation between the Concepts of 
Gender and Sex in Feminism 
The different approaches to the sex/gender relationship show many nuances in 
defining gender as a concept and in its relation to sex. The understanding of the 
relation between gender and sex has varied over the years, moving from considering 
gender as social sex228 or the cultural construction of sex within a hierarchy in which 
women are subordinated to men229 to considering gender as performance.230 
Nonetheless, all of these understandings agree on the social and cultural character of 
gender231 without, however, supplying a unified stance.232  
 
 
226  ibid. 
227  Anna Grear, ‘“Sexing the Matrix”: Embodiment, Disembodiment and the Law: 
Towards the Re-Gendering of Legal Personality’ in Jackie Jones and others (eds), 
Gender, Sexualities and Law (Routledge 2011) 40.  
228  Oakley (n 196). 
229  Catharine A MacKinnon, ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for 
Theory’ (1982) 7 Signs 515.Catharine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the 
State (Harvard University Press 1989). 
230  Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (n 179). 
231  A detailed list of ways in which the term gender has been used can be found in Mary 
Hawkesworth, ‘Confounding Gender’ (1997) 22 Signs 649; Canning (n 111).  
232  Flax (n 192) 627.  
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3.2.3.1 The Modern/Postmodern Framework in the Feminist use of 
Gender 
Mary Hawkesworth finds that gender has been approached as sex roles, stereotypes, 
status, as an individual attribute, as relations, socialization, as a social organization, 
as part of the psyche or consciousness, as power, as disciplinary device, as a 
structure, as difference, as exclusion, whether universal or historical. In all of these 
approaches, the binary of sex is left fixed and uncontested.233   
A basic divide, although most probably simplistic within academia but that might 
help to easily clarify the relation between sex, gender and feminism, comes from the 
modern and postmodern distinction in the feminist approach to gender.234  
In general terms, the modern feminist approach, which cannot be considered as 
monolithic rather with many different strands, suggested a significant advance in the 
fight against discrimination by drawing limits between biological sex and social sex. 
At this time we refer to the two-sex model related to a two-gender model established 
a primary difference between the naturalness of sex and the cultural nature of gender. 
Defining this nature/culture binary was the belief that sex was fixed and universal, 
whereas gender was variable, changing through time and space.235 Nevertheless, this 
was not convincing for many feminists who saw the concept of gender as 
problematic from many angles.  
The critiques from non-normative, non-white or non-heterosexual women state 
that the relationship established between sex and gender gave meaning only to 
recognized categories such as woman, femininity, or womanhood. The critics of 
gender as a main isolated factor shift attention to intersectionality236, a theoretical 
approach that focuses on the many different aspects that might create discrimination, 
with gender only one among many other factors. The critique of gender also stems 
from discontent over the close relation between sex and gender. Some feminists 
claim that this relation essentializes women and keeps some subjects out of the 
picture—for instance, intersex or queer individuals.  
 
 
233  Hawkesworth, ‘Sex, Gender, and Sexuality: From Naturalized Presumption to 
Analytical Categories’ (n 222).  
234  I agree with the critics that might consider that this generalization is somewhat 
reductive of the rich content of postmodern feminism, however it is a way to address 
the complexity of feminism , sex and gender. Even if simplistic, still there are other 
academicians who still do not even recognize the existence of a modern and postmodern 
feminism. 
235  Cott, Mitchell and Oakley (n 190). 
236  Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’ (2006) 13 European Journal 
of Women ’s Studies 193; Patricia Hill Collins and Valerie Chepp, ‘Patricia Hill Collins 
and Valerie Chepp “Intersectionality”’ in Karen Celis, Johana Kantola and S Laurel 
Weldon (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (2013). 
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These critiques open the path to the postmodern approach, which also consists 
on many different strands and approaches, but which in general supposes a shift in 
the feminist understanding of gender, arguing that gender precedes sex and not the 
other way around.237 This approach is charaterized by believing that gender affects 
the sexualization of bodies and establishes an artificial divide between the two 
sexes.238 Still, I must note that this is a generalization as within the postmodern 
feminists strands there are some which not use the term gender and prefer that of 
sexual difference or the feminist Luce Irigaray who tries to avoid the use of the term 
gender (genre) and uses sex (sexe) . Searching for the common traits within the 
different postmodern strands we might say that the main trait of the postmodern 
approach recognizes the existence of multiple genders or gender diversity.239 
However, even if at first sight seems a new original approach, it is important to note 
that Andrea Dworkin already in 1974 refered to “the fiction that there are two distinct 
polar sexes”240 thus  claiming the social construction of the binary of sex. This 
approach might be considered the seed for identity politics and the understanding of 
sex as culturally constructed. 
Postmodern approach to gender is criticized within feminism because it turns 
away from the woman as a political subject.241 Therefore, the influence of the 
postmodern approach, in which sex and gender are considered cultural constructions, 
has been more important to the queer movement and queer theory. The queer 
understanding of gender rejects the use of the political subject women as the locus 
of feminism.242 The queer approach to the concept of gender is significant in creating 
tension between feminism and queer theory243. Furthermore, as mentioned when 
defining the concepts, the relation between sex and gender becomes further 
complicated with the addition of sexuality as another actor in the relation between 
the two concepts.244  
Modern and postmodern feminism take different approaches to the concept of 
gender and its relation to sex, based on different treatment of the nature/culture 
 
 
237  Christine Delphy, ‘Penser Le Genre’.Sexe et genre, De hiérarchie entre les sexes.  
http://1libertaire.free.fr/delphy4.html. 
238  Flax (n 192); Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (n 
179).) 
239  Monro (n 14). 
240  Andrea Dworkin, Woman Hating (Penguin 1991) 175. 
241   Martha Craven Nussbaum, ‘The Professor of Parody’ [1999] The New Republic 37. 
242  Mandy Merck, Naomi Segal and Elizabeth Wright (eds), Coming Out of Feminism? (1 
edition, Wiley-Blackwell 1998). 
243  Beasley (n 190). 
244  D Richardson, ‘Patterned Fluidities: (Re)Imagining the Relationship between Gender 
and Sexuality’ (2007) 41 Sociology 457. 
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divide.245 Which approach, then, is the best or right one? Or, as posited by Jackson 
and Scott, “When we connect gender and sex, are we comparing something social 
with something natural, or are we comparing something social with something which 
is also social in this case, the way a given society represents ‘biology’ to itself?”246. 
3.2.3.2 Two Approaches to the Relation between Sex and Gender 
Izquierdo´s approach to gender247 helps to sum up the different feminist approaches 
to the relation between sex and gender. There are two clear stages in the definition 
of the relation between sex and gender and now they coexist as possibilities for 
theoretical approaches. The first, following Izquierdo, represents the binary 
approach—with sex and gender at opposite ends—which corresponds to the modern 
feminist approach248. In this first approach, gender is an effect of sex, in which 
gender appears as being in opposition to sex. The second one is the 
bipolar/continuum approach—the distinction between the two becomes blurrier—
which corresponds with the postmodern feminist approach.249 In this approach, 250, 
both sex and gender are considered to be culturally constructed, and thus the 
boundaries between the two concepts begin to break down.  
 
 
245  I agree with Maria Drakopoulou who commented on my thesis that “Modern and 
Postmodern feminism are broad characterizations and by no means hold a unified, or 
even, similar conceptions of gender.” Nevertheless, it makes easier to understand the 
approaches to the relation of gender when looking at the ways the different strands of 
feminism within modern or postmodern approaches refers in a general way to the 
relation between sex and gender and how they address gender.  
246  Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott, Gender: A Sociological Reader (Psychology Press 2002). 
247  Izquierdo (n 27). See also Chapter 2 
248  Modern feminism is the form of feminism that has still not been influenced by 
postmodern theory see introduction.  
249  Linda McDowell, ‘Doing Gender: Feminism, Feminists and Research Methods in 
Human Geography’ (1992) 17 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 399. 
250  West and Zimmerman’s article ‘Doing Gender’ explains the process of travelling from 
one view to another. Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman, ‘Doing Gender’ (1987) 1 
Gender & Society 125. 
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Figure 2. Two stages in the relation between sex and gender 
3.2.4 The Nature/Culture Framework of Sex/Gender 
First, feminism embraced the concept of gender as the social representation of sex. 
Sex discrimination was displaced by gender discrimination, as discrimination is 
derived from the social norms that define gender. This approach emphasizes the 
association of sex with nature251 and of gender with culture, 252 and the two are still 
often understood this way today. This stance is represented by Oakley when she 
speaks of the “natural” constancy of sex in opposition to the variability of gender.253 
Garfinkel, for his part, refers to a “natural attitude”, meaning a belief that relies on 
biology even if this is problematized by some biological science.254 This “natural 
attitude” is grounded in the natural moral facts that rule sex.255  
 
Figure 3.  First approach to the relation between sex and gender 
 
 
251  Nature is understood as the source of biological determinism. Nature gives us a sex and 
with it certain sexual attributes. 
252  Culture in opposition to nature represents social construction giving meaning to the 
natural.  
253  Oakley (n 196) 16. 
254  As cited by Hawkesworth in ‘Confounding Gender’ Garfinkel writes that “the beliefs 
constituting the natural attitude are ‘incorrigible’ in that they are held with such 
conviction that it is nearly impossible to challenge their validity”. See Hawkesworth, 
‘Confounding Gender’ (n 232) 146. 
255  Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Prentice-Hall 1967). 
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The opposition between sex and gender was further developed by Gayle Rubin in 
what she called “the sex/gender system”, meaning “a set of arrangements by which 
the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human social 
intervention”.256 This distinction is important, as Rubin saw it, in defining the 
relation between gender and sexuality. She did not refer to desire, as women’s 
sexuality was understood in culture and society as reproductive sexuality. Gender 
was understood as a separate concept from sex and the focus was put on its social 
construction. Gender became independent from biology and from sex. Gender is 
constituted by politically driven power relations and sexual oppression. Kate Millett 
followed this line of thinking, pointing to the cultural rather than the biological basis 
of gender, and emphasizing its political character,257 while Catherine MacKinnon 
focused on the sexual oppression of women, mainly driven in the form of  constraints 
on women’s sexuality.258 This approach to the concept of gender highlighted the link 
between sexuality and gender. Feminism called attention to the major role that 
heterosexuality plays as an institution that organizes sexuality.259 
Joan Scott suggested that gender is the basis of sexual difference, which builds 
relations of power, domination, and oppression that are not grounded in “nature” but 
rather in culture and politics.260 In this context, gender means relations, influenced 
by the cultural behaviors imposed on sex which in turn is influenced by other 
people’s expectations of certain normative behaviours. Therefore, gender, as Anna 
Kostikova has posited, became “a new subject of research – that is, of relations 
between the sexes in a specific, situation-based, sociohistorical context”.261 
 
 
256  Gayle Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex’ in 
Rayna R Reiter (ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Women (Monthly Review Press 
1975). 
257  Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (University of Illinois Press 2000). 
258  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University 
Press 1989). 
259  Adrienne Rich coined the term "compulsory heterosexuality" in ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’ (1980) 5 Signs 631. 
260  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113). 
261  Anna Kostikova, ‘Postmodernism: A Feminist Critique’ (2013) 44 Metaphilosophy 24. 
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Figure 4.  Variation of the first approach to gender in which sexuality takes a main role in 
constructing power relations. 
This confrontation of concepts, however, was criticized because the very 
confrontation entails the naturalization of gender—which Delphy calls, as Garfinkel 
did earlier, the natural attitude—as well as the impossibility of the autonomy of the 
concept of gender from sex.262 Delphy claimed that the ineffective use of gender was 
due to the general acceptance that sex is fixed and a given—“the container”—and 
that sex is the foundation of gender263—“the content”—together with the failure to 
address the asymmetry and hierarchy between the sexes.264  
 
 
262  Suzanne J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna have summarized these critiques. They 
explain that the natural attitude of gender implies that: 1) There are only two genders 
due to, as Garfinkel expresses it, the natural normally sexed person, which corresponds 
to the male and female, or masculine and feminine. 2) The morality of sex and gender 
is represented by a sex-dichotomized population in which heterosexuality is the norm; 
the binary of sex is the legitimate order. 3) Sex is fixed and unavoidable, and gender is 
an adult election and, as Garfinkel posits, “a condition whereby the exercise of [an 
adult’s] rights to live without excessive risks and interferences from others are routinely 
enforceable” 4) Once a sex, and thus a gender, is chosen, it cannot vary. 5) Genitals are 
the insignia of gender. 6) Sex becomes a natural fact ‘in accordance to the mores’. It is 
then a moral fact of life. 7) Any exceptions to two genders (sexes in Garfinkel’s version) 
are not taken seriously. 8) There are no transfers from one gender to another (or one 
sex to another in Garfinkel’s version).262 Regarding the transfer referred to in point 8, 
it may be said that the situation has slightly changed, although in some countries gender 
transitions are still considered borderline cases of deviance and are treated as such in 
the laws. In Kessler and Wendy McKenna (n 191). 
263  Christine Delphy and Diana Leonard, Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of 
Women’s Oppression (Hutchinson in association with the Explorations in Feminism 
Collective 1984) Introduction; Delphy, ‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’ (n 198). See also 
Katherine Franke, ‘Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of 
Sex from Gender’ (1995) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
264  Delphy, ‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’ (n 198).  
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3.2.5 The Role of Sexuality as Identity in the Sex/Gender 
Relation  
Overcoming the discursive essentialism of sex and the body requires to look at sex 
from a different perspective as suggested by feminists such as Moira Gatens, Eve 
Sedgwick, Donna Haraway, Iris Young, Judith Butler, and Luce Irigaray. As Toril 
Moi explains, ‘Their aim is to understand ‘sex or the body’ as a concrete, historical 
and social phenomenon, not as an essence’265. As Unger puts it, ‘Gender may be 
broadened to include both attributions made by others and assumptions and 
suppositions about one’s own properties (gender identity).’266 Now,  two new aspects 
of gender are differentiated: identity and expression. Gender becomes something 
external and internal, a part of one’s relation with others and at the same time one’s 
relation with oneself. In broadening the definition of gender, something much more 
complex occurs than merely mapping the binary of internal and external onto the 
binary of gender and sex. The relation of two —gender and sex—becomes a relation 
of three; the Gender Spectrum Association explains the new definition of gender that 
results as ‘the complex interrelationship between an individual’s sex (gender 
biology), one’s internal sense of self as male, female, both or neither (gender 
identity), as well as one’s outward presentations and behaviours (gender expression) 
related to that perception, including one’s gender role. Together, the intersection of 
these three dimensions produces one’s authentic sense of gender, both in how people 
experience their own gender as well as how others perceive it’.267 
 
Figure 5.  Second approach to gender 
 
 
265  Toril Moi, What Is a Woman?: And Other Essays (Oxford University Press 2001) 4. 
266  Rhoda K Unger, ‘Toward a Redefinition of Sex and Gender.’ (1979) 34 American 
Psychologist 1085, 1086. 
267  ‘Understanding Gender’ <https://www.genderspectrum.org/quick-links/understan-
ding-gender/>.  
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The emergence of this new attitude toward gender also coincides with the time period 
in which sex was rethought. The understanding of sex in a historical context shows 
its natural grounds in the emblem of genitalia that sustains the sex binary. In ancient 
times, belief in biological differences was also grounded in the idea that nature gave 
different humours to men and women, from which they derived different attributes 
and aptitudes. The idea of sex was sustained by the observation of the external 
genitalia and reproductive functions, as showed by Laqueur. During the 18th century, 
as described earlier, the single sex became the two sexes, still grounded in the 
biological observation of the reproductive organs268. The fixed binary of sex is hard 
to contest, and as a result, the efforts to contest the binary of sex concentrate on 
gender, which at least provides the possibility of going beyond the binary. Gender 
can potentially be understood as a continuum, as fluid, and as a variety of 
performances, focusing on a broader sense of diversity. The new approaches, which 
depict gender as fluid, offer the possibility of a new discourse beyond the binary. 
They imagine identities and expressions not entirely body-centered that disrupt the 
binary imposed by sex. This is possible through the combination of gender with 
sexual orientation, which facilitates the visualization of other forms of expression 
within groups. Acknowledging diverse sexual orientations that do not fit the 
heterosexuality imposed by the binary of sex breaks the binary of gender. This 
questioning broadens into the interrogation of the relation between sex and 
normative sexuality: how can sex be framed in the binary when there are bodies and 
individuals that do not belong to this binary? If the binary of gender is broken, how 
can we maintain the binary of sex within which gender is contained? The different 
sexualities that might be imagined are seen as an external feature but still ascribed 
to a corporeal materiality; however, it opens the door to new questions, such as, what 
precedes what?  
In feminism, the understanding of the concept of gender is linked to sex and 
sexuality within the binary; the development from sex vs gender to sex/gender did 
not affect the subject. This is explained by Ali Miller in relation to law saying , 
“Moreover, in this binary, when figured as an attribute of women, gender has 
connotations of heterosexuality; when figured as an aspect of men, gender appears 
to signal homosexuality”269.The relation between sex and gender has been mainly 
understood as a relation sustained by biology, one that decides which gender one 
belongs to and how one has to reproduce or even manage desire. The inclusion of 
gender has rather produced a broadening in the understanding of sexual orientation 
which affects the identity of subjects, but not the sex they are assigned/considered to 
have. The reproductive functions still determine the essence of women, thus 
 
 
268  Laqueur (n 116). 
269  Miller (n 210) 838.  
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subjecting their bodies to the power of nature. Men, though they may also be 
reproductive beings, are still not recognized as such: their body is neutralized, not 
gendered. 
The feminist tendency that conflates these three elements—sex, gender and 
sexuality—complicates the understanding of gender. Thus, as proposed by Eve 
Sedgwick, we should think about theorising sexuality independently from sex and 
gender270. This approach is the distinctive feature of queer theory.   
3.3 The Problematic Sex-Gender Relation 
There are some scholars who already stated their objections to the sex-gender 
distinction such as Anne Edwards, Mary Hawkesworth, Liz Bondi and Mora Gatens. 
As Mary Hawkesworth puts it, the problematic of the concept of gender within 
feminism stems from circumstances in which the term is not defined, consciously or 
unconsciously, or becomes interchangeable with sex271. The close relation 
established between the concept of gender and the binary of sex altered the use of 
the concept, not only by making gender a synonym of sex but also when “gender” is 
used as a synonym for “women”.272 These two confused uses of the term gender 
appears as the most common uses or definitions of gender; however, there are many 
other uses of gender. For instance, Marie-Victoire Louis, in “Tell me, what does 
“gender” really mean?”, signals at least 23 other different approaches to gender.273 
The common point in all of these definitions is that they share an understanding of 
gender as a social construction, and that they maintain the implicit male-female 
binary in the relation between sex and gender. This complexity makes it difficult to 
avoid misunderstandings in the use of both terms and raises the fear of being 
politically incorrect when using them.274  
As Mary Hawkesworth explained, the concept of gender within feminism 
evolves alongside feminist aims, and in all disciplines. At first the concept of gender 
is aimed only at including women, then at the analysis of the relation between sex 
and gender, and later at highlight difference or the construction of femininity and 
 
 
270  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press 
1990). 
271  Hawkesworth, ‘Confounding Gender’ (n 232). 
272  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113); Marta Lamas, 
‘Diferencias de sexo, género y diferencia sexual’ (Cuicuilco, 2000).  
273  Marie-Victoire Louis, ‘Tell Me, What Does “Gender” Really Mean?’ 
<http://www.marievictoirelouis.net/document.php?id=737&themeid=877>.   
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dictionaries. In the Spanish dictionary, nine different meanings are found for the term 
gender. 
The Concept of Gender in Feminist Theory 
 81 
masculinity, at expressing hierarchical structures of power, norms and movements 
and even to include other identities such as transsexual or transgender 275.  
A simple category has become a complex one immersed in a heated debate about 
its validity, meaning and usefulness in feminism as it has been exposed by Anne 
Edwards, 276 Moira Gatens,277 Denise Thompson278 and Liz Bondi.279 They question 
the laboratory aspects of the concept of gender.  
In this line, it is important to note Bondi´s work280 summarized in the book of 
Jeff Hearn and Wendy Parkin in 2001, Gender, Sexuality and Violence in 
Organizations.281 Bondi, as explained by Hearn and Parkin, finds three major 
problems related to the sex-gender distinction: 1) “because gender is socially 
constructed does not mean that can be changed more any  easily than sex”,282 2) “ 
the sex gender distinction is closely linked to other dichotomies, most obviously 
nature-culture and body-mind” and as they explain it can thus be argued the sex-
gender distinction reinforces its own dichotomies, and even repositions the 
male/masculinity as the norm”283 3) “ the sex –gender distinction implies that sex 
and biology are pre-social or free of the social; but biology is itself constituted in the 
social”.284 
3.3.1 The Cultural Aspect of Sex 
At described previously the concepts of sex and gender are separated at first, and in 
the second instance they merge.285 Postmodern feminism questioned sex and also 
considered it, just like gender, to be a political category and part of the heterosexual 
normative discourse. Thus, sex is another discursive category. This statement was 
 
 
275  Hawkesworth, ‘Sex, Gender, and Sexuality: From Naturalized Presumption to 
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4 Australian Feminist Studies 1. 
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supposed to entail the end of the fixed binary dichotomy of sex and gender.286 The 
post approaches to sex and gender claim that gender precedes sex. In this line, 
Laqueur, for instance, claims that there was a belief during a certain time period or 
among certain members of society that hierarchies were regulated by God. The 
celestial hierarchy, in which God was at the apex, justified the power of men over 
women. There was no need for the notion of sex, as the celestial hierarchy was 
enough to justify male and female relations and set the foundations for 
discrimination against women.287  
In the second approach (postmodern), which outlines the act of making a 
distinction between sex and gender becomes meaningless. This view is evolved by 
Judith Butler’s. She has pointed out the confusion between sex and gender that 
occurs when gender is treated as a cultural representation of sex and when sex is also 
a cultural category. The acceptance of the cultural construction of sex is related to 
the denial of sex as a pre-given category. Butler highlights the importance of the 
body as an element of sex, as a source of oppression, both sex and the body being 
aspects of culture. As she puts it, “perhaps [sex] was always already gender, with the 
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no 
distinction at all”.288 She questions the feminist approach to sex and gender as two 
separate concepts, highlighting the discursive construction of both. If one 
understands sex as something that is just as culturally constructed as gender is, the 
direct effect is the questioning of the binary of sex and the acceptance of the idea 
that sex is only another gendered category internalized in our discourse.289 Butler 
posited that the implicit dichotomy in the concept of gender shapes sexual bodies, as 
there is a correspondence between the culture of gender and sex. The direct link 
between gender and sex corresponds to the naturalization of gender through the 
naturalization of the body.290 Butler goes beyond the contestation of sex and gender 
to break the binary of gender (masculine/feminine) by also contesting the binary of 
sex (male/female) . She is aware of the danger of understanding gender within a 
 
 
286  Monique Wittig in The Straight Mind defines both sex and gender as social 
constructions, contesting their static nature. Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind and 
Other Essays (Beacon Press 1992). 
287  Laqueur (n 116).  
288  Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (n 179) 7.  
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The Concept of Gender in Feminist Theory 
 83 
limited binary, arguing that “[t]he presumption of a binary gender system implicitly 
retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex”.291  
In the attempt to break the binary, sex becomes another category of gender. There 
is a process of absorption that produces a conflation between both terms, producing 
a new discourse on gender. The result of the new sex–gender discourse is that gender 
wins over sex. The term sex cedes its place to gender as if the latter might express 
the culturally determined character of both. The confusion between the terms 
establishes a new kind of mimetic correspondence in which sex imitates the 
dynamics of gender. The result differs from what was hoped for. The binary of sex 
and gender works in a correlation that reinforces binary thinking. Curiously, this is 
a confusion that happens no matter what the approach to gender, whether earlier 
approaches in which the terms—sex and gender— are represented separately or later 
approaches that confuse the two terms by claiming them both as effects of culture. 
This new approach allowed the visualization of those who do not conform to the 
binary of sex, thus challenging the normative binary. It has proven problematic to 
make this theoretical approach lead to the concrete recognition of diversity beyond 
the binary within the sex group. This may be because of the effort made by feminism 
to maintain women as the focal subject, or because of the binary still implicit in both 
terms. The inclusion of sexual orientation is what has allowed a broadening of 
diversity within groups. However, the focus on diversity within the group broadens 
sexual orientation but leaves the male/female binary of sex intact. The blindness to 
broader diversity jeopardizes the insights about gender provided by postmodern 
theory. The influence of accepted normative beliefs still reinforces the feminine and 
the masculine, maintaining the relation of sex and gender within the binary.292  
Broadening the understanding of the concept of gender beyond the binary does 
not allow us to escape from the binary of sex, as nature still rules through the reading 
of the body. Thus it seems that the stubborn adherence to a definition of sex framed 
by the binary in both main uses of the term gender can be signaled as a source of 
problems. We must find a way to use the term more accurately, or not use it at all, 
and search for a way to accept a broader understanding of gender that would also 
imply a change in the understanding of sex. However, doing so raises other questions 
regarding the place of women in this broader understanding, as it might imply the 
category of woman being rendered invisible or displaced by other non-normative 
subjects. This is an important fact for feminism in its fight against discrimination 
against women, one that needs to be carefully addressed in order to choose strategies 
in this fight.  
 
 
291  ibid 6. 
292  Flax focuses on how the abstract character of gender reproduces the binary logic of 
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3.3.2 The Role of Language in Maintaining the Relation 
between Sex and Gender 
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a lack of terms in language, which 
extends to the language used within feminism, to depict gender as a continuum.The 
reality affected by the concept of gender is framed within the binary of “nature”. 
This binary of nature permeates the meaning and the concept of gender, despite 
having been contested by the most recent theoretical approaches. Language is part 
of this binary reifying the binary. The inability of gender to integrate into its 
poststructuralist meaning and be reconceptualised as a continuum results from the 
impossibility of using a term connected to nature —sex or gender—to represent a 
concept that is not based in nature. The accepted term is queer, which not only has 
denigrating connotations, but also has meanings related to the realm of sexuality and 
sexual orientation rather than gender per se. This lack of language keeps the subject 
categorized within unified groups: women and men. This division in two categories 
hinders any attempt to acknowledge someone whose gender is different without 
using a term relating to their sexual orientation. For instance, how can we name 
someone who has the appearance of a woman yet has male genitalia and is attracted 
to women. An homosexual trans? An homosexual transvestite? We have no words 
for it.  
3.3.3 The Use of the Term and the Concept of Gender in 
Feminism 
GENDER  TERM CONCEPT 
1 BIOLOGICAL INFERIORITY No  No  
2 de BEAUVOIR’S USE OF GENDER No Yes 
3 SEX / GENDER SYSTEM Yes Yes 
4 SEX – GENDER-WOMEN HIERARCHY Yes No 
5 SEX = GENDER as fluidity  Deconstruction 
Figure 6.  Summary of Izquierdo’s approaches to gender 
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In the previous table are reflected , as Izquierdo simplifies it293, the different 
approaches to the concept of gender derived from feminism that can be related to the 
use of gender as a term or as a concept.294 For her, there are five cases295: 1) Use of 
gender neither as a term nor as a concept. This corresponds to most of the historical 
discourses on the biological foundation of female inferiority. 2) Use of the concept 
but not of the term. This represents the beginning of the feminist fight against 
biological determinism, as shown in de Beauvoir’s writings. 3) Use of the concept 
and the term. This includes the use of gender by Nancy Chodorow and Gayle 
Rubin,296 who assume gender to be the cultural construction of sex.  4) Use of the 
term but not the concept. This occurs when gender is used as a synonym for sex or 
women—as, for example, when using the term gender violence to refer to violence 
only against women. 5) The era of deconstruction, postmodern and queer theories, 
which understand gender to be something fluid, a continuum that cannot be framed 
by the binary of male/female. 
3.4 A Gendered Classification of Feminist Theory 
The concept of gender has become an important concept within feminism and as 
Calás and Linda Smircich say “A key conceptual distinction among feminist theories 
is the way gender is understood”.297 To follow the evolution of the concept of gender 
in feminism, Lorber’s approach to classifying different feminisms is extremely 
useful. Here, I develop my own classification using hers as a basis but altering it in 
some places. 
In her classification and approach to the relation between feminism and gender, 
Lorber focuses on two aspects. First, she designs her classification to highlight “the 
continuities and discontinuities in recent feminist ideas and perspectives”; and 
second, she “discuss[es] the development of feminist theories as to the sources of 
gender inequality and its pervasiveness”. Both aspects are important, as the 
conceptualization of gender in the different feminist epistemologies can be 
 
 
293  It is important to note that when Izquierdo refers to gender as a concept she refers to 
the meaning of gender as a cultural construction of sex. 
294  Understanding the use of the term or the concept as well as which concept is referred 
to when using the term gender is important to later be able to analyse how feminism 
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295  Izquierdo (n 27). 
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arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of 
human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied” Gayle 
Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex’ in Rayna R 
Reiter (ed), Toward an Anthropology of Women (Monthly Review Press 1975). 
297  Calás and Smircich (n 190). 
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considered among the ‘continuities and discontinuities’. Her focus on gender 
inequalities helps us to understand the use of the concept of gender in different 
feminisms. The difficulty lies in understanding what Lorber refers to as ‘gender 
inequalities’. She defines ‘gender’ ‘as a social status, a legal designation, and a 
personal identity’ and ‘gender equality’ as “treating women and men as legally and 
socially the same”. However, as she does not give a specific definition for ‘gender 
inequality’, we must assume that she understands gender inequality as meaning the 
treatment of women and men as legally and socially different. The analysis below 
will confirm this assumption. 
Lorber’s feminist standpoint aids in the understanding of her approach to ‘gender 
inequality’. She says, “I myself was originally a liberal feminist, then a socialist 
feminist, and now consider myself to be primarily a social construction feminist, 
with overtones of postmodernism and queer theory”298. Lorber’s assessment of her 
own feminist standpoint shows that her approach to gender (inequality or equality) 
sets gender in the category of social construction. Next, the ‘overtones of 
postmodernism and queer theory” suggest an understanding of the term gender as 
conflated with sex because of a belief that sex too is culturally constructed, as 
detailed in the postmodern or binary approach to gender described earlier. While 
recognizing herself as a liberal and a socialist, she accepted the opposition of sex and 
gender, but then she shifted to a social constructionist approach. The social 
constructionist approach would have shifted her view on gender to an acceptance of 
the conflation of sex and gender in which gender precedes sex299. In this respect, she 
says “But gender and sex are not equivalent, and gender as a social construction does 
not flow automatically from genitalia and reproductive organs, the main 
physiological differences of females and males”. In this quotation, then, she seems 
to accept the concept of gender as identity and as external to the person. 
The problem is that all these attributes are external but still informed by the 
binary of sex (internal) that maintains gender in relation to the male and female 
sexes. The shift from speaking of sex to speaking of gender does not produce the 
inclusion of new subject, as she still understands the concept of gender within the 
binary and refers to equality between men and women. She accepts the cultural 
aspects of gender, approaching gender as identity, as external, and within the binary. 
She explicitly says, “Gender is now understood to be a social status, a personal 
 
 
298  Judith Lorber, The Variety of Feminisms and Their Contributions to Gender Equality 
(1997).  
299  Another social constructionist, Cecilia Ridgeway, gives an accurate definition of 
gender inequalities, saying, “We can think of gender inequality as an ordinal hierarchy 
between men and women in material resources, power, and status” in Cecilia L 
Ridgeway, Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the Modern World 
(Oxford University Press 2011). 
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identity, and a set of relationships between women and men, and among women and 
men. Sex is no longer seen as a one-way input or basic material for social 
arrangements, but a complex interplay of genes, hormones, physiology, 
environment, and behavior, with loop-back effects”300. Sex is no longer important 
for her, with its place taken by the concept of gender. Paradoxically, she accepts sex 
as gender but still refers to the categories of men and women, keeping the binary of 
sex (and with it the oppositional difference) alive and in a prominent role.  
Adding the term gender to the concept of inequality reinforces women as the 
subject of focus, in opposition to men, and helps to maintain the political subject of 
feminism, as detailed in following chapters here—although, as I will explain in the 
chapter on Feminism and Law, there is a backlash to using the word ‘gender’ to refer 
to problems such as violence against women because of the neutralization of the 
subject. In her fifth edition of ‘Gender Inequalities’ Lorber reiterates this position, 
saying, “Feminism is a social movement with the basic goal of achieving equality 
between women and men,”301 and similarly, she approaches the concept of gender 
inequalities by saying, “…Although we speak of ‘gender’ inequality, it is usually 
women who are disadvantaged relative to similar situated men’302. Thus the binary 
of sex still permeates the way she uses gender. In addressing the question of 
equality/difference she reinstates the belief in the fixed categories “man” and 
“woman,” thus restricting equality and difference to those who identify themselves 
as appertaining to one of these two categories.  
Lorber, as a social constructionist, thus follows the definition of gender 
inequalities given by Cecilia Ridgeway, who writes in her book, “We can think of 
gender inequality as an ordinal hierarchy between men and women in material 
resources, power, and status”303. Lorber recognizes the role of ‘gender’ as a source 
of inequality when she says, “The main point recent feminisms have stressed about 
gender inequality is that it is not an individual matter; rather, it is deeply ingrained 
in the structures of societies”.304 With these words, she reveals herself as no longer 
a poststructuralist; rather, she is a structuralist, understanding gender as a social 
structure ingrained in the normative value of the binary of sex. Thus, the source of 
inequality is not sex but gender structures. 
 
 
300  Lorber, The Variety of Feminisms and Their Contributions to Gender Equality (n 299). 
301  Lorber, Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics (n 26) 198.  
302  ibid. 
303  Ridgeway (n 300) 3. 
304  Lorber, The Variety of Feminisms and Their Contributions to Gender Equality (n 299) 
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Therefore, when reading Lorber one first needs to understand the approach that 
she is using, because, as we previously analysed, using sex vs gender is quite 
different from using sex/gender, although in both the binary survives. 
3.5 The Conflation between Feminist Theory and 
Law 
Until the mid XXth century in Europe, women were not considered to be full subjects 
of the law and were hardly even considered to be persons, which means that the law 
was built on sexed foundations305. The different legal feminist approaches to law did 
not only provided different theories, they all contributed to expanding knowledge 
about the foundations of the law and how it legitimized unjustified discriminatory 
customs and uses. Indeed, as Ngaire Naffine points out, “[i]t is useful to conceive of 
the feminist legal project as a sort of archaeological dig into law, rather than a series 
of interpretations…with each new phase, with each new excavation, has come a 
more penetrating understanding of the relation between law and masculinity…the 
joint project has been to challenge law’s account of itself as rational, fair and 
objective and hence adequate in its treatment to women.”306  
Feminism emerged from political movements that have been classified in waves 
or by political theoretical approaches307. The field of feminist scholarship is 
multifaceted and expands widely across all disciplines. Female emancipation 
presupposed the inclusion of women––many of them feminist activists––as active 
members of the political parties. However, even though women believed in the 
central ideology of their chosen parties, they soon realized that their needs and 
requests were not essential to “malestream” ideology.308 It was crucial to 
acknowledge the need for a feminist perspective and a reworking of existing political 
theories, such as Marxism, liberalism, and socialism, in order to make them sensitive 
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Unwin 1990). 
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to gender.309 The different feminist theories, in tension with each other, produced an 
extensive debate, which led to the evolution of gender as a concept.310 Due to 
political differences311, feminism approached the origin of discrimination against 
women and the implications for gender in different ways, which were also reflected 
in different approaches to law.312  
The foundational debate stems from the perspective on equality and difference: 
Are women equals to men, or are women different from men?313 In the latter 
approach there is a further variation in which women are considered to be considered 
to be not only different from men, but also different among themselves. The feminist 
approach to equality and difference has influenced a transformation of law and also 
affected the law’s discourse on the legal subject, as will be detailed in chapters 7 and 
8314. The core objective of feminism resides in its fight for the inclusion of women 
in law as equals to men. This aim evolved from the notion of equality between the 
sexes to an understanding of equality that recognized distinct needs and specific 
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rights on the part of women. These two different approaches to equality translated 
into different legal strategies—first to obtain equal rights and, later, to recognize 
women’s specific experiences such as maternity or rape through law, with important 
effects on the transformation of the law. The feminist debate around 
equality/difference brings along with it, too, the charges of essentializing the 
subject315. Grappling with the essentialist critique, feminism evolves towards a 
broader sense of difference in which multiculturalism and anti-essentialism try to 
find a place. This created a heated debate, as the attempt to dissolve the essentialist 
identity of the subject collides with essentialist feminist views.316 This important 
debate grounds legal feminist theory.317  
This debate exists in feminism alongside the influence of the different political 
and philosophical approaches. Thus, the classification of feminisms allows us to 
understand the evolution of feminism together with the different feminist approaches 
to gender. This classification aids in the understanding of the shared and opposing 
features of the different feminisms. 
There are already many different classifications of feminist epistemologies, 
which vary depending on the interest taken in different sociological, philosophical, 
political, historical or legal aspects of analysis318. One of the main distinction 
regarding the use of the term gender, as mentioned before, is between the modern 
and postmodern feminist approaches. Judith Lorber’s more complex classification 
makes it possible to underline the relation between feminist theory and the notion of 
gender—or, to be precise, the fight against gender discrimination. Therefore, as my 
interest lies in the term gender and its interplay with law, I find Judith Lorber’s 
classification the most applicable to my research319. I will not use her exact 
classification, but rather adapt her framework to my analysis of the relation of the 
concept of gender with feminist theory, as I explain in the following sections. 
The classification Lorber proposes is: 1) gender reform feminism (liberal, 
socialist/Marxist feminism); 2) gender resistance feminism (radical, lesbian, 
cultural, and psychoanalytic feminism); 3) gender rebellion feminism (third-wave 
 
 
315  As Margaret Davies explains, the critique of essentialism is usually related to 
postmodernism, and although postmodernism challenges essentialism, “the critique of 
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feminism).320 The movements within gender rebellion are considered to be ‘post’ 
(postmodern, post-structuralist, post-feminist, post-colonialist), and in this category 
other, “less” feminist theories such as masculinities and queer theory should be 
included.  
Notwithstanding this, and following Butler’s critique of the notion of gender/sex, 
I will argue that some of the movements of the third group—gender rebellion—
might be separated into a fourth group. This fourth group would include the less 
feminist and more gender-open movements such as queer theory or LGBT. This 
fourth category would also include feminists such as Christine Di Stefano, who, in 
“Dilemmas of Difference”,321 advocates the destruction of all gender categories, 
including that of women, to eliminate all gendered assumptions. She represents a 
genuine gender revolution close to the actions proposed by queer theory and the 
transgender movement,322 which advocate the elimination of gender.323 In this sense, 
as I will argue, they could be better considered as forming a separate, fourth group 
called gender revolution.  
Therefore, from my standpoint this latter movement (rather LGBTI) represents 
a step forward for feminism. Gender revolution is informed by feminism but its 
subject is not solely women, thus I think it should be rather named a 
genderbroadening movement324 than a feminist movement. Even if the use of the 
term gender should still be contested, as proposed by Butler, because of its problems 
in fixing an object of knowledge production, I think the name genderist is useful in 
order to differentiate the movement from feminism, which takes women as its object 
 
 
320  Rebecca Walker coined the term in Rebecca Walker, ‘Becoming the Third Wave’ Ms. 
Magazine (1992) 39. 
321  Christine Di Stefano, ‘Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and 
Postmodernism’ (1988) 8 Journal of Women Politics and Policy 1. 
322  For insights into queer legal theory, see Martha Fineman, Jack E Jackson and Adam P 
Romero (eds), Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable 
Conversations (Ashgate 2009); Francisco Valdes, ‘Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer 
Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social 
Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors’ (1997) 75 Denver 
University Law Review 1409.  
323  In my opinion, their proposal to eliminate gender is rather a reconfiguration of gender 
in which the multidimensional aspects of gender become visible. It is a continuation of 
Butler’s statement on the cultural construction of sex, gender and sexual dichotomy.  
324  Despite the use of this word to represent the movements with a broader understanding 
of gender I think it does not represent sex or gender beyond the binary. Nevertheless, I 
try to define these movements as genderist because they do not limit themselves to 
women or men as subjects. Thus, as already addressed in the introduction, I cannot 
consider them to be feminists, given that in my view feminism focuses only on women 
and men and gender movements broaden the subject while using feminist 
methodologies. Indeed, that is one of the reasons of the heavy critics of some groups to 
gender. 
Amalia Verdu Sanmartin 
92 
of focus.  Certainly, gender revolution movement mainly refers to queer studies, 
which already implies a field of study different from feminism and, as described in 
the next sub-section, in close relation to the post- movements.  
3.5.1 Gender Reform Feminism 
Approach to Gender: Binary / discrete approach; Gender and sex on 
opposite ends; Modern Feminism325 
Lorber’s classification starts with Gender reform feminism or gender balance 
construction, as she describes it, a category that comprises liberal feminism and 
Marxist/socialist feminism. The primary goal of this category of feminism was 
gender reform through the elimination of all formal, educational, and political 
inequalities326. These feminists did not originally use the term gender, but rather 
referred to sex (sexist, sexism, sex discrimination). At that time, the term gender was 
only part of the medical sciences, as previously explained, and beginning to be 
incorporated into the social sciences, whereas sex was part of the feminist vocabulary 
and had not yet been conquered by gender. Nonetheless, contemporary liberal 
feminism uses the term gender, which has fully displaced the term sex. 
Liberal feminism327 is rooted in the liberal tenets of the Enlightenment, and it 
introduced sex discrimination as the main cause of women’s subordination. In the 
early days of liberal feminism, the term gender did not coincide with the concept 
that would be developed during the 1970s. The entrance of the concept of gender 
roles or gender identity is mainly in the domain of health science disciplines and still 
did not have much influence on the feminist discourse. Even if contemporary liberal 
feminism uses the term gender it is important to note that the earlier liberal feminists 
only referred to sex.  
For this movement, undoing gender implied the acceptation of the binary of sex 
and the direct relation between sex and gender. For this category of feminism women 
and men are equals and as such they must be treated. The main objective of 1960s 
feminism was to achieve equal rights or gender balance. 
 
 
325  This line sums up the approaches to gender of the movement in question. All of these 
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Gender Reform and the Law 
Gender reform feminism, as explained by Judith Lorber, is commonly recognized as 
the “truly” feminist movement due to its focus on equality328. Undoing gender was 
restricted to the inclusion of women in the public space, although, as posterior 
approaches to gender will show, it made women assimilate into what men are 
supposed to be and what the subject of the law is supposed to be according to 
masculinist assumptions. Some feminists define this period as the era of the male 
monopoly329, referring to the strategy of assimilation, or the pursuit of a gender-
neutral law that would translate into women’s equality under the law.  
Sex equality would be transformed into gender equality as the term gender was 
gradually accepted. The lack of legal female equality, or equality in the law books, 
is one of the main causes of discrimination against women, reflected in a systematic 
violation of their rights by the state and by patriarchal, gendered society. The legal 
situation of women was evidently different from that of men, as evidenced in the 
sexually discriminatory norms applied in various European countries. Until 1975, 
for instance, in Spanish law, there were differences in the legal age of adulthood (18 
for men and 21 for women), and women needed spousal permission to open a bank 
account, to buy or sell property, and even to work. Marta Chamallas refers to this 
category feminism as “the generation of equality”330, given the focus on promoting 
the achievement of formal equality331. Liberal feminists denounced the exclusion of 
women from the full status of a legal subject;332 the main objective of the movement 
was to achieve formal equality through citizenship and antidiscrimination law333. In 
the search for equality, the law became the main tool with which to achieve 
“adequate similarity”,334 through the removal of legal obstacles within the 
established legal framework. The inclusion of women in the law by removing the 
obstacles that denied them equal treatment involved making an addition to the 
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structures in which they were previously denied a place, what Carol Smart calls the 
“mere addition of women to the books”335.  
The problem was the failure to question the neutrality of the law: the law was 
still assumed to be neutral. This resulted in heavy criticism of liberal feminism for 
its acceptance of the male norm, making women comply with established male 
standards336. The granting of civil and legal rights to act as autonomous individuals 
gave women a voice, but this strategy required women to adopt normative male 
standards337 as universal. As proponents of other movements such as gender 
resistance have observed, this issue of assimilation was a major problem not 
acknowledged by gender-based analysis of the law. In other words, these movements 
do not recognize how women bridge the gap to attain the male norm by sacrificing 
their womanhood.  
A belief in the sufficiency of legal reforms left the discourse of the law and the 
legal subject unquestioned.338  
3.5.2 Gender Resistance Feminism 
Approach to Gender: Binary / discrete approach. Gender and sex on 
opposite ends with focus on the sex hierarchy; Modern Feminism 
Gender resistance feminism comprises radical feminism, cultural feminism, 
psychoanalytic feminism, and French difference feminism. Lorber included 
Marxist/socialist feminism339 within the gender reform group, but I consider that they 
should instead belong to gender resistance. The reason for my disagreement is related 
to the way in which Marxist/socialist feminists understand gender. They relate to 
gender as a concept that establishes a hierarchy that parallels with the hierarchy 
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established by class. For them, women are disadvantaged because they are depicted 
as an inferior class.340  
The aim of gender resistance is to highlight and value differences by celebrating 
women’s special and unique qualities. Therefore, it doesn’t involve “resistance to 
gender,” it involves using gender as a tool to resist something else, namely 
patriarchal oppression. They resist the established patriarchal order that defines 
gender. As Lorber points out, ‘they develop the power of the gender ideology341’. 
Gender is thus separated from sex, although their difference from the gender reform 
approach relies on their view of gender as relational. Gender reflects power relations, 
emphasizing the cultural construction of sex within a hierarchy in which the male is 
privileged over the female. Gender organizes power, oppression, and domination 
over women. The understanding of the relation between sex and gender is similar to 
that of earlier feminist movements, for it emphasizes the hierarchy permeating the 
relationships between the sexes, in which women are subordinate to men. 
At the time these movements appeared, the term gender was fully installed in all 
disciplines and appears in many texts. The concept of gender equality is 
overshadowed by the focus on gender difference. Although all these strands of 
feminism did not propose the same origin of gender differences,342 they all celebrated 
difference as opposed to equality. Through a closer reading of these movements, 
gender is equated with patriarchy or patriarchal culture, a curious development that 
is explored in greater depth in chapter 6. Patriarchy is the main focus of these 
movements, and it shifts in meaning under their influence from “meaning the rule of 
the father to the social, economic, political and cultural domination of men, 
hierarchically [this is the approach taken by these movements] or laterally [this is the 
approach of movements in the following category] between men”.343 Gender is the 
imposition of certain cultural beliefs (patriarchal beliefs, structures, norms) on sex, 
hence the need to resist it. 
A change is also evident in the vocabulary, not only does gender resistance shift 
away from equality but it also moves away from the notion of equality to emphasize 
the oppression and domination that relates to sexuality. This change in the 
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vocabulary appertains to radical feminism and its interest in the theorization of 
sexuality. 
Radical Feminism postulates that gender is socially constructed and equality is 
only achievable through recognizing difference. Freedom can only be reached 
through the sexual liberation of women. This feminist group fights for the inclusion 
of the private realm; from the start it has seen the rise of the slogan the personal is 
political. 
In the radical feminist approach, sexuality is ascribed a central role, and for 
radical feminists like MacKinnon, sexuality is constitutive of gender. Sexuality and 
gender are defined in terms of each other.344 These feminists understand sexuality to 
be a factor of oppression that belongs within the private realm. Patriarchy (the 
sex/gender system345) gives men control over women’s sexuality and access to 
material resources. Patriarchy relies on the social structures of reproduction, sex, and 
the socialization of children, enabling men to control women.346 Radical feminism 
distances itself from gender reform, which it sees as offering little resistance to the 
valorization of masculine standards and the devaluation of feminine culture. Radical 
feminists propose the creation of a women’s culture beyond patriarchal patterns.347 
Cultural feminism in the USA, French difference feminism, and psychoanalytic 
feminism grew strong during the 1980s and emphasized the importance of valorizing 
feminine characteristics that differ from masculine ones. They argued that the 
feminine essence has been silenced, that women as a group share experiences that 
need to be voiced. Their aim was to emphasize feminine essence and recognize its 
value in contrast to masculine essence. Following Judith Evans,348 cultural feminism 
is orientated towards a culture of care, relations with others, and the feminine 
characteristics related to motherhood, thus valorizing the private realm. Masculine 
culture is privileged, and hence women should create a feminine culture defined by 
themselves rather than being defined as the “other” in opposition to men. 
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Psychoanalytic feminism claims that oppression is rooted in the psycho-social 
creation of roles. The work of Nancy Chodorow349 asserts that roles are not solely 
socially constructed, but rather that the psychological internalization of actions 
perpetuates the continuation of established roles. Women as mothers teach these 
roles to their children by relating differently to their sons and to their daughters. 
Chodorow states that mothers are close to their infant sons, but that they view their 
male children as different and do not share with them the same sense of “oneness” 
that they experience with their daughters. The mother’s different relationship with 
their children feeds into patriarchy, which is thus sustained by mothers. Feminists 
such as Irigaray or Cixous focus on language as discourse that affects the 
construction of the feminine. Focusing on the psychoanalytical field, Kristeva’s 
interest lies in the identity of the feminine350. 
Marxist/socialist feminism has sharply rejected liberal feminism, though, as 
Susan Hekman has noted, both Marxist and socialist feminism coincided with liberal 
feminism in trying to bring women into male categories.351 One difference between 
Marxist and socialist feminism is that Marxist feminism claims that class is the main 
factor of oppression, whereas socialist feminism considers both class and gender to 
be the main oppressing factors. Heidi Hartman has argued that the link between both 
standpoints is their agreement that “the material base upon which patriarchy lies 
most fundamentally in men’s control over women’s labor power” 352, which spans all 
social classes, ethnic groups, ages, or races. Women’s exploitation is manifest in two 
areas of labour: unpaid domestic labour, which forces women to be economically 
dependent, and lower wages for “women’s” jobs. The concept of paid and unpaid 
labour does not just concern the home but has repercussions for the state economy.353 
Although the gender resistance feminist movements are not a homogeneous 
group and each movement represents a very different approach and perspective, they 
 
 
349  Nancy J Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology 
of Gender, Updated Edition (University of California Press 1999). 
350  Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous are usually grouped under the label of poststructuralism. 
In my classification, poststructuralism is included in the next group; however, in my 
view these feminists belong to gender resistance, as they mainly focus on the female 
and feminine. Their analysis focuses on language as discourse, and in fact they should 
be considered transitional feminists, between gender resistance and gender rebellion. 
351  Susan J Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism (John 
Wiley & Sons 2013).  
352  She uses the term patriarchy but not gender, Heidi I Hartmann, ‘The Unhappy Marriage 
of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union’ (1979) 3 Capital & 
Class 1. 
353  Feminists like Maria Rosa dalla Costa have proposed the professionalization of 
domestic labor to obtain economic independence for women, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, 
The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (3rd ed, Falling Wall Press 
Ltd 1975). 
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all advocate a feminine counterculture and the creation of a feminine world.354 Their 
common claim to create of a female-oriented culture makes them converge under 
cultural feminism, which proposes a feminist standpoint in the creation and 
development of a culture and science grounded on women’s experiences.  
Gender Resistance and the Law 
These movements are very important in terms of the law. Their analysis of law can 
be considered the origin of legal feminism or feminist jurisprudence.355  
Gender resistance does not believe, as gender reform feminism does, that 
equality is a process of becoming masculinized by embracing men’s standards, but 
rather that real freedom can only be obtained by following feminine values. 
Difference became the touchstone of resistance feminism, highlighting the need for 
many other reforms, not only in the text of the law but also in the knowledge and the 
institutional structures necessary to put an end to the oppression of women under the 
law356. The realization that even if women might have been considered equals, they 
did not feel equal was crucial. Gender resistance, represented by the dominance 
model and the difference model,357 focuses on the differences between women and 
men and how each need different treatment under the law. In chapter 7 I explain how 
this change from formal equality to substantive equality affects the legal approach 
to the subject. The law is viewed as an oppressive structure that sustains oppression 
in the private sphere by not considering the personal political. There is a sharp divide 
between the public and private spheres in which the private is not regulated. The 
debate around the inclusion of the private sphere led to significant changes in legal 
systems to accommodate women’s experiences of oppression such as marital rape. 
The female voice arose powerfully, putting into words the differences between 
women and men in terms of needs and experiences that were not present in the law. 
As a strategy to achieve this goal, it has been proposed that the feminist focus on the 
 
 
354  Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Beacon Press 1990); 
Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975 (U of 
Minnesota Press 1989); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard University Press 
1982); Robin West, ‘The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological 
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory’ (2000) 15 Georgetown Law Faculty Publications 
and Other Works -Women´s Law Journal 149. 
355  See Chapter 7 
356  Nicola Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women’ in Karen Knop (ed), 
Gender and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2004). 
357  The difference model represents the cultural feminist perspective; this is different from 
the perspective of radical feminism, which defends the dominance model, although 
both movements are included in gender resistance. Chamallas (n 9). Influential scholars 
pursuing the recognition of different feminine values in the law include Carol Gilligan 
or Ann Scales. 
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law be extended from norms to interpretation and enforcement. For instance, changes 
in the way consent was understood by the law justified criminal actions according to 
sex-based assumptions, as happened in certain cases of marital rape and rape in 
general.   
Gender resistance revealed the assumptions of the law and society that defined 
and described women358. There is a generalized “male culture”359 that influences all 
walks of life, including the law. Gender resistance feminism successfully exposed 
the law as a human creation founded upon the male standpoint. Women were defined 
by male standards and represented in the law in accordance with a masculine 
understanding of them. Sexuality was defined by male standards in which men are 
depicted as active and women as passive or without sexuality other than in a 
procreative sense. Sexuality is seen as an important source of women’s oppression, 
though gender (sociocultural sex) is seen as taking precedence over sexuality and 
“the binary divide between heterosexuality and homosexuality is seen to derive from 
gender”.360 Gender resistance feminism exposed the legitimation of male dominance 
that is expressed in the omission of women’s sexual experiences from the law. For 
instance, as also noted by Lorena Fries, women’s sexuality and reproduction is 
regulated by family and criminal law. Women’s sexuality that is experienced or 
exercised differently from the way it is regulated would be considered illegitimate361. 
Radical feminists focused on the reform of sexually discriminatory law, notably 
influenced by Catharine MacKinnon´s work on the sexualization of dominance362. 
They pointed out how sexuality was given meaning from the male standpoint, 
thereby denying women their status as independent sexual subjects. From a legal 
perspective, they concluded they concluded that the law operated as an efficient 
mechanism in society’s control of female sexuality 363. 
The gender resistance movement’s strategy to recognize difference was very 
effective in terms of establishing the fact that difference should be introduced into 
the law. As a result, “women’s issues” such as violence against women, sexual 
 
 
358  West (n 355). 
359  Naffine, Law Sexes Explor. Fem. Jurisprud. (n 307). 
360  Richardson (n 245). 
361  Lorena Fries and Veronica Matus, ‘Why Does the Method Matter?’ (2011) 7 American 
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law. 
362  MacKinnon is one of the prime proponents of feminist legal jurisprudence, exposing 
the lack of neutrality in the law and its focus on the male point of view, and highlighting 
the need to consider the feminine point of view, Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 1989). 
363  Catharine A MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women : A Case of Sex 
Discrimination (Yale University Press 2011); Joan Sangster, Regulating Girls and 
Women : Sexuality, Family, and the Law in Ontario, 1920-1960 (University of Toronto 
Press 2014). 
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harassment, rape, marital violence, and reproductive rights were high on the feminist 
agenda. The main difference between this approach and that of gender reform is the 
focus on the body. The invisibility of the body in the gender reform theories gave 
way to gender resistance bringing the body to the fore as a main site of analysis. This 
led to include the role of the body in law, at least the visualization of a sexed body. 
The inclusion of the concept of gender as sociocultural sex helps to reveal the 
absence of women’s bodies in the law. The abstract person of law is embodied in a 
sexed body. This evolution of the reading of the body in law due to the feminist 
discourse on the body will be detailed in chapter 6.  
As described before, gender reform and gender resistance were successful in 
bringing about legal reforms that accorded women equal and special treatment.364 
These movements constituted the foundation on which future feminist movements 
relied, using the law as a critical tool to attempt to eradicate discrimination against 
women and challenge maleness, armed with new feminist legal theories. They were 
nevertheless criticized for obscuring the multiplicity of oppressions that women 
experience.365 These criticisms paved the way for intersectional feminism and new 
approaches to diversity that affect feminist strategies in law, as analysed in chapters 
7 and 8.366  
3.5.3 Gender Rebellion Feminism  
Approach to Gender: Bipolar. Gender and sex become confused trying to 
depict a continuum; Postmodern feminism. 
Gender rebellion feminism comprises postmodern feminism and third-wave 
feminism, more precisely all the post- movements (post-structuralist, post-modern, 
post-feminism). It tries to widen the woman-centred discourse to introduce diversity 
into the category of woman. Gender now begins to be conflated with sex in order to 
 
 
364  Equal pay and equal employment are part of equal rights, and pregnancy and 
breastfeeding are rights that are specific to women. Rape is a notable issue with regard 
to which the debate has provoked major change in favour of women, with a shift in the 
definition of consent in relation to sexual acts.  
365  As Kimberlé Crenshaw states in her ground breaking article “Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989), black women have not been 
acknowledged in the feminist movement, Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) 1989 University of Chicago 
Legal Forum. 
366  Rebecca Walker, To Be Real : Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism 
(Anchor Books 1995).In this book, she is the first to speak of the third wave with its 
focus on diversity. 
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show the diversity of possibilities, although total conflation is not achieved. 
Nevertheless, in the sex/gender matrix, sexuality—or rather, sexual orientation—is 
introduced as an important category that becomes part of the feminist analysis and 
allows for the visualization and acceptance of lesbians as women and as political 
subjects.367 Lorber includes lesbian women’s (homosexual women)  under Gender 
Resistance, but I choose to include them in this group, gender rebellion, because 
even if the questioning of heterosexuality happens with gender resistance, it is later, 
using the insights of groups with a focus on diversity, that homosexuality is fully 
integrated into the feminist discourse368.  
As far as the treatment of sex and gender by gender rebellion feminism, Toril 
Moi claims that “[w]ith respect to sex and gender poststructuralists are reformist 
rather than revolutionary”.369 This reformist element comes from the inclusion of an 
understanding of sexual orientation that tries to break the matrix of heterosexuality, 
as opposed to the simple notion of homosexuality, which leaves the sex binary intact. 
The revolutionary rather than reformist approach would come from contesting the 
binary of sex and not only sexual orientation. This is why I extend Lorber’s 
classification by adding a new group consisting of the movements with a more 
revolutionary stance, detailed in the next sub-section. 
When referring to the third-wave370, post-modernism, or post-structural 
feminism, it is difficult to come to an agreement about who is who and what is what. 
Even when referring to post-feminism, in which an overlap of “post” thinking might 
be expected, one finds an ensemble of heterogeneous and conflicting discourses.371 
 
 
367  During the 1970s, lesbian women were denied a place in the feminist movement and 
labelled the “lavender menace” for feminism by liberal feminists. The gender rebellion 
starts to acknowledge the importance of sexual orientation, although its full acceptance 
occurs within the gender revolution. Apart from gender, many other aspects such as 
race or age are important in defining women for gender rebellion feminists. 
368  It seems odd to include all lesbian women (which is a sexual orientation, not a 
theoretical/political posture) under a certain class of feminism (which is a 
theoretical/political posture). Lesbian women can have a variety of postures and 
positions toward feminism, the body, society, sex, and everything else. They can be 
modern, postmodern, capitalist, Marxist, anything. I think what Lorber intends to 
highlight that at the time of gender resistance lesbian are accepted in a way that previous 
movement did not. For that, I understand that the acceptation of lesbian women should 
be done in gender rebellion as this group tries to reflect the diversity of women.   
369  Moi (n 215). 
370  Deborah L Siegel, ‘The Legacy of the Personal: Generating Theory in Feminism’s 
Third Wave’ (1997) 12 Hypatia 46; Jenny Coleman, ‘An Introduction to Feminisms in 
a Postfeminist Age’ (2009) 23 Women’s Studies Journal 3; Bridget J Crawford, ‘Third-
Wave Feminism, Motherhood and the Future of Legal Theory’ in Jackie Jones and 
others (eds), Gender, Sexualities and Law (Routledge 2011).  
371  Teresa L Ebert, ‘The “Difference” of Postmodern Feminism’ (1991) 53 College English 
886.  
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With regard to postmodern feminism372 poststructuralism/373 postcolonial and third-
wave feminism: Who is who?374 That is the question! Among the many 
characteristics of these groups, Shannon Bell claims that “[t]he defining 
characteristics of postmodernism are fragmentation, discontinuity, indeterminacy, 
plurality, multiplicity, difference, and ambiguity”375. 
The approach to gender is different, gender is not in opposition to sex; rather, the 
two are alike, with sex just as culturally constructed as gender is. This heralded a 
major shift in the approach to gender: sex was as culturally constructed as gender 
was376. Gender rebellion critiques the dichotomy between sex and gender that is 
embraced by gender reform and gender resistance, because of its power in reifying 
the biology implicit in the concept of gender. However, even though sex and gender 
are conflated for gender rebellion feminists, an analysis of gender rebellion feminists 
shows how they still view only gender as a cultural construction. This statement is 
closely analysed and explained in the analysis of the category woman in Chapter 7.  
These groups’ focus is on the discursive production of knowledge and truth, 
including the truth regarding gender and sex. They highlight the interplay between 
gender/sex and sexuality as discursive constructions informing the subject and the 
object of knowledge. Sexuality was already a focus of gender resistance movements; 
however, the shift in the understanding of the concept of gender here also broadens 
the approach to sexuality. For these groups, gender is already merged with sex and 
the cultural realm expands to include sex, affecting the binary implicit in the 
heterosexual relation. Sexuality includes other sexualities intersecting with sex and 
gender. Gender rebellion represented the continued development of difference and 
the more complex feminist perspectives, ‘the generation of complex identities’377.  
 
 
372  Joan W Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of 
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism’, The postmodern turn (Cambridge University 
Press 1994); Dennis Patterson, ‘Postmodernism/Feminism/Law’ (1991) 77 Cornell 
Law Review 254; Linda Nicholson, Feminism/Postmodernism (Routledge 2013); 
Maxine Eichner, ‘On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory’ (2001) 36 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 1.  
373  Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault are the three most renowned representatives of 
poststructuralism. Their positions are not part of a metanarrative; on the contrary, they 
are located in very different positions.  
374  Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice &amp; Poststructuralist Theory (Blackwell Pub 
1997). 
375  Bell (n 211). 
376  Margaret Davies, ‘Taking the inside out: Sex and Gender in the Legal Subject’ in 
Ngaire Naffine (ed), Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence (Allen 
& Unwin 1990).  
377  Chamallas (n 9). 
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It is rather difficult to explain the different approaches deployed by all these post- 
movements378. It is easier instead to find the common points that allow one to classify 
them under the same category. They embrace, in their treatment of the relation 
between sex and gender, the “cultural turn” that entails a reappraisal of the relation 
of sex and gender while still including sexuality as the third axis.379  
A new element in this line of thought is the adoption of the concept of identity, 
acknowledging Butler’s approach to the relation between sex and gender in which 
identity becomes a central point, and, at the same time, the attempt to accommodate 
it within the existing theories on the feminist subject. Many of these feminists prefer 
to speak of sexual difference rather than gender, but the aspect of identity brings 
“gender” back into play. The term gender is used to signal constructed identity or 
sexual orientation. This exposes an important common point that relies on the 
construction of identities, not just as part of the self but also as part of an universal 
narrative, which poststructuralists have called the humanist discourse.380 This 
discourse implies that there is no essential identity that precludes the individual: it is 
not ‘nature’ or biology, but rather the historical discourse of power—as analysed by 
Foucault—and the discourse imposed by grammar and language—explored by 
Derrida381—that inform the self.   
Among these different strands of gender rebellion thought, they all agree on the 
influence of the different discourses in the shaping of the subject and in the 
questioning of the rationality and truth of modernity.382 This agreement leads to the 
decentering of the modern subject and the rejection of meta-theories and meta-
narratives. Both strategies point to what Janet Patterson has called the myth of the 
 
 
378  Poststructuralism developed from structuralism, tackling questions that arose from the 
critique of structuralism. Poststructuralists are engaged in the understanding and 
analysis of language as discourse, and it is argued that poststructuralism is the 
informing philosophy of postmodernism. Regarding postmodernism, it is Lyotard who 
coined the term; for him, the postmodern focus is on the changing nature of knowledge 
and the rejection of metanarratives. Regarding postmodern and poststructuralist 
authors, there are no clear boundaries determining who belongs to one or the other, and 
there are also important differences among the different postmodern groups. There are 
also no clear boundaries between poststructuralism and postmodernism, as they 
conflate in some instances. 
379  Linda Nicholson, ‘Interpreting Gender’ (1994) 20 Signs 79. 
380  Linda Alcoff, ‘Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory’ (1988) 13 Signs 405.  
381  Bridget Crawford, ‘Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, 
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure’ (2007) Pace Law Faculty Publications; 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (JHU Press 1998). 
382  Judith Butler, ‘Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism’ 
in Steven Seidman (ed), The postmodern turn (Cambridge University Press 1994).  
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unitary subject.383 Certainly, many characteristics are shared by post-feminist 
groups, such as questioning the established truths by focusing on the silenced, 
forgotten, and hidden features that constitute a multiplicity of discursive subjects. In 
practice, metatheories cause subjects to slip between the cracks and become 
forgotten or silenced. This entails the search for a postmodern subject that responds 
to multiple truths and not just to one. The postmodern truth must include all the 
diversity of discursive subjects, which means distancing oneself from the feminist 
metanarrative of women as a unified discursive subject. Moreover, the decentering 
of the subject for postmodern feminism means decentering the dominant discourse 
on women and men.  
The decentering of the modern subject gives us a starting point, outlining how 
postmodernism breaks down these Enlightenment concepts, namely rationality and 
universality. In this task, postmodern and third-wave feminism coincide with the 
introduction of diversity and the celebration of difference within the group. They 
acknowledge that the category of woman is not unified; women are different from 
each other, as are their experiences of oppression.  
Postmodern feminism questions the Western, modern, male, and phallocentric 
discourse that has led to the development of our society. To postmodernism, the 
dualistic opposition between gender reform and gender resistance appears as a false 
opposition.384 Such a dualism perpetuates gender roles and avoids deconstruction, as 
I address throughout this thesis. Furthermore, the dualism helps to “do gender”385—
i.e., when people adjust their behaviour to make it consistent with what society 
expects from their sex within the male-female dichotomy. Postmodern feminists 
point to the dualisms inherent the gender discourse that identifies male domination, 
386 a discursive dualism that also defines the meaning of woman as the opposite to 
man. Accepting the existence of this patriarchal power or historical discourse that 
constructs the truth also implies the acceptance of the discursive construction of 
woman as real.  
It is time for the Death of Man to destroy essentialism, as Jane Flax claims;387 
she means the Death of History as the end of the master narratives of history, and 
 
 
383  Janet M Paterson, ‘Le Roman “Postmoderne”: Mise Au Point et Perspectives’ (1986) 
13 Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/ Revue Canadienne de Littérature 
Comparée 238. 
384  Ebert (n 372).  
385  Candace West and Don H Zimmerman, ‘Doing Gender’ (1987) 1 Gender & Society 
125.  
386  Patterson (n 373); Nicholson, Feminism/Postmodernism (n 373); WS Kottiswari, 
Postmodern Feminist Writers (Sarup & Sons 2008); Evans (n 335).  
387  Jane Flax follows Lyotard in this approach. 
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the Death of Metaphysics, dismantling the true or the real.388 The reaction to the 
discursive nature of the subject implies killing the subject, which for feminism means 
killing the political subject of women. The focus on diversity challenges the 
homogeneous conception of woman389. The concepts of universalism and oppression 
still constitute the main discriminatory factor. The difference of gender rebellion 
from the previous movements lies in the search for internalized oppression390. The 
notion of the elimination of women as political subjects has of course been criticized. 
The critics focus on the need for a “woman subject” in order to continue with the 
political project of feminism.391 All these critiques have great importance in the 
future of feminism and in the confrontation of a modern subject with a postmodern 
discourse, as will be analysed in detail in Chapter 7. 
Third-wave feminism rejects what it understands as “old” feminism although it 
adopts some aspects from its discourses. It seeks to understand how gender 
oppression works and how it interlocks with other kinds of oppression. Third-wave 
feminists do not believe that women constitute a single unitary group. To many third-
wave feminists, the category of woman is their enemy, and in their view women are 
free to be and do whatever they want. 
Men’s studies (masculinities/feminist studies of men)392 is the result of the rapid 
expansion of gender studies. It poses the question of the relational aspect of gender 
in men and women and how masculine identities are socially constructed. The male 
and female genders are embedded in social structures, and therefore men also “do” 
gender through their gendered behaviour towards women and other men.393 A 
hegemonic masculine pattern is used in the construction of individual identities. This 
model conforms to a symbolic order394, the main aspect of which is heterosexuality, 
 
 
388  Seyla Benhabib, ‘Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance’ in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange’ in Seyla Benhabib and others (eds), Thinking 
Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West 
(Routledge 1990). 
389  Mary Joe Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (Routledge 1992); Tracy E Higgins, ‘By 
Reason of Their Sex: Feminist Theory Postmodernism and Justice’ (1994) 80 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1536; Patterson (n 373). 
390  Frug (n 390); Higgins (n 390); Patterson (n 373). 
391  Alcoff (n 381); Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Psychology Press 1992).  
392  For the different approaches to men’s studies see the journal Men’s Studies: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/home/men 
393  Michael S Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History (Free Press 1996).  
394  An excellent analysis of the symbolic order with regard to the interconnection of the 
institution of family with sexual orientation can be found in Linda Hart, ‘Relational 
Subjects : Family Relations, Law and Gender in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(University of Helsinki 2016). 
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which prescribes for men sexual desire towards women and makes sexual relations 
with women the main measurable factor of masculine identity395 . 
Diversity and identity are core concepts within gender rebellion feminism. The 
diversity explored by gender rebellion is characterized by the variety of theoretical 
approaches, and it is difficult to encapsulate the different strands396 in a few general 
characteristics. However, it is possible to find a common rallying cry for these 
movements under the umbrella concepts of performativity and diversity397. These 
concepts converge in the introduction of identity as another feature of the subject 
that intersects with gender, sex and sexuality. These are theoretical tools that have 
as their purpose the understanding of the individuality of the subject within the 
group. Identity is constructed differently in every subject.  
Gender rebellion defends the acceptance of diversity within a group. In this 
approach gender appears to be in relation to normative (heterosexuality) sex. Gender 
rebellion takes a step forward provoked by the insertion of sexuality into the analysis 
of the relation between sex and gender. Genders is not only social sex or the body’s 
sex, but the way in which we desire and feel our sexuality. The approach to sexuality 
 
 
395  Nevertheless, this is a new time for feminism, influenced by Derridean deconstruction. 
See, Joan C Williams, ‘Deconstructing Gender’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 797; 
Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist 
Theory for Feminism’ (n 373); Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, 
Deconstruction, and the Law (n 337).  
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French Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan 2009); Merri Lisa Johnson, Third Wave 
Feminism and Television : Jane Puts It in a Box (IB Tauris 2007); Katha Pollitt and 
Jennifer Baumgardner, ‘Afterword: A Correspondence Between Katha Pollit and 
Jennifer Baumgardner’ in Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier (eds), Catching a Wave: 
Reclaiming Feminism for the 21st Century, (Northeastern University Press 2003); 
Natalie Fixmer and Julia T Wood, ‘The Personal Is Political: Embodied Politics in 
Third Wave Feminism’, (2005) 28 Women’s Studies in Communication; Astrid Henry, 
Not My Mother’s Sister : Generational Conflict and Third-Wave Feminism (Indiana 
University Press 2004); Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, Manifesta: Young 
Women, Feminism, and the Future (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2000). 
397  Third-wave feminism is not a homogenous movement and there are different strands. 
One could argue that its origins lie in postmodern feminism, which pursues social 
criticism that is far from traditional philosophical foundations. 
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is a holistic one. This approach examines and analyzes the ways in which sexual 
orientation and desire have been made normative. Sexual orientation plays a central 
role in the construction of identity and interacts with sex and gender. The main 
difference between this approach and the inclusion of sexuality by gender resistance 
lies in the understanding here of sexual orientation beyond heterosexuality. This 
breaks the correlation between sex and sexuality. The result is the conflation of sex 
and gender. This conflation is probably the outcome of the postmodern and 
poststructuralist interest in the intersections of sexuality and gender.398  
Gender rebellion claims the need for postmodern subjects that will eliminate 
women as the central subject. However, the elimination of the subject that it proposes 
is not elimination as such but rather the broadening of woman to women. It is not a 
real elimination of the subject but a broadening of the concept of diversity with a 
greater focus on sexuality and intersectionality399. The strategies developed 
alongside the discourses affecting the subject will be detailed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
The acceptance of a postmodern approach to the concept of gender rests in the 
acceptance of a sexuality that goes beyond established heterosexuality. This makes 
it possible to broaden the subject from woman to women, although this still keeps it 
within the limits of the binary of sex. The widening of the subject entails the 
expansion of the category of woman while still leaving the category’s basic 
definition the same, as “woman. Indeed, as Nina Lykke argues, the problem of 
gender rebellion is that as ‘an unintentional side effect, feminist gender 
de/constructionism has contributed to the reproduction of a dichotomous 
understanding of biological sex and sociocultural gender’400. This unintentional 
effect is provoked by the dismissal of the body as the core element in the discursive 
construction of gender and by the belief in the existence of a real woman. 
Gender Rebellion and the Law 
These new movements challenge the previous feminist legal discourse on power, and 
some seek to transform postmodern insights into positive law401. The questioning of 
the law intensifies seeing law as “male dominated and full of bias even into the very 
concepts of law”402. 
 
 
398  Silvia Pilar Castro-Borrego and Maria Isabel Romero-Ruiz, Identities on the Move: 
Contemporary Representations of New Sexualities and Gender Identities (Lexington 
Books 2014).  
399  The ways in which feminism disguises the subject are analyzed in Chapter 6, which 
addresses the feminist approach to the category of woman, and in Chapter 7, which 
addresses the feminist discourse on the legal subject. 
400  Lykke (n 28) 124. 
401  Eichner (n 373).  
402  Margaret Davies, ‘Exclusion and the Identity of Law’ (2005) 5 Macquarie LJ 5. 
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As a matter of fact, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) had a significant influence on 
these feminist groups—or more specifically, the union of feminism and CLS that 
those known as the ‘Fem-crits’ emerged from403.The Fem-crits404 have been 
criticized for not being sufficiently law-oriented, and few legal scholars follow this 
new 21st-century approach.405 Indeed, postmodern feminist principles have not been 
transposed into the law to the same extent as with other disciplines, which probably 
stems from the fact that their abstractness of their philosophy makes their legal 
application difficult406.  Bartlett points out the impossibility of finding a way to apply 
the postmodern critique in positive law as a common denominator connecting CLS 
and feminist CLS 407. Nevertheless, despite postmodern reputation for not 
considering legal solutions or strategies to be major drivers of change, the law is 
included as an important tool in a comprehensive document on the goals of gender 
rebellion: “The Baumgardner and Richards Manifesta”.408 The authors set goals 
related to the achievement of equality in law, although they do not give specific 
advice on how to achieve these goals through the law. However, they are effective 
in criticizing the indeterminacy, the non-objectivity, and the hierarchical aspects of 
the law from a feminist standpoint. Their criticism is based on the impossibility of 
using the law as a real game changer; law is denied a main role in the achievement 
of equality409. However, I argue that this criticism is not fully justified in that the 
main problem has been the inability of the law to account for the new gender 
rebellion approaches rather than the application of postmodern ideas. The law is 
grounded on certain sexual assumptions about women, categorizing and accepting 
 
 
403  I am referring to CLS in a broad sense, focusing on the critical spirit that led them to 
challenge law; however, I must say that I am aware that there are many differences 
between the different “schools,” namely those of the UK and the USA.  Nonetheless, I 
try to highlight the features they share rather than focus on the differences.  
404  “Fem-Crits” such as Clare Dalton, Francis E. Olsen, Margaret Davies, Nicola Lacey, 
and Ngaire Naffine. The CLS approach is more extensively explained in Chapter 4. I 
need to point out that there are many differences, as commented previously, between 
all the different post-modern approaches. Regarding law and the intersection between 
CLS and feminism, many different approaches are also reflected. There is no a single 
Fem-Crits movement; it might be divided by nationality: UK, USA and Australia. 
Nevertheless, here I try to emphasize the general critiques of all of them and their 
commonalities. 
405  Crawford (n 382). 
406  However, even if the legal output has not been as abundant as in other feminist legal 
movements, there are well-known and active postmodern legal scholars (e.g. Drucilla 
Cornell, Mary Jo Frug, NgaireNaffine, Carol Smart, Margaret Davies, and Nicola 
Lacey) applying mainly postmodern thinking to the law. 
407  Bartlett (n 211).) 
408  Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, Manifesta :Young Women, Feminism, and 
the Future (10th Anni, Macmillan 2010). 
409  See section two on the relation between CLS and Fem-Crits.  
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the binary as a legal fact to maintain order. Breaking down the universality of a group 
and acknowledging the diversity within and beyond the gender binary thus seems 
chaotic and contrary to the nature of the law. This is reflected in the construction of 
legal person, in which the male/female binary and the depiction of unified sexed 
subjects is iterated, hindering the possibilities of real equality or real freedom in 
making choices. This is analysed in detail in the next chapters, which describes how 
the body, the modern legal person and the feminist discourse on the subject interplay 
in ways that hinder a legal transformation that might accommodate gender rebellion 
and gender revolution theories. 
Feminist philosopher Judith Butler’s performativity theory410 is among those that 
support the gender rebellion perspective. It has proved to be a powerful tool for 
analysing trials, judges’ decisions, and the actions of lawyers and magistrates in 
terms of how gender reproduces itself through legal discourse411. Even if its 
application to law has been questioned, it analyses legal discourse as gendered 
performance412. Butler describes society as a place in which gender is reinstated 
through our own performance and behaviour, which accord with an internalized 
notion of gender norms. Gender norms that are enforced through legal structures tell 
us how to behave, how to desire, and even how to feel. We create gender 
involuntarily through “regulative discourses” that not only control our way of 
behaving but also construct sex. It is through this cultural construction of gender and 
sex that we perform gender without being conscious of it. It becomes something that 
we make, that is grounded in heterosexuality and forces us to act in certain ways and 
to accept a preset role.  
The feminist analysis of the law from a gender-rebellion perspective focuses on 
the individuality of subjects confronting gendered notions of consent or intent 413. 
The main points of contention include reproductive rights, prostitution, and violence 
 
 
410  Butler’s performativity theory supposed a new approach to the relation between gender 
and sex, showing the entanglement of both with politics and law. Her theory has been 
very influential as it helps us to consider the political and cultural discourses that 
construct and normalize law. Butler’s theory has been extended to include the queer 
and transgender perspectives, which have become part of the diversity started by the 
gender revolution. 
411  Susan Ehrlich, ‘Trial Discourse and Judicial Decision-Making: Constraining the 
Boundaries of Gendered Identities’, Speaking Out (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2006); 
Martha Merrill Humphrey, ‘Law in Drag: Trials and Legal Performativity’ (2012) 21 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law.  
412  This resulted from the application of Butler’s performativity theory.  
413  Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Market-Inalienability’ (1987) 100 Harvard law review 1849; 
Nancy Ehrenreich, ‘Surrogacy as Resistance?: The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the 
Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts’ (1992) 41 DePaul Law Review; Clare 
Dalton, ‘An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ (1985) 94 The Yale Law 
Journal 997.Radin; Ehrenreich; Dalton.  
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against women, although the standpoint differs from that of gender resistance. The 
distinctiveness lies in gender rebellion’s introduction of women’s diversity, in 
contrast to notion of the unique essence of women that is characteristic of gender 
resistance. Nevertheless, the uncomfortable question to pose to feminism is, how 
does the focus on women’s diversity impact the analysis of the problems already 
addressed by gender resistance feminism or in the legal attitudes and behaviours? I 
would venture to say that it did not have much impact in law apart from the 
acceptation of sexual orientations other than the heterosexual, as is detailed in 
Chapter 7 and 8, through the different feminist legal strategies and the depiction of 
the legal person. 
The conservative institution of the law, represented by its ontological—
sexed/gendered—legal subject, stays within the limits of the sex dichotomy. The 
legal subject appears unmovable as the main pillar of the sexual/gender binaries. The 
gender rebellion finds a way to shake the foundations of the law, attacking the fixed 
duality of the legal subject in one of the most conservative of institutions, that of 
marriage, with the recognition of same-sex marriage in many legal systems414. This 
appears to be a main legal impact of gender rebellion’s strategy, in which sexual 
orientation plays an important role.  
Gender rebellion also entails the questioning of male gender meaning, and the 
diversity seen in the female group extends as well to the masculine group. Under the 
law, this approach assumed the recognition of men as fathers, endowing them with 
the rights accorded to women related to their maternal nature. When these changes 
took place in the 2000s, as, for instance, with the push for EU Directives on parental 
leave, men were finally entitled to paternity leave and started to be acknowledged as 
assuming some duties that had been considered feminine in nature. This recognition 
pre-supposed the introduction of men into the private realm and made them part of 
the maternal sphere. However, the extent of the recognition still differs widely in the 
national legislations of the EU member states. 
3.5.4 Gender Revolution 
Approach to Gender: Bipolar. Gender and sex become confused, trying to 
depict a continuum and move sex beyond the binary; Postmodern 
(feminism) 
Gender revolution is not one of the paradigms used by Lorber. In this separate group 
I place some of the movements that Lorber located in gender rebellion. All of these 
 
 
414  Many countries in Europe already allow same-sex marriage and it is also legal in the 
USA.  
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movements can be described as appertaining to the post- movements, but I argue that 
gender revolution is significantly different from gender rebellion. Even if gender 
rebellion is under the influence of postmodern feminist thought, I find it more of a 
transitional move between modern and postmodern. This statement can be explained 
by referencing Negri and Hardt’s opinion about the difference between modern and 
postmodern thought: “[W]hat really divides them is that modernists want to protect 
or resurrect the traditional social bodies and postmodernists accept or even celebrate 
their dissolution”415.  
Gender rebellion is a starting point that reveals the differences within gender 
groups, and gender revolution goes even further by rejecting the normative binary 
opposition of masculine/feminine.416 Gender revolution approach is possible because 
of the broader definitions of sex and gender used by gender rebellion. A more 
nuanced approach to gender questions the women–men dyads sustained by earlier 
feminism. Gender revolution goes a step further than gender rebellion, strengthening 
the notion of a fluid identity that challenges the women-men dyad on which both 
“old” and “new” feminism have been built.  
To define the main difference between gender revolution and the previously 
described movements obliges us to look at the subject, for this main difference is 
gender revolution’s departure from women as a category. The other important 
difference between gender rebellion and gender revolution is driven by the variations 
in the approach to the concept of gender and reflected in their approach to the subject: 
the former still keeps the subject alive while the latter seeks its dissolution. For 
gender revolution women as subjects and questions about female discrimination or 
oppression are no longer the main focus of attention. Gender revolution denies the 
existence of women as a category to focus on the discursive construction of subjects 
and the creation of the normative.  
Gender revolution has broad focus on identity constructed through the mismatch 
between sex/gender and sexuality in relation to desire417. The queer movement, main 
representative of the gender revolution approach, rebelled against the normative 
sexual and gender identities characterized by the masculine and feminine 
frameworks. Gender revolution also follows Butler’s theory on the relation between 
sex and gender by stressing the features that establish a bond of gender as the external 
representation of sex or identity expression.  
 
 
415  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude : War and Democracy in the Age of 
Empire (The Penguin Press 2004) 190. 
416  Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist 
Theory for Feminism’ (n 373). 
417  Annamarie Jagose, ‘Feminism’s Queer Theory’.  
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Queer theory is the main theoretical approach that informs gender revolution418: 
it proposes to dissolve the subject to avoid the exclusion of any potential subjects 
from discourse, law or social categories which causes it to be frequently seen as at 
odds with feminist objectives419. Queer theory focuses on the understanding of the 
concept of sex and the critique of the way in which gender is limited to the 
heterosexual man and woman.420 Queer theory, informed by feminism, opens up the 
field of gender studies. Indeed, queer theory draws from Lacan’s statements on the 
illusion of establishing categories, such as “la femme n’existe pas.” However, taking 
Lacan’s statement a step further, we should also ask ourselves, does man exist? 
Gender revolutionists embrace theories on the discursive construction of women, 
stating that the female subject does not exist, or if she does, she is grounded in a 
discursive construction. 
Terry Kogan labelled gender revolutionists critical gender theorists, mainly 
because many of these theorists focused on transsexualism. He refers among them 
to Bernice Hausman, Gordene MacKenzie, Janice G. Raymond, Dwight B. Billings 
and Thomas Urban, Anne Bolin, and Edward Sagarin.421 The position represented 
by critical gender theory confronts that of gender reform, gender resistance, and 
gender rebellion, which all restrict themselves to staying within the limits of the 
category woman and the duality imposed by normative sex/gender. The novelty of 
gender revolution is in its understanding that gender must be theorized separately 
from sexuality422.  
Gender power relations affect not only women and men but also many people 
who do not feel that their gender is in accordance with their sex. Moreover, there are 
many who completely fail to appear in the spectrum of the subject until they choose 
to belong—or someone else decides that they belong—to a certain category, such as 
intersex. The opposition of a non-normative subject to a normative subject reveals 
transgressive identities, or “outcasts”.423 Butler denounces the false nature of gender 
and sex by highlighting the existence of “outcasts”424—i.e., those who identify with 
prohibited or abnormal profiles. The subject is artificial; it is a contextual creation. 
 
 
418  Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (New York University Press 1996); 
Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Queer Theory’ (1991) 3 Differences: A Journal of Feminist Culture 
Studies iii; Steven Seidman, Queer Theory Sociology (Broche 1996). 
419  Jagose (n 418). 
420  Sedgwick (n 217).Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of 
California Press 1990) 
421  Terry S Kogan, ‘Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a 
Restroom Labeled Other’ (1996) 48 Hastings Law JournalJ. 
422  Richardson (n 245). 
423  When referring to outcasts, I refer to all individuals who are not included as part of the 
sex or gender binary. The LGBTI movement represents this. 
424  Outcasts are also referred to as outlaws.  
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What identifies this movement is a process of exclusion rather than difference, as 
Margaret Davies has explained, following Laclau: “[T]he identity is constituted by 
exclusion, it is also constantly threatened by exclusion; the exclusion does not just 
establish different identities, but rather the exclusion antagonizes and resists 
identity”. External identity can also be an internal identity grounded in sex (as 
sexuality or desire). The exclusion applies to sex—which can be understood in an 
ambiguous sense here, as meaning either biological sex or sexual orientation. The 
exclusion also applies to sex (in which the term can be understood in its ambiguity 
as biological sex or sexual orientation), as the exclusion can be because of sex or 
sexual orientation. Margaret Davies points out: “Because the excluded ‘other’ is 
essential (though negatively) to the concept, object or identity in question, it intrudes 
into any such identity and undermines it as an identity.”425 Therefore, focusing on 
the interplay between gender/sex and desire, outlaws who do not identify themselves 
with either of the two sexual categories (or heterosexual practices) antagonize the 
normative; non-normative subjects undermines fixed sex identities, the  sex binary 
identities and normative sexuality.  
Summing up the focus of gender revolution goes beyond women or men as 
subjects; it focuses on the existence of other subjects that break the binary and the 
interplay between sex/gender and sexuality. Therefore, it might be said that the focus 
point of queer theory and then gender revolution comes from their broader 
understanding of sexuality, which is influenced by their broader understanding of 
the concept of gender. In gender rebellion the understanding of gender is produced 
by a conflation of gender, sex, sexuality, and identity—ideas that ground queer 
theory.426 Gender is still conflated with sex in order to acknowledge the cultural 
construction of both, although sexuality as (sexual orientation and sexuality itself) is 
taken out of the matrix and replaced by a major focus on identity427. In this view, 
gender is not the result of sex, and sex, again, is based on an artificial divide that 
reduces the world to a normative binary that sees many people as pseudo-subjects. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether gender revolution should be labelled 
feminism. Gender revolution uses feminist methods to deconstruct gender and to 
attempt to envision a genderless or sexless society. It tries to widen the discourse to 
bring in the multidimensionality of gender using the previous movement’s foray into 
 
 
425  Davies, ‘Exclusion and the Identity of Law’ (n 403). 
426  Francisco Valdes, ‘Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the 
Conflation of Sex,Gender and Sexual Orientation’ (1995) 83 California Law Review.  
427  They still focus on the external, but their questioning of the internal (sex) is valuable. 
Their focus on identity, I think, still keeps us from challenging the binary of sex by 
assigning too much value to gender. Nevertheless, gender rebellion questioning of 
normative sexualities and its independence from the relation between sex and gender is 
helpful in moving forward. 
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the field of sexuality to denounce the heteronormative framework of society.428 It might 
be more appropriate to see it as “genderism”, in which the category of woman is blurred 
and expanded to accept persons who suffer under the power of the constructed truth. 
However, as previously argued, the term gender seems to have an implicit attachment 
to the binary that makes it difficult to use it to broaden the subject, even within the more 
fluid and open approach. The term gender and the notion of gender are aligned with the 
binary of sex, reproducing the binary of bodies. As described in the previous section, 
the blurring of the boundaries between sex and gender between that transforms sex as 
well into a cultural construction does not get rid of the binary. The broadening of 
accepted identities does not affect biology. Gender revolution tries to displace the 
subject from its delimitation within the binary; however, they only focus on external or 
internal identity. Still, the binary imposed by the genitals survives.  
This is not completely wrong; as the new materialism approach claims, indeed 
biology, or rather the body, plays an important role and must be considered 
independently from sexuality. For that, it is important to look at the role of the body 
in grounding beliefs, whether deterministic or non-deterministic, about sex/gender. 
Gender and sex are blurred but also need to be understood as separate entities if we 
acknowledge the new materialism approach. The use of the parallelism between sex 
and gender tries to include sex as part of the realm of the cultural and criticize the 
artificiality of the binary of sex; however, this is impossible, as sex remains attached 
to the materiality of a normative sexed body. Gender rebellion dismissed the power 
of the body and the materialist approach was set aside to focus on discourse. The 
focus was placed on the denaturalization of the body and culture, as will be analysed 
in chapter 6. The combination of queer theory with the new materialist approach 
might help to move towards a broader understanding of the subject and to avoid the 
tendency to fix a subject as an object of knowledge. It is not just a question of gender, 
sexuality or desire, it is also a question of sex and its biological aspects. The very 
existence of intersex individuals evidences the fictional nature of the binary 
worldview that overlooks those that do not fit the binary framework—such as these 
very same intersex people—and forces them to integrate with the norm. 
The gender revolution is truly a ‘genderist’ movement in which the outcasts are 
included. It is genderist because the elimination of the actual subject tries to shed 
light on the cultural construction of the category sex (as sexuality). Gender 
revolution represents an important move in the destruction of the subject as we know 
it and in the blurring of boundaries. ‘Gender feminists’, as Christina Hoff Sommers 
names them, are ‘stealing’ feminism.429 Indeed, Sommers argues that the inclusion 
 
 
428  Sedgwick (n 217). 
429  Christina Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism?: How Women Have Betrayed Women 
(Simon and Schuster 1995). 
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and vindication of other identities beyond the masculine and feminine helps one to 
understand the biased configuration of society. However, many ‘objective’ 
disciplines, including the law, still caution against the subversive nature of queer 
theories and gender revolution, which are mainly grounded in the subjectivity of 
sexuality. However, isn’t the objectivity of sex and the body already subjective?  
Noting that gender revolution seems to be at the cutting edge of gender thinking, 
we might consider going further. Gender rebellion acknowledges binaries and is 
starting to promulgate the need to eliminate binaries, for it understands that the 
binary of sex is a product of gender, although gender rebellion continues to theorize 
within the binary. Gender rebellion accepts the sex binary in the form of gender and 
only affect to sexual orientation; however, as the gender revolution authors claim, it 
is necessary to return to the binaries, because that is where the problem lies.430 This 
is to say that we might acknowledge the full spectrum of gender and sex possibilities, 
as they spontaneously occur, “dissolving the ‘natural attitude’ as well as the 
significance of sex and gender”.431 Indeed, the multiple varieties of the possible 
identities and expressions of sex and gender would disappear. Multiplicity needs to 
replace diversity. The principle of multiplicity that needs to be addressed is referred 
to by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus: “Principle of multiplicity: it is 
only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, “multiplicity,” that it 
ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, 
image and world.” 432 These multiplicities transcend the limits between the conscious 
and the unconscious, nature and culture, and even the body and soul433. Multiplicity 
is a different approach to difference in which there is no one and no other, thus 
oppositions are not possible. There is not a prior unity or fragmented greater whole. 
Overcoming differences to achieve multiplicity, and equality within multiplicity, 
requires uncomfortable collaborations and conversations in order to fight the places 
where the sex binary reproduces itself and reifies subtle sex hierarchies434. The 
acceptance of a continuum of gender or sex possibilities is symptomatic of the post-
gender or post-queer era.435  
However, the multiplication of sex and gender identities lessens their 
importance, which might constitute the single most important driver towards a post-
 
 
430  Lal Zimman, Jenny Davis and Joshua Raclaw, Queer Excursions: Retheorizing 
Binaries in Language, Gender, and Sexuality (Oxford University Press 2014). 
431  ibid 41. 
432  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Thousand Plateaus (A&C Black 2004). 
433     The way to achieve multiplicity is developed in chapter 5, and in reference to the body.   
434  Approaching multiplicity means that equality needs to go beyond gender inequalities; 
it has to arrive at sex equality whatever the sex of the person might be (beyond the 
binary).  
435  Palazzani (n 180) 48. 
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gender society. De-institutionalizing gender, or rather delinking gender from sex, 
would be the next important step to take, as so-called gender neutrality proves not to 
be so neutral after all.436 The combination of queer theory with new materialism 
seems to be the sensible next step in challenging the normative, because we still treat 
the body as sexed within the binary. This statement obliges us to understand and 
analyse the different approaches to the body and to read them using a Deleuzian 
approach to difference, as explained in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, the body is framed by 
and cannot escape from the binary of sex or gender. The body represents the truth 
about nature that cannot be overcome, legitimizing the sex duality and with it the 
categories of woman and man. Nevertheless, as I will propose in Chapter 9, there are 
options that can help us to transcend the binary of sex. 
Gender Revolution and the Law 
The genderist movement437 has revealed the fluid nature of identities, which cannot 
simply be divided into two. This approach to gender entails confrontation with the 
natural legal subject constructed within the natural binary perspective on sex. It will 
entail the queering of law, as stated and developed in Chapter 9. It is a new form of 
diversity, different from the one that emerged from the gender rebellion, and at first 
sight it seems even more complex and challenging438.  
For the earlier feminist approaches to gender, difference was the key. On the 
other hand, for gender revolution the key is exclusion/inclusion rather than simple 
difference, hence the necessity of finding ways to overcome the impositions made 
by the model of the universal legal person. Indeed, its main application to the law 
argues for the inclusion of outcasts or outlaws as visible subjects, regardless of their 
sex identity or sexual orientation, allowing them the same legal rights as everyone 
else439. Even if the issue of outlaws seems to have only an indirect effect on the legal 
situation of women, in fact it has had a direct effect in showing how woman as a 
subject is constructed based on the idea of a natural essence that bestows specific 
 
 
436  Joan C Williams, ‘Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path 
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory’ (1991) 40 Duke Law 
Journal 296. 
437  In Chapter 1, I explained how I do not see this group as part of feminism. I prefer to 
consider it a different movement that is closer to concepts such as genderism. Its 
proponents appear to use insights and methodologies gleaned from feminism, although 
they cannot be considered part of the movement. 
438  No Arvind Narrain and Alok Gupta, Law like Love: Queer Perspectives on Law (Yoda 
Press 2011). 
439  Transsexuals can be considered outlaws because, even though they fit one side of the 
binary, the transition and the subsequent sex category restrict their status in law. See, 
Susan S. Edwards, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (Oxford University Press 
1996). 
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female rights on her, which indeed are no more than gendered responsibilities.440 The 
proof comes from analysing the legal situation of outlaws, who are invisible if they 
do not accept being part of the normative dual sexual pattern—in other words, 
choosing between women’s and men’s rights. Their identity can be anywhere on the 
continuum of gender, but but still they need to choose one of the two legal genders. 
This clearly belies the so-called neutrality of the law441, showing how the legal 
subject is founded on a hierarchical dichotomy that keeps women and men in their 
inherited roles. Choosing a legal gender does not imply that one accepts a social 
identity, but it still constrains one’s rights and responsibilities that are legitimized by 
law.  
Indeed, bringing outlaws within the focus of the law and politics emphasizes how 
the law discriminates not only against women but also against all who do not fit into 
the dual-sex configuration, disclosing the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation in the law442. It makes a voice heard that promotes the full sex/gender 
revolution in the law and society, and the dismantling of heteropatriarchy and 
dualistic sex/gender structures. However, there are still many legal scholars who 
defend sex or gender as playing an important role in law. For feminism it is the way 
to justify women as a political category, and for others the specific reproductive 
condition of woman makes the sex/gender differentiation in law important. 
However, many of the justifications for the necessity of sex and/or gender are 
attached to internalized unconscious and inherited beliefs about the rule of nature. 
The unconscious acceptation of categories and meanings of womanhood and 
manhood plays an important role in every discourse that constructs the subject and 
the world we live in, as will be analysed in Chapter 7. If sex or gender has no role, 
why do we still use it in law? If gender or sex play no role and the law is already 
genderless, then we should embrace the gender revolution discourse and analyse law 
to eliminate the places where remains of sex or gender still exist. A genderless, or 
sexless, law would help everybody to make choices independently of their sex or 
gender and without being constrained by the definition given by law of woman and 
man.  
 
 
440  I refer to women’s rights as ones that are mainly related to women’s caring and 
nurturing nature. This is visible in many court decisions that reflect the natural view of 
women as only mothers or wives, failing to see beyond those characteristics and thus 
denying them any agency apart from being a mother or a wife. 
441  Feminists have long denounced the lack of neutrality in the law, although there is a 
belief in contemporary society that the law is neutral. However, genderist movements 
such as the queer movement challenge this, referring to the continuing absence of 
subjects who do not conform to the sexual dichotomy. 
442  Francisco Valdes, ‘Afterword & Prologue: Queer Legal Theory’ (1995) 83 California 
Law Revue. 
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The gender revolution in law implies the recognition not only of sexual 
minorities but also of all queer people, including straight queer people443, in order to 
avoid “[t]he narrowness and essentialism that at times have limited Feminist and 
Critical Race critiques of law”444. Sex and gender issues exceed the limitation 
imposed on the subject in the creation of the ‘Other’. The invisible limitations that 
are devised as ‘deviation’ hinder the effective dismantling of the system, which is 
sustained by normative sex or gender conflated with sexual orientation. These are 
limitations that may be overcome through inclusiveness and the acceptance of a 
broader understanding of gender—in other words, the inclusion of all subjects 
through the fusion of feminist and genderist movements. The gender revolution, as 
Martha Fineman puts it, brings different subjects into the same arena for 
’uncomfortable conversations’445. Despite the approaches being different, the past 
tensions and disputes between what has been considered feminism and queer 
movement converge in gender revolution through the recognition of this 
conflation446, resulting in what I prefer to name genderism447.   
It is undeniable that the law puts up a strong resistance against the recognition of 
fluidity within gender. However, there are some changes that lead one to believe that 
the law will acknowledge the existence of subjects other than men and women in the 
future. The effected changes in legislation allowing sex change and homosexual 
marriage represent a step forward, although there is still a long way to go. As the 
gender revolution has shown, the law must evolve to accept gender fluidity. This, in 
turn, will dissolve the cultural construction of women based on nature, and lead to 
the achievement of a society that is free from any sexual hierarchy.  
The hidrances to successfully achieving this latter approach might be explained 
using Lorber´s approach to gender as structure in connection with the transformation 
 
 
443  The acceptance of straight queers entails the recognition of real female diversity, which 
in many cases does not conform to normative womanhood and faces discrimination for 
not complying with it. Straight Queer people decouples “queer” from sexual preference 
and connects it to other ways of not living up to hegemonic ideals of sex and gender 
444  Valdes, ‘Afterword & Prologue: Queer Legal Theory’ (n 443) 355. 
445  Martha Fineman defines uncomfortable conversations thus: ‘The purpose for holding 
Uncomfortable Conversations is to bring together people with many common, but also 
some potentially contentious and conflicting ideas’. Fineman, Jackson and Romero (n 
323).  
446  Elaine Craig, ‘Converging Feminist and Queer Legal Theories: Family Feuds and 
Family Ties’ (2010) 28 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice. 
447  I prefer to name it genderism in order to place the emphasis on an abstract subject that 
widens the male–female normative category. An abstract subject able to subscribe to 
the understanding of gender as a fluidity. This might be in accordance with the use of 
the term genderism by those groups who are against the theory of gender. Indeed, these 
groups relate gender theory with feminism but rather with the destruction of the binary 
and the normativity of sex.  
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of the concept of gender, explained in the previous chapter. In the process of 
transformation, the sociopolitical structures (already gendered) can be recognized as 
a main source in development of the notion of gender, resulting in a gendered notion 
of gender that is limited to its relation with sex, and thus limited to the binary. 
Therefore, the concept of gender can be seen as already gendered and recognized as 
a gendered category (structure) frames and delimits the binary imposed by sex. Thus, 
if gender is the term used to represent the cultural values ingrained in the structures 
of society that rest on the binary of sex, how can we use the very same term and 
concept, gender, to destroy gender as a source of discrimination? The answer seems 
clear: it proves to be difficult. This is an answer already given by postmodern 
feminists such as Butler, who condemns the way in which the use of the term gender 
fixes an object of knowledge production that still produces exclusions. She argues 
that sex loses its double signification of biological sex and sexual orientation in the 
interplay between sex, sexuality and gender. Indeed, she highlights how all three 
aspects, in their interplay, reinforce each other in their discursive constructions. The 
result is that the array of possibilities is reduced and still produces exclusions448. This 
is not only the outcome of gender as a gendered category, but also of the use of the 
notion of gender with other categories, such as the body, patriarchy or feminism and 
law. Feminists consider themselves as the driving force in the development of the 
notion of gender, or, as Lykke posits, the renegotiation and resignifications of the 
notion of gender, as well as the cause of the confusion about what it signifies449. 
The use of the conventional dichotomies, as Lorber said, ‘will take the ‘normal’ 
for granted by masking the extent of subversive characteristics and behaviours”450. 
It might be said that the power of gender transformed the neutral into the new normal. 
This is to say that the neutral means to being equals within the difference establish 
by the normative binary. The neutral, however, is a product of our imagination, 
because this new normal- neutral is still delimited by the old understanding of the 
binary constructed by patriarchy. Our imagination forms a concept of neutral within 
a binary framework constraining a broadening of the understanding of the neutral 
beyond the binary.451  
 
 
448  Judith Butler, ‘Against Proper Objects’ (1994) 6 Differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Culture Studies. 
449  Nina Lykke and Jeff Hearn explain the problems that generate the multiple intersection 
among the uses in “and around gender, gender relations and gender powers” in addition 
to the intersection between different feminist epistemologies: “These present 
differential understandings of and intersections between discourse, embodiment and 
materiality, and sex and gender” in the Editor’s Foreword of Lykke (n 28). 
450  Lorber, ‘Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality, and 
Gender’ (n 14) 143–4. 
451  This argument is developed in Chapter 6 examining the false neutrality of the term 
gender.  
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Achieving total inclusion and the possibility of sex-free choices requires the 
involvement of feminism452, given that the tools and methodologies have already 
been developed within its domain453. Feminist methodologies should now converge 
with insights into sex, gender, and sexuality inspired by the gender revolution454. 
Moreover, this approach should be translated into law to really achieve equality as 
well as include all subjects, even those currently considered outlaws, as argued in 
Chapter 9. This approach, besides helping with the inclusion of the Others, would 
also eliminate the distribution of rights and responsibilities based on sex as well as 
the established sex roles455.  
  
 
 
452  Fineman, Jackson and Romero (n 323); Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Eccentric Subjects: 
Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness’ (1990) 16 Feminist Studies; Weed and 
Schor (n 137); Craig (n 447).  
453  Brenda Cossman, ‘Continental Drift: Queer, Feminism, Postcolonial’ (2012) 4 Jindal 
Global L. Rev. 17.  
454  There are authors who defend the existence of queer feminism. I dislike the name 
because it implies a connection between feminism, which only concerns women, and 
queer. Such an association diminishes the power of the abstract queer subject. For this 
reason, I prefer to talk about gender revolution.  
455  For cases, see Hart (n 395). 
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CONCLUSION 
Sex came before gender. Women’s and men’s fates were determined by their sex. 
Feminism fought this determination by confronting it with gender. The introduction 
of the concept of gender challenged the belief in nature-based sex roles, highlighting 
the role of culture. This shift helped feminism to fight biological determinism and, 
later, the imposed binary of sex. There are two differentiated moments in the 
development of the concept of gender in feminism, one that sets sex and gender at 
opposite ends, and another that merges sex and gender. Despite the differences in 
these two conceptions of gender, in both of them gender is still supported or 
grounded by its relation to sex and considered to be sociocultural sex, being limited 
to the binary imposed by sex.  
The modern feminist approach to the relation between sex and gender, 
represented by the initial understanding of gender as opposite to sex, created a bond 
between the two that legitimizes the natural grounds of sex in biology, making it 
difficult for gender to escape from sex. The later approach of postmodern feminism, 
after the exposure of heterosexism and the false unity of gender, defended the 
cultural construction of both gender and sex. Gender, it argued, is a discursive 
construction built on the discourse of the natural binary of sex itself a discursive 
construction. The use of the concept of gender to refer to the cultural construction of 
sex roles was questioned. Gender is too closely bound to sex or, conversely, sex is 
too closely bound to gender to enable the effective use of gender in the destruction 
of the essentialism that permeates sex. Nevertheless, this new ground-breaking 
theoretical approach is not a ground-breaking approach in practice, as gender 
remains ascribed to a binary understanding of sex. 
This debate around the different uses of the concept of gender in feminism made 
it possible to broaden the idea of difference to acknowledge diversity, although the 
concept of gender still limited diversity within the dichotomy of the two normative 
sexes. This concept of difference is framed by the concept of gender, showing how 
the concept of gender remains ascribed to the binary of sex visible in the body. 
Gender revolution, or the acceptance of gender and sex as artificial products of 
society, envisages the problems related to the binary of sex. This binary reproduces 
itself through its linkage to the concepts of gender and sexuality, demonstrating the 
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difficulties in putting queer theory into practice. In the relation between sex and 
gender, the body appears as the leading aspect that causes the binary of sex to 
continue affecting the representation and understanding of the concept of gender. 
Despite the evolution of the concept and the acceptance of the cultural grounds of 
sex and gender, gender is still sex, and both remain within the binary. 
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4 GENDER AND LAW 
In the 1980s, the term gender made its entrance into law after having been 
established as an important feminist tool of analysis in many countries.456 Gender, 
with the help of feminism, became an “irritating” category used to analyze law. The 
feminist impulse facilitated a shift away from the term sex and toward the term 
gender, as analysed in the previous chapters. Independently of the two different 
feminist approaches to the term gender in relation to sex, there was a growing 
acceptance in society, academia and politics of the use of the term gender in 
substitution for the term sex.457 Law and gender have also both been accepted as 
cultural constructions (mainly following the first feminist approach to the relation 
between sex and gender, and gradually accepting the second approach that confuses 
both terms) and as an effect of the beliefs and customs established in and for society. 
The relationship between gender and law has been addressed in two ways: gender 
representation in law and the way in which law is gendered.458 In this chapter, I 
examine the interplay between feminism and law, an interplay that helped to unveil 
the cultural grounds of law and its power in legitimizing a cultural sex hierarchy. I also 
address the social construction of law and its evolution under the influence of different 
beliefs and customs coming not only from the legal context but also from other 
disciplines. An interdisciplinary approach shows how the communication between 
disciplines affects the inclusion of the term and concept of gender in law. This 
communication between other disciplines and law is complex, and it is not simple to 
analyze the vectors of influence involved. However, despite the difficulties, it is 
important to undertake an interdisciplinary analysis to unveil the differences between 
 
 
456  The English term gender was already established in the ’80s; however, it would be 
different from the terms ‘género’ (in Spanish) or ‘genre’ (in French). In these 
languages, the use of the term gender itself would have to wait until the 2000s, as 
explained by Bereni and others. For the term genre, see Laure Bereni et al, Introduction 
Aux Études Sur Le Genre (De Boeck Supérieur 2012) 10. 
457  See chapters 2 and 3. 
458  These two approaches are part of the feminist debate on gender and law. See Frances 
Olsen, ‘El Sexo Del Derecho’ in Alicia E.A Ruiz (ed), Identidad femenina y discurso 
jurídico (Biblos 2000); Joanne Conaghan, Law and Gender (Oxford University Press 
2013).  
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the approach to gender in other disciplines and the legal and social approaches. The 
legal acceptance of the term and concept of gender is limited by the depiction of a 
sexed legal person who does not take on the potential social diversity of gender. 
I continue with an analysis of the use of the term gender in EU law and 
international law.459 I focus on the use of the term gender in the English, Spanish and 
French versions of these documents, revealing the inconsistency in the use of the 
term.460 The inconsistencies in the translation of the term affect its meaning, preventing 
its full achievement of the social possibilities intended by use of the term gender. The 
analysis of the relation between gender and law tries to answer the following questions: 
1) How does law understand gender? 2) How does law construct gender?  
4.1 Law is… constructed 
“What is law?”461 This is a difficult question with innumerable answers.462 Ann 
Grear says that “[l]aw is a complex phenomenon,”463 and Joanne Conaghan refers to 
“that which has been laid down, fixed, or prescribed”.464 Margaret Davies identifies 
what she refers to as  law beyond the law, produced by “the legislatures, constitution, 
bureaucracies, and courts,” and addresses the power of law to “shape our perception 
and, hence, our existences”.465 They all address important points: the fixed and 
prescriptive character of law, the complexity of the definition depending on 
perspective or ideology influenced by beliefs and customs, and the power of law in 
giving meaning to our existence.466 Law is whatever people believe and treat as law 
in their everyday practices.467 Law is everything and it is in every place. 468   
 
 
459  Here the analysis of the EU Directives will be limited to the changing definition and 
understanding of gender in the texts. 
460  For the differences in use of the term gender in different languages and the influence 
of the Anglo-Saxon use, see chapter 2.  
461  Eva-Maria Svensson, ‘Boundary Work in Legal Scholarship’ in Åsa Gunnarsson, Eva-
Maria Svensson and Davies Margaret (eds), Exploring the limits of Law: Swedish 
Feminism and the Challenge to Pessimism (Ashgate 2007).. 
462  The different perspectives on law are addressed mainly through the analysis of common 
law, in Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question – Thomson Reuters Australia (4th 
editio, Thompson Reuters 2017). 
463  Grear (n 228) 41. 
464  Conaghan (n 459) 9. 
465  Davies, ‘Taking the inside out: Sex and Gender in the Legal Subject’ (n 377). 
466  Law, indeed, does not exist in a vacuum, immune to the influences of politics, culture, 
and power on what is considered right, wrong, useful, or useless. Brian Z Tamanaha, A 
General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University Press 2001). 
467  Law could also be social, economic or political customs, uses and beliefs ruling our 
relations in the world. 
468  As Bourdieu explains, law creates its own habitus, and this is in interconnection with 
other habitus. See Bourdieu and Thompson (n 129). 
Gender and Law 
 125 
Societal needs redefine the scope, frame and understanding of law, drawing upon 
prior tradition. Law, especially in the Occident, has shifted from a focus on material 
possession to being God-given, constructed, and politicized.469 The change in focus 
affected the subject whom law was directed toward, representing this subject 
according to their role in society and the reigning principles at the time. Women were 
subordinated based on the protection of property, God, or rationality.470 In Roman 
law, based on a pervasive essentialism471 that considers women only to be 
reproductive beings, women were considered as the vehicle of property transfer and 
legal measures were enacted to safeguard the transmission of property.472 Human 
nature was first linked to property and, from there, the focus developed within natural 
law until it eventually was placed on nature.  
Since rationality became a core feature of society, law was accepted as rational 
and universal and thus equally applying to women and men. However, the very 
 
 
469  In Roman times the focus of law was on property, aiming at the preservation and 
possession of that property. The rise of religion and Christianity brought with it the turn 
to God-driven law. In this view, law was given by God, justifying property on sacred 
grounds. God-given law is understood as Natural Law. See Thomas Hobbes, The 
Leviathan (online, 1660) <https://www.ttu.ee/public/m/mart-murdvee/EconPsy/6/ 
Hobbes_Thomas_1660_The_Leviathan.pdf>; John Locke, ‘Two Treatises’ (- Online 
Library of Liberty, 1689) <https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/john-locke-two-treatises-
1689> accessed 15 April 2019. Created law is understood according to the positivist 
stance; see Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Lawbook Exchange 2005). For the 
constructed approach, Mark G Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Harvard 
University Press 1987). The reason of man is represented by Spinoza; see Martin Lin, 
‘The Power of Reason in Spinoza’ in Olli Koistinen (ed), The Cambridge Companion 
to Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press 2009). Man’s will, as understood 
since the beginning of the modern era, is not only based on reason but also on politics, 
in order to construct the meaning of the law that rules and maintains order. Tamanaha 
(n 11); Roberto Unger Mangebeira, ‘The Universal History of Legal Thought’ 
<http://www.robertounger.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/the-universal-
history-of-legal-thought.pdf>. 
470   Legal theories both feminist and non-feminist attribute this constancy to the emphasis   
on essential human nature coming from “God” and advocated by natural law. Natural 
law is a very old understanding of the nature of law, but today there is a movement close 
to the natural law approach called New Naturalism with followers such as Finnis; see 
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press 2011). On the 
feminist side, there is the Christian feminist movement and other renowned feminist 
scholars such as Jane O’Leary, who in a certain way follows the naturalist, “biological” 
approach; see O’Leary (n 193).) 
471  Essentialism is detailed in chapter 7. 
472  I am focusing here on women, although it might be interesting to examine the 
construction of the binary of sex in law.  
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concept of rationality was biased by an inherited belief about the inferior rationality 
of women.473  
4.2 Law is politics: CLS and feminism 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS)474 and feminism,475 being the most critical approaches 
to law,476 share a growing recognition that law is much “implicated in its social, 
political and cultural contexts,”477 challenging the modern foundations of law.478 The 
feminist scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow points to these two approaches when she 
says that the “[f]eminist critique starts from the experiential point of view of the 
oppressed, dominated, and devalued, while the critical legal studies critique begins, 
and some would argue, remains a male-constructed, privileged place in which 
domination and oppression can be described but not fully experienced”.479 The 
 
 
473  Rousseau, a recognized naturalist, became by far one of the strongest heirs and 
defenders of the essential differences between women and men, insisting on their 
different capacities based on sex. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, Ou, De 
l’éducation (J-M Tremblay 1762) <http://www.uqac.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_ 
sciences_sociales/classiques/Rousseau_jj/emile/emile.html>. 
474  CLS has points in common with feminist insights into law, as both direct their critiques 
at the foundations of law. According to Tushnet, CLS is an “interminable critique”, 
something that can also be recognized as a feature inherent to feminism. See Mark 
Tushnet, ‘Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings’ 
(1986) 36 Journal of Legal Education 505, 516.  
475  These feminists represent the beginning of feminist critical theory, a part of the Critical 
Legal Studies movement contributing to the latest feminist theories on gender and law. 
Some feminist scholars identify as critical legal scholars, for instance Claire Dalton, 
Elizabeth Mensh, and Frances Olsen.  
476  As addressed in chapter 3, the challenging of the binary of sex and reconfigurations of 
the concept of gender have been encouraged by the feminist part of these movements. 
The importance of this new turn in the analysis of law is also reflected in the questioning 
of established concepts such as sex or gender and their function in law and society. . 
477  Conaghan (n 459) 12. 
478  The defining characteristic of CLS is the critique of everything and the question of 
whether everything could exist in another form. A detailed explanation of what exactly 
CLS is can be found in Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement: Another Time, A Greater Task’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561; 
Davies, Asking the Law Question (n 463). See also Tushnet (n 475); David Kennedy, 
‘Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholarship’ (1985) 21 New 
England Law Review 209.  
479  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal 
Education or the Fem-Crits Go to Law School’ (1988) 38 J. Legal Educ. 61. The same 
argument and a reference to those who disagree can be found in Linz Audain, ‘Critical 
Legal Studies , Feminism , Law and Economics, and the Veil of Intellectual 
Tolerance:A Tentative Case for Cross - Jurisprudential Dialogue’ (1992) 20 Hoftra Law 
Review art. 5.  
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different perspectives encourage the general view that they are competing or 
conflicting schools. However, their shared critique that law can exist in another form 
is common ground that can be the basis for promoting dialogue.  
The dialogue between both movements resulted in Feminist Critical Theory, a 
more feminist critical stance on law.480 The political aspect of law481 combined with 
feminism—“Law is politics” and “the personal is political”482—allowed for an 
understanding of the deeper gendered roots of law. Feminists such as MacKinnon, 
Olsen, and Fredman made deeper inquiries into the discriminatory power of law, 
while others defended the development of “feminist jurisprudence” with a critique 
of law that in some aspects overlaps with the critique made by CLS.483 According to 
Joanne Conaghan, in their goal of change, CLS and feminism share the following 
strategies: 1) closer inquiries into law’s social and political aims and effects; 2) a 
search for hidden narratives; and 3) a view of law as discursive tool, “exploring the 
processes through which law confers meaning and structures experience”.484  
Both movements believe in law’s inability to serve as a tool for justice, being 
rather a tool for domination485 and a formal mechanism of social control.486 CLS and 
feminism, simultaneously challenging the self-proclaimed objectivity of the law and 
shaking its foundations, read law as inseparable from politics. As Nicola Lacey 
suggests, “Feminism, in common with other critical approaches in social theory, will 
always try to expose as false law’s pretended autonomy, objectivity and 
neutrality”.487 Law is not neutral; instead it is a discourse that helps to maintain 
hierarchies. Critical theory embodies the emancipation of the individual from 
 
 
480  There are two differentiated groups inside feminism that research law: feminist legal 
theory and feminist critical theory. See: Menkel-Meadow (n 480) 64.  
481  The political is the focus of critical legal studies; however, it can be argued that the 
political has also always been part of the feminist discourse. For a long time, the 
feminist slogan has been “the personal is political”, and not without reason.  
482  In fact, feminism self-proclaimed its political roots, to change the power relations 
between men and women. 
483  Margaret Davies says, “[I]n a broad sense critical legal studies can refer to all of the 
modern and postmodern critical scholarship which has been flourishing for over two 
decades. These critical approaches include such perspectives as feminist legal theory, 
critical race theory, critical historical scholarship, psychoanalytical theory, 
postmodernism (in its various manifestations), the law and literature movement, and 
queer legal theory.” In Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (2nd editio, Law 
Book Co of Australasia 2002) 167.  
484  Conaghan (n 459) 13. 
485  See the following point about the power of law as culture: the tool of the dominant 
group.  
486  Michel Foucault, Vigilar y castigar: nacimiento de la prisión (Siglo Veintiuno 2002).  
487  Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Hart 
Publishing 1998) 186.  
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oppressive societal structures and implies a societal transformation by ‘debunking’, 
‘deconstructing’,488 or ‘trashing’489 theories. 
CLS and feminism use the detailed reading and deconstruction of texts to reveal 
the contradictions of law and the power of sex hierarchies.490 As Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger states, “the inherited arrangements and routines of society and culture”491 are 
present in society. These arrangements and routines are deeply rooted in society, and 
sovereigns accept them in order to keep power. A sovereign who disagrees with the 
social arrangements and routines, and tries to challenge them, would become 
powerless. A sovereign, in his desire for power, must maintain the arrangements and 
routines as part of the conception of law.492 In sum, sovereigns must keep things as 
they have always been to please society and maintain their power. The inherited 
beliefs and customs that are embedded in law and society become more powerful 
than a sovereign’s will. Therefore, law has accepted given historical and ideological 
beliefs and customs even if other possibilities were available.493 The inherited truth 
has become fixed and unmovable. Legal discourse rules cultural relations, 
legitimizing them to serve as a method of control used by the dominant groups. 
Feminism and CLS assert that law is a construction based on discourses, 
sprouting from the power relationships within societies. Law is not objective or 
rational; it serves the interests of some and constitutes a way to legitimize 
discrimination rather than being a set of neutral beliefs promoting justice. Critical 
feminist legal studies help law to produce a conception of the legal subject that better 
corresponds to real individuals. Functioning on the premise of neutrality, law’s 
subject-specific identities are sustained by the law’s indisputable veracity and 
rationality. For CLS and Fem-Crits, the response is based on rejecting the alienating 
meta-narratives that have defined the legal subject. The institution of law is the main 
 
 
488  This tool, developed for literary analysis, appeared as a new way of reading texts, 
looking for the inconsistencies within the text. Deconstruction became one of the “buzz 
words” of the 20th century in academia. It was promoted as an innovative “method” 
devised to unveil the illusion of truth. The text that marked the beginning of 
deconstruction is Derrida’s seminal Of Grammatology. Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology (JHU Press 1998). Deconstruction in feminism is detailed in chapter 7. 
489  Debunking, trashing, and deconstructing are all terms used by CLS to refer to the 
dismantling of the foundations of legal theories. 
490  Motoaki Funakoshi, ‘Taking Duncan Kennedy Seriously:Ironical Lieral Legalism’ 
(2009) Vol. 15 Is Widener Law Review; David Fried, ‘Reviewing the Reviews: The 
Political Implications of Critical Legal Studies’ (2014) 10 Berkeley Journal of 
Employment & Labor Law 531; Duncan Kennedy, ‘A Semiotics of Legal Argument’ 
(1994) 42 The Syracuse Law Review 309. 
491  Roberto Mangabeira Unger, ‘The Universal History of Legal Though’.  
492  This is expanded in the next section, 3.2.1 The power of law as culture. 
493  Davies, Asking the Law Question (n 463) 5. 
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advocate of justice and fairness; however, as feminism and CLS have unearthed, just 
whom are justice and fairness for? 
4.2.1 Feminist Critique of Law: Legal Jurisprudence 
During the ’90s, the analysis of the status of women before the law resulted in the 
birth of feminist jurisprudence494 or feminist legal theory.495 Feminism analysed 
legal concepts, legal theory, legal practice, and areas of substantive legal doctrine.496 
The critical questioning of law included the same legal concepts497 behind which 
discrimination and patriarchy hid.498 Law has become, as Nicola Lacey says, “a body 
of knowledge which can be explored, dissected, and subjected to close critical 
scrutiny”.499  
Feminist jurisprudence is, in MacKinnon’s words, “an examination of the 
relationship between law and society from the point of view of all women”.500 
Martha Minow broadens the understanding of feminist jurisprudence to include not 
only theory but also the search for practical justice.501 Feminist jurisprudence 
brought together a set of different approaches to law, entailing a shift from a solely 
 
 
494  As Ann Scales explains, the first recorded use of the term ‘feminist jurisprudence’ 
occurred at a conference for women graduates at Harvard Law School in April 1978. 
In Ann C Scales, ‘Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1981) 56 Indiana law journal. 
See also Maria Drakopoulou, ‘Revisiting Feminist Jurisprudence: A Rehabilitation’ 
(2013) 3. 
The term ‘feminist jurisprudence’ has raised concerns; for example, Robin West 
has claimed that the expression ‘feminist jurisprudence’ is a conceptual anomaly 
because  jurisprudence is male and there are no possibilities of other jurisprudence until 
patriarchy has been eliminated; in Robin West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) 55 
The University of Chicago Law Review 1. However, other feminists, such as Ann 
Scales or Catherine MacKinnon, have defended the use of the term feminist 
jurisprudence.  
495  Lisa R Pruitt, ‘Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, A’ (1994) 16 University of Arkansas 
Little Rock Law Review 183. Robin West and Patricia Cain prefer to use the term 
feminist legal theory rather than feminist jurisprudence. 
496  Vanessa E Munro, The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory 
(Routledge 2016).  
497  Katherine Donovan, ‘With Sense, Consent, or Just a Con ?’ in Naffine Ngaire and 
Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the subject (LBC Information Services Sweet & 
Maxwell 1997) 47.  
498  Frances E Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ 
(1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1497.  
499  Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (n 488).  
500  As quoted in Heather Ruth Wishik, ‘To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist 
Jurisprudence’ (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s LJ 64.  
501  Minow (n 213).; 
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positivist approach to a theoretical one, and always from a feminist perspective.502 
As Maria Drakopoulou claims, “feminist jurisprudence was first and foremost a 
contemplation and affirmation of a theoretical and critical position towards law”.503 
Patriarchy directly affected the legal subject of mainstream legal theory, and 
feminism tried to uncover the real nature of this subject, pointing to the ungendered 
abstract individual who, in fact, incarnated the patriarchal ideology that sets men as 
the norm.504 The individuals depicted by law are not mere fictions of law; they have 
reality, and they are fundamental to the process that constructs gender.505 The 
permanent blindness to Others has continuously undermined the neutrality, equality, 
and universality of the values on which the legitimacy of law should rest.  
4.2.1.1 Feminist critique of the Duality of Norms 
In the 70’s, feminism confronted the traditional dichotomies that ruled Western 
thought and went to the heart of the matter, pointing to the inefficacy of law due to 
the implicit hierarchy of sex imposed by nature/culture.506 This is explained by R.A. 
Sydie, following Durkheim: “[T]he duality of the human nature is common to men 
and women, but the dichotomies are unequally developed and represented in the 
sexes”.507  
Western thought identified women with nature, associating motherhood with 
nurture, caring, and nursing.508 Nature is linked to the body, to nurture and the private 
realm, in which women are located, and culture is associated with reason and the 
public world, in which men are located. The problematic is located in the stable 
location of women in the realm of nature/emotions/the private, in opposition to men, 
who are separated from nature to become located in the realm of culture/reason/the 
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public.509 The negative aspect of these dichotomies is their immutability and the 
different hierarchical values assigned to the sexes.510 Nature is devalued while 
culture is privileged, placing women in the devalued part of the dichotomy.  
Mainstream legal jurisprudence normalized these dichotomies in such a 
convincing way that they appeared to be immutable truths,511 such as in Durkheim’s 
512 recommendation that women should be in charge of the aesthetic functions and 
men of the instrumental ones. As Ngaire Naffine explains, this truth is transposed to 
legal theory, which envisioned a natural world comprised of unregulated nature and 
a world of ‘convention’ regulated by law.513 Mainstream legal theory assigns a 
hierarchical dualism to nature that legitimizes the roles given by law to its subjects. 
Hierarchical dualism permeates law, where men are represented as being aligned 
with characteristics of modern law such as rationality, objectivity, culture and 
universality and women as being aligned with the unvalued opposite characteristics 
of irrationality, subjectivity, and the particular (nature).514  
The hierarchy inherent in these dichotomies, which also makes its way into law, 
made it imperative to subject law to close critical scrutiny from a new perspective, the 
female one.515 Olsen, for one, has emphasized the relationship between the core values 
of law and the sexualized dualist hierarchy.516 Studies like hers about the influence of 
hierarchical dualism on law have led to different feminist strategies, such as those of 
gender rebellion and gender revolution, which have sought to dismantle rather than 
transform law. For gender revolutionists, law did not prove inclusive,517 and the 
objective was and still is to make law both inclusive and impartial. 
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4.2.1.2 Patriarchy and its relation to the foundational discourse of law 
The feminist’s core denouncement of law is reflected in Carrie Menkel-Meadow’s 
words: “In the beginning, the law was male”.518 One can say that the law was not 
totally male-centred because “it was enforced against women as well as men.”519 
Nevertheless, the male standard norm, the male being the more valued member of 
the pair in the hierarchy, has thoroughly permeated and still permeates law.520 This 
male norm sustains the legitimization of various entitlements grounded solely in the 
male view of the application and enforcement of law.  
As Bourdieu posits in La domination masculine, sexual division is an organizing 
principle of patriarchy that imposes a symbolic violence on social structures.521 
Feminism denounced the role of law in the legitimization of patriarchy, showing the 
patriarchal foundations on which law was sustained.522  
Feminism analyzes law by looking into the ways in which women are subordinated 
and dominated, highlighting the power of patriarchy in defining what is real and what 
counts as truth.523 Zillah Eisenstein denounces the discursive construction of law as 
phallocentric: the ‘phallus’ defines a social order that privileges the male, and the law 
is the authorized language of the State, used to determine how women’s equality is 
understood. Carol Smart concentrates on the male definition of the legal world524, in 
which male truths are imposed on everyday life events.525  
Law, a man-made creation, has become patriarchy’s legitimizing tool and a way 
for patriarchy to reproduce itself. Feminism has shed light on the accepted and 
unquestionably biased truths of law, such as biological differences.526 Society’s 
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beliefs become habits or customs accepted by the majority and legitimized by law,527 
keeping women in their role of restricted femininity.  
4.2.1.3 The sexist gendered male law 
The different feminist approaches to law are constantly evolving. The feminist 
approach to law reflects 1) that law is sexist, even when it aims at the achievement 
of formal equality and reproductive rights528; 2) that law is male,even when it 
focuses on differences—e.g., that women are different from men529—with the aim of 
achieving substantive equality; and finally, 3) in an approach informed by 
postmodernism, that law is gendered.530  
The approach to the maleness of law has been systematized by Joanne 
Conaghan,531 who followed Carol Smart.532 Conaghan, Smart, and other feminists 
such as Lorena Fries have sustained the notion that ‘law is gendered’.533 The 
genderedness  of law, as Smart and Naffine explain534, leads to the accepted idea 
that “[l]aw is a gendering strategy”.535 The labels assigned to the law in the three 
statements above outline the feminist insights into law, highlighting the maleness 
of law as a central point. They also show an evolution in the understanding of law 
as a source of oppression, alongside the different feminist approaches to the 
relation between sex and gender. Patriarchy is replaced by maleness and later by 
gender, and these concepts and their evolution are consequently applied in the 
analysis of law. 
The notion that the law is sexist refers to a subject who appears in law already 
sexed. The law is sexist when women are treated poorly because they are different 
from men. The second assumption, that the law is essentially male, was explored by 
MacKinnon536, followed by many others, such as Zillah Eisenstein and Robin West. 
MacKinnon’s understanding of law as male comes from the law’s roots in male-
dominated power relations in which the State is an accomplice in the legitimation of 
male dominance. As MacKinnon points out, the law is male because it applies 
supposedly objective criteria in which the male subject is seen as the universal. In 
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these three positions the power of patriarchy is still evidenced, as it is the bedrock 
that creates the law as sexist, as male and as gendered.  
Consequently, the maleness implicit in law is difficult to overcome, as it enters 
into the discourse of its subjects, concepts, and categories. The move towards the 
assertion that law is gendered is a subtle step forward from the statement that law is 
male. Smart explains that the difference is in the processes that make law a gendering 
strategy, and that these practices mean something different for men than for women. 
Or, as Margaret Davies explains referring to the process that genders the legal 
subject, “the legal constructs of the person reflect the social construct of masculinity 
– law is gendered”.537  
4.3 Law as Culture: Writing Against the Culture 
Law-as-culture scholars suggest that inquiries into the nature of law must factor in 
the intertwined relation of law and society. Unger addresses this intertwining by 
saying, “From the beginning, I have seen law as the institutional form of the life of 
a people and as a place where interests meet ideals, and spirit struggles with structure. 
Law is not a separate thing; it is an expression of all society and culture”.538  
As the latest cultural approaches to law have noted, culture is a constituting 
power that creates meanings by means of intertwining signifying. This approach 
defines culture as something more than creative intellectual and artistic production. 
The scholars who follow the cultural approach to law emphasize the understanding 
of culture as a conjunction of ideas and practices framed by heterogeneity and 
stemming from elements that intersect in order to “fabricate a world of meaning that 
appears to us as real”.539 Naomi Mezey refers to this approach, as previously 
suggested by William Sewell, as “a semiotic system and the practices that reproduce 
and contest that system, always in constant process of change”.540 Mezey points out 
how culture, understood as language and practices, takes a main role in the 
production, performance, contestation, and transformation of meaning, which might 
happen unconsciously or consciously.541 Likewise, in Rosen’s terms—a term taken 
from Bourdieu, in fact—all these signifying practices become “the categories of our 
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experience”542, categories that evolve and change with time, provoking changes in 
normative beliefs. The creation of these categories, as Bourdieu recognizes and 
advises, contributes to the constitution of the world, “but only within the limits of 
their correspondence with pre-existing structures”.543  
Culture, therefore, is more than a set of customs. Or, as Paul Berman elaborates: 
“Thus, culture … is woven into the fabric of our being”.544 Foucault’s theory of the 
construction of knowledge claims the subjective nature of knowledge, grounded in 
the reflection of pre-existing narratives and in culture, society, and politics. Our 
truths and knowledge are a reflection of what Foucault would call the “regimes of 
truth”.545 These regimes of truth are implicit in the discursive practices, values, 
principles, and ideas that are embedded in our society. These regimes of truth are 
culture, the normative culture that informs our world. They are, as previously noted, 
the inherited beliefs embedded in law and society that sovereigns avoid confronting 
in order to keep power. Law is embedded within society and culture, involved in 
creating meaning and legitimizing certain beliefs rooted in society. In order to unveil 
the constructed beliefs and truths of law, it is necessary to address both law as politics 
and law as culture.546 
The depiction of law as culture has been highly influenced by the work of 
Clifford Geertz, who claims that “law, here, there, or anywhere, is part of a 
distinctive manner of imagining the real”.547 Law and culture have usually been 
understood as separate, independent entities. However, law is not just a group of 
norms that are added into a determined society. On the contrary, law is an active part 
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of society. Law and society mutually inform each other in their process of 
construction548; they are both culture.549 This is explained in Bourdieu’s words: “The 
law is the quintessential form of ‘active’ discourse, able by its own operation to 
produce its effects. It would not be excessive to say that it creates the social world, 
but only if we remember that it is this world which first creates the law”.550 Bourdieu 
outlines the two directions  of influence, from law to society and from society to law, 
stating how both are culture. Culture informing culture is key in the creation of 
meaning. As Rosen explains, culture must be understood as an effect of relationships 
that appear to be “immanent and natural”.551 Law is not a separate entity from 
culture; as Naomi Mezey states, “the meaning of each is bound up in the other”.552  
Law as culture is constitutive of social realities, generating positive norms as 
well as prohibitions of, legitimations of, and oppositions to the subjects and objects 
it recognizes.553 The constitutive approach, as Mautner describes, consists of 
acknowledging the power of law as constitutive of culture.554 Law constitutes 
behaviours through its normative power; it intertwines with religion, ideology, 
politics, moral precepts, and customs, normalizing certain beliefs and behaviours of 
society.555 In fact, law legitimizes culture, hindering alternatives outside of what we 
consider as truth.556 The law’s power integrates practices and ideas, as it is 
discursive, productive, and coercive.557  
The cultural legal approach applies to sex/gender relations and the normative 
power of law over them. Mautner gives the example of the introduction of sexual 
harassment as a new legal category in the USA. As Mautner explains, this legal 
category gives women a different approach with which to conceptualize social 
situations and redefine the relations between women and men. This 
reconceptualization of sex relations between men and woman will in the long run 
become internalized as an always-existing way of relating by future generations. In 
the countries where this new legal category has been introduced, women know that 
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they are protected and men know about the corresponding limitations in their 
relations with women, as now these relations have a legal meaning.558  
Law may have the power to create change, but it is necessary to question or 
challenge the assumptions that cultural beliefs or habits have always been, as a key 
role of law is to maintain the cosmological order559 or the social order.560 As a mirror 
of society, law mainly reflects the dominant cultural norm, and this reflection acts as 
a key function in society.561 This idea about law has also driven legal feminism, as 
Tamanaha explains, to research law using “the selective mirror approach”, which is 
that “law reflects only certain customs or morals, or values and interests within 
society”.562 As North American critical legal feminism claims, law is the reflection 
of the male dominant culture imposed on everybody in society as a rule. Law may 
appear to be neutral, but in reality it is selective.563 
Law as culture, by now, has become a dominant perspective of research. 
However, as Mezey claims this mirroring is not crystal clear. Sometimes we fail to 
see the cultural grounds that grounds the interconnections between society and law. 
In Mezey’s words, “Law as culture does not tell you anything substantive about how 
cultural meaning and practice change in response to, say, a legal rule” or the absence 
thereof.564 For instance, many women in some countries (e.g., France, Finland) 
continue to adopt the surname of their husband even if it is not legally required 
anymore. The custom remains stronger than the law; as Rosemary Coombe says, this 
reflects “[p]eople’s imagination of what ‘the law says’”.565 
This is to say that it is necessary to look at the intersections of different social 
discourses to identify the construction of needs, beliefs, or truths. It is necessary to 
identify, as Mezey claims, the slippages or points of disengagement between law and 
culture. These slippages can be found in three different places: 1) the places where 
the production of law technically occurs, 2) the cultural practices that influence and 
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confront law, and 3) the point of intersection between law and culture.566 The shared 
point where these three places intersect might be found in the inquiries into history 
that create the differences and exclusions that are part of culture.567 Or as Mezey, in 
accordance with the method of Abu-Lhugod, says, the practice of “writing against 
culture”568 instead of deconstructing.  
Moving to write against culture entails abandoning the static categories of 
meaning rooted in modern ideas and values, and focusing instead on the signifying 
practices of everyday life. The focus on everyday life lights up the “[l]aw’s failure 
to acknowledge identities and meaning”569, which probably, as Abu-Lhugod claims, 
is a result of the impossibility of moving beyond the static categories of modernity.  
The strategy should be to work against the regimes of truths, shedding light on 
the absences and exclusions in them. One must acknowledge the subtle working of 
power that is present, not only in the visible interactions but also in the absent ones. 
Law’s power creates prohibitions and absences of subjects and objects. In these 
absences, what is missing and the impact of this silence in law can be felt, even if it 
is not evident. The complexity is found in the process of unveiling where the 
absences and silences are, and which are the intersections that produce these 
absences.  
Following Rosemary Coombe, the strategy of writing against culture might be 
an effective option that can be extended to researching against culture. This means 
researching from multiple and shifting perspectives that might allow us to discover 
the hidden possible multiplicities of difference. An approach against culture that is 
grounded in multiplicity570 also entails an approach against the artificial unity of 
universality, in order to show the possibilities of neutrality and universality in 
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multiplicity. This would entail going against the imperialism of linear dual 
thinking.571 Indeed, part of the symbolic power of law stems from the absences, 
which usually can only be unveiled when culture is contested and confronted.  
In this line, acting against culture, Preciado’s strategy of “Contra-sexualidad” is 
an effective way to dismantle the construction of sex, sexuality, and anything that is 
serving as a biopolitical tool. This strategy does not attempt to newly invent nature 
but rather to eliminate the idea of nature (which is a social construction) that 
legitimates the subjection of bodies and rules the relations between them. He 
envisages a contra-sexual contract that recognizes self-discursive bodies, no longer 
men or women. This strategy makes it necessary to transcend a fixed sexual identity 
determined by nature, which also entails renouncing the social benefits that come 
with naturally determined identity. It becomes necessary to substitute the concept of 
equality with that of equivalence: instead of equality, there is an equivalence among 
all bodies. This new approach also displaces substantive equality, as there is no one 
standard to compare with. The culture of equality is destroyed and substituted with 
an equivalence of multiplicities.  
Regarding law, Preciado’s strategy seems to be a difficult one to realize, as law 
seems to deny the artificial understanding of nature. Law relies on culture to impose 
its standards. Law appears in the form of an unchanging cultural sexual institution 
in which sexual technologies are extemporal. This is addressed by Preciado, who 
claims that any attempt to displace or destroy the sexual technologies brings with it 
the Apocalypse of Humankind. The challenge lies in finding strategies that confront 
the culture of law and make it possible to work against culture within law.  
4.4 The Sex and Gender Distinction in Law 
Feminism has imported and introduced the concept of gender into law. However, as 
previously discussed, the approach of feminism to gender was produced in two ways: 
in the first, sex and gender are at opposite ends of an axis (and gender is an effect of 
sex); in the second, gender is absorbed by sex (and is not a consequence of sex). Was 
gender similarly applied to law? How did both concepts, sex and gender, evolve for 
feminism in law?  
In chapter 3 I examined how feminism tried to denaturalize gender—that is, 
separate it from the biology that permeated sex. The use of the term ‘sex’ gave way to 
the use of the term ‘gender’ in other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and 
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philosophy before the shift reached the field of law.572 Furthermore, post-structuralist 
deconstructionism marked a radical change in the understanding of gender as a 
category573, and the critical approach to law further complicated the understanding of 
gender in law. With this in mind, the legal discourse relied on an ambiguous definition 
of gender that informed legal regulations. Indeed, within feminism, gender and sex 
have been influenced by different contextual politics. In what follows, I examine how 
law rejects the second feminist approach to the concept of gender, as rights and 
obligations are still grounded in sex differences framed by the binary. 
4.4.1 From Sex to Gender in Law 
Despite the difficulties of integrating gender into law, the concept has now become 
everyday currency in law—but what kind of currency and of what value?  
The society we have constructed, together with all its institutions and structures, 
has accepted the sex hierarchy based on biological differences without much 
questioning. The status of a person in legal terms was based on biology, and the 
different hierarchical characteristics of women and men were assumed to be 
natural.574 However, the inclusion of the concept of gender as part of law has not 
questioned the binary. As noted by Louise Langevin, the first use in the ’70s of the 
concept of gender did not question the binary of sex, but rather reproduced the idea 
of biological differences.575  
The main effect was a decline in the use of the first term, ‘sex,’ in favour of the 
second term, ‘gender’. Even if this shift took place across all disciplines, in the field 
of law the tendency to favour the term ‘gender’ over the term ‘sex’ is currently more 
prevalent in jurisprudence than in positive law. Analysing gender in law sheds light 
on how the politics of the sex-gender relationship works within law, on the 
practical—which is also to say political—introduction of the word ‘gender’ in 
international, regional, and national laws, and on how the alliance of feminism with 
gender was a catalyst for transforming law. However, the use in positive law shows 
that the terms sex and gender as cultural concepts were not accepted in law, and that 
the approach was maintained in which gender precedes sex. If sex is accepted as just 
as much a cultural construction as gender, the use of gender as a substitute for sex is 
justified, and then sexed and gendered obligations and responsibilities cannot exist, 
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nor can the binary division in which the legal person is grounded. However, the 
notion of gender as cultural and sex as biological should not allow the use of sex as 
a synonym for gender, because one is grounded in culture and the other in biology. 
Nevertheless, the term gender found its inclusion in law as a substitute for sex even 
if the law never accepted that sex is a cultural construction.  
But why is gender such a slippery concept in law? Why is there no agreement 
about the legal usage of gender? We should turn our gaze to politics to find the 
answer. As Margaret Davies claims, for law, “fact-finding is often of more 
significance than conceptual contests,”576 and gender still belongs to the latter 
because, in reality, it is a substitute for sex.  
4.4.2 Gender: A Political Concept Becomes a Legal 
Concept 
By the time the term gender was introduced into legal discourse, it was already a 
highly politicized concept. There is a lack of clarity in the use of the concept of 
gender in law, leaving too much room for political interpretations. A formal legal 
concept of gender is missing, which in turn diminishes its application, converting it 
into a political tool rather than a legal one.577 Gender is mainly considered a feminist 
issue rather than a general jurisprudential problem.  
Dale O’Leary gives an example of the politicized aspect of gender in her work 
The Gender Agenda, which describes the early use of the concept of gender by the 
United Nations. She exposes the existence of a hidden gender agenda, in which the 
term was introduced in documents for the sake of political correctness, but in a very 
subtle manner so as to avoid alarming the population. The question is, why should 
people be afraid of a term like ‘gender’? Most likely, the hidden reason is not actually 
that the term is alarming to the public but rather that researchers and feminists are 
unable to fully explain their reasons for introducing the term or the meaning of 
gender as used in these documents.  
The term ‘gender’ is used with no clarification either of its semantic meaning or 
of the differences between sex and gender. Together with the problems of translating 
the term578, this lack of clarification leads to ambiguity and confusion. Religious 
feminists, the Vatican, and conservative political movements have accused the use 
of the term gender of destroying societal and family values.579 These groups tend to 
 
 
576  Davies, ‘Exclusion and the Identity of Law’ (n 403) 16.  
577  Goetz and Baden (n 4).  
578  Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (1 edition, Polity 2013).  
579  This is what is happening in France, where the opposition is using gender as a political 
weapon in cases such as same-sex marriage or fighting against the introduction of 
gender education in schools. 
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associate gender with the evils of the world,580 referring to it as the “ideology of 
gender”, which only creates more confusion about the feminist use and meaning of 
the term and concept of gender. Indeed, the political character of gender hinders any 
possible neutral approach to the subject.581 As noted by Carol Bacchi, a political 
category cannot be neutral, as it is always exposed to interpretations.582 The 
complexities surrounding gender as a political category increase when we note the 
differentiation Bacchi makes among political categories between conceptual 
categories and identity categories. Gender is included in both groups: it is a 
conceptual category that informs other concepts such as equality, and it is a concept 
that constructs identities such as woman and man.583  
In the form in which gender has become institutionalized, its definition is more 
susceptible to political interpretation than a formal legal definition would be; the 
latter would decrease misinterpretations and ambiguities. An explanation might be 
found in the overtly political rather than legal use of the concept.584 Therefore, as 
Carol Bacchi explains, the question around a political category is: To what extent 
can a category produce change and transformation? Moreover, what changes can a 
political category produce in law? There might be a certain interest in maintaining 
the ambiguity of the term in order to suit any political discourse and, indirectly, to 
avoid a real revolutionary step towards the ending of discrimination. In this context 
and with political aims in mind, during the UN conferences in Beijing in 1995, 
activist groups and other interest groups585 held a heated debate as to the definition 
of gender. Many different positions could be found: those who did not want to use 
the word ‘sex,’ preferring ‘gender’ instead; those who attached the term to the social 
 
 
580  The definition of moral panic in the dictionary of sociology says: “The process of 
arousing moral concern over an issue – usually the work of moral entrepreneurs and the 
mass media.” The use of the concept is mainly ascribed to Peter Cohen, who used it in 
the analysis of teen behaviours; since then it has been widely used to analyse the societal 
reaction to social problems. See John Scott and Gordon Marshall, A Dictionary of 
Sociology (Oxford University Press 2005).  
581  Neutrality here is understood as a neutrality that recognizes difference, thus implying 
the inclusion of all.  
582  Carol Bacchi, The Politics of Affirmative Action: ‘Women’, Equality and Category 
Politics (Sage Publications 1996). 
583  ibid xi. 
584  Carver Terrell Chapter 14 in Gender Richard Bellamy and Andrew Mason, Political 
Concepts (Manchester University Press 2003). 
585  The groups represented in this debate on UN conferences are, as cited by Dale O’Leary: 
1) population controllers; 2) sexual libertarians; 3) gay rights activists; 4) 
multiculturalists/promoters of political correctness; 5) environmental extremists; 6) 
neo-Marxists/progressives; 7) postmodernists/deconstructionists. The gender agenda is 
also supported by big-government liberals and certain multinational corporations. 
O’Leary Dale, The Gender Agenda: Redefining Equality (Vital Issues Press 1997) 
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construction of roles; and those who, aware of the ambiguity, requested a precise 
definition.586 
This occasion was one of the first attempts to introduce gender as a concept in 
international law, which might explain the difficulties in achieving a consensus. 
However, later on, when the concept became commonplace, the ambiguity continued 
in a similar manner. Law never accepted the concept of gender as fluid or as a bipolar 
continuum; the person in law continued to be depicted as having one of two genders 
in direct relation to the two normative sexes. In truth, there is only some consensus 
accepting gender in opposition to and as the cultural construction of sex. Law 
operates by setting limits between what is the same and what is different, organizing 
categories that include or exclude.587 This requires clear yardsticks in order to delimit 
categories and identify who is inside and who is outside. Gender represented as a 
fluid concept does not limit or set a category; instead it blurs such limits. In this 
sense, the latest feminist approaches in law trash the relationship between sex and 
gender. The gender revolution approach seems to be very far from the consensually 
accepted definition of gender that leaves the categories intact. It seems that the latest 
approaches, in which sex is seen to be just as socially constructed as gender, are only 
accepted in theory and hardly found in law.588  
Having a loose definition of gender can be advantageous in politics, but can lead 
to serious drawbacks in terms of its applicability in law, which requires clear and 
unambiguous categories. An agreed-upon definition could facilitate collective and 
unambiguous political action, supported by legal measures that share an equal 
understanding of the concept of gender. In the absence of a consensual definition of 
gender, the concept’s acceptance in law stays within the limits of sex: gender is sex, 
or at least its cultural representation. Or, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explains, it 
is better to say gender than sex because “they’re not going to be thinking about what 
you want them to think about”—in other words, the term sex leads people to think 
about prurient details rather than power dynamics.589 The reality is that gender is not 
sex, and the real diversity of women goes beyond the limiting definitions of the 
category ‘woman’.. However, if we do not know how to include gender in law, we 
should be thinking about how to deal with it… or whether or not to continue using it 
at all. 
 
 
586  Palazzani (n 180) 60. 
587  Davies, ‘Exclusion and the Identity of Law’ (n 403). 
588  In positive law it is possible to find the term gender as a substitute for sex. However, 
the mere substitution of the term sex by the term gender does not mean that the intention 
is to stress the artificiality of the binary of sex. The use of the term gender instead of 
sex is just evidence of the influence of Anglophone countries’ use of gender. 
589  ‘Heavyweight’ (The New Yorker) <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/ 
03/11/heavyweight-ruth-bader-ginsburg. 
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4.4.3 Sex and Gender as Legal Concepts 
 
 Legal Concept Political Concept 
CONCEPT SEX GENDER 
SOURCE  NATURE / BIOLOGY CULTURE/ SOCIETY 
ADJECTIVE  MALE/FEMALE FEMININE / MASCULINE 
PERSPECTIVE  OBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVE 
SEXUALITY HETEROSEXUALITY ANY 
 
Finding literature on the legal usage of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ and how they are defined 
in specific laws is difficult. In particular, the clarification of what gender means in 
law comes from the interpretation of judges and the outcomes of judgements dealing 
with gender issues. The outcomes dealing with the meaning of gender seem 
surprisingly disparate, showing a variety of approaches in the legal usage of gender. 
From our birth to our death, both gender and law are intertwined parts of our 
lives. The first legal obligation when a child is born is its immediate registration 
under the category of either male or female. Later, within said registered category, 
we are subjected to acts such as marriage, divorce, parenthood, adoption, and 
decease, which are small legal acts that frequently pass unnoticed. According to 
Margaret Davies, “[l]aw orders the way we see the world, as well as what we do”590, 
implying the power of cultural reliance on sex as an identity category. Gender 
entered the law as part of an attempt to underline and combat the androcentrism 
ruling the world. Patriarchy and gender were recognized as cultural constructions 
which, alongside other intersectional factors, cause discrimination.591  
Gender is far from being a legal concept, but sex does play a fundamental role 
in law.592 In law, difference is mainly based on sex; however, the use of gender 
shifted difference from biology to culture. Difference in law is transformed into 
equity, even if the law is informed by sex and not by gender.593 Nevertheless, the 
 
 
590  Davies, Asking the Law Question (n 484) 6.  
591  The concept of patriarchy is traced back to Weber. However, it differs from the feminist 
concept of patriarchy. Weber refers to patriarchy to define the household led by the 
eldest man. Feminism took the concept and extended it to define male domination over 
women. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the relationship between gender and 
patriarchy. 
592  Conaghan (n 459). 
593  Ivana Radacic, ‘Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights - (2008) 19 European Journal of International law 841.   
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growing use of the term gender in law does not acknowledge its political origin, 
without legal value. Joanne Conaghan explains how despite the shift in law from the 
use of sex to gender, still, “of the two, ‘sex’ is more likely to be called upon to do 
the legal work”.594  
Sex continues to rule in law because of the rejection of the latest acceptation of 
gender as fluidity. The fluid acceptation only appears in law, as previously 
mentioned, when linked to a “surname” in the phrase gender identity, depicting the 
external expression of it and its detachment from sex. Gender as identity in law keeps 
the value of sex immutable: sex is still sex, as the fluidity of identity cannot be 
acknowledged by the static binary of sex. Not only are these valuable reasons to 
reject gender in law, but also the latest acceptation of gender oozes subjectivity, 
another potential reason for law not to embrace it. In fact, the objectivity of sex, 
based on genitals, makes the division into two objective categories easier and implies 
no subjectivity; this is more acceptable to law than the subjectivity of gender.595  
Louise Langevin’s analysis of the use of the term gender in Canadian law 
outlines Canadian legislators’ confusion between biological sex and gender, 
resulting in the absence of the term ‘genre’ in French-Canadian law. As Langevin 
explains, the reasons for the rejection of the term gender (genre) in French may be 
ideological or may lie in confusion over the terminology.596 Consequently, law’s 
approach to sex as a formal legal concept mainly follows the gender reform and 
gender resistance feminist approaches to sex and gender. These approaches set dual-
sex biology as the foundation of gender, implying that gender, in legal terms, 
continues to be considered the cultural representation of sex.597 One might say that 
gender rebellion, despite acknowledging diversity and embracing gender as fluidity, 
still refers to gender as cultural and sex as biological. Thus it includes a broader 
 
 
594  Conaghan (n 459). 
595  Radacic (n 594). 
596  Langevin (n 576). 
597  Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute defines gender as follows: “For the purposes of this 
Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, 
within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different 
from the above.” A good analysis of the use in the Statute of Rome can be found in: 
Valerie Oosterveld, ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’ (Harvard Human Rights Journal 2005). The ICC policy 
paper on gender-based crimes refers to gender in the Statute of Rome article 7 (3): 
“Gender‛, in accordance with article 7(3) of the Rome Statute (Statute) of the ICC, 
refers to males and females, within the context of society. This definition acknowledges 
the social construction of gender, and the accompanying roles, behaviors, activities, and 
attributes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys. Sex: ‚Sex‛ refers to the 
biological and physiological characteristics that define men and women” and the 
explanation given is: “To put it another way: ’Male‘ and ’female’ are sex categories, 
while ’masculine’ and ’feminine’ are gender categories”. 
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spectrum of women by using a third feature: sexual orientation. However, this 
feature must be understood as something different from sex or gender.  
The idea of sex as biological truth might be one of the indestructible truths 
inherited from previous societies. The biological truth shows the clear influence of 
natural law on the construction of modern law.598 Natural law, which assumes 
women’s inferiority due to biology, establishes differences that configure the 
“natural” social order. Therefore, the influence of natural law still imbues the 
concept of ‘sex’ in law—the male and the female—with different essential 
characteristics. These differences configure the natural social order that law still 
asserts is the only truth.599 The understanding of bodies and the interest taken in them 
say a great deal about law’s understanding of sex, as I will further analyse in chapter 
6. The approach that accepts a “natural” social order carries other implications, such 
as establishing an ethical foundation—procreation—that makes heterosexuality the 
only accepted normative expression of sexual desire.600 This assumption about the 
validity of the natural truth constitutes law and maintains immutable beliefs about 
women and the configuration of sex in general.  
Challenging culture or the normative meta-narratives, as suggested by 
postmodern theories, implies a move away from natural or positivist law, involving 
a slight shift in the influence of the rule of nature. One result of such a shift can be 
found in the legitimization of same-sex marriage. The natural approach that rules 
heterosexuality makes way for cultural impositions. Still, in same-sex marriage, the 
use of the concept of gender is limited to the binary ascribed to sex. Leslie Green 
addresses the deeper point in her article “Sex-Neutral Marriage,”601 explaining how 
the first step in eliminating the binary of sex in law is a theoretical justification 
against the influence of natural law. This might be a step forward; before this, 
however, one must comprehend other existing problems such as how strongly natural 
law still influences contemporary law. Becoming aware of the influence of natural 
law will reveal the linkage of the concepts of sex and gender to nature. In the usages 
and definitions of sex and gender in law, courts and law only refer to biological 
aspects, while on the occasions when a broader definition of sex that encompasses 
psycho-social factors is accepted, the binary of sex is left untouched.602 The use of 
gender in law should acknowledge the subjectivity immanent in the concept of 
gender, which allows for a certain degree of arbitrariness in legal decisions.603 
 
 
598  This inherited truth is part of culture and, as such, transposed to law. In this case, it 
seems necessary to write or research against culture.  
599  Conaghan (n 459). 
600  John Finnis is one representative scholar of the new natural law. 
601  Leslie Green, ‘Sex-Neutral Marriage’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 1.  
602  Joanne Conaghan gives clear examples of this use in her book. Conaghan (n 459) 178.  
603  An example is the disparity in the norms regulating changes of sex. 
Gender and Law 
 147 
The result is a process in which sex objectivity informs gender subjectivity and 
not the other way around, denying the possibility of acknowledging multiplicity in 
law. The confusion of both concepts impedes the subject from embracing 
multiplicity, relegating the subject to the fixed binary of sex. Gender is pulled within 
the limits of sex, and the objective fact of genitalia is ultimately established as the 
main factor that distinguishes the two elements of the binary.604  
Lorber has highlighted how the multiplicity that reflects the fluidity of gender 
must be acknowledged: “the variety, this continuum of physiological sex cannot be 
ignored”.605 The concept of the continuum is referred to by Fausto-Sterling, who 
proposes a more biologically grounded base classification of a continuum of sex than 
the theoretical approach does.606  
Indeed, recognizing gender fluidity in law would match the actual reality of 
society; such a recognition would be influenced by the evolution of science and 
knowledge, which pushes us to reconsider sex as something other than what is 
indicated by genitalia. Still, genitalia remain the primary and most “objective” factor 
for the designation of sex. This objectivity becomes blurry when it is confronted with 
the absence in law of those who do not fit into the binary: intersex people. Then 
again, the subjectivity of gender seems difficult to transform into objective facts 
other than through its linkage with sex. Therefore, the answer might be to reconsider 
how we can define sex as far as possible from the current binary, which maintains 
the natural truth that feminism is trying to fight.  
Law, by its attachment to the objectivity of sex, even under the name of gender, 
reifies the very same hierarchy that those who introduce the term gender in law are 
trying to dismantle Is the binary divide of sex so important that it must be 
maintained? Or should we envisage the possibility of its elimination or neutralization 
in favour of truly inclusive law? Should we not find different criteria to address the 
harm caused by discriminatory actions?  
This is an issue already raised by Marie-Victoire Louise when addressing the 
deceptive and chaotic use of gender. She asks, “How can one not see that speaking 
of gender and violence towards women, women victims of gender violence, domestic 
and gender violence, violence linked to gender discrimination, gender and violence 
towards women, gender violence, violence linked to gender, violence based on 
 
 
604  Lorber, ‘Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality, and 
Gender’ (n 14); Hubbard (n 290). The IOM defines sex as the classification of living 
things, generally as male or female, according to their reproductive organs and 
functions assigned by the chromosomal component; IOM, ‘No Title’ 
<http://www.iom.int/about-iom.> accessed 20 March 2018. 
605  Lorber, ‘Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality, and 
Gender’ (n 14); Hubbard (n 290). 
606  Fausto-Sterling (n 175) 255. 
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gender, the gender of violence... evacuates the question of the sex of the authors of 
this violence?”607 She evidences a problem that lies in the use of gender, which is 
similarly transposed to law: that speaking of gender not only evacuates the question 
of the sex of the perpetrators (authors), but also the question of sex discrimination, 
including against those who are not recognized in the binary of sex. Indeed, the 
outlaws, all those who are forced to choose a sex to have rights, are also 
discriminated against because of sex and not because of gender. Women and men, 
who have different rights and obligations, are discriminated against and treated 
differently because of the sex hierarchy. Also, the same-sex couples who have to 
decide who assumes the role of which sex to obtain their parental rights are 
discriminated against because of sex, not because of gender. Therefore, the use of 
gender simply obscures these forms of discrimination while at the same time failing 
to acknowledge the fluidity that gender is supposed to reflect, at least in the latest 
approaches to the concept of gender—a fluidity or multiplicity that law overlooks by 
using gender as blinder.  
Therefore, if the concept of gender does not find its place in law, especially in 
the approach that merge sex and gender, the natural response should be to eliminate 
it, as happened with the concept of race.608 The concept of gender (being faulty) 
could be done away with just like the faulty concept of race was done away with. 
The elimination of both would force us to search for ways to recognize multiplicity 
in law. As Jo Shaw states, “‘importing gender’ is the task of engaging with 
‘embodied difference’ within law, legal institutions and legal processes, especially 
(but not exclusively) in the ways in which individuals relate to or interact with these 
laws, institutions, and processes”.609 This is a task that, instead of moving towards 
gender-neutral law, causes the opposite effect by embodying the law within the limits 
of sex.  
4.5 Sex and Gender in Legal Texts 
Law is a powerful tool to promote equality, a fact already proved by international 
and EU law. For instance, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
1951 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) set the tone to guarantee 
human rights. They both played, and still play, an important role in promoting 
equality and in highlighting the need for specific international legislation addressing 
 
 
607  ‘Marie-Victoire Louis - Tell Me, What Does “Gender” Really Mean?’ 
<http://www.marievictoirelouis.net/document.php?id=737&themeid. 
608  Monique Wittig, The Straight Mind and Other Essays (Beacon Press 1992); Butler, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (n 179). 
609  Shaw (n 187). 
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women’s rights. Therefore, the achievement of equality between men and women 
and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women have become 
fundamental international objectives as part of the protection of human rights. The 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration influenced the enactment of more specific 
legislation on women’s rights, such as the Declaration on the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination against women610 and the Convention on the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW).611 
The influence of these legal tools on national legislation is visible in the many 
changes carried out in domestic law to accommodate the values and principles 
promoted by international and European law. These international legal instruments 
have been fundamental in advocating the achievement of sex equality, as a result of 
the influence of legal feminism; they establish the obligations of signatory countries 
in relation to equality and discrimination, playing an important role in advancing 
women’s rights universally. Moreover, they opened the path to progressive 
development in the area of women’s rights, which has materialized in the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action. In addition to the international human rights 
instruments, there are regional instruments such as the 1950 European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,612 which arose as a powerful 
instrument to achieve equality through the prohibition of sex discrimination. Also in 
 
 
610  The preamble of this document explains the existence of other legal instruments for the 
same objective and the need for this specific one to emphasize women’s rights. See 
http://www.un-documents.net/cedaw.htm 
611  CEDAW is mainly a women-specific tool, and, as Ali Miller explains, it is one of many 
UN structures addressing women. The women-specific structures listed by Ali Miller 
are: “U.N. Charter-created political bodies (where governments speak in their national 
interest), such as the Commission on the Status of Women/CSW); independent expert 
treaty-based bodies, such as CEDAW (part of the U.N.‘s human rights treaty body 
system); and U.N. agencies and funds (programmatic arms of the U.N. system 
constituted as arms of the U.N. bureaucracy, such as the old Division for the 
Advancement of Women/DAW or UNIFEM, a sub-agency of UNDP, and the United 
Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 
(UNINSTRAW)”. There are also special advisers on women to the Secretary General, 
Special Rapporteurs on women and various women-identified issues in the Human 
Rights Council, and a new Special Representative to the Secretary General on Sexual 
Violence in Conflict that provides reports to the Security Council. All these institutions 
were grouped in 2010 under UN women; see Miller (n 210). It is also important to note, 
as Noreen Burrows and Esin Orucu have done, that the 1979 CEDAW refers to sex-
based discrimination and not gender. They highlight that men are excluded; see Noreen 
Burrows and Esin Orucu, ‘The International Approach to Discrimination’ in 
Maclen,Sheila and Noreen Burrows (eds), The Legal Relevance of gender: Some 
Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination (Macmillan Press 1988). 
612  This instrument allows individual citizens to bring complaints to the ECHR when 
violations of the Convention occur. 
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the EU, the Treaty of Rome in 1957 made equality a core subject that has been 
developed in subsequent treaties and through the directives to be implemented by 
member states. In fact, equality began as a question of economic interest, as depicted 
in the principle of equal pay for equal work, and was later transformed into a question 
of social interest. The fight against discrimination yielded specific policies in the 
area of discrimination against women and gender equality.613  
The different feminist movements played a main role in the development of these 
legal instruments by questioning the status of women in law and society. Their main 
weapon, gender, became a core concept in law in an attempt to eliminate the 
biological foundation of women’s discrimination and to highlight the arbitrariness 
of the culturally constructed roles, attitudes, and behaviors based on sex. Thereby, 
what at first was labelled sex discrimination in a patriarchal society later became 
gender discrimination. It is important to note that, regarding international legal 
instruments, the term gender was first introduced in the 1993 UN Declaration of 
violence against women614 (only in the English version) and then later at the Beijing 
Conference in 1995 (in the English and Spanish versions).615 Before these instances, 
the references were to sex discrimination.616  
Nevertheless, the introduction of the term gender in law was not simple. It 
became a concept with no clear meaning, which complicated its application and 
utilization. This problematic has been addressed by Ali Miller, who focuses on the 
meaning of gender in international human rights by asking the question, “[W]ho or 
what person is figured (imagined, addressed, elaborated, and maintained) with the 
use of the word gender?”617 As she points out in her research, “the fault line divides 
gender either into short-hand for attention to ‘women’ deemed a unified, single 
category; or gender into shorthand for an aspect of gay (male), or more recently 
transgender, identity. Reductive and mutually exclusionary uses of one of these two 
versions of gender abound in advocacy on U.N. policy and programming, and in the 
resulting policy, norms, development, and programming itself”.618 
An example of the term gender in positive law is found in the ICC Rome Statute, 
which was the first place where the concept of gender was defined in an international 
treaty. The definition in the treaty says: “For the purpose of this Statute, it is 
understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within 
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Discrimination Law - Publications Office of the EU’ (2016). 
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the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different 
from the above”.619  
This definition was heavily criticized when the treaty was concluded. As 
analysed by Valerie Oosterveld, the term gender appears nine times in key articles 
of the Rome Statute. The definition has a direct impact on the cases that the court 
may handle and has also gone on to affect the legal definition of gender in other 
international laws. This direct impact on other international law is evidenced in the 
following analysis.  
4.5.1 Sex and Gender in International Legal Texts 
The terms sex and gender are both used in international legal tools. Regarding the 
definition of gender, Valerie Oosterveld shows the evolution within the international 
realm from the definition with minimal content in the 1995 Beijing Declaration to 
the more detailed one given by other UN institutions. Oosterveld claims that the UN 
definitions of gender emphasize the socially constructed foundations of the concept, 
the influence of culture on it, and how the concept varies within and among 
cultures.620  
These international legal tools have become important sites in the definition of 
the concept of gender and its relation to the concept of sex. In order to understand 
how these concepts are used, it is important to analyse the use of the terms in 
particular international tools—for instance, the Charter of the United Nations (1945), 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1967), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979), and 
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993). In addition 
to these texts, it is also important to look at a pseudo-legal text, the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform Action of 1995, which has been a great influence on the 
fight for equality.  
Louise Langevin’s analysis of Canadian and French legal texts provides a 
starting point. Langevin posits that there is a slow shift from using the term sex to 
using the term gender, which coincides with a similar shift in French from sexe to 
genre. The increased use of the term gender over the term sex in French as well 
 
 
619  Rome Statute, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1998) The Hague, 
Netherlands: International Criminal Court. 
620  Oosterveld (n 598).  
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shows how the Anglo-Saxon term finds its way into all languages. However, it is 
important to note that the way in which the concept is used is another story.621 
The terms chosen and used in a legal instrument are of special importance, as 
was already signaled in 1929 in the USA by the Institute for International Rights, 
regarding the use of the term person.622 This group worked on a first version of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which it stressed the importance of 
choosing the neutral term person to refer to the subjects before the law. The election 
of the neutral term was intended to avoid women’s discrimination, even though in 
some countries women were still not recognized as independent subjects before the 
law.623 Nevertheless, the inclusion of women as subjects with full status in the 
declaration was not easy to achieve, and even required protests.624  
The terms and expressions used in the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) set the tone for the future 
developments of in human rights. The preamble of the Declaration of Human Rights 
refers to “all members of the human family”, and Article 2 explicitly prohibits sex 
discrimination.625 The Charter of the United Nations refers to the subjects included 
under its protection with the neutral term people. In the following articles, which 
clarify who are subjects, it addresses men and women. It also prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex. The term gender does not appear in any of these 
documents, and there is no reference to social sex or the cultural construction of sex. 
Relating to the feminist movements, this was the era of sex equality imbued with the 
patriarchal reading of universality. Gender is not yet present in the legal discipline 
or in feminism, although it is already acknowledged, as mentioned in chapter 3, in 
relation to sex roles.  
In the 1967 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women and in the CEDAW text of 1979, the term gender did not appear 
either in English, French or Spanish, despite the use of the term at this time in the 
health sciences. The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women of 1967 explicitly spoke of the discrimination caused by being a woman. 
This declaration reflects the aims of the gender reform movement, trying to achieve 
 
 
621  This fact returns us to the analysis made in chapter 3 about the importing of the term 
gender to languages other than English, French being perhaps the language most 
reluctant to adopt the term in its discourse. 
622  Langevin (n 576). 
623  Louise Langevin following Marilyn Lake, ‘From Self-Determination via Protection to 
Equality via Non-Discrimination: Defining Women’s Rights at the League of Nations 
and the United Nations’ in Patricia Grimshaw, Katie Holmes and Marilyn Lake (eds), 
Women’s Rights and Human Rights (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2001).  
624  Langevin (n 576). 
625  ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights | United Nations’ <http://www.un.org/ 
en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>. 
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equality by raising women to the same position as men. Later, the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 (CEDAW) 
continued along the same lines as the previous declaration. The Convention aimed 
at the achievement of equality between men and women, revealing the influence of 
the gender reform movements. At this time feminism still did not refer to the concept 
of gender and was mainly focused on sex equality as formal equality. The influence 
of these movements is visible in the preamble of CEDAW. It specifically stresses 
the aim of sex equality, saying that the aim is “the full enjoyment of the rights of 
men and women”.626  
There is a slight shift in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women of 1993627 that shows the influence of the gender resistance discourse, which 
had begun to dominate feminist discourse by this time. This influence was evident 
with the introduction of the term gender in the document. We find Article 1 of the 
Declaration saying: “For the purposes of this Declaration, the term ‘violence against 
women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result 
in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats 
of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public 
or in private life”. The term gender was included in the English text, in contrast to 
the Spanish and French documents, which still refer explicitly to “le sexe féminin” 
or “sexo femenino”.  
The use of the term gender in the 1993 Declaration appeared as a substitute for 
sex—to be precise, for the female sex.628 It seems that the dominant discourse of 
gender resistance found its way into the legal texts to emphasize the societal aspect 
of gender or, as gender resistance defines it, the cultural oppression based on sex 
difference. For gender resistance, gender is the hierarchical construction of sex 
influenced by culture. Thus, in a certain way we might say that this phenomenon is 
what feminism at that time wanted to emphasize.  
The term is absent in the translations into other languages of the 1993 
Declaration. This might be justified as a consequence of the differences in meaning 
between the English term gender and the equivalent term in other languages. These 
differences were significant, since at this time the term gender had not yet been fully 
adopted by other languages. In addition, the absence of the term might also be 
 
 
626  ‘CEDAW 29th Session 30 June to 25 July 2003’ <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ 
daw/cedaw/text/econvention>.  
627  As noted by Aleida Luján, PhD Candidate at the University of Turku, in CEDAW and 
in the Declaration on the Elimination of violence against women of 1993, in the German 
version the word used is Geschlecht. 
628  This fact coincides with many of the feminist claims about the association of gender or 
sex with women only. 
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because the Vatican, 629 one of the countries that rejected the use of the term gender, 
raised fears that the term would problematically open the possibility of going beyond 
the binary of sex, probably because in other languages gender implies three 
genders.630 . The possibility of a third gender was not to be contemplated—at least 
not by very conservative groups.631 Backlash against the use of the term has come 
from critics belonging to conservative and religious groups. These groups label any 
theory related to the concept of gender as “gender ideology” without specifying the 
meaning of the concept or how it is understood.  
The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action represents an important 
moment in the development and introduction of the concept of gender in 
international legal texts. Indeed, as Baden and Goetz explain, the Beijing Platform’s 
subject matter concerned the concept of gender to such an extent that it was possible 
to pose the question, “Was the conference to be about ‘sex’ or ‘gender’?”632. 
Therefore, the 1995 Beijing Platform can be set as the moment when the term gender 
was finally fully introduced into the official political language, not only in English 
but also in Spanish, although there was still controversy and opposition. The 
opponents of the use of the term gender in the text only accepted its inclusion within 
quotation marks – ‘gender’.  
The meaning and use of the term and concept of gender was contested and 
provoked active opposition from conservative groups. The opposition is evidenced 
in the words of one of the speakers on a panel at the 1995 Beijing Platform: “We 
have to try to neutralize the tremendous amount of gender, gender perspectives, 
which are going to go directly against our families and against our children.”633  
The absence of the term gender in other documents provoked a statement by the 
president of the conference on the meaning of gender634. It is curious that even if the 
document states that there would be an explanation of the term, in the end it did not 
contain one. The Beijing Platform’s Article 2 says: “Having considered the issue 
thoroughly, the contact group noted that: (1) the word ‘gender’ had been commonly 
 
 
629  Langevin (n 576). 
630  See chapter 1.  
631  In February 2017, the association HazteOir.org drove a bus around the streets of Madrid 
campaigning against the ideology of gender. In March, other similar groups were 
campaigning in New York against the so-called ideology of gender; these groups stated 
that boys have a penis and girls have a vagina, and there is no other way. See Ediciones 
El País, ‘El autobús contra los transexuales de Hazte Oír desafía la tolerancia de Nueva 
York’ (EL PAÍS, 23 March 2017) <http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/ 
2017/03/23/actualidad/1490225852_325943.html> . 
632  Sally Baden and Anne Marie Goet, ‘Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]? 
Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing’ (1997) 56 Feminist Review 3, 11. 
633  ibid. 
634  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf 
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used and understood in its ordinary, generally accepted usage in numerous other 
United Nations forums and conferences; (2) there was no indication that any new 
meaning or connotation of the term, different from accepted prior usage, was 
intended in the Platform for Action”.635 This statement did not clarify the meaning 
of the term, especially not for all those countries in which the term had not been 
introduced. The term was introduced in English and in Spanish translation as 
‘género’; however, the French translators opted to keep it in English and not use the 
French ‘genre’.  
The paradox of the 1995 Beijing Platform has been explained by Ali Miller as 
follows: “The ‘gender fights’ of 1995 at the U.N. Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing simultaneously opened the U.N. to free-wheeling debates over 
the scope of gender (Are there five genders? Is talking about gender really talking 
about homosexuality? What are the different ways to differently gender women? 
How are men and women gendered?) and, in practice, produced gender work in the 
U.N. system which solely meant work on women”.636 It seems the meaning of gender 
was finally limited to women.  
The meaning of gender implied in “its ordinary, generally accepted usage” is the 
meaning given by the gender resistance movement: the cultural construction of sex. 
Gender is the term intended to denaturalize sex by highlighting the social 
construction of discrimination. The introduction of the term gender in the 
international document was understood as a feminist victory because it entailed the 
recognition of a cultural-social rather than a biological justification for women’s 
discrimination. Nevertheless, when analysing the document in English, this sense of 
cultural construction is not easily observed because gender ends up serving instead 
as a mere substitute for sex, thus maintaining the natural depiction of differences and 
confusingly applying the term gender only to the category of woman.637 Feminism 
helps to understand the power of culture in governing the relations among human 
beings and, likewise, the power of law in governing these relations.638 The use of the 
term gender in positive law is difficult, especially when not accompanied by a clear 
explanation of its feminist meaning. The understanding of gender in international 
texts also implies, as Ali Miller notes, a connection to sexuality in which “women 
identified through gender analysis must be heterosexual and men who can be 
analyzed with regard to gender must be homosexual”.639 
 
 
635  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf 
218 
636  Miller (n 210) 851. 
637  See chapter 1, section 1.3.2: The Sex/Gender Debate in Feminism: From Modern to 
Postmodern. 
638  This point is broadened in the next chapter.  
639  Miller (n 210) 839. 
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An analysis of the use of the term gender in these documents shows the influence 
of gender resistance feminism in recognizing what, in sum, is patriarchy. Moreover, 
even if one is familiar with feminist theory, the evolution of the meaning of gender 
makes it difficult to understand which meaning is intended by the author. The 
understanding of gender in English is constrained to a binary of female and male, 
although in other languages such as Spanish or French it implies a third gender.640 
The different meaning in different languages makes it difficult to imply the cultural 
acceptation of gender if one is not acquainted with feminist theory, which is not very 
common. Moreover, the confusion between the concept of gender in relation to sex 
and as a political category complicates its use.  
Despite the reluctance of some countries to use the term gender, it moved 
forward and slowly gained its preferential place, at least in English and Spanish law, 
although French law continues to reject it, preferring the use of the term sex instead. 
The increasing use of the term gender is visible in the Rome Statute, which states its 
use and definition in Article 7 (3), as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, this use and 
definition of the term and concept of gender still reflects the natural attitude toward 
sex, as gender is still treated as a consequence of sex. This usage highlights the 
differences between social sex and biological sex, showing the influence of the 
gender resistance movements. The importance of this definition in the English 
version can be seen when it is compared with Article 7 (3) in French. The term 
gender does not appear and the term sex is maintained instead: Article 7 (3) Aux fins 
du présent Statut, “le terme « sexe » s’entend de l’un et l’autre sexes, masculin et 
féminin, suivant le contexte de la société. Il n’implique aucun autre sens”.  
There is an evident rejection of the use of the term gender by the French-speaking 
countries, and an explicit preference for keeping the term sex.641  In Spanish, the 
preference is to use the term gender in a restrictive way—for instance, in the Spanish 
law to fight violence against women “Ley Orgánica 1/2004, de 28 de diciembre, de 
Medidas de Protección Integral contra la Violencia de Género”642, the preferred term 
is género (gender), to acknowledge the influence of international legal tools in the 
drafting and enactment of the law. The same law states that its inspiration is 
international law, pointing out that the term gender is used with the intention of 
 
 
640  In the case of English this is not entirely crystal clear because, as analyzed in chapter 
3, at one point the term gender in English implied the existence of a third gender. 
641  In Canada, where English and French are official languages, in the French version of 
the Canadian law there is an additional line explaining the social aspect of sex in order 
to equate its meaning with the term gender. This is explained by Louise Langevin, who 
includes a reference to a Canadian law that explicitly explains that gender will be 
understood according to article 7 (3) of the Rome Statute. See Langevin (n 576). 
642  ‘BOE.es - Documento Consolidado BOE-A-2004-21760’ <https://www.boe.es/buscar/ 
act.php?id=BOE-A-2004-21760. 
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following the advice of previous international legal tools. Indeed, it is important to 
note that in the international legal tools referred to, the term gender is used as a 
substitute for sex, supposedly implying the social context, while on other occasions 
it is used as a substitute for women. Confusion arises regarding the Spanish law, in 
which the term gender is used even in the law’s descriptive title, which explicitly 
refers to the fight against gender violence. However, the meaning of gender there is 
women (or transsexuals transitioning from man to woman) rather than social sex, 
because the only protected subjects are women.iii  
Continuing with international legal instruments fighting violence against 
women, we find the “Recommendation Rec (2002) of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on the protection of women against violence” that resulted in “the 
Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention 2011)”. Both documents prefer 
the term women instead of gender but fully incorporate the term gender in their texts. 
The 2002 Recommendation fully accepts the use of the term gender, at least in 
English. In the preamble, it begins by using the term gender as a substitute for sex, 
although it can be understood that the intention is to imply the socio-cultural 
character of the discrimination. This assumption is not so clear in the Spanish or 
French texts, as the translation in these languages refers to sex instead of gender.  
The possible inclusion of outlaws or other sexes besides women becomes 
difficult when using the term sex, as it still implicitly maintains the binary that refers 
only to female or male. The attempt to include not only women but also femininity 
is applicable only to the legal texts and interpretations in English; it is more difficult 
to make such an interpretation of the Spanish or French texts. 
In Article 1, the Recommendation defines “‘violence against women’ to be 
understood as any act of gender-based violence”, still trying to emphasize the gender 
resistance use of the term gender as a hierarchical cultural construction of sex based 
on culture. The use of the term, however, changes when we look at the French 
translation, as the term genre is not used at all, and for the term gender the translation 
chosen is sexe. On the contrary, in the Spanish version, the preferred term is género.  
The differences in the meaning given to the term are visible also in the general 
measures concerning violence against women in Article 5 (a) of the 2002 
Recommendation, which says: “Research, data collection and networking at national 
and international level should be developed, in particular in the following fields: the 
preparation of statistics sorted by gender, integrated statistics and common indicators 
in order to better evaluate the scale of violence against women”. In the English 
version the chosen term is gender, and it acts merely as a substitute for sex. However, 
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in the Spanish and French versions, the term gender is rejected in favor of the term 
sex.643  
There is also conceptual confusion evident in the fact that gender-based violence 
is taken to mean violence against women. If we take into account the gender rebellion 
or gender revolution understanding of violence, everybody should be included in this 
definition. However, the text only addresses women. Therefore, one should 
understand that the intention of the given meaning is to imply the hierarchical 
cultural construction of sex, which supposedly is addressed by the term gender. The 
conceptual confusion around the term gender becomes more complicated in Article 
14, where the text refers to “gender perspective”. What, then, is a gender 
perspective? Marcela Lagarde gives a definition , saying, “La perspectiva de género 
tiene como uno de sus fines contribuir a la construcción subjetiva y social de una 
nueva configuración a partir de la resignificación de la historia, la sociedad, la cultura 
y la política desde las mujeres y con las mujeres. Esta perspectiva reconoce la 
diversidad de géneros y la existencia de las mujeres y los hombres, como un principio 
esencial en la construcción de una humanidad diversa y democrática”644. This 
definition leads one to believe that gender refers to women or to sex, and that when 
it refers to sex it indicates the hierarchical construction of sex. This view is also 
shared by EIGE, which says on its web page, “Taking into account gender-based 
differences when looking at any social phenomenon, policy or process. The gender 
perspective focuses particularly on gender-based differences in status and power, 
and considers how such discrimination shapes the immediate needs, as well as the 
long-term interests, of women and men”.645 
One of the most important international legal texts, the Istanbul Convention of 
2011, starts by defining gender equality as a principle of human rights, which implies 
the elimination of all discrimination based on sex. The document sets gender as the 
principal term rather than sex. By 2011, gender was already an accepted and 
politically correct term. Therefore, the term sex was nearly eliminated from every 
article and substituted with the term gender. Surprisingly, for the first time, in the 
 
 
643  This also happens in Articles (33), (67), and (72) Recommendation Rec and 
Explanatory Memorandum, ‘On the Protection of Women Against Violence’ 
<http://www.bmgf.gv.at/cms/home/attachments/0/8/9/CH1585/CMS1468407483265/
the_rec_council_of_europa_recommenda_26571.pdf>.  
644  Translation: Gender perspective aims to contribute to the social and subjective 
construction of a new configuration starting from a resignification of history, society, 
culture and politics from and for women. This perspective recognizes gender diversity 
and the existence of men and women as an essential principle in the construction of a 
diverse and democratic humanity. Lagarde (n 62) 13.  
645  The source given for this definition on the EIGE webpage is the Swiss Center of 
Expertise in Human Rights – SCHR. Women’s Human Rights’ App. Based on 
ECOSOC 1997.  In http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/thesaurus/terms/1197 
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French text the term genre appeared. It appears as early as the preamble, which 
highlights that discrimination is grounded in genre (gender)646, thus implying the 
societal context of gender. It seems that the term gender had finally permeated the 
French language and become accepted as a valid term with a valid meaning. An 
agreement had been reached about the use of the term gender, at least in the context 
of gender-based violence, thus implying the hierarchical cultural construction of sex 
rather than biological sex as a source of discrimination.  
The meaning of the term gender is also, for the first time, explicitly addressed in 
Article 3 (c): “gender’ shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviours, 
activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and 
men”. This might be the reason for the acceptance of the use of the term gender by 
the French, given that in the translation of the Rome Statute a line had been included 
describing le contexte de la société. 
In Article 4(4), gender is also included along with sex as prohibited grounds for 
discrimination, which is an innovation, as it also appears in French as genre. This 
text might be understood as the result of the influence of all feminist approaches to 
sex and gender. Besides sex and gender, sexual orientation and sexual identity are 
also among the prohibited grounds for discrimination. The introduction of sexual 
orientation and gender identity was a new turn in the concept of gender that helped 
to visualize how the concept of gender was shaped by heteronormativity. The 
heteronormative framework informs cultural assumptions about sex, gender, and 
sexuality that operate in most legal instruments. Nevertheless, the Istanbul 
Convention needs a detailed analysis itself due to its importance in the fight to end 
violence against women (VAW). Moreover, this text also addresses domestic 
violence against men and boys, which complicates the unified understanding of the 
term throughout the text. 
All of the above obliges us to agree with Valerie Oosterval that the international 
definitions of gender vary. Some find that gender is a social construct and oppose it 
to sex; others just separate the two concepts, pointing to the biological foundation of 
gender; and still others focus on the social construction of sex or as a synonym of 
sexual identity.647 The result is that the different approaches to the term gender 
constrain the evolving understanding of it and make it a chaotic and deceptive term.  
 
 
646  ‘Textes de Référence’ (Convention d’Istanbul Lutte contre la violence à l’égard des 
femmes et la violence domestique) <http://www.coe.int/web/istanbul-convention/basic-
texts>.  
647  Oosterveld (n 598). 
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4.5.2 Sex and Gender in EU Law 
The analysis of EU law shows problems similar to those found in broader 
international law. European Union law provides enforceable rights to individuals 
(direct effect), which override national law in cases of contradiction (primacy). The 
direct effect and primacy of EU law have an important say in the effects of sex- and 
gender-related legislation. This means that EU law plays a core role in the legal 
framework for gender that is instated by national norms. In this analysis it is 
important to note, as Margaret Davies claims, that “the processes of law exclude a 
multiplicity of people and things in a multiplicity of ways and collectively these 
exclusions can be seen to constitute the ‘real’ positive law”.648  
For the EU, gender equality is a fundamental value that must be recognized in 
all legislation. Gender equality and sex discrimination law in the EU has progressed 
through the enactment of both hard and soft law.649 In the attempt here to analyse the 
use of gender in the EU, it is important to recognize the “substantial difference” 
between non-discrimination or equality, which are legal categories, and the concept 
of gender, which is a non-legal category.650 Surprisingly, within the legal texts of the 
EU, the term ‘gender’ was not included until quite recently, probably because EU 
law addressed sex discrimination before gender became the fashionable term. 
The concept of gender was influenced by the meaning given in other 
international legal tools. In the EU, the word always appears linked to equality: it is 
never mentioned alone, but always as part of the term gender equality. It might be 
said that the intention here is to imply the social construction of difference in 
opposition to sex (biology). 
The shift from sex to gender did not initially reach EU legislation per se, but 
rather the EU’s equality discourses and policies. The actions taken by the EU started 
out based on grounds of sex, or equality between women and men (formal 
equality)651. The concept of gender, first included in feminist discourse and policies, 
became accepted enough to be included in positive law. The efforts to convert the 
 
 
648  Margaret Davies, ‘Unity and Diversity in Feminist Legal Theory’ [2007] Philosophy 
Compass 1. 
649  Hard law is understood as treaty provisions and directives and soft law as resolutions 
and proposals; however, when talking about equality law, soft law is also understood 
as that established by the WTO and the mainstreaming policies applied through law. 
For this topic, see: Gregory C Shaffer and Mark A Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: 
Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2010) 94 
Minnesota Law Review 706.  
650  Shaw (n 187).  
651  The concept of gender is still not part of the discourse on discrimination. The EU aims 
to achieve equality between the sexes. The EU policies and law will focus on achieving 
rights equal to those of men. It will focus mainly on formal equality.  
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political concept of gender into a legal concept were, nevertheless, strongly opposed 
by the concepts of sex and equality, which firmly held on to their positions as legal 
concepts.  
4.5.2.1 Sex equality in the EU 
The EU’s legal framework dealing with sex discrimination developed beginning in 
the 1970s by means of primary and secondary EU law, and its scope was limited to 
the areas of employment, social security, and access to the supply of goods and 
services, showing the economic nature and concerns of the EU. Sex equality 
developed through a combination of policies, policy papers, programs, treaties, 
provisions, court jurisprudence, and directives. The treaties established EU actions 
regarding sex discrimination, and subsequently directives, recommendations, and 
case law of the Court of Justice followed the treaties. The EU, based on the rule of 
law, requires that all of its members harmonize and include the EU provisions in 
their national legislation. The EU treaties laid the foundations for further 
developments in equality issues and strengthened the acquis communautaire in terms 
of sex (gender) equality .652 
The initial enshrining of sex equality in the EU through article 119 of the Treaty 
of Rome (1957)653 grew out of France’s economic concerns about preventing 
lopsided competition produced by the unequal pay for women and men in 
neighbouring countries654. The provision, however, was not specifically invoked 
until the Defrenne I and Defrenne II (1976) cases on direct effect in relation to article 
119. The effects of these cases were reflected in the enactment of five consecutive 
directives on equal treatment and the prohibition of direct or indirect discrimination: 
 
 
652  At first reference was only made to sex discrimination, but later this would change to 
gender equality and gender in general, mainly to acknowledge the power of culture, or 
what is called cultural sex.  
653  Article 119 Treaty of Rome 1957 states: “Each Member State shall during the first 
stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and 
women should receive equal pay for equal work. For the purpose of this Article, “pay” 
means the ordinary basic it minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, 
whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect 
of his employment from his employer. 
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: 
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of the 
same unit of measurement; 
(b)  that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job. 
654  Jane Lewis and Ilona Ostner, Gender and the evolution of European social policies 
(ZeS 1994).  
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Directive 75/117/EEC5, Directive 76/207/EEC6, Directive 79/7/EEC7, Directive 
86/378/EEC8 and Directive 86/613/EEC9.  
After the enactment of these Directives, the second step was to extend the scope 
of equality beyond the principle of equal pay655. The development continued with 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, which consecrated equality as a community 
principle and broadened its scope in the EU.iv The Treaty of Amsterdam maintained 
article 119 (equal pay without sex discrimination), and it also required all EU 
member states to uphold the principle and eliminate sex discrimination from  their 
national legislation.656 This treaty also expanded the categories of discrimination to 
include sex and sexual orientation alongside race, ethnicity, disability and age.657 
It was the combined action of treaties, directives, Court of Justice case law, soft 
law, and policies that developed an effective strategy against discrimination. There 
is a noteworthy influence on all member states as a consequence of the EU 
reinforcement of the legal framework on gender equality.658  
4.5.2.2 Shifting to Gender: The Combined Effect of Directives and 
Treaties 
The use of the term gender in the EU texts reflects the different feminist 
approaches to the concept of gender as classified in chapter 3: gender reform, 
gender resistance, and recently, with the inclusion of sexuality, gender rebellion. 
Initially, the term sex was preferred to the term gender. A shift has happened 
progressively, however, as the feminist language of gender has been adopted. The 
language of gender also forced the inclusion of sexual orientation659. The broadening 
 
 
655  The scope of equal treatment extends outside the work context; however, it only applies 
to the supply of goods and services. Directive 2004/113/EC. 
656  Article 3 “In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.’ It is also 
stated in Article 118.1, With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 117 the 
Community shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the 
following fields: Treaty of Amsterdam 35 —improvement in particular of the working 
environment to protect workers’ health and safety; —working conditions; —the 
information and consultation of workers; —the integration of persons excluded from 
the labor market, without prejudice to Article 127; —equality between men and women 
with regard to labor market opportunities and treatment at work”.  
657  Directive 78/2000 and Directive 43/2000 
658  I have to specify that the EU refers to equality between men and women and not to 
gender equality. 
659  The use of the concept of gender by gender resistance feminisms led to the inclusion of 
the term in EU legislation, and the influence of gender rebellion led to the inclusion of 
sexual orientation.   
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of the approach to gender by means of the inclusion of sexuality660 has forced the 
inclusion of the term gender as an adjective applied to identity. as it appears only 
once and as an adjective. 
The novelty of sex and sexual orientation in the Treaty of Amsterdam was 
accompanied by a new directive (Directive 2000/78/EC), introducing sexual 
orientation as prohibited grounds for discrimination. Another novelty was the 
introduction, for the first time, of the term ‘gender’ in article 19 of the Directive 
2000/78/EC661, which identifies the need to include the principle of gender 
mainstreaming in order to report on the impact on women and men of measures 
taken.662  
The obligation of gender mainstreaming meant that all EU member states should 
assess the impact on equality between men and women when laws, policies, and 
activities are implemented. Even when it uses the term gender, this article is still 
speaking of sex, as it refers to women and men as subjects.663 With the use of the 
term gender, the focus is placed on the cultural grounds of the ascription of roles and 
the creation of discrimination. This is a clear use of the first feminist approach to 
gender, in which sex and gender are separated and create the meaning of the concept 
of gender as a social category. The term gender appears accompanied by 
mainstreaming as the approach to address new tools for achieving equality664. The 
inclusion of the term gender is an effect of the influence of the gender rebellion 
 
 
660  I argue, though, that this mainly refers to the inclusion of sexual orientation, which is 
only one element of sexuality. 
661  In Article 19: Report,  
1.  Member States shall communicate to the Commission, by 2 December 2005 at the 
latest and every five years thereafter, all the information necessary for the 
Commission to draw up a report to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the application of this Directive. 
2.  The Commission's report shall take into account, as appropriate, the viewpoints 
of the social partners and relevant non-governmental organizations. In 
accordance with the principle of gender mainstreaming, this report shall, inter 
alia, provide an assessment of the impact of the measures taken on women and 
men. In the light of the information received, this report shall include, if necessary, 
proposals to revise and update this Directive. 
662  Here, gender still refers to the first understanding of gender as cultural, in opposition 
to sex as natural. 
663  This new tool was envisioned as an effective mechanism for achieving the objective of 
equality and avoiding indirect discrimination; however, the success of this measure has 
been widely questioned. In Caroline Moser and Annalise Moser, ‘Gender 
Mainstreaming since Beijing: A Review of Success and Limitations in International 
Institutions’ (2005) 13 Gender and Development 11. 
664  This strategy might be seen as the seeds of transformative equality, since the measures 
need to be taken by the State. Moreover, these are measures taken to achieve equality 
that emphasize the cultural (patriarchal) grounds of the system. 
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movement, which focuses on identity in order to be more inclusive and to emphasize 
the role of power in sex relations.  
Looking now at the chronology of the legal texts, curiously, the Fundamental 
Rights Charter (2000) does not include either the term or the concept of gender in 
English or in any other language.665 In this legal text, Title III, dedicated to equality, 
and articles 21 and 23, on non-discrimination, refer only to sex, sexual orientation or 
the under-represented sex. Article 23 refers to equality between women and men, 
similar to what is found in the Spanish and French translations.  
The Directive 2002/73/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training 
and promotion, and working conditions outlines the need to clarify concepts such as 
direct or indirect discrimination, harassment related to a person’s sex, and sexual 
harassment. In whereas clause 6, Directive 2002/73/EC explicitly refers to the need 
to define sex: “Thus it is appropriate to insert definitions consistent with these 
Directives in respect of sex”. Yet there is no use of the term gender in the Directive 
and the clarifications still refer to sex discrimination. The influence of the gender 
reform and gender resistance movements is still visible, and their ideas on patriarchy, 
discrimination and domination permeate the law. However, these movements did not 
force a shift from the term sex to the term gender (even if by this time gender 
resistance already used the term gender). The law attached to the legal category of 
sex still rejected gender as a useful category.  
Directive 2004/113/EC11 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services extended the scope 
of equality to include the supply of goods and services. Still, the legal reference is 
made to sex, a term that appears 45 times, while gender appears only 3 times, always 
followed by a “surname” or second word. The concepts of sex and gender are used 
indiscriminately in the text. The whereas clause 4 says that “Articles 21 and 23 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibit any 
discrimination on grounds of sex”, and whereas clause 6 refers to sex discrimination: 
“The Commission announced its intention of proposing a Directive on sex 
discrimination outside of the labour market in its Communication on the Social 
Policy Agenda”. Nevertheless, the same whereas clause (6) changes the term sex to 
gender, saying: “Such a proposal is fully consistent with Council Decision 
2001/51/EC of 20 December 2000 establishing a Programme relating to the 
Community framework strategy on gender equality (2001-2005) (4) covering all 
Community policies and aimed at promoting equality for men and women by 
adjusting these policies and implementing practical measures to improve the 
 
 
665  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT& 
from=EN 
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situation of men and women in society”. The use of these two terms in the same 
whereas clause sheds light on the use of sex as a legal category and gender as a 
political category. Equality is a social achievement; sex is a natural biological fact. 
It seems the term gender is limited to combination with the term equality and sex is 
limited to references to discrimination. The rest of the whereas clause continues to 
refer to sex discrimination, as do whereas clauses 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. Then whereas 
clause 15 shifts to naming sex-related violence, and the term sex is taken up again in 
17, 18, 19, 20, and 25. Indeed, Article 1 explicitly names the purpose of the Directive 
as laying down a framework for combating discrimination based on sex, in all cases 
avoiding the use of the term gender.  
A change in the understanding of gender in EU law is seen in the directives 
relating to pregnancy and parental leave. These directives do not include the term 
gender when relating to a highly gendered issue: motherhood. Therefore, the 
Pregnant Workers Directive (1992)666 addresses only women, depicting the woman 
as the sole worker who has children. This approach shows the influence of gender 
reform, which places prime importance on including women in law. The Directive 
has also been influenced by gender resistance, its aim being to recognize experiences 
unique to women, such as motherhood.  
The Recast Equality Directive (2006) includes the term gender but it still refers 
to the gender resistance approach based on the cultural construction of sex667. Gender 
is linked to the binary of sex: the male and the female. Parental leave appears as a 
neutral term but implicitly refers to women and men. This was explicitly addressed 
in 2008 in the proposed amendments to the Pregnant Workers Directive, which refer 
to women and men in relation to parental leave668. 
The provisions of the treaties combined with the directives on equality cover 
equality between women and men in general, with an emphasis on the working life. 
The grounds for discrimination that are explicitly prohibited are sex and sexual 
orientation, and the directives explicitly refer to equality between “men and women”. 
The term ‘gender’ in this case is understood as the cultural representation of sex 
roles, and always within the normative duality of sex. For instance, Masselot, who 
 
 
666  ‘Directive 92/85/EEC - Pregnant Workers - Safety and Health at Work - EU-OSHA’ 
<https://osha.europa.eu/en/legislation/directives/10>. 
667  Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) https://eurlex.europa.eu/ 
legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32006L0054&from=EN 
668  Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework 
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP 
and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC in https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/ 
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0018&from=EN  
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emphasizes the disconnect in the understanding of sex and gender in Directive 
2004/113/EC1669,has criticized the attempt at clarification in the text. She refers to 
the disconnect in the definition of gender mainstreaming: the Commission 
emphasizes the need to understand gender and recognize gender identities apart from 
the biological differences between the sexes670. However, the directives continued to 
recognize only the need for “equality between men and women” and the prohibition 
of sex discrimination rather than gender discrimination. This is a rejection of moving 
beyond sex as a natural binary. Despite feminist legal efforts, the term gender has 
still not fully found its place in European law. 
4.5.2.3 After the Treaty of Lisbon  
The gradual change of the concept of gender and the fight against discrimination 
continued through the following Treaties and became solidified in the Treaty of 
Lisbon (TFEU and TEU),671 which entered into force in 2009. The importance of the 
fundamental principles of non-discrimination and equality were emphasized in the 
TFEU and reinforced through the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU as part of the TFEU. Nonetheless, the term gender did not appear in it. Article 
10672 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex and sexual orientation, and 
Article 19673 enhances the power of the Council and Parliament to fight these two 
types of. The term gender does not find a place in positive law. The influence and 
acceptance of the term gender are more visible in jurisprudence than in substantive 
law. The trend continues in the subsequent Parental Leave Directive 2010, in which 
the question of workers who have children is expanded from a motherhood issue to 
 
 
669  Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and 
services 
670  Annick Masselot, ‘The New Equal Treatment Directive: Plus Ça Change ...’ (2004) 12 
Feminist Legal Studies 93. 
671  The Treaty of Lisbon is the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the new Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The principle of equal 
pay remains intact in Article 157 (ex-Article 141 TEC and ex-Article 119 TEEC). 
672  Article 10 of TFEU specifies that "[i]n defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation". 
673   Article 19 (ex-Article 13 TEC) 1. “Without prejudice to the other provisions of the 
Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the 
Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age, or sexual orientation.” 
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a parenthood issue.674 However, the sex binary and heteronormativity are still 
implicit in this directive. It extends parental responsibilities and recognizes the role 
of fathers, but always within the heterosexual binary of women and men.  
4.5.2.4 The Role of the European Court of Justice 
The European Court of Justice has played a prominent role in developing the idea of 
gender and principles of equality between men and women in the EU,675 and some 
consider it the only protagonist in shaping and developing sex equality law.676 
Therefore, equal pay converges with equal treatment, going from being merely an 
economic factor to being a social one.  
Along these lines, the court’s first cases were related to the provision regarding 
equal pay for men and women. They set the foundation for future developments, 
such as using the “direct effect” to force the implementation of “positive action”677 
in order to promote women’s integration into professional areas where they are still 
underrepresented.678 Undoubtedly, the influence of the similarities/differences 
debate permeates the ECJ decisions. For instance, the ECJ protects pregnant women 
so that they can receive extra benefits during their maternity leave and even during 
and after their pregnancy, a female-only situation, in addition to providing various 
care options.679 Also, the “male-only professions” usually prohibited to women were 
overruled by the Court, thus allowing women to enter the military and police with 
equal conditions.680 There is a clear influence of feminism on the Court in its rulings 
on equality, translated into the concepts of formal and substantive equality. 
However, these approaches still make it difficult to gain distance from the essentialist 
 
 
674  Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework 
Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP 
and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC in https://eurlex.europa.eu/ 
legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0018&from=EN 
675  For a detailed analysis of the ECJ’s development through its decisions, see Cathryn 
Costello and Gareth Davies, ‘The Case Law of the Court of Justice in the Field of Sex 
Equality since 2000’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1567.ibid; Kristina 
Koldinsk, ‘Case Law of the European Court of Justice on Sex Discrimination 2006-
2011’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1599; Evelyn Ellis, ‘Common Market 
Law Review.’ (1963) 37 Common Market Law Review 1403.  
676  Annick Masselot, ‘The New Equal Treatment Directive: Plus Ça Change ...’ (2004) 12 
Feminist Legal Studies 93.  
677  Kalanke (450/93). 
678  Abrahamsson and Anderson v Fogelqvist (407/98). 
679  Brown (394/96); Abdoulaye et al v Renault (218/98); Silke (307/98); Melgar (438/99); 
Tele Danmark (109/00).  
680  Kreil (285/98) and Sidar (273/97). However, in some countries, such as Finland, 
military service is still obligatory for men and optional for women.  
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attributes of women and men. Indeed, the attachment to the first feminist approach 
to the meaning of gender that set sex and gender in opposition produces a negative 
effect that keeps women attached to normative womanhood and denies the 
possibility of multiplicity.681 
The influence of the 1996 ECJ ruling C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County 
Council can be seen in the slight shift produced with Directive 2002/73/EC, which 
reveals a different approach. The P v S and Cornwall County Council ruling refers 
to sex discrimination and its interpretation in accordance with the “Directive 
76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions”. The question to be answered by the ECJ was, “[D]oes the 
dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gender reassignment constitute a 
breach of the Directive?” The problem came from the limited understanding of sex 
discrimination, which was reduced to those belonging to either the female or male 
sex. Transsexuals were not included within the grounds of sex discrimination as they 
were not discriminated against because of belonging to either the male or female sex.  
The implication of the ECJ ruling in C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council 
was a broadening of the definitions of sex and gender and a development of gender 
equality, accepting in a certain manner the approach of the gender rebellion 
movement.682 However, in spite of the court’s good intentions, the term gender was 
still misused in this ruling, being equalized with sex. It might be speculated that 
equating gender with sex was done with a positive intention, to show the fluidity and 
cultural construction implicit in both concepts. However, this does not seem 
plausible. An analysis of the court ruling in other languages reveals the real use of 
the concept. The French or Spanish versions reveal a disagreement in the use of the 
concepts of gender and sex. For instance, in Recital 3 of the ruling, in the English 
version, the concept used is gender reassignment, while the Spanish translation says 
sex change surgery (operación de cambio de sexo), concordant with the French 
version, in which the expression used is sex change surgery (conversion sexuelle). 
In fact, as we already analysed in chapter 2, this is an example of the Anglo-Saxon 
character of the feminist concept of gender that appears as a polite substitute for sex. 
It is difficult to transpose into other languages. 
Paradoxically, later in point 10(2), the Court refers to the applicant as 
transsexual, avoiding the use of transgender. Despite the inconsistency in the use of 
the terms, the decision in this case still broadens the scope of discrimination to 
acknowledge the possibility of a fluid sex, rather than gender. It specifically claims: 
“Such discrimination is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person 
 
 
681  Shaw (n 187). 
682  To date, more than 300 cases on sex discrimination have been ruled by the ECJ. 
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concerned”. The ECJ took a main role in the development of the concept of gender 
with P v S and Cornwall County Council, which for the first time made an explicit 
reference to gender in a legal text, even if it is always either confused with sex or 
used solely in combination with the surname identity. The summary of the ruling 
clearly states that “the directive cannot be confined simply to discrimination based 
on the fact that a person is of one or other sex. It must extend to discrimination arising 
from gender reassignment, which is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex 
of the person concerned”. 
At first sight, one might believe that the Court is applying the gender revolution 
approach to gender, entailing a fluidity or continuum. Gender has a fluidity in its 
social expression, implying the recognition of women or men who do not fit within 
the definitions of womanhood or manhood. However, it is unlikely that gender is 
being treated in this way here, as the Court seems to see gender as external, as social 
sex or as a form of identity in opposition to biological, natural sex. The influence of 
culture appears in relation to gender, but not to sex, for the binary is left intact. The 
court decision still uses sex as the factual category, and sex is doing the legal work. 
In this acceptance, the terms sex and gender encompass a binary where a certain sex 
implies a certain gender. 
This represents an important step forward, although the concept of ‘gender’ here 
is not in accordance with the gender revolution meaning, which would allow the 
concept of gender to be broadened beyond the sex/gender opposition. In P v S and 
Cornwall County Council, the Court held that discrimination on the grounds of sex 
includes discrimination against a person’s gender reassignment, entailing the 
recognition of “the other”, the outsider. At the very least, it recognizes the good faith 
of the “other” in “becoming one of us”.  
The influence of ECJ jurisprudence reconfigured the scope of equality and the 
meaning of the discrimination protection established by the “Directive on the 
principle of Equal Treatment between Men and Women in the Access to and Supply 
of Goods and Services (2004/113/EC)”. The effect of the ECJ ruling imposes the 
inclusion of transsexual people within the protection provided by this Directive, 
which implies that sex discrimination includes gender identity. The Joint Council 
and Commission report states that persons who are “intending to undergo, 
undergoing or who have undergone gender reassignment” are under protection, 
which shows that gender still works as a substitute for sex.683  
The “Directive on Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women 
in Matters of Employment and Occupation 2006/54/EC (Recast Directive)” 
consolidated the existing directives on gender equality. The criticism made by 
 
 
683  Council of the European Union 2606th meeting of the council at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-04-264_en.htm. 
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different political and social groups is similar to the one made by Masselot regarding 
the previous Directive 2002/73/EC, when she pointed to the perennial conservative 
attitude of legislators in contrast to evolving ECJ case law. An analysis of the use of 
the terms sex and gender shows evidence for Masselot’s claim about the conservative 
attitude of legislators, as the term most commonly used is sex (45 times), in 
comparison with gender (5), which when used is always accompanied by an 
additional “surname”. Some scholars have pointed out that “the inconsistency and 
sometimes conservative decisions of the ECJ have prevented gender from 
developing to its fullest”.684  
The criticisms from scholars and political groups have mainly arisen in relation 
to the fight for women’s rights. However, a broadened concept of diversity beyond 
the same-sex group is lacking. The concept of gender is delimited to address 
diversity within women as a same-sex group. Therefore, it shows how the intention 
of the directives and the ECJ is merely to reach a diversity approach of the type 
proposed by gender rebellion, rather than the approach proposed by gender 
revolution.  
The binary of sex is perpetuated through the concept of gender. However, it 
might also be the other way around: the binary of gender is perpetuated through the 
binary of sex—a binary that allows only the gender resistance approach and, in a few 
cases, the gender rebellion approach to play a role in law. In the EU legal framework, 
gender acts as a political concept rather than a formal legal one. The development 
from the gender reform to the gender rebellion approach has been possible mainly 
through the action of the ECJ. Thereby, the concept has been able to develop in the 
jurisprudential realm. However positive law still seems to reject the inclusion of a 
broader concept of gender. Moreover, this shaping of gender through the ECJ relates 
to the relative and limited autonomy of law from politics.685 This is also corroborated 
by Tuori’s view that law is an instrument to achieve purposeful rational political 
goals. Do we need gender? Does it not confuse us rather than help? Does it not 
sustain the indestructible link with sex that affects all multiple identities by forcing 
them to stay within one of the two categories? We should probably start thinking 
about how to eliminate the binary of sex and highlight the non-binarism of sex rather 
than about how to use gender, as it seems this binary keeps women and men attached 
to certain ideologies of sex and defines all others as outlaws.  
 
 
684  Agata Brzezińska, ‘Gender Equality in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice. 
IES WORKING PAPER 2/2009’ (2009) Working Paper 6.Brzezińska. 
685  Shaw (n 187).  
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4.6 The New Era of Gender in International Law 
The 2006 Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights 
Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity686 were designed to 
enhance states’ obligation to recognize and protect the human rights of all persons 
regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.687 The Yogyakarta 
Principles were followed by a revision ten years later in 2017, known as the 
Yogyakarta +10, which proclaims itself in its preamble to be “an authoritative 
statement of the human rights of persons with diverse sexual orientation and sexual 
identities”.688 Both the 2006 Yogyakarta Principles and Yogyakarta +10 should be 
read together, as the second includes a set of 11 Additional Principles and State 
Obligations. 
The Yogyakarta Principles marked a move forward in the understanding of the 
concept of gender compared to the earlier gender resistance approach. This new 
approach entails the understanding of both gender and sex as an effect of culture.689 
Gender is no longer a consequence of sex, as defined in the second approach to the 
relation between sex and gender analyzed in chapter 3. Both terms, gender and sex, 
become one, an approach touted by gender rebellion and gender revolution. This 
approach, which focuses on identity and sexual orientation rather than sex, 
supposedly inspired the Yogyakarta Principles in their acceptance of different sexual 
orientations and gender identities.  
The definitions of “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” are the starting 
point of the Yogyakarta Principles, and they are recalled in YP +10. Additionally, in 
 
 
686  As it is stated in the preamble of these principles: “In 2006, in response to well-
documented patterns of abuse, a distinguished group of international human rights 
experts met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia to outline a set of international principles relating 
to sexual orientation and gender identity. The result was the Yogyakarta Principles: a 
universal guide to human rights which affirms binding international legal standards 
with which all States must comply. They promise a different future where all people 
born free and equal in dignity and rights can fulfil that precious birthright.” See M 
O’Flaherty and J Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human 
Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law 
Review 207.  
687  It was not until 2011 that the first clarification of the meaning of gender became 
available. Yet at least 20 years earlier some feminists already contested the use of 
gender as a valid category. New approaches to the concept of gender already introduced 
during the ’90s were cautiously included in international law. Paradoxically, it was 
necessary to wait more than 20 years to see gender included in international law, in the 
2011 Yogyakarta Principles. 
688  Yogyakarta +10 
689  See chapter 1, section 1.3.2 The Sex / Gender debate in feminism: From Modern to 
Postmodern. 
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YP +10 the definition of “gender expression” and “sexual characteristics” are also 
included.  
Starting with the 2006 Yogyakarta Principles, we find the definition of “gender 
identity to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of 
gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including 
the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of 
bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other 
expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms”. The definition of 
sexual orientation is also given in the preamble: “Understanding sexual orientation 
to refer to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual 
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender 
or the same gender or more than one gender”.  
In these definitions, one can notice that sexual orientation seems rather clearly 
defined compared to gender identity. The text makes a clear distinction between 
gender and sexual orientation, avoiding the confusion of the two, while the same 
does not seem to happen with the terms gender and sex. If this approach appears to 
be only vaguely defined in the 2006 text, it is later reinforced in the YP + 10 with 
the inclusion of the definition of “sexual characteristics”.  
The definition provided in the 2017 text says, “Understanding ‘sex 
characteristics’ as each person’s physical features relating to sex, including genitalia 
and other sexual and reproductive anatomy, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary 
physical features emerging from puberty”. Moreover, in the following paragraph of 
the preamble, the YP+10 explicitly notes that “sexual orientation, gender identity, 
gender expression and sex characteristics are each distinct and intersectional grounds 
of discrimination”. From a legal perspective, this definition of sex characteristics 
applies what is understood as sex in law, which is limited to the binary of male and 
female. The clear statement that gender is separate and distinct from sex leaves no 
room to understand the binary of sex as also constructed. Moreover, these definitions 
seem to state that sex is nature and gender is culture. 
Regarding the translation of the document into French and Spanish, we find 
that the French version has now finally accepted the use of term ‘genre’, referring 
to “identité de genre”, while the Spanish version refers to “identidad de género”. 
It seems that this definition incorporates the latest approaches to gender. However, 
in the definition we still feel the difference between the psychological attribute of 
gender and the biological attribute of sex. Gender and sex are separated and 
presented as biological versus psychological features that define a person. This 
would correspond to the gender rebellion approach, which, despite claiming the 
cultural construction of sex as well as gender, still differentiates between 
inherent—biological—sex and external—cultural—gender. This approach 
envisages the possibility of diversity within a sex group but no more than that, 
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leaving the binary of sex intact.690 Therefore, in the Yogyakarta Principles, the 
concept of gender does not escape the limits imposed by the heterosexual matrix 
that naturalizes gender.691  
In this sense, we can argue that the English version, and to some extent the 
Spanish version, uses sex and gender as similar concepts. This might be the reading 
suggested by principle 2, which states the prohibited grounds for discrimination: 
“Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity may be, and 
commonly is, compounded by discrimination on other grounds including gender, 
race, age, religion, disability, health and economic status”. In this principle, gender 
appears on its own, without the surname of identity, and sex is omitted. However, it 
says that discrimination based on “gender identity” may be compounded by 
discrimination based on “gender” – treating gender identity and gender as two 
different things. The term appears similarly in the Spanish version; however, in the 
French translation, instead of a reference to “genre”, “sexe” is identified as the 
prohibited grounds for discrimination. Does this mean that the use of gender in the 
English and the Spanish versions has been influenced by the gender revolution 
movements, which understand gender and sex as similar?  
In fact, no, as the following principles show, and because an understanding of 
both sex and gender as culturally constructed would create a contradiction with the 
definition of gender identity given in the preamble, and especially with the 
definition of sexual characteristics in YP+10. Indeed, in the same principle 2 b), 
the English version makes the demand to “[r]epeal criminal and other legal 
provisions that prohibit or are, in effect, employed to prohibit consensual sexual 
activity among people of the same sex who are over the age of consent, and ensure 
that an equal age of consent applies to both same-sex and different-sex sexual 
activity”, referring explicitly to sex instead of gender. This is also the case in the 
Spanish versions, in which principle 2 b) also names sex instead of gender. A 
similar reference to sex also appears in the English and Spanish versions of 
principle 4 a) and principle 6 b).  
The same assumption can be traced from Principle 3, which states, “No one shall 
be forced to undergo medical procedures, including sex reassignment surgery, 
sterilisation or hormonal therapy, as a requirement for legal recognition of their 
gender identity”. Here sex reassignment means biology, in opposition to gender, 
 
 
690  For a contestation of the concept of gender identity, see Matthew Waites, ‘Critique of 
“Sexual Orientation” and “Gender Identity” in Human Rights Discourse: Global Queer 
Politics beyond the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2009) 15 Contemporary Politics 137.  
691  Butler refers to the heterosexual matrix to mean the tripartite system formed by 
sex/gender/sexual orientation; in Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (n 179). 
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which means culture. The use of gender as a separate concept from sex is explicitly 
stated in Principle 3 c), which says that in order to enforce the right of recognition 
before the law it is necessary to “take all necessary legislative, administrative and 
other measures to ensure that procedures exist whereby all State-issued identity 
papers which indicate a person’s gender/sex  — including birth certificates, 
passports, electoral records and other documents — reflect the person’s profound 
self-defined gender identity”. Here the two terms seem to be used together to indicate 
that they are two alternative names for the same thing. However, principle 3 f 
continues explaining the need to “[u]ndertake targeted programmes to provide social 
support for all persons experiencing gender transitioning or reassignment”; in earlier 
lines of the same principle 3, reference is made to sex reassignment and sex, but now 
the term gender is chosen over the term sex.   
The French version refers, as before, to “réassignation de sexe”, maintaining 
consistency in its use of the terms. In fact, the French version only uses the term 
genre when accompanied by identity. The two versions, English and French, start 
out using gender/genre in the same way, and then this sameness disappears as the 
text goes on. The Spanish version diverges from the English in principle 3 E), in 
which the English version refers to gender and the Spanish version to sex. The 
possibility of a misunderstanding in the approach to the concepts of sex and gender 
is counteracted by the inclusion of the definition of sexual characteristics in the 
YP+10. 
In sum, the Yogyakarta Principles’ expressions of gender do not contest the 
binary of male/masculine versus female/feminine present in both sex and gender, 
thus repeating the same mistakes already made by feminism in their aim of keeping 
a specific political subject within the binary of sex. Moreover, they do not seem to 
share gender revolution’s aim of seeking to destabilize gender. The Yogyakarta 
Principles imply an essential or pre-existing gender.692 Sex and gender are used 
within the same binary frame used by feminism, the binary that has already been 
contested and criticized for its artificial foundation.693 Analysing the concept of 
gender identity in the Yogyakarta Principles, Matthew Waites highlights how the 
concept of gender identity still pushes to “privilege notions of a clear, coherent and 
unitary identity over conceptions of blurred identifications”.694 For instance, the need 
 
 
692  Waites (n 693) 148.  
693  As Sara Ahmed notes in her book, there is a similar problem with ‘sexual orientation’, 
as it is a concept that presumes a choice within the heterosexual/homosexual binary, 
marginalizing other sexualities such as bisexuality and queerness. As Ahmed explains, 
the homosexual is constructed as the deviant from the neutral that is the heterosexual. 
Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Duke University 
Press 2006). 
694  Waites (n 693) 147.  
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for diagnosing ‘gender dysmorphia’ as a precondition for any kind of surgery or civil 
status change is a statement that the person has still not decided on which side of the 
binary she/he wants to stay. Therefore, gender is still a nicer way of naming sex—
however, one that keeps the binary of sex intact and with it many sex roles and 
symbols.  
The problems with the use of the term gender in international law have been 
noted by Ali Miller, who says: “[M]y sense is that the dominant institutional use of 
gender in the U.N., and among many advocates, is a flat, binary, and exclusionary 
one”.695 The first view on sex and gender described in chapter 1 (binary/discrete) 
prevails and continues to generate obstacles.696 This approach is criticized by those 
who trace the legal effects and obstacles697 generated when sex and gender are used 
in opposition. Keeping the concept of gender within the approaches established by 
the gender resistance and gender rebellion movements, which is also the case in the 
Yogyakarta Principles, hinders the achievement of real equality and the recognition 
of difference beyond the normative. As Juliet Mitchell has stated, “No human being 
can become a subject outside of the division into two sexes.”698  
4.7 What Is the Law Asking? 
In positive law it is noticeable that gender acts as a substitute for sex when not used 
as an expression of identity. Linking gender to identity seems to be the most accepted 
use, likely a result of ECJ jurisprudence and activism against the binary that affects 
transgender people and transsexuals. In this activism we can find a definition of legal 
gender as the documentation of an individual's gender in law.699 Then there are two 
camps of scholars, those who refer to legal sex700 and the others who refer to legal 
gender.701  
An interesting approach to the definition of legal gender is provided by the 
organization Lambda Legal, which deals with transgender rights. This 
organization acknowledges the problems in the definition of legal gender: “This 
expression gets thrown around a lot, but there is no such magical wand to make 
 
 
695  Miller (n 210) 838.Ali Miller, ‘Fighting over the Figure of Gender’ (2011) 31 Pace Law 
Revue 837) 838. 
696  Nicholson, ‘Interpreting Gender’ (n 380) 86.  
697  Franke criticizes the separation of the two terms. Franke (n 264).  
698  Jacques Lacan and Juliet Mitchell, Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École 
Freudienne (WW Norton 1985) 6. 
699  http://nonbinary.org. 
700  Luis Duarte D’Almeida, ‘Legal Sex’, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
701  ibid. 
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you ‘legally’ male or female when it comes to gender transition. Laws vary from 
state to state concerning the requirements for changing gender markers on birth 
certificates and other identity documents. Laws also vary concerning whether a 
state will accept such identity documents as conclusive with respect to your 
gender identity. Finally, context also can make a difference as to whether your 
gender identity will be respected. For example, a court might recognize your 
gender identity or the sex designation on your birth certificate as your ‘legal 
gender’ in one marriage-related context, but then a government agency in the same 
state might deny you respect in another marriage-related context, despite the 
change to your gender marker.”702 
The national legal systems still require individuals, with some exceptions703, to 
register as male or female, which implies choosing a gender (or rather, a sex). The 
paradox is the lack of definition about what it means to be male or female in law. 
Thus, the system still relies on an implicit association with genitals,704 which means 
 
 
702  ‘FAQ About Transgender People and Marriage Law’ <http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
know-your-rights/article/trans-marriage-law-faq>. 
703  All countries still require civil registration of sex within the binary. Nevertheless, the 
registration of legal gender and the used of civil sex status is being discussed and limited 
to some specific cases. The registration of legal gender is broadened to accept the X 
marker in some countries within and outside the EU. The countries accepting the X 
marker outside Europe are India, New Zealand and Australia, and within Europe, The 
Netherlands and Malta. It would be interesting to research how these countries address 
the concept of gender and sex that allows to have the X marker as they are not 
addressing it similarly. 
704  There are some exceptions, as some countries already recognize the third gender. For 
example, Germany in the EU, or, outside Europe, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
New Zealand, Australia, and more recently the State of Oregon in the US recognize the 
non-binary. See Mic, ‘7 Countries Giving Transgender People Fundamental Rights the 
U.S. Still Won’t’ (Mic, 9 April 2014) <https://mic.com/articles/87149/7-countries-
giving-transgender-people-fundamental-rights-the-u-s-still-won-t>; ‘Oregon Court 
Rules That “Nonbinary” Is a Legal Gender | PBS NewsHour’ <http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/rundown/oregon-court-rules-that-nonbinary-is-a-legal-gender/>. 
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that the law is still referring to sex and not to gender.705 The importance of fitting 
into one or the other in order to be bestowed with rights has produced a growing 
number of cases of transgender people asking for the recognition of these rights. If 
the law is gender-neutral, why, then, is it so important to be one or the other? These 
cases, as Marjorie Garber has stated, have produced a category crisis, “a failure of 
definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable that permits of border 
crossing from one (apparently distinct) category to another. The binarism 
male/female, one apparent ground of distinction… is itself put into 
 
 
705  It is important to note the case of Malta. The Malta’s government enacted a new gender 
identity, gender expression and sex characteristics act in 2015. This act gives explicit 
definitions of gender identity, gender expression and lived gender and sex 
characteristics. The gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics act in 
Malta provides new legal rules regarding the registration of legal gender. However, it 
is important to note how this text defines gender and sex. In fact, gender is defined 
alongside the terms identity, expression and marker. We find the following literal 
definitions in the legal text: “gender expression’, refers to each person´s manifestation 
of their gender identity, and, or the one that is perceived by others; ‘gender identity’ 
refers to each person´s internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may 
not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body 
(which may involve, if freely chosen, modifications of bodily appearance and, or 
functions by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, 
including name , dress, speech and mannerisms; ‘gender marker’ refers to the identifier 
which classifies persons within a particular sex category; ‘lived gender’ refers to each 
person´s gender identity and its public expression over a sustained period of time;‘ sex 
characteristics’ refers to the chromosomal , gonadal and anatomical features of a 
person, which include primary characteristics such as reproductive organs and genitalia 
and, or in chromosomal structures and hormones; and secondary characteristics such as 
muscle mass, hair distribution, breasts and, or structure” in “Gender Identity, Gender 
Expression And Sex Characteristics” Chapter 540, April 2015 ‘Malta Gender Identity 
Act’ <http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid= 
12312&l=1> accessed 13 July 2019. This document needs to be studied as it does not 
give a definition of the term gender itself. This lack of definition implies certain 
inconsistencies between what is expressed in the Gender Act and the Birth Registration 
certificate and Registration of identity for Foreigner as it refers in some application 
forms to sex and others to gender. The gender act also refers in some parts of the text 
to gender instead of sex when referring to the birth certificate while in the birth 
certificate they ask for the sex. Similarly, it is important to note the case about the 
possibilities of choosing the X gender in the passport at The Netherlands. This is an 
option only possible through court request, however, even if named as gender is still 
referring to sex because only applies to those who can medically prove their condition 
as intersex. Thus, neither other person categorised as Female or Male can apply for the 
X gender see https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/j5yyp3/gender-neutral-passports-
dont-guarantee-equal-rights. In Europe, the first country to accept the self-declaration 
of gender without surgical intervention was Denmark in 2014, however, still restricted 
to the binary male/female. 
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question”.706Gender revolution’s claims of blurring the binary of sex and gender risk 
getting lost in the persistent use of the term gender. To be precise, regarding gender 
revolution movements, there is a combined use of various terms: sexual difference, 
gender, or both. Nevertheless, we might argue that the concept of sexual difference 
is no better than gender, as it also depicts the normative or known opposition of 
sexes. This is problematic, as the loss of more radical approaches to sex and gender 
is detrimental to those who do not fit within the binary or excluded from it and also 
to the women who are symbolically attached to normative interpretations of 
womanhood. Moreover, the impossibility of achieving a more diverse representation 
of the subject in law keeps the binary intact, and with it the rights and obligations 
bestowed to the legal subject who must be fitted into this binary. The essentialism 
that permeates these rights and responsibilities, which will be analysed in detail in 
chapter 7, remains intact and hidden within the neutrality of the language and the 
subject framed by the concept of gender. A close reading of legal texts shows how 
the essentialism of the binary spreads throughout, despite claims of equality and 
inclusion framed by universality and neutrality. Gender is a legitimized essentialism 
of culture. 
Law presents itself as a machine that shapes the person within a Cartesian 
framework. The attachment of law to normative sex implies an attachment to a 
Cartesian approach to the body. This reading of the body entails a process of 
exclusion of all non-normative bodies. Law still relies on sex as the main concept of 
categorization with which it establishes relations of power. The restrictive 
framework of positive law is in a way balanced by the courts, who allow for 
movement between the normative sexes. This results in a non–revolutionary 
transformation of law. The law keeps a restrictive gender/sex classification system 
attached to sex, or, more precisely, to bodies with distinctive genitals, and with this 
system it maintains the established patriarchal order unnoticed. The reality is that the 
concept of gender as used in feminism or in law has not helped to queer the law, 
despite the merging of the concept with sex.  
 
  
 
 
706  Marjorie B Garber, Vested Interests : Cross-Dressing and Cultural Anxiety (Routledge 
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CONCLUSION 
Law is more than an independent structure. It is culture; it is part of the cultural 
expression of society. The power of law as culture is evident in the introduction of 
the term gender in law, which has brought both its positive and negative aspects 
along with it.  
The use of gender as a category of analysis led feminism to launch new inquiries, 
which contested the existing law system. Feminism shifted its analysis from a 
feminist perspective to a gender perspective to stress the cultural roots of law. 
Reading law through the gender perspective changed preconceived notions about the 
modern values of rationality, universality, and neutrality.  
The lack of consensus about the concept of gender has also been imported into 
law. One may think at first sight that the concept of gender has been integrated into 
law as if it had always been part of it; however, the developments above show that 
this has not been the case. Gender’s intertwining with sex creates an ambiguity, and 
its growing use forces the political concept of gender to act as a legal category. As a 
legal category, it is powerful enough to dismantle the scaffolding of sex 
discrimination: there has been a shift from sexual discrimination to gender 
discrimination. On both accounts, however, sex and gender are framed in the context 
of male/masculine or female/feminine. 
The term gender in law has achieved the status of legal category by taking the 
place of sex. The relation between sex and gender lies at the root of the depiction of 
gender as a legal category. However, the ploy of the patriarchal system can be 
uncovered if we take a close look at the use of the term gender in law. The 
masquerade of gender, as referred to by Butler in her analysis of the strategies of 
gender, makes it look neutral. Indeed, to enforce its power, gender always needs to 
appear in combination with a “surname”, such as equality, identity, or 
discrimination, in order to remain neutral or to clothe these terms with neutrality. 
The ambiguity and deceptiveness in the use of the term gender emerge when we 
analyse the core international tools in the fight against discrimination. Contrary to 
the belief that the strict binary of sex attached to the meaning of gender is only a 
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problem affecting the trans, queer, or intersex, it also concerns the cisgendered.707 
The current use of the term gender affects women and men, as it disguises the 
symbolism attached to the binary of sex in gender equality. It also directly constrains 
women’s possibilities by attaching them to the definition of womanhood, while men 
are attached to the definition of manhood, even if there is an acceptance of diversity 
within each group. The subjects recognized in law are those who comply with the 
division into two sexes. Certain features are still attached to womanhood and 
motherhood, and reproduction remains unaltered. 
Law claims to speak the language of objectivity, but gender is subjective; how 
can we thus hope to make it work in law? It is difficult to make gender an objective 
concept when we accept the fluidity and diversity of gender stated by the latest 
feminist (genderist) approaches. We can attempt to inform sex with the subjectivity 
of gender, or we can eliminate sex and gender from law if we really want to achieve 
a neutral law or a law that includes all people. Law should be developed to care about 
personhood rather than sex or sexual orientation. 
Gender in law appears mainly as a politically correct substitute for sex. If there 
is no real difference between gender and sex in law, why introduce gender? The 
unclear and disparate legal usages of sex and gender in law do not aid in eliminating 
inequalities and discrimination. Evidently, looking at sex and gender representation 
in law, the influence of the separation of sex and gender is still quite alive. Even 
when gender is approached as a discourse or ideology and sex as an artificial 
construction, both of them are still framed in a natural context.  
A natural context is validated through the term gender. Only those who do not 
ascribe to the normative identity need to fight for a gender identity. The apparent 
neutrality that disguises the concept of gender affects the identity of the subject in 
law: only those included in the norm are part of the legal subject. The use of the term 
gender in law hides even the two normative identities implicitly working within law. 
The essence of the binary works within gender, hidden in the apparent neutrality 
brought with the term gender. The essence of the binary can only be visualized 
through a close analysis that shows how those considered outlaws are not present 
and how they need special gender identity tools to become present.  
As gender revolution claims, sex and gender are dynamic and multiple. Both 
involve a dynamic relation that changes over time or space. Therefore, the tendency 
to see sex and gender as separate entities framed by a binary has reified the dualistic 
subject of law. This causes two problems: it maintains the essentialism that 
permeates the subjects in law, and it rejects other subjects such as trans or intersex 
persons. On the other hand, blending the concepts of sex and gender together or using 
 
 
707  Cisgender persons are those whose sex is in concordance with their gender. 
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them interchangeably does not seem to be the solution, because it does not 
acknowledge the multiple possibilities of personhood and keeps the concepts framed 
in the binary, thus also naturalizing the cultural aspect of gender. 
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5 THE BODY 
In the Cartesian conception of the person, in which the body is separated from the 
mind, the body is rooted in nature and therefore in close relation to sex. However, 
the opposition between nature and the political or cultural realm that is achieved 
through the concept of gender later evolved into theories that also recognize the 
cultural construction of nature and the body. The theorization of the body evolves 
alongside the concept of gender, giving birth to different approaches stemming from 
corporeality to embodiment.  
Feminism has theorized on the concept of “body building”, as coined by Michel 
Feher, referring to “the different modes of construction of the human body”.708 With 
a multi-perspective approach, addressing the body from often opposing standpoints, 
feminism has shed light on the central role of the body in the subordination of 
women. At first, feminist theories, aiming to avoid the ideological male 
representation of the female body and biological determinism, eliminated the body 
from their discourse709; later they shifted to focus on theorizing the body by directly 
addressing it in their discourse. The evolution of the body in feminism has been 
captured in the words of Anne Witz: “Female sociality is compressed into female 
corporeality”.710 The treatment of women’s bodies in feminist sociology, as Witz 
claims, focused on fighting against female “fleshy materiality”.711 
5.1 Female Corporeality: The Body without Mind 
The Cartesian approach to the body set the body on an inferior level relative to the 
mind or soul. The flesh is the thick materiality of the feminine. There is a Cartesian 
influence evident in the affirmation of a universal human reason independent from 
the body. However, in the case of women the logic disappears, for the belief in the 
 
 
708  Michel Feher, ‘Of Bodies and Technologies’, Discussions in Contemporary Culture 
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lack of women’s reason makes women’s bodies their signifiers, sentencing women 
to a life grounded in nature.712 Women, rather than having a divided body and mind, 
are treated simply as bodies and signified by their bodies alone.   
Female corporeality was, in fact, a sexual form of embodiment representing 
women as reproductive beings attached to a reproductive sexuality.713 Their 
specificity as bearers of children determined their status as persons, their location, 
their sexuality, and even their experiences. The feminist fight for the freedom of 
women, as Tamar Pitch explains, is no more than a fight for the freedom of women’s 
bodies714 
The body is signified by reproduction, and this relation rules the separation of 
spaces: private space is for reproduction and public space for production.715 Gender 
reform wanted to demonstrate that sexual difference, manifested in the body, was 
not an impediment for persons to enter and stay in the public realm. Challenging the 
spatial division entailed women conquering the public realm, but without refuting 
reproduction as a female role. The implicit representation of the woman’s body as 
the pregnant body remained uncontested, perpetuating the dichotomies of 
production/reproduction and private/public.  
The idea of womanhood or manhood emerges through the sexed body. The 
different bodies are the basis for sex differences716, a view which raises debate about 
the relation between sex, gender, and the body. Poullain de la Barre stated that “the 
mind has no sex”717 long before the gender reform movements did; this statement 
reveals an adherence, of the type feminism would have later, to the nature-culture 
relationship that is reflected in the opposition of biological and social sex, or sex and 
gender.718  
 
 
712  The Cartesian subject represents the core of modern thought. See Susan Hekman, 
‘Reconstituting the Subject: Feminism, Modernism, and Postmodernism’ (1991) 6 
Hypatia 44.  
713  Witz whose bodies matter. Elizabeth A Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal 
Feminism (Allen & Unwin 1994).  
714  Tamar Pitch, Un Derecho Para Dos (Trotta 2003); Tamar Pitch, ‘Sexo y genero en el 
Derecho: El Feminismo Juridico’ (2010) 44 Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez 435. 
715  See chapter 2. In this regard, Durkheim also believes that sexual difference should 
determine roles: that women must stay at home and take responsibility for the affective 
functions, while men take responsibility for the intellectual functions.   
716  For this, and an encouragement of incorporating the body into sociological research, 
see : Mike Featherstone, Mike Hepworth and Bryan S Turner, The Body: Social Process 
and Cultural Theory (Sage 1991).  
717  Londa Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex?: Women in the Origins of Modern Science 
(Harvard University Press 1991) 2.  
718  See chapter 3; this approach is that of gender reform and gender resistance. 
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5.2 Approaches to the Body in the Gender 
Feminist Classification 
The gender reform movement discarded the body, considering it a site of 
discrimination. Gender reform’s approach tried to minimize the body´s power to 
determine social norms. The intention of gender reform feminism was to distance 
women from corporeal, biological determinism and to eliminate biology from the 
discourse, discarding the role of the body. This strategy had already been carried out 
by earlier (first-wave) feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft, who tried to break the 
deterministic relation between the body, the mind, and society. 
The critique that came from other scholars—mainly gender resistance 
feminists—raised concerns about the body as a site of discrimination. The source of 
discrimination was the male reading of women’s bodies, hence the importance of 
readdressing the body from a feminist perspective. The body was placed at the centre 
of the discussion. This was already done in the ’70s by scholars such as Garfinkel, 
Kessler, and McKenna, who questioned the natural grounds for the accepted notion 
of sex as well as the absence of the body from the analysis of gender. They were 
critical of the natural assumptions underpinning the concept of gender, as later 
feminists would be too. In this sense, Garfinkel might be referred to as a precursor 
of Butler’s later “performance theory”, which states that sex is a performance. Stevi 
Jackson’s analysis shows how Garfinkel, Kessler and McKenna “see gender 
attribution as an interactive process involving both a performance of gender and a 
reading of that performance”.719 However, the insight into the concept of gender as 
performance did not take root in feminism at that point, due to the lack of focus on 
the body. The idea was set aside until Butler’s theory reopened it.  
The critiques of the diminishing of the role of the body stress how this 
diminishment complicates the attempt to explain the relation between the body and 
the meaning of being a woman, as well as women’s subordination.720 It hinders the 
possibilities of fighting sexual oppression based on sexuality. These critiques point 
out that in the schema that subordinates women, the body becomes the centre of 
culture, with different symbolism for men and women. The symbolism attributed to 
the body is part of “the politics of the body”, as stated by Foucault, who stresses the 
role of culture as a disciplining power.721  
The gender resistance movement stressed the body precisely because it was a 
prevalent source of discrimination. The focus on the different bodies (man/woman) 
led from the egalitarian approach of gender reform to the essentialist perspective of 
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gender resistance.722 Gender resistance feminism focuses largely on sexuality and 
the woman’s body, looking at the women’s body as “the body of nature”.  Oakley, 
Rubin and Lamas focused on social power’s role in the construction of gender, 
calling it the “socialization of gender”.723 This assumption views gender as a social 
construction susceptible to transformation, in opposition to the stability of biological 
sex. As Toril Moi claims, this view “has the merit of stressing that gender is a social 
construction and the demerit of turning sex into an essence.”724 Discrimination is 
understood as external to the body and thus potentially transformable. The body is 
seen as a tabula rasa, a blank surface, onto which gender is written. The objective is 
to escape from the essentialism of sex and biological determinism. However, 
essentialism proved difficult to fight, as it continued to permeate both sex and 
gender.  
In the 1970s, Gayle Rubin’s sex/gender system appeared as a logical explanation 
for discrimination against women. The purpose of the sex/gender system was to 
dissolve the power of the body as a primary site of discrimination. The emphasis on 
the language of gender made gender resistance focus on the social construction of 
femininity, but this did not extend to acknowledging the social construction of the 
body. The body was first set aside in an abstract realm to eliminate the belief in 
women’s biological inferiority; however, concealing the body does not prevent the 
body from framing the relation between sex and gender. Rubin took for granted the 
existence of the two sexes in direct relation to two genders725, locating the source of 
discrimination solely in the realm of gender. There are rules and authorized 
behaviours based on the bodies of women and men that even apply to intersex bodies, 
which are also disciplined to fit the culture of sex. Marcel Mauss uses the phrase “the 
techniques of the body” to refer to the learnt process that teaches human beings to 
understand their bodies. The techniques of the body are ruled by four different 
principles : “1) Sexual division of techniques of the body (and not just sexual 
division of labour), 2) Variations of techniques of the body with age, 3) 
Classification of techniques of the body according to efficiency, 4) Transmission of 
the form of the techniques”.726 
The intentional absence of the body, or more accurately the implicit acceptance 
of the body without challenge, led law to an unconscious acceptance of the binary of 
 
 
722  From the perspective of equality, these different standpoints represent a movement 
from equality to equity.  
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Lamas claims that American feminism does not incorporate the Lacanian insights into 
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Amalia Verdu Sanmartin 
186 
sex and sex differences. The problem with gender resistance movements, which 
bring the feminine to the fore, is their vision of gender, which does not acknowledge 
the social construction of the body. Gender resistance, focusing only on gender, 
accepted the direct relationship between sex and gender within a binary that 
recognizes only one bodily expression of each sex. This essentialism relies on 
accepting only one type of feminine body and one type of masculine body. The 
meaning of the category of woman derives from the reflection of only one type of 
image: the maternal, nurturing body. Gender resistance insists on the power of the 
natural female, reinforcing the idea of an essential embodied woman. The essence of 
women’s bodies is the grounds for theories of female ethics, which proponents such 
as Carol Gilligan considered to be the key to reversing the cultural construction of 
gender.727  
Feminists such as Gayle Rubin envisage the solution in the transformation, or 
rather elimination, of gender to create “‘a genderless society’ …. In which one’s 
sexual anatomy is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom one makes 
love.”728 This approach silences the body’s role in individual and social subjectivity. 
On the other hand, gender requires the support of a concrete body that justifies the 
creation of social sex supported by the rule of nature.  
Overcoming the essentialism of the body, a third approach, in which the body is 
contextual and fluid, appeared as a new path for feminism. This latest approach 
appeared as a result of Foucault’s work on biopower and the influence of “post-” 
approaches on feminism.729 Both gender and sex were set in the realm of culture, 
changing the reading of the body. The notion of both gender and sex as products of 
culture intersects with the body, helping to conceptualize the artificiality of the 
binary of sex.  
Gender rebellion and gender revolution are the main movements theorizing the 
body within this framework and deepening the understanding of the role of the body 
in the creation of discrimination. As a consequence, the “outlaws” have obtained 
their place as political subjects. However, even if they have become visible, the 
bodies of these “outlaws” seem to remain limited within the binary of sex that 
continues to rule society and law. Nonetheless, the gender revolution movement 
raised the issue of the artificial categorization of the body, acknowledging that the 
binary implicit within sex or gender is the product of a cultural discourse. This 
awareness opens up new possibilities, as analysed in this chapter, such as 
understanding the body from the perspective of multiplicity.  
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The gender revolution has made way for the recognition of transgender people, 
allowing a step forward. This is explained by Tey Meadow, who says, “I wish instead 
to accept the invitation transgender identities grant us to rethink the relationship of 
sex to gender in feminist thought”.730 The source of this invitation should be 
extended beyond transgender identities to all non-normative bodies, in order to 
acknowledge the discriminatory power of gender and rethink the different aspects of 
the relationship between sex and gender. Gender revolution rejects the distinction 
between nature and culture and understands the body as a site constructed by culture. 
This rejection goes further, as Paul Beatriz Preciado extends this critique to claim 
that culture is the grounds for the relations between sex, gender and sexuality. 
Preciado explains how the body is constructed by technologies that have always 
shaped corporeality along with the idea of sexuality.731 These technologies are 
designed by the power that guides and defines sex relations. 
Among others, Stanley and Wise propose moving towards a new reading of the 
body; their proposal goes back to the realm of culture while accepting differences, 
for, “although such differences may result in different moral ontological ‘voices’, 
these are the product of culture and social construction, not biological or other 
‘essential’ differences between the sexes”.732 This position leads to a new reading of 
the body in which a process of embodiment goes beyond mere biological differences, 
while still recognizing the body as a site of subjectivity. The body becomes a site of 
the alignment of different discursive and cultural meanings. As Judith Butler puts it, 
“Phenomenological theories of human embodiment have also been concerned to 
distinguish between the various physiological and biological causalities that 
structure bodily existence and the meanings that embodied existence assumes in the 
context of lived experience…. the body is ‘an historical idea’ rather than ‘a natural 
species’”.733 
The body has guided the approaches to the relation between sex and gender since 
the very beginning, either by its absence or by being foregrounded. The analysis of 
the body through the lens of gender (culture) emphasizes the role of power, 
enhancing the symbiotic relation between power and the body. Bodies are 
disciplined by biopower, and this relationship influences the understanding and 
development of self-identity and subjectivity.734  
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5.3 Empowering the Female ‘Fleshy Materiality”: 
Mothering sexuality 
The cultural approach to the body allows us to liberate it from the limits of gender 
and sex. The body is able to create its own discourse because, as Grosz has claimed, 
“the body codes the meanings projected onto it in sexually determinate ways”.735 The 
sexed body creates its own discourse, interacting with other discourses such as 
gender, sexuality (sexual orientation), race, age, and class. Diversity has shifted the 
reading of the body from female corporeality to embodied experience. This shift 
involves a move from the acceptance of a static body to a view of constantly 
changing ones. Michel Feher explains that the body is not static, but rather “a reality 
constantly produced”.736 The female body, negotiated within feminism to avoid the 
essentialism of female corporeality, has found a way out in the theories of 
embodiment.737 As feminism responded to female corporeality, the body began to 
travel from the realm of nature to that of culture, with culture being seen as 
responsible for the understanding and construction of the body.738  
Interrogations of the body, influenced by Foucault, led to the rejection of the 
immutability of sex. Sex is artificial, or, as Foucault explains, “the notion of ‘sex’ 
made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, 
biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make 
use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to 
be discovered everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and as 
a universal signified”.739 Therefore, as Foucault claims, sex and sexuality are bound 
together. To him, sexuality is a product of sex, although he might also have said that 
sex is a result of sexuality. Along the same lines, Ann Witz claims that gender is 
conflated with sexuality/reproduction740, and that “gender and sexuality are 
collapsed here into a concept of a body and effectively rendered 
indistinguishable”.741 
For women, sexuality is determined by their reproductive function. The control 
of reproduction configures sexual difference. Sexuality is set in power relations in 
which heterosexuality appears as the norm. Sexuality is an effect of the corporeality 
of gender, transforming women’s bodies into objects of men’s pleasure. Women 
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came to realize that their bodies were treated as no more than sexual objects meant 
for reproduction or the pleasure of men.742 One aim of feminism has been to focus 
on devalued women’s bodies and affirm the positive value of the female body.743 
Gender resistance and gender rebellion movements claim that the maternal body 
needs to become a source of positive values. Thus, the relation between the sexed 
body and sexuality needs to be recognized for its negative implications for women. 
The feminist approach shifts from the rejection of the maternal body744 to a 
reconceptualization of the feminine maternal essence.745 The relation between the 
body and sexuality constitutes an essential part of power relations in which the body 
becomes a political issue. The female body is different from the normative male 
body, as, citing Grosz, “the specificities of the female body, its particular nature and 
bodily cycles, menstruation, pregnancy, maternity, lactation etc. are in one case 
regarded as a limitation on women’s access to the rights and privileges patriarchal 
culture accords to men”.746  
Women’s bodies are ruled by their reproductive attributes, impeding their ability 
to become anything other than women.747An analysis of sexuality reveals the control 
of women’s bodies as the common thread in the way law and Western society deal 
with sexuality.748 Female sexuality is treated as being for others, and for the purpose 
of reproducing others. Sensual and procreative sexuality are defined as mutually 
antagonistic, and women are associated solely with procreative sexuality. The 
control of women’s sexuality is performed through the control of their bodies.749 As 
Reena Glazer argues, law also contributed to women’s hatred of their own bodies by 
promoting laws that tell them how they should feel about their bodies, such as the 
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criminalization of women’s toplessness but not that of men.750 These double standard 
rules, in which women’s bodies are punished, represent a clear example of how the 
law produces discriminatory effects for women. Furthermore, as Reena Glazer has 
stated, “this inverted structure of point of view helps to maintain men’s 
objectification of women”.751 The body of the woman, searching for another type of 
sexuality outside of procreative limits and loving couples—as in the case of 
prostitution, for example—is accepted in law only with difficulty. Yet the depiction 
of the deviant female body persists. 
The valuing of women’s maternal body shifts maternity from a source of 
oppression to a unique experience.752 Irigaray purports to offer a reconsideration of 
philosophical thought that uses the female body as a point of departure instead of the 
male. However, this is seen by scholars such as Toril Moi as a form of essentialism 
that reinforces the previous biological determinism, as it requires us to accept the 
binary and treat the female body as real and not constructed.753 Women’s experience 
signifies the essence of being a woman, which seems to depend on the special female 
reproductive capacities. Woman’s experience is framed by the role of the body in 
the construction of sex. The effect of these sexual capacities is reflected in the 
acceptation and construction of the individual’s subjectivity. Does this mean that 
someone who does not bear children is not a woman? Does it mean that not bearing 
children prevents one from having a feminine subjectivity? Which part of the body 
makes us a woman or a man? These are tricky questions that have been raised by 
feminists who recognized the explicit and implicit essentialism in this form of body 
reading.  
It is hard to break the representation of women as mothers, as they are linked to 
reproductive sexuality. As Eisenstein has claimed, the mother’s body “is more than 
female because it embodies institutionalized gender ‘difference.’”754 The failure to 
break the pairing mother-woman, which might also be represented as procreative 
sex–woman, stands as one of the problematics of feminism. This difficulty might 
come from the insistence on revalorizing the female body without acknowledging 
the possibilities of many other bodies or other bodily characteristics, which would 
help to break down the close relationship between the vagina, the woman, the 
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mother, and procreative sex. The absence of the body in feminist discourse does not 
do away with the feminine essence, while the rise of the body in feminist discourse 
homogenized the meaning of women through corporeal feminine experiences. In 
both approaches, sex rules just as much as it does in its relation to gender. These 
feminist approaches insist on maintaining the subject within the theoretical 
framework of the sex/gender system while trying to give body to gender.755 The 
belief in the existence of an essence that allows us to group subjects under a unified 
category imbues the body and the sex/gender system, forcing itself into the system. 
Avoiding the prior biological determinism seems difficult for a body based on 
essentialism. The neutral gender justifies the acceptance of the feminine body as 
something different from the male body.  
So then, despite its challenges to the binary of sex, why does gender remain so 
restrictive? Why does gender, supposedly a liberating tool, end up constraining 
women by accepting the diversity of their womanhood but never letting them escape 
from the implicit essence of womanhood? The answer might be found in one of the 
forgotten tools of feminism: patriarchy. 
5.4 Constructing Body Language 
Society plays a role in the creation of meaning through language. As Mary Douglas 
claims, following Mauss and Durkheim: “The centre of the first scheme of nature is 
not the individual; it is society.”756 Society communicates and gives meaning to the 
world by means of language, and the body is involved in this process of societal 
meaning-creation. The relation between the body and language is claimed by 
mainstream philosophy and feminism, as Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar claim: 
“From Freud to Lacan to Derrida on the one hand, and from Woolf to Irigaray to 
Cixous on the other, masculinist and feminist theorists alike have toyed with the idea 
of a culturally determined body language which translates the articulations of the 
body into that body of articulated terminology we call language”.757 
Therefore, as Mary Douglas explains: “The social body constrains the way the 
physical body is perceived. The physical experience of the body, always modified 
by the social categories through which it is known, sustains a particular view of 
society. There is a continual exchange of meanings between the two kinds of bodily 
experience so that each reinforces the categories of the other. As a result of this 
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interaction the body itself is a highly restricted medium of expression.”758 Along 
these lines, Braidotti claims that “[t]he body or the embodiment of the subject is to 
be understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category, but rather as a point 
of overlap between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological”.  
The language about the body is the result of an interplay of languages that give 
meaning to our world and experiences. Indeed, the language of sex, gender and the 
body is the outcome of society’s, religion’s, philosophy’s, and law’s institutionalized 
discourses. The institutionalized discourses of sex, gender, sexuality and the body 
exist in an interplay in which they all sustain each other. As Stanley and Wise have 
stated, the body has a key role in the sex/gender discourse: “The body is thus both 
signified – the product of language and a set of institutions that define, classify, 
assign, order and control; and also one of the key signifiers in Western culture – the 
body is actually different bodies around which different readings, significations and 
judgements can be made”.759 
The body carries a meaning. The body is framed by the language of sex. This 
meaning tries to hide within the concept of gender. The body, sex and gender’s 
discourse interact in a similar way to give meaning to sexual difference, constructing 
man’s and woman’s bodies.760 The specificity of the body defines the meaning of 
woman. Therefore, women’s sex defines their gender, just as it does for men. This is 
the case with the definition of man or manhood given by Jeff Hearn: “[T]hough 
bodies are diverse, and with many different meanings, talk of the male body can 
easily suggest a male (bodily) essence. This can in turn imply some kind of ‘deep 
(bodily) masculinity’ that supposedly only men can know, that is men’s or male’s 
special property”.761  
The universal body, which is in fact the masculine body, obscures the feminine 
body within the frame of the language of neutrality. The essentialism attached to the 
body does not spring from the body itself but is rather a meaning ascribed to it by 
culture. The discursive meaning of bodies does not match the reality of bodies. 
Therefore, the language of sex and gender does not work for women’s liberation 
because discrimination is also inscribed in the materiality of bodies. The discursive 
meaning of bodies unconsciously becomes a powerful active agent that allows only 
a certain process of embodiment. 
Feminism focused on the power of language and moved beyond the linguistic 
turn. In Witz’s words, this turn means that “the new sociology of the body over-
valorises the body in feminism and overlooks the ways in which feminist sociologists 
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have de-valorised the body in explanations of the gendered social, the new feminist 
philosophies of the body de-valorise gender”.762 In Bodies that matter,763 Butler 
claims that the materiality of the body must be analysed together with the discursive, 
highlighting how sex itself, as well as matter in general, cannot avoid the effects of 
discourse. It is probably time to come up with a new language that does not carry 
along with it the current discourse on matter.  
5.5 Towards the new “Corporeal Turn” 
Despite the cultural approach, which takes into account embodied experience and 
empowers “fleshy materiality”, the rule is still that a female body always differs from 
the normative male body. Gender rebellion’s approach to the body aimed to reflect 
diversity and to empower women’s bodies; however, even with this diversity taken 
into account, sexual difference is still grounded by the body, and the body is always 
sexed within the binary. In gender rebellion, difference is still part of the discourse 
that constructs the body, but it widens beyond the focus on the essential biological 
features of the body to include other features that construct our identity.764  
The solution envisaged by gender rebellion or gender revolution to address the 
changingness of the body entails challenging the Cartesian subject, thus rejecting the 
mind/body split. The aim is to overcome Cartesian dualism in order to achieve a 
unified model in which the social and the material are analysed together. This model 
understands that the experience of the body comes from the body and the mind; they 
are not separable. 
Questioning sex and Cartesian dualism requires questioning the sex/gender 
relation as well. Gender rebellion’s questioning of the sex/gender system in 
feminism is accompanied by a re-reading of the body, a move from seeing it as part 
of a Cartesian subject to seeing it as an embodied mind-body subject.765  
The dichotomy sex and gender find themselves in, grounded in the culture/nature 
relation, has been challenged by an understanding of the body that shows the body’s 
central role in the creation of discrimination.766 Feminism highlighted how the link 
between sex and gender carried a restrictive categorization of bodies following the 
rules of nature. The essentialism of bodies has been transmitted through sex to the 
concept of gender, and vice versa. A mimetic relationship reigns between sex and 
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gender, which also constructs bodies. The woman’s body accepted by feminism 
survives despite the recognition of sex as cultural.767 The sex of the body determines 
how the process of becoming will occur—or, essentially the same thing, the “gender” 
of the body determines how the process of becoming will occur.  
Feminists such as Wittig, Irigaray768, Gatens, Grosz or Butler have challenged 
the essentialist reading implicit in the body, contesting the meaning of the sexed 
body. For them, the cultural relevance of gender is in direct relation to sex, and 
culture acts directly upon bodies. In a way, this challenging reading entailed a return 
to the earlier approaches of Garfinkel, Kessler and McKenna, who already foresaw 
the performance implicit in the sex/gender relation, which was obviated in a way 
because of the intentional absence of the body from discourse. Likewise, Butler has 
addressed the performative process in which male and female bodies try to 
approximate the ideal femininity and masculinity established by male standards.  
To recognize the process of becoming male or female changes the starting point 
from fixed biology and accepts a historical body that changes and is transformed.769 
The performative becoming is the result of a process of materialization that gives 
meaning to the subject. This process of materialization implies acts of repetition, and 
the discourse constructs meaning through reiterations. The sexed/gendered body is 
created through the reiteration of the governing rules that give meaning to bodies or, 
as Butler has called it, cultural intelligibility.770 
The challenge consists in achieving a corporeal reading of the body within an 
embodied framework. This involves recognizing that we are not limited by nature, 
but rather by our limited understanding of it. Moreover, the way society applies this 
limited understanding of nature to bodies ends up controlling and signifying the 
body. Therefore, if we cannot use discourse to define nature, we will be unable to 
define the materiality of bodies through any discourse. 771 
Bringing the focus back to the materiality of the body is the aim of “the corporeal 
turn” claimed by gender revolution. The physical character of the body is brought up 
in the ‘corporeal turn’. The language of the body is always restricted to a cultural 
signification, leaving the “reality” of the bodies out of the discourse. This is to say 
that the body is signified through discourse, but a limited societal discourse restricts 
it to the normative and known binary of sex. The difficulty is to name the bodies so 
 
 
767  This statement is developed in detail in chapter 7. 
768  As previously mentioned, Irigaray’s work may fall into essentialism; however, her text 
also questions the static relation between the body and the sex-gender relation. 
769  Barbara Brook, Feminist Perspectives on the Body (Routledge 2014). 
770  Butler and Butler (n 132). 
771  Yuderkis Espinosa, Escritos de Una Lesbiana Oscura: Reflexiones Críticas Sobre 
Feminismo y Política de Identidad En América Latina (En la frontera 2007) 100.  
The Body 
 195 
far unnamed by the discourse without excluding any of them. Can we really name 
something without constructing new exclusions?  
The complexity comes from the depiction of the physical, the symbolic and the 
sociological, from how these three elements are understood and how they construct 
the difference that underlies the understanding of all of them. The “corporeal turn”, 
as proposed by Grosz, Barad and Kirby, entails reading the body within a “corporeal 
feminist framework”. This new strategy aims to bring the body from the margins to 
the center of the analysis. The corporeal turn follows Butler’s claim that for a body 
to “matter”, it must be materialized.772  
The corporeal turn aims to avoid the limitation of sex to a binary and to recognize 
the multiple sex differences that are reflected in bodies. There are not two bodies, 
but rather a multitude of bodies fighting the normative. This multitude of bodies 
creates a distance between the sole objective of liberating women from masculine 
oppression and the objective of liberating bodies from the imposed difference of 
sex.773  
5.6 The Difference within the Multitude 
Feminism and gender have been influenced by both Deleuze’s and Derrida’s 
approaches to the idea of difference. Derrida and Deleuze share the belief that 
difference is created a priori: for both of them, difference lies at the origin of things 
though Derrida qualifies the term, saying that we cannot talk about origin in the 
traditional sense of that term, it can never be reached but deferred 
While sharing the idea of difference as an origin, they differ in their 
representation of difference—to put it in very simplistic terms, Derridean difference 
is linear while Deleuze’s difference is shapeless.  
Derrida uses the neologism différance, 774  which various authors consider to be 
neither a concept nor a word to address the concept of difference. Différance 
materializes only through its relation to the concept of difference. Difference is in 
fact addressed through the relation of différance and difference, with a focus on the 
intrinsic processes that create difference. In reference to différance, Derrida writes, 
« et par rapport à ce que nous appellerons plus loin la différance, concept 
économique désignant la production du différer, au double sens de ce mot ».775 That 
is, différance is a composite of differing and deferring (both the same verb in 
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French). And as Derrida explains,  " ne pourrait plus l'appeler « origine » ni « 
fondement », ces notions appartenant essentiellement à l'histoire de l'onto-théologie, 
c'est-àdire au système fonctionnant comme effacement de la différence »776. 
Différance has to do with the construction of meaning: meanings never finish being 
constructed, because there is an endlessly continuing, endlessly deferred, process of 
distinguishing between one difference and another. 
Deleuze approaches difference through the concept of repetition, saying, 
“Difference is included in repetition by way of disguise and by the order of the 
symbol”. Repetition contributes to the creation of generality, while in every 
repetition something distinct occurs. When we repeat, we are focusing on the similar; 
however, nothing is equal; instead it is always different. There is no equal or 
equivalent of the first instance of something: every act of nature repeats with novelty. 
We rationalize through analogy by creating something new while repeating 
something old. For Deleuze, difference is only empirical. He says, “Difference is 
‘mediated’ to the extent that it is subjected to the fourfold root of identity, opposition, 
analogy and resemblance…. Difference finds its own concept in the posited 
contradiction: it is here that it becomes pure, intrinsic, essential, qualitative, synthetic 
and productive; here that it no longer allows indifference to subsist”. Deleuze thus 
tries to approach difference from a new angle to avoid constructing it based on 
opposition. He explores a rhizomatic approach to difference. The rhizome is a 
network in which any point of the rhizome can be connected to any other in a non-
hierarchical way and framed by the principle of multiplicity. 777 In many frameworks 
of thought, difference is constructed in a negative way, but in Deleuze’s thought 
there is a shift to constructing it in a positive way. 
With these two approaches to the concept and idea of difference, we might say 
that in feminist discourse there is a problematic that stems from the concept of 
difference delimiting the body within the binary. Feminist difference opposes the 
idea of sexual difference and yet ends up reiterating it. The feminist conception of 
difference that is influenced by Derrida’s approach to difference, remaining within 
the linear, does not eliminate the binary of sex. 
Derrida’s understanding of difference limits the possibility of moving towards 
the depiction of multiple bodies, which would entail the need for multiple sexes. The 
Derridian definition of difference is visible in the feminist discourse on difference 
which comes from a relation in which the discourse on biological sex merges with 
the discourse on sexual orientation, delimiting the possibilities that exist. The 
difference is still constructed in opposition to the Other. 
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Accepting the multitude of bodies acknowledges the construction of difference 
within a duality, rejects it, and embraces the Deleuzian difference that creates a 
“‘difference from the difference’…. Difference in general is distinguished from 
diversity or otherness”.778 Derrida’s différance helps to reflect diversity while 
Deleuze’s difference is multiple.779 The multiplicity of bodies are beyond the 
difference between two things, or, as Deleuze says, “the difference ‘between’ two 
things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. 
However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine 
something which distinguishes itself—and yet that from which it distinguishes itself 
does not distinguish itself from it”.780 As Elisabeth Grosz points out, Deleuze’s 
account of difference is not linked to binarized structures; “rather, it is addressed to 
the ontological ground that prefigures and makes possible relations between 
subjects, and between subjects and objects”.781 The difference from a Deleuzian 
perspective is not reduced to opposition or to a comparison in which both entities 
would share an understanding of a relation between two terms. Difference according 
to Deleuze, as stated by Grosz, goes beyond two terms, and ontological difference is 
the point of departure.782  
The other important aspect of conceptualizing another kind of difference can be 
signaled in relation to the body. Linear difference does not escape from a pre-given 
essence or pre-given natural body defined by sex. Linear difference is easier to 
understand because it is a normative, institutionalized conception of difference. 
Deleuzian difference accepts a pre-given body of flesh that cannot be situated within 
the binary. Sarah Salih refers to the Butlerian approach to the body, stating that “there 
is no ‘natural body’ which pre-exists culture and discourse, since all bodies are 
gendered from the beginning of their social existence”.783Butler’s and 
Braidotti’s Approaches to Difference 
Two different conceptions of difference support the analysis of the body in Butler’s 
and Braidotti’s work.784 These two theorists enter the debate from related yet 
different positions. In this matter, Braidotti says that while Butler “takes the 
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linguistic turn, I go nomadically the way of all flesh. I think that sexual difference is 
written on the body in a thousand different ways, which includes hormonal and 
endrocrinological evidence”.785 These words seem to indicate that Butler’s body 
produces meaning and is produced by meanings. On the other hand, Braidotti’s body 
is flesh, and is grounded in the existence of a multitude of different bodies. Braidotti 
continues by defining her understanding of the multitude of bodies, saying, “[I]t is 
to be understood as neither a biological nor a sociological category, but rather as a 
point of overlap between the physical, the symbolic and the material social 
conditions”.786 This definition makes one believe that Braidotti approaches the body 
from a standpoint of multiplicity. 
Butler’s and Braidotti’s different conceptions of bodies connect their feminist 
approaches to the relation between sex and gender found in the gender rebellion and 
gender revolution movements. For both, sex is just as cultural as gender is. Both 
scholars have tried to challenge the binary. Butler questions the binary that sustains 
the relation between sex and gender, embracing the possibility of multiple bodies. 
Braidotti envisages the possibilities of the multitude of bodies, which also challenge 
the gender binary.787  
Nevertheless, despite their similarities, they differ in approach. The differences 
become evident in their respective readings of the political subject. Braidotti focuses 
on feminine subjectivity, hindering the possibility of a multitude of bodies by 
implicitly accepting the binary to keep her subject alive. Her strategy is to try to 
avoid the hierarchy by avoiding the opposition between the feminine and the 
masculine. She tries to set them beside each other, at the same level. Nevertheless, 
her position still implies the fixing of two poles of a binary. She claims that every 
subject is situated, is what she calls a nomadic subject, which allows them to 
undertake their own process of becoming.788 It might be possible to say that she 
applies Deleuzian difference to the subject itself, but not to the relation of the subject 
with others. In a rhizomatic relation, the subjects are composed of a unique 
combination of attributes that make up their identity or sense of themselves. 
Nevertheless, nomadic subjects are limited by the intersection between sex, gender 
and sexual orientation, which is all set within a binary, thus an acceptance of the sex 
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787  Braidotti envisages the possibilities of overcoming the implicit hierarchies between 
sexes. See Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in 
Contemporary Feminist Theory (n 13). 
788  Braidotti’s nomadic subject is in accordance with Teresa de Lauretis’ feminine subject.  
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binary is implied.789 The rhizomatic understanding of difference becomes 
constrained by the binary that is implicit in all the attributes that configure the 
understanding of the subject. Therefore, Braidotti applies a rhizomatic approach to 
one’s own self but the relation between subjects remains constrained by the 
limitations of the dualities implicit in the female/male, feminine/masculine binary.  
Braidotti accepts a different meaning of woman that goes beyond the maternal 
body, although she still claims the existence of some kind of feminine essence. She 
explicitly rejects the definition of woman as a monolithic essence, instead saying 
that woman is “rather the site of multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory 
sets of experiences, defined by overlapping variables, such as class, race, age, life-
style, sexual preference and others”.790  
Butler tries to undo the relation between sex and gender, which is seemingly 
Braidotti’s objective as well. In fact, Braidotti claims that she approaches gender as 
something that is confused with sex, stating the cultural character of the binary of 
sex. However, her approach to the female subject reveals the opposite, as she still 
accepts the femininity that is opposed to masculinity. Her approach to sex is still 
delimited by the sexed body. She approaches sex as a binary, which forces a binary 
approach to gender. She does not reject the relation between sex and gender, only 
the intersection of sex and gender with sexuality.  
As Donna Haraway defines it, “although not mutually exclusive, the language of 
‘gender’ in Euro-American feminist discourse usually is the language of ‘sexed 
subject position’ and ‘sexual difference’ in European writing”.791 This statement can 
apply to Braidotti’s discourse on the subject. Braidotti’s nomadic subject is 
embodied; the female feminine nomadic subject in Braidotti’s view is not a woman 
but a feminine subjectivity. What, then, are the characteristics that make her 
subjectivity feminine? Is there a specific feature that makes embodiment feminine 
and not masculine? Is it the eyes, the skin, the hair, the nose, the ears, the age that 
makes that embodiment specifically feminine? Or do the female genitals make one’s 
embodiment feminine? Braidotti ascribes a non-essentialist approach to herself by 
following Irigaray’s similar non-essentialist approach, explicitly saying that “[t]he 
‘feminine’ for Irigaray is neither one essentialised entity, nor an immediately 
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accessible one: it is rather a virtual reality in the sense that it is the effect of a project, 
a political and conceptual project of transcending the traditional (‘molar’) subject 
position of Woman as Other of the Same, so as to express the other of the Other”.792 
Braidotti sees the nomadic subject as a virtual reality. However, Braidotti’s 
nomadic subject still seems to be ruled by a femininity in opposition to a masculinity, 
a fact that restrains Braidotti’s avowed nomadism. Butler’s approach does have 
similarities to Braidotti’s focus on the flesh, as Butler’s questioning of sex tries to 
dilute the importance of the vagina and the penis by attending to other features, such 
as the skin, eyes, hormones, and age. However, Butler’s approach differs from that 
of Braidotti’s, as it does not foresee a revaluation of the feminine; rather, it thwarts 
the identification of the masculine or the feminine. Braidotti’s analysis of sexual 
difference is powerful until she limits herself to the female subject in opposition to 
the male subject. Her acceptance of femininity suggests another approach to 
diversity within the group; as she explains, “In this perspective, the subject of 
feminism is simultaneously sexed and social; s/he is motivated by the political 
consciousness of inequalities and therefore committed to asserting diversity and 
difference as a positive and alternative value”.793 The question is, how can the body 
be sexed as flesh beyond the binary if we only have language for the female and the 
male? The problem with Braidotti’s approach is her attempt to fight institutional 
femininity, discrimination against women, and the binary of sex with the same tool. 
Braidotti looks for the positive difference that is not based in the hierarchy, a 
sexual difference that does not mean inferiority. She immerses herself in a strategic 
essentialism, which transforms the negative difference into a positive difference that 
she believes will help women. The strategic new subject of feminism is not woman: 
as she explains, “the subject of feminism is not Woman as the complementary and 
specular other of man, but rather a complex and multi-layered embodied subject who 
has taken her distance from the institution of femininity”.794 However, her subject is 
still named as woman. She still depicts a body with female attributes that implicitly 
represent the mother’s body. Bodies still remain within a binary, evoking the 
symbolism attached to them. She does seem to move away from institutionalized 
femininity, but how can she define a non-institutionalized femininity? 
Braidotti envisages a multitude of female bodies and a multitude of male bodies, 
always dividing the multitude into the categories of female and male, as opposed to 
Butler, who searches for the multitude of bodies without dividing the multitude into 
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the categories of female and male.795 Despite Braidotti’s ‘strategic essentialism’796 
in the use of positive sexual difference, her proposition is not useful for 
encompassing the multitude of bodies. She is aware of the power of her proposal 
when she says, “[T]his definition of the feminist subject as a multiple, complex 
process is also an attempt to rethink the unity of the subject, without reference to 
either humanistic beliefs or naive social constructivism. It critiques dualistic 
oppositions, linking instead body and mind in a new flux of self”.797 The problem is 
in the binary understanding of the body itself. The question here lies in finding a way 
to rethink the unity of the subject in order to achieve the representation of the 
multitude of bodies without reifying femininity and masculinity. A multitude of 
bodies goes beyond the binary of sex, destroying the binary and making it appears 
as the artificial construction it is. Thus the focus must not only be on the body-mind 
split but also on the binary divide of the sex categories that limits the understanding 
of the body. 
5.6.2 Changing the Point of Departure in the Construction of 
Difference 
Braidotti wonders, “[C]an gender, ethnic, cultural or European differences be 
understood outside the straitjacket of hierarchy and binary opposition?”.798 
Braidotti’s subject is an embodied subject in which sex has a say—or at least sex as 
we know it.  I would ask instead, Can we think of a multitude of bodies outside the 
straitjacket of sex and gender? And also, What would happen if the approach to the 
sex-gender relation came from a rhizomatic799 perspective instead?  
The process of becoming a subject is ruled by discourses that produce two types 
of embodiment. What would happen if the departure point changed from positive 
difference to a difference among multitudes of bodies? Everything would probably 
change. The process of embodiment and becoming would be different, as no subject 
would be restrained by the limited binary. Now, the embodiment process, the process 
of becoming a woman, is a sex-normative institution that is downplayed by the focus 
on the concept of gender.  
 
 
795  ibid.  
796  Braidotti advocates Irigaray’s strategic essentialism.  
797  Braidotti, ‘Becoming Woman: Or Sexual Difference Revisited’ (n 789) 46.  
798  Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory (n 13) 10. 
799  The rhizome is a concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari, based on the botanic 
rhizome, related to multiplicities. A rhizomatic relation involves multiples and non-
hierarchical relations that go beyond the binary. See Deleuze and Guattari (n 433). 
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The point of departure in the analysis and construction of difference is still 
constrained within dualist thought. It seems that Braidotti tries to apply a rhizomatic 
approach by stating that our existing embodiment is rhizomatic.800 However, is she 
truly applying a rhizomatic approach when the binary is still there creating its 
opposition? She also claims the need for more rhizomatic relations in the 
construction of subjectivity. More complexities are indeed needed, but where are 
these complexities in sex and sexuality? In the matrix of rhizomatic connections, the 
subject might be bestowed with multiple sexualities and the starting point already 
beyond the binary. Even when Braidotti claims to take a rhizomatic approach, Butler 
seems to be closer to really starting from such an approach. Butler tries to overcome 
the binary of sex by contesting the difference grounded in a divide of two and by 
stressing its cultural grounds. From my reading, Braidotti’s approach does not evolve 
into a multitude of bodies because in it the concept of gender implicitly sustains the 
binary. Braidotti questions the binary yet uses binary difference as a starting point. 
Butler’s bodies are entering the realm reclaimed by gender revolution, as opposed to 
Braidotti, whose bodies are within the realm of gender rebellion. 
Braidotti’s subject results in the reification of an implicit binary that, even if 
reclaimed as non-essentialist, borders on essentialism. She tries to expand the subject 
beyond the definition given by genitals. She wants to include other bodily attributes 
that also constitute the sexed subject. However, is she not still referring to a feminine 
body in the end? The representation appears to be clear, and the difference of the 
multitude vanishes. This approach represents feminist efforts to keep the female 
subject alive, still imposing a label within the normative binary, despite claiming the 
destruction of this binary. Overcoming gender also requires overcoming the norms 
imposed by gendered sex and, therefore, overcoming the feminine and the masculine 
in search of the multitude. Braidotti herself refers to the problem when she says that 
“the mental habit of linearity and objectivity persists in the hegemonic hold over our 
thinking.”801 As far as I am concerned, retaining a contemporary feminine that 
transcends the old femininity is an example of persisting in the linear. One may easily 
acknowledge the power of Braidotti’s approach and accept it as a necessary step 
forward before continuing the search for more revolutionary approaches. However, 
Butler’s challenge to the feminine and masculine might more easily reach a 
multitude of sexualities and bodies.  
 
 
800  Braidotti uses the concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia and Thousand Plateaus. She uses the concept of the rhizome, which is 
an image of thought in which the representation of non-hierarchical multiplicities is 
implicit. 
801  Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (n 788) 12.  
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Analysing the concept of gender in law, we can still perceive the implicit binary 
in sex or gender and see that the philosophy of multitudes has not found its place in 
law. Braidotti’s subject makes her way into law, as opposed to Butler’s subject, 
because law does not know how to accommodate the multitude of bodies. A reason 
for this rejection of the multitude might be found in law’s preference for objectivities 
rather than subjectivities. However, is the multitude of bodies not objective enough? 
Wouldn’t accepting the multitude of bodies make it possible to attain a genuinely 
neutral subject?  
5.7 The Body of the Law 
Law is one of the most all-pervading and controlling social institutions affecting the 
understanding of the body. A concise understanding of this relation can be found in 
Alan Hyde’s words: “Law’s discourse, like other social discourse, constructs bodies 
as male or female, and consequences follow these constructions”.802 However, Hyde 
advises that it is necessary to be cautious about this assertion, as “[o]ften the body 
constructed in the legal discourse may have no gender at all”.803 Hyde tries to 
convince us that the body in law is genderless, depicting a universal subject. 
The legal discourse tells a story of truth. It tells truths about bodies. The 
materiality of bodies allows the construction of an accepted truth, and under this 
accepted truth one perceives the natural through the neutrality of gender. The 
normative binary creates the sickness of the deviants who need to be cured. Law 
collaborates actively in this process of curing by allowing the transition from one 
normative sex to another, instating the concept of the wrong body, and, as Sandler 
and Monro claim, transsexuality can also serve as another way to reify the binary.804 
The sickness diagnosed has to do with one’s relationship to sex, and gender is the 
analytic category that justifies the healing process. Therefore, essentialism does not 
refer to gender but rather to the normative definition of two specific sexual bodies 
based on “historical specificity”. 805 In sum, law’s essentialism does not accept that 
sex is gender.   
Law and the body have had an uneasy relation, resulting in a normalization of 
humanity based on men’s bodies. Questions about gender and women in law have 
usually been left out of the discussion, which implies a lack of concern for other 
bodies. The male body was treated as the abstract universal body, into which the 
woman’s body has been incorporated. The feminist insights into sex and gender have 
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informed the construction of the body in public discourse and in law, framing bodies 
through sameness or through difference. Zillah Eisenstein has stated that “[i]n 
Western theory, as in law, the female body is most often assumed to be like the male 
body when the equality of women and men is being asserted; by the same token, the 
female body is most often explicitly said to be ‘different’ from the male when the 
equality of women and men is being denied.”806 
Historically, following Alan Hyde, the body as a biological object was often 
defined as a machine, placing it within the boundaries of the dominant Cartesian 
dualism. The fundaments of Cartesian thought lie in the sharp division between the 
body and the mind. The body is part of nature and separated from the rational 
faculties, and the supremacy of reason over nature is stated. In this sense, the concept 
of the body, or the matter that belongs to a human being, must be separated from the 
concept of the person in law. Despite seemingly being synonyms, in everyday 
language the body and the person do not refer to the same subject.807 The mismatch 
between concepts has inspired feminism to question not only what kind of person is 
legitimized by law, but also what kind of body.  
As feminists have already claimed, there is a “‘gendering’ of legal rationality” 
that permeates legal reasoning. Anna Grear claims that “[l]aw presents itself as a 
rational discourse – a discourse of reason”808, and this is the grounds for law’s 
authority to ascribe meanings and create categories. The problem is not legal reason; 
instead, as Mark Johnson has analysed in his book The Body in the Mind: The Bodily 
Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, the ignoring of the human body has 
undermined the embodied experience. As he posits, “The body has been ignored by 
Objectivism because it has been thought to introduce subjective elements alleged to 
be irrelevant to the objective nature of meaning. The body has been ignored because 
reason has been thought to be abstract and transcendent, that is, not tied to any of the 
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bodily aspects of human understanding. The body has been ignored because it seems 
to have no role in our reasoning about abstract subject matters”.809 
Disembodied reason effectively exists, but in a “negative” way, in the sense that 
it is taken away from women; its embodiment is not abstract and neutral, because 
reason has always been linked to the male attributes. The disembodiment, one might 
say, is biased, affecting certain bodies because reason is assumed to be part of neutral 
maleness.810 If reason has no body, therefore, as women are embodied, they have no 
reason. The outcome of this logical process is the idea that, as women have no reason 
and are represented by the body, they need to be protected by legal reasoning. Indeed, 
the reality is that the disembodiment also has a body, one that is represented as 
neutral and abstract: the male body. Anne Grear has noticed this, stating that “[t]here 
is a body in the disembodiment”.811 This is an important argument already 
emphasized by feminism and nicely explained by Grear, who reminds us that “the 
liberal legal subject is disembodied and simultaneously male”.812 
5.8 The Female Body in Law 
Given the direct relation between the male body and the conception of the legal 
person—which sets the male body as the norm in law and women as the exception—
analysing the representation of women’s bodies in law is not an easy task. Legal 
feminism highlighted how the sameness that gender reform invoked in an attempt to 
achieve formal equality within law was unreal, because a “woman’s body is not a 
man’s body”.813 Legal feminism signals law as an important part of the inner 
workings of the technology of gender.814 Different bodies meant oppression, 
repression, and exploitation. Women were objectified in law through their bodies. 
The gendered—or rather, patriarchal—depiction of the sexed body produced a 
gendered law, constraining positive or different depictions of the female body and 
maintaining the male body as the universal standard.  
 
 
809  In his book, Mark Johnson defines Objectivism as ‘the tradition that treats meaning and 
rationality as purely conceptual, propositional, and algorithmic, and therefore in no way 
dependent on metaphorical extensions of non-propositional image schemata. Since 
Objectivists think that meaning and rationality transcend the way individuals might 
happen to grasp meanings or understand reasoning processes, they tend to view reason 
in abstract and absolute terms, as if it operated in a realm free of bodily constraints and 
absolute terms, and governed only by its own logical rules’. Johnson (n 86) xiv and xxi.   
810  Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater and Martin Richards, Body Lore and Laws (Hart 
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To analyse woman’s body in law, it is important to start by acknowledging the 
influence of classical philosophy—that of Plato and Aristotle—on the foundations 
of Western thought and the organizing of binaries. The classical tradition inspired 
the representation of the sexed body and its transposition into law. Classical 
philosophy represented the body according to the needs and experiences of that time. 
Philosophy focused on the body as matter, and matter was the objective fact giving 
meaning to and defining the body. Reason was the tool for analyzing matter. 
Therefore, the same hierarchy ruling nature and culture applied to the understanding 
of matter. Matter grounded classical society, which, as far as women went, implied 
their depiction as incomplete males.815  
Aristotle believed in a shared human substance that becomes differently 
represented through the body, wherein emotions play a main role. According to 
Aristotle, nature ruled over matter, setting sexual differences in bodies. This resulted 
in male nature and female nature. The sexual differences grounded in bodies had 
specific manifestations such as sexual temperament, according to which the female 
body had a different temperature from that of the male body. The female’s colder 
body and different humours made women hysterical. The belief in these different 
humours, which gave matter a different meaning for women and for men, led to the 
denial of women’s status as independent individuals in law.816 According to this 
view, inherited by Christians, it is easily argued that women’s different bodies make 
them more susceptible to sexual passions, thus the need to protect them even from 
themselves. This persistent argument has informed law since classical times. It has 
influenced the understanding of sexed bodies, according to which women’s bodies 
become men’s property, enabling domination by men. The supposed inferiority of 
women due to their physical attributes has been used to justify the restriction of their 
rights. In this view of the body, which has influenced law, the male body is the 
standard measure for other bodies. Therefore, the female body, which is different 
from the normative male body, is placed in an inferior position and excluded from 
being part of the legal subject. The disembodiment of law, as previously mentioned, 
is rather a quasi-disembodiment817. 
The restrictions suffered by women made them concentrate on achieving rights 
and recognition in terms of law, thus becoming blind to the body. This sharp 
separation between mind and body correlated with the opposition between male and 
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female that feminists tried to overcome, focusing on the universal human mind. 
Therefore, in earlier feminism the analysis of the body was not considered necessary 
in order to include women in law. However, by Victorian times there were already 
feminists who looked at the body as a site of discrimination. Among them, Josephine 
Butler fought the Contagious Diseases Act, which forced women, presumed to be 
prostitutes, to undertake venereal disease exams. She praised the right over one’s 
own body in order to stop the campaigns of medical inspections of women, and she 
challenged men’s rights to women’s bodies.818 However, in Victorian times, the 
focus shifted from the body to the inclusion of women in law as equals to men with 
similar intellectual capacities. Thus the mind became the central focus of the 
feminists, who saw women and men as equals.  
The publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex underlined the 
importance of the body in becoming a woman.819 The different sexed bodies are lived 
differently. Women’s bodies were different, and law refused to account for it. The 
feminist focus on the body paralleled the rallying cry of ‘the personal is political’, 
pointing out the effects of body politics on women. The feminist concerns with the 
body and its depiction in law arose from the debate on abortion rights and extended 
to the objectification of women, violence against women, and reproductive rights. 
This new feminist focus on the body emphasized the central role of law in the 
distribution of power, for instance in the regulation of women’s bodies. Moreover, 
it highlighted how the law played a central role in denying a place for women’s 
bodies. The analysis of the law’s discourse in relation to the female body placed the 
spotlight on issues such as rape, contraception, abortion, pregnancy, and sexual 
harassment. Women bodies were not recognized in law until feminists made them 
part of the law, first as equals to men and then as women in their own right. However, 
the depiction of women in law still carries with it the ingrained belief about the need 
to protect them. Moreover, women still lack control over their bodies, as 
demonstrated by the many laws on prostitution or abortion.  
The female body means a reproductive body, and this defines the essence of the 
category of woman. The cultural intelligibility denounced by Butler is still at play. 
This cultural intelligibility becomes unintelligible in zones where ‘others’ appear. 
These others are neither woman nor man and cannot be put into any of the existing 
categories. The actual multitude of bodies is absent in the law. The sexed body 
represented in law, however, generates discrimination, vulnerabilities, and a 
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violation of rights. Feminist achievements have turned the masculine law into a 
masculine and feminine one. It might be argued, though, that the representation of 
the feminine still coincides with the masculine representation of the feminine—that 
deconstruction shifted the focus from the masculine to the feminine, but the feminine 
still stayed within the limits of patriarchal concepts. Certainly, there is a degree of 
positive difference in the recognition of diversity, but it still does not reach a 
multitude of bodies. One might say that now we have a law for two: for women and 
for men. Yet despite the law for two, women are not equal to men, either within 
difference or outside it.  
Law assigns a value and status to bodies in accordance with culture, establishing 
the definitions of bodies both explicitly and implicitly. Therefore, within the unified 
understanding of body and mind, identities and subjectivities are effects of law.820 
Bodies appear as the place where the binary can be broken. Within law, however, 
the embodied person is still represented as a sexed Cartesian person. 
The bodies represented in law are physical bodies delimited by the binary of the 
genitals. In accordance with Braidotti’s definition, the body of the subject in law is 
a combination of the physical, the symbolic, and the material social conditions, 821 
based on the linear sexual difference that grounds the binary of sex. This depiction 
of the body within a limited binary is not without consequences. The law bestows 
bodies with rights and obligations according to the genitals, creating legal 
consequences. Law uses sexed bodies while interpreting them through gender as 
neutral, abstract subjects. It seems that law only transformed a pre-existing social 
understanding into rights and obligations. Men and women are biological categories 
that become legal categories. The natural categories become truths through the 
process of legal legitimization and the need to attribute certain rights and obligations 
to them. The law is the tool that institutionalized the binary of bodies by giving them 
a legal meaning with legal consequences. Gendered law or patriarchy, as already 
mentioned in the previous chapters, defines what the reality is and what counts as 
truth.822 
Gender is transposed by gender resistance feminism into the body of law as 
neutrality in order to undo the hierarchy of power between the sexes. However, the 
idea, still present in law, that one sex belongs to a corresponding gender brings with 
it an essentialism that is adapted to the person represented in law. Gender brings with 
it the integration of sex differences in equity. These differences are just specific 
physical attributes that should not entail hierarchy, although in reality they do get 
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placed into a hierarchy, even in cases when the hierarchy is nominally being fought 
against. Gender paints the natural in a neutral colour, in which the natural is just 
natural and does not imply culture or hierarchy.823  
5.9 Is There a Corporeal Turn in Law? 
The sex/gender relation, framed by binary-based Western thought, is starting to 
crack. However, law still seems to be reluctant to recognize the actual non-
conforming bodies and non-normative sexualities that disrupt the natural relation 
between sex and sexuality. Law is part of the societal endeavor in the construction 
of nature as mentioned in the previous section. 
The absence of non-normative bodies from law comes alongside the acceptance of 
the equivalence between gender and sex within the symbolic binary. This equivalence 
is one of the structural technologies through which biopower deploys its tentacles. 
Outlaw bodies (e.g., transgender people, transsexuals, or intersex people) draw attention 
to the discursive configuration of the person designed to follow a heteropatriarchal 
framework and the way in which this implies accepting given femininity and 
masculinity as the normative truth.824 Intersex people represent a category crisis, 
disrupting the power of normative sex. They make up a non-represented but real 
category. Transsexualism and especially intersexuality force law to confront the binary. 
The outlaws shed light as well on the way in which gender is kept within the boundaries 
of the binary. Genitals rule the relation between sex and gender, causing a domino effect 
in which genitals define sex, sex defines gender, gender defines sex, and sex defines 
genitals—a circular process that maintains the normative order. This circular process is 
legitimized by law maintaining a sexed legal person.  
In order to overcome the binary and achieve real equality, or at least an equality 
that bestows us with the freedom of choice, the law should reconsider its self–
proclaimed neutrality to recognize the existence of multiple subjects with multiple 
choices. Society, composed of many different beings, cannot categorize all these 
beings within an artificial binary. Together with the forced choice of one sex within 
the binary comes the imposition of a particular way of life in which law acts as an 
accomplice. This is a fact accepted in law and evidenced through a close reading of 
the legal person that appears sexed and granted with rights and obligations depending 
on sex.825 
 
 
823  Feminists have underlined the hierarchy between the sexes as the source of 
discrimination and use gender to highlight that this hierarchy is constructed and not 
appertaining to sex.  
824  Allaine Cerwonka and Anna Loutfi, ‘Biopolitics and the Female Reproductive Body as 
the New Subject of Law’ (2011) 1 feminists@law.  
825  This is analyzed in detail in chapter 8. 
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And so, do we need sex and gender in law when they make it impossible to 
recognize all subjects? Is it useful for women to retain gender and sex as legal 
categories? What would happen to women as subjects if the concept of gender were 
to disappear? This last question has been a concern in feminism since the rise of 
post-structuralism, because of the fear that the subject will be killed as she dissolves 
into diversity.826 
This brings back the aforementioned approaches by Butler and Braidotti to 
difference. In sum, neither approach is able to solve all of the problems: on the one 
hand, Butler’s approach of blurring the binary does not solve the problematic 
attached to the category of woman, and does not entail a better situation for women 
in law either, as avoiding the depiction of femininity makes it hard to address the 
hierarchy and oppression created specifically around femininity. And on the other 
hand, Braidotti’s focus on revaluing the feminine does not help to destroy the binary 
of sex. However, the shared common point of both approaches is the use of the 
concept of gender in its second feminist approach, in which sex is seen as being just 
as constructed as gender is. 
Representing sex difference as gender difference problematizes the acceptance 
of the concept of sex as culture. The nature of sex never goes beyond the binary and 
never becomes ‘gender’. The cultural body (sex) frees itself from nature in theory, 
but the diversity of different physical features appears to ultimately still be limited 
by genitals and their functionality. The language of sex seems to ultimately rule the 
language of the body and gender. 
The multitude of bodies, defended by gender revolution, is argued for through 
the visualization of other bodies beyond the binary—e.g., those of intersex people—
which are still denied a representation and place in law. The existence of intersex 
and transsexual people problematizes the immutability of sex. Their embodiment 
helps to challenge the dichotomous relation between sex and gender and to subvert 
the traditionalism and biologism of the legal discourse. Non-conforming bodies give 
us the opportunity to understand the limitative power of gender and sex, laying out 
the possibilities of a post-gender era in which categories are eliminated to allow 
multiplicity.827   
 
 
826  Ledis San Juan Mejia, ‘Reclaiming the Woman Subject from Postmodern Feminism: 
Standpoint Feminism and the Science of Gender’ <http://www.academia.edu/ 
3575412/Reclaiming_the_Woman_Subject_from_Postmodern_feminism_Standpoint
_Feminism_and_the_Science_of_Gender%3E;>; Rosemary Hunter, ‘Deconstructing 
the Subjects of Feminism : The Essentialism Debate in Feminist Theory and Practice’ 
(1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 135.  
827  This is developed in chapter 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since time immemorial, the different construction of bodies has always dictated the 
fate of every human being, with the body even signifying a prison in the case of 
women. Natural attributes have established the division between woman and man. 
At first this division was made according to the different humours or temperaments 
of the body. During antiquity, the genitals were seen as being practically the same, 
as the female uterus was understood as a male penis turned inside out. It was only in 
the 18th century that science shifted from the one-sex theory to defining women’s 
and men’s genitals as very different from each other.828 Nevertheless, this shift in 
definitions was not followed by a shift in the status of women; on the contrary, it 
strengthened the discrimination women faced. Science supported the discourse on 
the legal subject using patriarchal roots. As Laqueur has claimed, the representation 
of the female body was created by men. The body has always been the main site of 
discrimination against women, although more precisely it was the reproductive 
capacities of women’s bodies that determined their fate.  
The role of the body in discrimination against women was unveiled by feminism. 
At first the feminist enquiries about the sources of women´s discrimination dismissed 
the role of the body in the creation of discrimination and accepted the naturalness of 
women’s bodies, while fighting for their inclusion in the public realm. This strategy 
partly worked, as the symbolism and representation of the female body appeared to 
be a constraint to women’s full participation in the public realm. The body, 
conceived as belonging to the private realm, seemed to dissolve through the focus 
on reason. Feminists realized the need for new strategies to address the body; 
however, they fell into the acceptance of a culturally constructed female body that 
defines the essential attributes of womanhood. The acceptance of the woman’s body 
as having natural attributes entailed the implicit acceptance of one type of woman, 
which can be extended also to the acceptance of one type of man. Moreover, this 
assumed an implicit acceptance of the binary of sex.  
 
 
828  Laqueur Thomas W, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Harvard 
University Press 1992) 
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The acceptance of the natural body entailed the implicit acceptance of 
heterosexuality as the norm. The natural attributes of the body rule reproductive 
sexuality, although for women they also entailed a restrictive sexuality. The 
challenges to the essentialist acceptance of the body obliged us to confront sexual 
orientation, by bringing up the existence of desire alongside the existence of other 
sexualities and sexual orientations. Challenging heterosexuality not only brings 
about non-normative sexualities, but also allows these sexualities to become many 
identities.  
Nonetheless, the binary of sex was still not challenged, as diversity seemed to 
apply only to identity and not the body. Multiplicity applied to social sex and to 
sexual orientation, but the multiplicity of bodies remained within the restrictive 
limitation of the natural attributes. There was a confrontation of the binary of 
gender—understood as social sex—but the body still seemed to resist multiplicity. 
The body only produced women and men, although it was possible to accept a 
transition from one sex to the other. This is the influence of gender, in which the 
cultural construction of sex deploys its power.  
During the ’80s, the body became central in feminist research. The Cartesian 
understanding of the body faded in order to make way for embodied reason. This 
approach allowed the shift from the static being to a fluid one and, in combination 
with the concept of gender, also influenced law. At this point, law tried to abandon 
the Cartesian approach, letting embodiment find its representation in law. The sexed 
body was transformed into the neutral universal body of law through the process of 
gender. The challenging of the binary of sex brought about the neutral body. The 
sexed fiction of the person was substituted by the neutral artificial body. However, 
if we carefully read the body represented in law, we can acknowledge it is sexed and 
recognize how the natural still permeates the so-called new neutral body, which in 
fact is no more than a sexed person.  
The body is formed by many different attributes, making it difficult to find two 
equal bodies. Also, the combination of the different factors that determine the sex of 
a person casts light on the variety of possibilities. The exclusion of bodies with non-
normative sex from law reveals the artificial and cultural construction of the body, 
in which patriarchy still has some say. The multiplicity of bodies is absent from the 
discourse, as the imposition of sex and the surgical manipulation of intersex bodies 
shows. 
The current process of the socialization of nature829, in which certain natural 
events acquire a social character due to scientific and technological development, 
related to reproduction or change of sex, renders the binary of sex a question of the 
 
 
829  Antony Giddens, Sociology, Polity 2006. 
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past. It also provides the possibility of overcoming the representation of womanhood 
and manhood within the limits of the traditional understanding of the body. Law still 
shows a certain rejection of different discourses on the body and fails to accept the 
multiplicity of bodies. For law, there are still only two sexed bodies, the male and 
the female. 
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6 THE PATRIARCHY OF GENDER 
The 20th century witnessed the upraising of new concepts in the fight against 
discrimination, among them the concept of patriarchy. Patriarchy is a reflection of 
the androcentrism of the world, once accepted and justified as the expression of 
nature but now seen simply as the domination of men over women. The possibility 
of a future without such domination encouraged feminism to use the concept of 
patriarchy as a tool of analysis in the search for the sources of women’s oppression. 
However, a society without patriarchy remains no more than a utopia, as patriarchy 
still permeates our lives. This is evidenced every day in the news, for instance in the 
photos of men meeting to debate abortion law or prostitution law,830 in the debates 
with so-called “all-male panels,” or in the “mansplaining” practice. Patriarchy 
grounds all types of structures. Moreover, patriarchy rules the construction of sex, 
affecting not only women and men but also people of non-normative sex.  
Before the feminist use of the concept of gender, the concept of patriarchy was 
the most important category of analysis in feminism. Patriarchy represented male 
power, as well as the male foundations of Western thought. Nevertheless, the 
powerful concept of patriarchy has partially given way to the more powerful concept 
of gender. Today, the debates or discussions on patriarchy have largely, though not 
entirely831, been replaced by debates on gender, especially in legal and official 
discourse. However, did patriarchy disappear, or did it stay quietly within us? 
Moreover, where is patriarchy hidden? I argue that patriarchy is still with us, as many 
feminists do as well. But I go further, arguing that patriarchy is among us disguised 
under the seeming neutrality of the term gender.  
In this chapter I will explore the concept of patriarchy to analyse the relation 
between the concepts of patriarchy and gender. The system of patriarchy has been 
smart enough to survive, or rather to reinvent itself and adjust to new needs in order 
to maintain the existing order. It just changed its name to gender. Therefore, I would 
 
 
830  ‘Una Sala Llena de Hombres Decidiendo La Salud Reproductiva de Las Mujeres’ 
(ELMUNDO, 24 March 2017) <http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/03/24/ 
58d57d0de2704ea23e8b45bc.html>.  
831  There are still some feminists, in regions such as Latin America or Spain, who prefer 
to use the concept of patriarchy; one stand-out example is Rita Laura Segato.  
The Patriarchy of Gender 
 215 
argue that we are using a patriarchal tool to attempt to dismantle oppression, because 
the concept of gender is nothing more than patriarchy disguised as politically correct 
neutral language. Regrettably, patriarchy still rules, impeding the elimination of 
oppression and becoming imperceptible because of its new, neutral name: gender.  
6.1 The Concept of Patriarchy 
The feminist concept of patriarchy appeared as a main concept of feminism after the 
publication of Kate Millett’s book Sexual politics (1970).832 The feminist concept of 
patriarchy helps to reveal the continuing inferior status of women in society.833 Carol 
Pateman has explained how the feminist definition of patriarchy specifically referred 
to the domination and oppression of women by men,834 and Alicia Puleo focuses on 
the power of the concept of patriarchy to stress masculine hegemony.835 There are 
many examples of patriarchy in action, but violence against women is probably the 
principal situation that reveals the specific effects of patriarchy.  
The sex/gender system conceived by Gayle Rubin was an attempt to overcome 
the immutability and inevitability implicit in the concept of patriarchy: the term 
gender, according to Rubin, would make it possible to achieve this. However, Gayle 
Rubin’s sex/gender system has received criticism from several feminist scholars, 
among them Celia Amorós, who points out that patriarchy is an ensemble of real and 
symbolic practices ruling the pacts among men. The real and symbolic practices of 
patriarchy informs concepts and enactments of gender as well as sex. This 
understanding of patriarchy does not require patriarchy to be dismissed in order to 
speak of gender, because, in agreement with Celia Amorós, the cultural construction 
of gender appears to be the same as patriarchal hierarchy.836  
The concept of gender just changed the focus, placing it on the power of culture 
in giving an specific meaning to biology, power and domination. Culture and society, 
as feminism has highlighted, are ruled by men. Indeed, patriarchy is just a cultural 
 
 
832  Millett (n 258). 
833  However, as Puleo has pointed out, the feminist definition of patriarchy has not found 
its place, for instance, in the Spanish dictionary in either 1995 or 2018. In Spanish, the 
feminist concept of patriarchy is still not included, as opposed to French, where the 
Larousse dictionary says: «Forme d'organisation sociale dans laquelle l'homme exerce 
le pouvoir dans le domaine politique, économique, religieux, ou détient le rôle 
dominant au sein de la famille, par rapport à la forme», http://www.larousse.fr/ 
dictionnaires/francais/patriarcat/58689#ylblH8rCRxoHAKgc.99. For the Spanish use 
of the concept, see http://dle.rae.es/?id=SB5KObD.  
834  Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press 1988). 
835  Alicia Puleo, ‘Patriarcado’ in Celia Amorós (ed), 10 palabras clave sobre mujer (Verbo 
Divino 1995). 
836  Amorós (n 194). 
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construct built over biological difference, which sounds very close to the definition 
of the concept of gender. 
6.2 Patriarchy and Gender 
Patriarchy is an abstract concept that has imposed a universal view of human nature 
on the understanding of humanity. Some feminists researchers aimed to find a 
concept that could bring into focus the construction of cultural grounds of 
discrimination on the site of the body, and realized that the concept of gender, also 
abstract, might be useful: it might bring materiality to the analysis by allowing both 
women and men to be conceptualized, along with the cultural foundations of sex 
roles. Thus, these feminist researchers substituted the concept of patriarchy with that 
of gender roles, gender relations, gender identities, and the gender system837.  
The concept of patriarchy was and is dismissed as having limited possibilities; 
however, I suggest that the concept of gender resembles the concept of patriarchy, 
with the sole difference of implying two instead of one. Patriarchy denotes a single 
body ruling over many other bodies, and implies the male body of a father that rules 
and governs both as the norm and by establishing the norms. Gender still accepts the 
abstraction of a universal human nature, but it reflects two bodies, one of which is 
the norm and the other of which is not. Both bodies are, however, a creation of 
patriarchy, as they are both defined by the patriarchal rule. The concept of gender is 
not revolutionary enough to break the patriarchal conceptualization of the subjects 
woman and man, still defined under patriarchal rule.  
Patriarchy838, as defined by Walby, is “a system of social structures and practices 
in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women”839. This definition coincides 
with that presented by Gerda Lerner in The creation of patriarchy, where she refers 
to patriarchy as “the institutionalization of male dominance over women in 
society.”840 In both definitions, the focus lies on the disadvantaged position of 
women and the power relations between men and women, established under a 
hierarchy of the sexes. A shared feature in these definitions is the understanding of 
patriarchy as part of culture. It appears as a male creation that establishes the 
organizing principles of our world. Patriarchy, thus, is male domination through the 
creation of knowledge and rules that become discourses of truths and control culture. 
 
 
837  No all feminists changed the used of the term patriarchy for the used of the term gender 
as still some prefer to use sexual difference or sex.  
838  For a description of the very different definitions of patriarchy, see Jo Foord and Nicky 
Gregson, ‘Patriarchy: Towards a Reconceptualisation’ (1986) 18 Antipode 186, 195.  
839  Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy, vol 20 (Oxford 1990) 214. 
840  Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (Oxford University Press 1986) 236. 
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The physical, political, and economic realms establish a specific hierarchy that 
designs and reproduces the power relations between men and women.841   
Regarding gender, we can use the definitions set by the most important scholars 
in the field, such as Gayle Rubin, who coined the term the sex/gender system, 
meaning “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex 
and procreation is shaped by human social intervention”.842 This definition shows 
feminism’s main intention in using the concept of gender, which is to distinguish 
culturally assigned characteristics from biological ones. Joan Scott offers another 
definition that focuses on difference and power: “Gender is a constitutive element of 
social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is 
a primary way of signifying relationships of power”.843 This definition implies the 
cultural background of the concept of gender, revealing it as a system grounded in 
difference that designs specific power relations between men and women.844 Sandra 
Harding defines gender as “an analytic category within which humans think about 
and organize their social activity rather than as a natural consequence of sex 
difference, or even merely as a social variable assigned to individual people in 
different ways from culture to culture.”845 In this definition, she stresses gender’s 
aspect as an organizing principle of society, institutions, and structures. 
In the search for parallels between the concepts of patriarchy and gender, we can 
follow the main features of patriarchy as listed by Alda Facio846: 1) Patriarchy as a 
historical construct is not based on nature. 2) Patriarchy is grounded in 
institutionalized male domination over women.847 3) Patriarchy searches for 
justifications in the biological difference of women, and all disciplines, including 
religions, have contributed to the justification of women’s subordination. 4) 
Patriarchy maintains and reproduces itself through practices, relationships, 
organizations, and institutions such as language, family, heterosexuality, education, 
 
 
841  For more definitions and the understanding of patriarchy in feminism, see Raphael 
Samuel, People’s History and Socialist Theory (2016).  
842  Rubin (n 297).  
843  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113) 1067.  
844  Joan Scott explains how the introduction of the term gender was encouraged by “those 
scholars who worried that women's studies scholarship focused too narrowly and 
separately on women  [and] used the term ‘gender’ to introduce a relational notion into 
our analytic vocabulary.” ibid 1054. 
845  Sandra Harding, ‘Introduction’ in Sandra Harding (ed), Feminism and Methodology 
(1987) 18.  
846  Facio and Fries (n 527). 
847  She notes the existence of male oppression within power relations; thus, male 
oppression works directly between a man and woman of the same status, and indirectly 
or symbolically when it works between a woman and a man of an inferior category. In 
ibid 27. 
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essentialized motherhood, history, the division of labour, law, the sciences, violence, 
etc. Curiously, all these features are also acknowledged as part of the definition of 
gender. The definitions of both gender and patriarchy show distinct parallels between 
the two analytical categories.  
Both concepts identify the grounds of domination and oppression, and they both 
address the organizing principles of society that are not an effect of biology but rather 
of culture. Both systems, patriarchy and gender, are the foundations of a hierarchical 
construction of the sexes. Patriarchy and gender assign different roles and spaces to 
women and men, thus governing the type of power relationships between them.  
The difference between the concepts might be found in the biological 
foundations of patriarchy, which are in opposition to the cultural foundations of 
gender. This, however, is an arguable difference, as gender was born as the cultural 
representation of sex, and biological difference is still the ground for gender. In this 
sense, Joan Scott stresses that the use of the term gender was intended to reject 
biological determinism, avoiding any reference to sex or sexual discrimination.848 
Scott coincides with Sheila Rowbotham in emphasizing the problem that the term 
patriarchy takes biological determinism for granted, and in recognizing the multiple 
ways in which gender is defined.849 The concept of patriarchy visualizes the 
androcentric grounds of our world and makes women invisible, whereas the concept 
of gender supposedly de-sexes the subject, making it possible to dissolve 
androcentrism and create a real neutral subject. Nevertheless, a return to biology also 
occurs with the term gender, as biological difference, originally dismissed by gender 
reform, would be later addressed by gender resistance and gender rebellion. The 
difference proposed by the term gender is non-hierarchical but still biological; 
moreover, it is taken from patriarchy.  
6.3 Critiques 
We have already acknowledged the similarities between the concepts of patriarchy 
and gender. However, despite their similarities, patriarchy has now been displaced 
by gender.850 Criticisms of the term patriarchy pointed out its weaknesses as an 
analytic category and its lack of acknowledgment of the historical and inter-cultural 
forms of women’s subordination851. Gender was seen as a more complete analytic 
category that would allow an understanding of historical accounts of discrimination. 
 
 
848  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113). 
849  Sheila Rowbotham, Woman’s Consciousness, Man’s World (Penguin 1973). 
850  We rarely listen or read the term patriarchy although in Latin America and Spanish 
speaking countries is still very much in use.  
851  Walby (n 842).  
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In contrast, the concept of patriarchy supposedly could not explain why the 
patriarchal system exists or how it is perpetuated. Therefore, the theories of 
patriarchy have been considered reductionist for dealing only with class, biology, or 
family, or because of their ahistoricism.852 Theories of patriarchy have also been 
criticized as limiting societal relations to only those between men and women.853  
On the other hand, Gerda Lerner’s research on the concept and the historical 
process of the institutionalization and establishment of patriarchy in a pre-patriarchal 
society makes room for a reconceptualization of patriarchy to reflect diversity.854 
Sylvia Walby, too, claims the need for a concept of patriarchy that captures 
diversity.855  
This critique of the ahistoricism and universalism of the concept of patriarchy 856 
curiously parallels the feminist criticism of the concept of gender as well. 857 In fact, 
Walby’s analysis of the theories of patriarchy addresses feminists who began by 
using the concept of patriarchy but would later be known for their approach to 
gender.858  
6.4 Problems in the Relationship Between the 
Concepts of Patriarchy and Gender 
Mary Hawkesworth’s question, “Can gender be deployed as an analytic tool that 
escapes the natural?”859 serves to reconsider the relation between gender and 
patriarchy. We can gain a hint of an answer if we change the term gender to 
patriarchy, resulting in the question: Can ‘patriarchy’ be deployed as an 
analytical tool that escapes the natural? The term patriarchy has been disregarded 
by feminism because it represented the subordination of women on the grounds 
of biology. Instead, the term gender was preferred for its detachment from 
 
 
852  Ahistoricism, as explained by Pilcher, is a failure to acknowledge or account for 
historical variations in gender relations. In Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan, Fifty 
Key Concepts in Gender Studies (SAGE Publications 2004). 
853  ibid.  
854  Gerda Lerner explains how the formation of patriarchy was not a sudden event but a 
process that happened over the course of 2,500 years, from approximately 3,100 to 600 
BC. In Lerner (n 843). 
855  Walby (n 842). 
856  “Essentialism” is the notion that there are fixed, essential definitions of what a man is 
and what a woman is, that the idea of patriarchy doesn’t imply any questioning of these 
universal essences. The feminist approach to essentialism is developed in detail in 
Chapter 7.   
857  Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ (n 113). See also Chapter 2. 
858  As theories of patriarchy, Walby refers to those of Delphy, Rich, Firestone, and 
Brownmiller. 
859  Hawkesworth, ‘Confounding Gender’ (n 232). 
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biology. Gender supposedly rejected the essential difference, in opposition to 
patriarchy, which created essential differences. However, is this relation so 
straightforward?860  
The concept of gender became popular with the gender resistance movement for 
attracting attention to the hierarchical cultural construction of power, structures, 
institutions, systems, politics—in sum, everything related to our society. The 
insertion of women as subjects into law was intended to diminish the power of the 
patriarchal system. The strategy of the gender reform movement focused on 
achieving neutrality in law, with women’s inclusion being the first step. The 
inclusion supposed the making of women into neutral subjects before the law. This 
was an effect unachievable by the concept of patriarchy, which powerfully denoted 
biological determinism.  
Regarding women, it is important, as noted by Lerner, that they are not totally 
powerless or deprived of rights. On the contrary, effective male domination implies 
bestowing women with a certain amount of power and rights in order to maintain a 
society that caters to male needs and interests. Law is the tool that bestows women 
with those needed rights, and this bestowal is facilitated by gender. Thus, women 
have been denied rights because of their gender, and they have also been assigned 
rights because of their gender. The explanation of this paradox lies in the effect of 
these rights, which legitimizes the patriarchal model contested for such a long time.  
The term patriarchy implies the source of these rights: it straightforwardly names 
the deciding master as the man/father. As master of rights, the man had the power to 
decide to whom rights would be given, which rights, and how; he even decided the 
role of biological differences. Gender, however, blurred biology and no longer 
directly named the source of the deciding power. Culture alongside biology (sex and 
gender) remain the guilty elements, while the deciding master (patriarchy) is kept 
hidden.  
The concept of patriarchy clearly evidenced the non-neutrality of law. The 
introduction of the term gender made it easier to achieve neutrality in law, allowing, 
as gender resistance claimed, women to be women in law. The concept of patriarchy 
confronted the practices and mechanisms through which male-based patterns 
become part of the sexed person. This confrontation vanished when neutrality started 
to govern. In fact, the acceptance of neutrality implied a step forward in the equality 
of sexes in which the male pattern became aligned with the female one. Gender 
included women (womanhood) by changing the language to a more neutral, inclusive 
one, rather than using confrontational language to challenge male power. Gender has 
tried to neutralize the sexed person, the source of the practices and mechanisms that 
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form a subtle part of the process of becoming a subject. Moreover, gender helps to 
leave an essential feature of patriarchy unquestioned: sex. Biology, made neutral by 
gender, can still rule in a way that is accepted by patriarchy.  
The inclusion of women as equal subjects in gender-inspired law should have 
caused a break in patriarchal foundations, as men were no longer understood as 
deserving to rule based on their sex. What happened? The acceptance of the feminine 
experience did not challenge the patriarchal source of the definition of the 
feminine—i.e., when women say, “I am a woman” or “I am feminine,” they are really 
using definitions of woman and feminine produced by the patriarchy. Patriarchal 
difference became legitimated as gender difference. It remained intact and accepted.  
Patriarchy was, and still is, part of the law; it is the organizing power that places 
women in a subordinate position. As Becker claims, patriarchy always survives in 
any form of social organization, and law is no exception. Even if oppression is not 
the aim of patriarchy, the hierarchy that it establishes produces oppression and 
domination.861 Patriarchy establishes a set of values and principles that permeate our 
world without being noticed. The gender reform movement was criticized by later 
movements for not challenging patriarchy enough. The critics highlighted how 
patriarchy simply readjusted itself to the standards of equality, disguising male bias 
under the coat of neutrality.  
Walby’s first sentence in her text Theorizing patriarchy862 is a good example of 
the problems with the term gender and its relation to patriarchy. She says, “The 
concept of patriarchy is an essential tool in the analysis of gender relations”, and in 
this analysis, gender relations have to do with the power relations between the sexes. 
If we change the wording of the sentence, substituting the word gender with the word 
patriarchy—i.e., “The concept of patriarchy is an essential tool in the analysis of 
patriarchal relations”—this change in the sentence makes it straightforwardly 
address the problem of culturally constructed relations evidencing the ruling male 
hierarchy, which had been hidden at first in the neutrality of the term gender. The 
original sentence, in which the author uses the term gender, is rendered misleadingly 
neutral by language that makes the male norm abstract. The power relations are not 
defined and problematized as a male imposition; women appear to be included in the 
relations on equal terms. The same pattern of misleading neutrality is replicated in 
other places, as in the tendency of public gender policies to pass up the option of 
focusing on patriarchy (male domination) in favor of using a vague word (gender) 
that doesn’t name either men or women specifically and leaves intact the structures 
and relations between the sexes. When gender is used as a substitute for sex or 
 
 
861  Mary Becker, ‘Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism’ (1999) 
1999 University of Chicago Legal Forum 21. 
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women, the original meaning defined by patriarchal standards remains intact but 
neutralized by language.863 There is a clear example in the expression ‘gender 
violence’. This expression removes the origin of the violence—patriarchy—and the 
perpetrator. It overlooks women as victims of patriarchy as well as the fact that this 
violence is perpetrated following patriarchal norms. What would happen if we just 
said patriarchal violence? Or violence against women? We would then have to 
accept that patriarchy is what kills women. The violence against women is because 
of their sex and so it is noted by legal instruments that only include people from the 
female sex as victims.  
6.5 The Power of Patriarchy 
Sally Alexander claims that the use of the concept of patriarchy in feminism was 
originally intended to highlight masculine power and eliminate masculinity, 
transforming the whole web of psycho-social relations, rooted in patriarchy, in which 
masculinity and femininity are formed.864 Therefore, the feminist insistence on 
valuing femininity led to the acceptance of the concept of gender as the most 
appropriate tool to safeguard femininity. The concept of gender put the focus on the 
role of culture in constructing sex and social and power relations, moving past the 
limitations imposed by the concept of patriarchy and valuing the feminine. 
Femininity, along with masculinity, shapes the much-desired neutrality; however, it 
does so without realizing that femininity and neutrality were already impregnated by 
patriarchy.  
Some scholars such as Sally Alexander reclaim the concept of patriarchy as an 
analytic category because, as Alexander posits, “it is the analysis of kinship rules 
and unconscious mental life—not the study of biology—which helps us to 
understand how this channelling of desire towards reproductive heterosexuality 
occurs, and also what some of its costs have been: not only in terms of the systematic 
repression of homosexual love and lovers in most cultures, but also in terms of 
’normal’ feminine sexuality.”865 Nevertheless, this is in fact the aim of the use of the 
concept of gender as an analytical tool. The expected result of the use of the concept 
of gender instead of patriarchy is a shift in focus from the role of biology to the role 
of culture in constructing sex relations and roles. The aim is to expand research from 
the mere study of women’s subordination to include the male normative discourse. 
The concept of gender is bestowed with the power to unveil hegemonic masculinity 
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or heterosexism and to challenge the binary sex system. However, all these 
discussions are grounded in patriarchy and, moreover, they are an effect of 
patriarchy. The male normative discourse, hegemonic masculinity, heterosexism, 
and the binary of sex are expressions of patriarchy or the effect of patriarchal power. 
One might even say that they are patriarchy. All these systems, relations, and powers 
interact to reshape patriarchy in many different forms, affecting everybody. 
The critics might say that patriarchy does not account for subjectivity, as gender 
does. However, the subjectivity informed by gender might also be part of patriarchy. 
The process of embodiment is limited by the binary of sex, and this is an expression 
of patriarchy. The relation between sex and gender is understood through the lens of 
patriarchy and connected to the definition of behaviours and practices imposed upon 
the binary of sex.   
Therefore, if the concept of gender is patriarchy disguised in neutrality, it will 
never allow society to fully reinvent sex beyond the binary. Gender will constrain 
the relation between sex and gender by needing one to signify the other. The 
separation of sex and gender supposes an evolution of the concept of gender, 
although it still relies on a Cartesian acceptation of the human being. From the 
Cartesian perspective, the mind represented by reason is not sexed, only becoming 
gendered by the effect of culture. However, the body represented by sex remains 
sexed and is not affected by culture.866 The evolution of the concept of gender from 
being separated from sex to merging with it did not create a big change in these 
assumptions, allowing patriarchy to remain hidden as gender. The inclusion of 
sexuality as a gendered factor required the acceptance of diversity, although 
patriarchy still ruled, determining how to legitimate sexuality within the limits of 
sex. The broadening of diversity to a wider acceptance of sexuality left sex and 
gender untouched.  
The concept of patriarchy depicts, as does gender, sex differences and the social 
impositions that accompany them. Gender is given the credit for understanding that 
women and men are imprisoned by patriarchy. In this logic, patriarchy takes the 
place of culture, gender takes the place of patriarchy, and women and men are 
imprisoned by gender. The source of the difference becomes abstract, and patriarchy 
dissolves alongside the patriarchal origin of gender. The relations are between 
genders/sexes, but the patriarchal origin in which sex plays an important role 
becomes blurred by gender. Gender helps to stress the relational while keeping the 
patriarchal binary intact. In fact, the binary allows women to achieve a certain degree 
of status in society and in law, but they are still framed entirely by womanhood.  
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Sheila Rowbotham rejects the use of the theory of patriarchy. She claims that the 
concept of patriarchy relates closely to biological roles and can only lead to the 
abolition of biological maleness, while still allowing the masculine / masculinity to 
survive.867 For Rowbotham, the theory of patriarchy represents the abolition of sex, 
which for her means the abolition of men. She thinks the focus should be placed 
instead on eliminating the cultural part of the construction of sex roles—gender roles. 
However, looking only at the elimination of gender roles leaves the binary of sex 
unchallenged, and thus intact. One might guess that the strategy of maintaining the 
binary allows feminism to maintain women as a political subject. In fact, among 
feminist scholars, there is a certain fear of acknowledging the need to eliminate 
biology, which is overcome only by the idea of converting biology into gender. 
Notwithstanding, as Gerda Lerner explains, “gender is the cultural definition of 
behaviour defined as appropriate to the sexes in a given society at a given time. 
Gender is a set of cultural roles. It is a costume, a mask, a straitjacket in which men 
and women dance their unequal dance.”868 Lerner reflects on how the emphasis 
shifted from male imposition to the two sexes, both sexes actively involved in but 
not questioning the patriarchy implicit in female behaviour. Moreover, the concept 
of gender relies on a blind acceptation of two sexes. And so the binary remains static. 
With its success as the most effective tool of feminism, the concept of gender 
seems to have fallen into the same traps as the concept of patriarchy. Indeed, 
patriarchy and gender are equally based on biology. The refusal to address the 
cultural construction of sex hinders the possibility of real freedom of choice. 
Moreover, embodiment, since it is governed by patriarchy, hinders the possibility of 
real free subjectivity. This complicated relation between sex, gender and patriarchy 
obliges us to admit that the sex/gender relation ruled by patriarchy makes us overlook 
the cultural construction of sex.  
Challenging the cultural roots defining concepts such as sex, gender, woman, 
womanhood, men, and manhood, we find Sally Alexander and Juliet Mitchell, who 
claim the need for a cultural revolution to learn new ways of being women and 
men.869 This is indeed the challenge already posed in the ’80s, when womanhood or 
the act of being a woman was attached to the characteristics defining femininity. The 
focus on diversity broadened the definition of woman and womanhood, as addressed 
in chapter 3. However, the imposition of the binary of sex overshadows the fluidity 
of gender, a fluidity that might be found in sex. Sex is limited to the categories man 
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and woman: even if both categories are   broadened and depicted as diversity, the 
main essence of woman or man seems to be maintained as the core of the binary.870 
We need to level a broader challenge to contemporary society: that of learning how 
to be a person. 
The use of the concept of gender should have had positive effects on the fight 
against women’s discrimination and helped to blur the notion of a female essence, 
but there were no such effects. These potential positive contributions of the concept 
of gender have been described by Delphy in three points: “1. All the differences 
between the sexes which appeared to be social and arbitrary, whether they actually 
varied from one society to another or were merely held to be susceptible to change, 
were gathered together in one concept. 2. The use of the singular (‘gender’ as 
opposed to ‘genders’) allowed the accent to be moved from the two divided parts to 
the principle of partition itself. 3. The idea of hierarchy was firmly anchored in the 
concept”. However, Delphy adds, “which does not mean they have happened”.871 
Similarly, Gentile claims that nothing good has been achieved by the use of the term 
gender.872 In the same line, Unger and Crawford have posited that the separation of 
sex and gender has proved to be conceptually provocative but feeble in solving most 
epistemological issues.873 The feminist development of the concept of gender should 
have led to the positive effects described by Delphy, for whom the two sexes do not 
equal the two genders. However, the only achievement has been the use of the 
singular gender as opposed to gender. Yet, the two genders seem to parallel the two 
sexes. 
Gender disregards the patriarchy imbued in all institutions, politics, and culture. 
It blurs the real active agent of violence, the source of privilege and the standards 
ruling our society. Our entire world and all our relations are shaped under the veil of 
patriarchal domination, and so the term gender disregards the real foundations of our 
world. The use of the term gender seems to legitimize the patriarchal foundations of 
knowledge and the system of domination by painting it with the colour of a neutral 
equality and accepted difference.  
6.6 Gender in Law under the Spell of Patriarchy 
Legal institutions are active agents in the construction of meaning. Therefore, we 
need a clear definition of gender to use in law, otherwise patriarchy will attempt to 
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create moral panic, appealing to the goal of making sure the natural stays natural. 
The lack of agreement over the use of the term gender entails an array of different 
approaches to gender that curtail its potential achievements.  Most of sex 
discrimination law accepts that sex and gender are two distinct concepts. The gender 
revolution approach, which considers that sex and gender are not separate concepts, 
is far from being accepted. However, as we observed in previous chapters, there is a 
tendency to use the terms sex and gender interchangeably without implying the 
diversity found in the gender revolution approach to gender, thus causing confusion 
about gender.  
Regarding sex and sexuality, in an attempt to provide fair rules and maintain 
order, law has searched for answers in science. Sex is a scientific category transposed 
into law, but even when science cannot provide clear definitions, law still looks to it 
for answers. For example, medicine has defined what is male or female, and law has 
accepted this as fact. Law uses a very clear but too limited and restrictive definition, 
one that tries to draw neat lines around the binary without accepting that reality may 
be blurrier. However, as Julie A. Greenberg has commented on the paradox of the 
relationship between law and medicine, “[t]he law typically has operated under the 
assumption that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ are fixed and unambiguous despite 
medical literature demonstrating that these assumptions are not true”.874 
Nevertheless, the ambiguities regarding sex have forced law to confront the 
definition of sex and the limitations that it entails. The law has found it necessary to 
address the case of transsexuality, but has left many other forms of ambiguity 
unaddressed. Confronting the limitations of sex, law uses categories of gender to 
allow a transition from one sex to another, understanding the process as an initial 
‘mismatch’ between a person’s sex and their gender. Transgender persons confront 
the direct relation between sex and gender that still maintains the binary of sex. Their 
transitioning still takes place within the binary of female and male. In the case of 
transgender people, the meaning of sex stays intact and, thus, transgender or 
transsexual persons do not represent a revolutionary transformation of society, law, 
or other institutions.  
The traditional—natural—and categorized understanding of sex implied the 
controversial situations explained by Greenberg, as in the case of people with 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome. Greenberg addresses the case of a person with an 
XY chromosomal pattern and testes but with a female external appearance and 
female genitalia. The opposition between genitalia and chromosomal sex required 
further studies in order for the individual in question to be categorized within the 
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binary. This individual felt like a woman, related to being a woman, and lived as a 
woman while having a Y chromosome and undescended testes. The issue, as 
Greenberg posits, is how the law would categorize this individual: as a female, 
relying on the objective grounds of appearance, genitals, and sexual identity, or as a 
male, based on the objective criteria of chromosomal or gonadal analysis? 
Depending on the law’s chosen criteria, this individual would be bestowed with 
different rights and responsibilities that affect their choices and opportunities in 
life.875  
The gender order is established through every aspect of human society and 
culture, and it works through a network of meanings. There is no possible rewriting 
of gender beyond the normative meaning given by the binaries without dismantling 
the normativity within the legal ideas of reproduction and family. In this way, 
sexuality, sex and gender become interwoven in the legal imagination, resisting the 
post-modern attempts to separate those concepts. Law provides legitimate 
definitions that perpetuate truths about bodies. Law allows for transgression, but this 
transgression is limited to the movement between the normative sexes established 
by sciences. Law does not allow us to choose sex; on the contrary, it imposes a 
restricted sex and gender aligned with each other – i.e., that a male-sexed person 
should be a male-gendered person. Law imposes sex based on certain arbitrary or 
rather medical definitions (e.g., genitalia). Sex is separated from gender along 
nature/culture lines, but the law still considers it most “normal” and desirable if a 
person’s gender is in alignment with their sex. The inclusion in law of the concept 
of gender did not do much to change the binary of sex imposed by patriarchal rule. 
The confusion of sex and gender might create possibilities for liberating women 
from many of the discriminatory practices that are still in place, as it might break the 
tendency to construct subjects as deviations from the norm. Indeed, if sex and gender 
are both confusing because of their cultural grounds, should not the binary in which 
they are framed be questioned? This is a question that has already been answered by 
the gender revolution approach.  
As gender revolution states, questioning the binary would help create acceptance 
of the existence of an array of multiple subjects. This should be logical; however, 
the reality is different. At least in law, the neutrality achieved still mainly attaches 
the subjects to the limitations of the male-female or masculine-feminine binary. Law 
maintains a dichotomous view of gender, grounded in the dichotomy of sex. Law 
seems to be only slowly beginning to accept the fluidity represented by gender. In 
order to accept fluidity, it first needs to recognize deviance. This is explained by 
Kirkland, who shows how the law imposes strict requirements in this regard. First, 
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the prerequisite to be considered an “acceptable” transgender subject or an intersex 
condition is to recognize the existence of an illness that needs to be cured, the need 
for the person to conform to an acceptable sex, to become ‘the healthy’.876  
The neutral language of law hides the binary that cunningly maintains an 
adherence to culturally constructed concepts of nature, which still rules the status of 
women in law and society. Men rule, and men make the rules that locate women in 
a subordinate position. This power dynamic is signaled in the use of the concept of 
patriarchy and the statement that patriarchy is part of the law; patriarchy is the 
organizing power that places women in a subordinate position. As Becker claims, 
patriarchy always survives in any form of social organization, and law is no 
exception; even if oppression is not the aim of patriarchy, the hierarchy that it 
establishes produces oppression and domination. Patriarchy establishes a set of 
values and principles that permeate our world without being noticed and treat the 
masculine as if it were neutral and universal. Patriarchy, therefore, is the basic 
pattern that all other discourse is constructed from—for instance, law’s discourse. 
When dealing with transsexual and transgender persons, law posits the 
possibility of a mismatch between biological sex and gender role within the same 
person; however, it still maintains the two sexes as the only options for a 
transgressor.877 Despite the recognized ambiguities in the medical sciences’ 
definition of sex, law still prefers to ignore these ambiguities. The introduction of 
the concept of gender did not aim to recognize a broader array among the multitude 
of bodies, only to include women in law. It changed, to a certain degree, the way law 
defined male, female, and sex, although gender is still limited by a traditional, 
inherited ideology that cannot be ignored. We also cannot ignore how law’s 
definition of female and male affects the lives of many people. The relation between 
sex and gender in the law was and still is restricted to the binary of sex.878  
The gender revolution approach to sex and gender, which challenges the binary 
of sex, should have affected law. This movement’s questioning of the binary makes 
it difficult to defend a fixed or static approach, as both sex and gender definitions 
evolve with time.879 Its understanding of sex and gender obliges us to question 
whether what we call natural is, in fact, shaped by culture. The difficulty in accepting 
the gender revolution approach might be partly explained by the influence of earlier 
feminist discourse, which is still very strong and infused with an unconscious 
acceptance of patriarchy. 
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As far as law goes, sex is important and it seems to be necessary to approach it 
from a biological-physiological stance. This approach must not be seen as defending 
the essential biological characteristics of the sexes nor as establishing sex within a 
binary. One should start by addressing sex as a cultural biological construction 
represented by two sexes based on genitalia, and acknowledge that this is the 
foundation of old discourses of truth that informed law for ages.880 This is the 
meaning that also informed the foundation of heteronormativity.881 Therefore, law’s 
approach to sex has been restricted to the rule of genitals. This is to say that the sex 
dichotomy in law is based on a very particular, even incomplete and biased, 
interpretation of the laws of nature – namely, based on genitals and reproduction and 
not on other things that might equally be expressions of nature. The dichotomy of 
sex based on the genitals and their reproductive functions is the rule of sex. The 
evolution of sciences has proved the artificiality of the binary of sex: the definition 
of sex, in fact, broadens beyond the genitals. The binary of sex is grounded in old 
understandings in which the body is approached from a very restrictive perspective. 
Indeed, the binary is based on a set of essential characteristics, defined separately for 
men and for women, whose only foundation is a single physical attribute of the 
body—the genitals—and its procreative power.882  
The relation in which sex and gender constrain each other within the limits of 
the binary was already posited by Kosofsky Sedgwick, who has argued that “the 
question of gender and the question of sexuality, inextricable from one another 
though they are in that each can be expressed only in the terms of the other, are 
nonetheless not the same question, that in twentieth-century Western culture gender 
and sexuality represent two analytic axes that may productively be imagined as being 
as distinct from one another as, say, gender and class, or class and race”.883 Kosofsky 
Sedgwick refers to a sexuality closely related to sex through normative 
heterosexuality, in accordance with Butler’s later matrix, which was created by the 
intersection of sex/gender/sexual orientation and desire. Defining sex, Kosofsky 
Sedgwick says that “‘sex’ is, however, a term that extends indefinitely beyond 
chromosomal sex,”884 and that genitalia should be included. She continues by 
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suggesting that “[i]ts history of usage often overlaps with what might, now, more 
properly be called ‘gender,’ and this is only one problem”.885 
Kosofsky Sedgwick addresses the two main problems with the concept of sex: 
namely, its restrictive understanding within the limits of chromosomes and genitalia, 
and its overlap with the term gender. Therefore, Kosofsky Sedgwick proposes 
focusing on sexuality, choosing the heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy over the 
male/female dichotomy. She focuses on the power of sexuality to eliminate the 
binary of sex. Kosofsky’s theory contains the same flaws as the previous theories: it 
reproduces a dichotomy. We may accept that sexuality is conflated with sex and 
gender, but sexuality still represents the normative binary in society and creates 
another opposing binary, that of heterosexual versus homosexual. Natural thinking 
seems to be difficult to overcome.  
As Valdes886 states, there is a conflation of sex/gender and sexual orientation; 
they are embedded in society and cannot be separated. However, one might argue 
that the introduction of sexual orientation as an important factor is merely a 
consequence of understanding sex and gender within a binary. In this binary, sex is 
biology and gender is culture, both implicitly framed by heterosexuality. Regarding 
law, broadening sex and gender beyond the binary would force us towards genuinely 
neutral and inclusive law in which the power of the biopolitics of heterosexuality is 
minimized. Overcoming the binary would also allow individuals to freely make 
choices about themselves. Including sexual orientation in the dyad of sex and gender 
might help to broaden the possible combinations (sex-gender and sexuality), 
enhancing the multiplicity of gender. However, even with this inclusion, the binary 
of the genitalia is kept intact and the and the discriminatory hierarchy of masculine 
versus feminine is maintained. 
A critical stance towards the conventional use of the category of sex forces one 
to incorporate knowledge that understands gender as fluid or as a cultural 
construction of the binary. Gender, from a gender revolution perspective, goes 
beyond the binary of masculine and feminine and entails a fluidity that includes the 
transgender, androgynes, transvestites, etc.887 The recognition of gender beyond the 
binary may be rationalized (objectivized) into sex, and gender can also be transposed 
into sex to understand its cultural and artificial origin. This recognition might help 
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us to represent biology within a broader spectrum, by acknowledging the multitude 
of bodies on bases beyond genitalia. From this stance, sex may go beyond the 
normative binary division888 that masks the variety of possibilities and reinforces a 
society grounded on the “illusion” of the rule of heterosexuality.889 By 
understanding sex and gender separately, we may address the role of law in 
maintaining discrimination based on old “objective” truths, and we may objectivize 
the subjectivity of gender in order to make law inclusive. The merging of these 
concepts should come from the understanding that sex is gendered, yet still separate 
from gender.  
The fluidity of gender creates a mismatch with the sex binary, just as the 
continuum of sex would also mismatch the gender binary. The fluidity of gender 
advocated by gender revolution, recognizable in society through subversive 
sexualities, would force sex to expand beyond the binary to accommodate gender 
diversity in law. However, the understanding of gender in relation to sex hinders this 
possibility. The binary seems to be rooted in the concept of gender because of a 
deceptive use of the concept. The denial of gender-sex multiplicity, rather than 
diversity, implies that a certain group of people are “outcasts” or “outlaws” and 
causes them to be denied basic rights on the basis of their gender or their sex. This 
is evidenced in the case of intersex persons, who are obliged to choose within the 
binary, thus choosing between being one sex or the other (female or male) and the 
rights that this choice bestows. The fluidity of gender within the binary also implies 
an implicit acceptance of the binary that equally sustains the recognition of the 
established foundations of the gender roles.890 
Searching for ways to represent the understanding of sex and gender beyond the 
binary will blur the truth of accepted natural limitations, thus allowing the option of 
multiplicity.891 The concept of gender identity beyond the binary still doesn’t allow 
the depiction of the multiplicity of sex, as there is still a lack of recognition, as Cowan 
explains, of the “spectrum of possibilities of sex/gender”892. The multiple 
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possibilities are absent from the legal regulation of sexual identity, as this regulation 
only recognizes the possibilities within the binary. The situation is evidenced in post-
operative transsexuals who are “‘made to fit’ within the existing sex and gender 
structures, [and] are no longer a threat to the heteronormative order”.893 Transsexuals 
change their sex to fit into the binary just as intersex individuals do; they do not 
represent a possibility beyond the binary. 
Understanding the interconnectivity of sex and gender embedded in law makes 
visible the processes of interaction between law, culture, and society, and the way they 
influence each other and shapes our knowledge.894 Sex and gender form a vicious cycle 
that imitates the cycle that rules law and society: on one end stands the subjectivity of 
culture and on the other the objectivity of nature.  Gender and culture are the subjective 
factors, while sex and law represent the objectivity of nature—a dubious objectivity 
and a dubious use of nature. However, objective nature is depicted with words, with 
the discourse and binaries with which law is familiar. Hence, it seems necessary to 
update the vocabulary of law to introduce a contemporary objectivity of sex informed 
by the subjectivity of gender. Sex and gender evolve over time; in our contemporary 
society both should be reinterpreted to include subjects beyond the binary. Achieving 
the recognition of multiple bodies requires accepting the cultural construction of sex. 
The objectivity of sex in law is unsustainable if we accept its not-so-objective 
foundations. One might argue that instead of objective sex, law acknowledges the 
powerful political heterosexuality that permeates law’s own foundations. Indeed, the 
law’s lack of neutrality is mainly visible through the definition of outlaws,895 who are 
outside of the binary. The outlaws visibly reinforce the argument about the character 
of gender, a performance that is also encouraged in the law.896 Thus, I wonder, do we 
really need sex or gender in law? 
It seems that the use of the concept of gender in law has permitted the widening 
of the political subject of feminism from woman to women. ‘Woman’ as such does 
not exist. In the classification of feminism described in chapter 3, we addressed how 
the initial parallelism between woman and gender drove us to recognize women as a 
diverse group, while still preserving an implicit sense of womanhood. Women in 
their diversity did not escape the natural symbolism linked to the concept of woman. 
Moreover, diversity did not change their gendered responsibilities, as if the notions 
of woman and womanhood were enough to determine a fixed essence.   
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CONCLUSION 
The feminist concept of patriarchy, once the main conceptual tool for fighting 
discrimination, was displaced by gender, despite the opposition of feminist scholars 
such as Celia Amorós and Chantal Mouffe. In contrast, other feminists such as Gayle 
Rubin and Judith Butler defended the use of the concept of gender instead of 
patriarchy. The natural character of patriarchy was the main reason for favoring the 
concept of gender, which seemed more suitable for unveiling women’s hidden 
diversity, in opposition to the more generalized character of patriarchy. Feminism 
discarded the concept of patriarchy, as it obscured and hid other sources of 
discrimination. The gender rebellion and gender revolution movements’ rejection of 
metanarratives justified the rejection of more general concepts such as patriarchy.  
Launched by the gender resistance movement, the concept of gender is an effect 
of the patriarchal cultural construction of the world. At this point, the concept of 
gender obliterated the implication that sex might be another cultural construction. 
The absence of sex and the sole focus on gender hid the patriarchal foundation of the 
sex/gender system. Gender resistance’s intention of valuing the feminine dismissed 
the patriarchal foundations of knowledge, which also continued to underlie the 
gender rebellion movement.  
Gender acts according to the rules of patriarchy hidden inside the apparent 
neutrality of the term gender. The focus on the revalorization of the feminine through 
gender analysis and the dismissal of patriarchy has ended up strengthening the 
dominant symbolism of the feminine. The binary system of sex has been reinforced, 
and the power relations seem to remain static. The focus on gender and simultaneous 
dismissal of its relation to patriarchy obscure the patriarchal grounds that sustain the 
binary, keeping women attached to their symbolic cultural construction. The 
patriarchy of gender is visible in the way its discourse of the neutral subject is 
constrained within the frame of the female/male. The neutrality of the term gender 
supposedly transforms the biased person in law into a neutral person. However, the 
person in law is still sexed. The neutrality of gender is infused with an implicitly 
accepted patriarchy that still determines how the subject is constructed. The neutral 
term gender not only affects the binary but also hides the natural grounds that define 
how women are represented in law. Gender does not attack the patriarchy that 
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permeates sex. On the contrary, it reifies it within the political correctness of 
neutrality. Patriarchy acts through gender in maintaining an artificial representation 
of the body and constraining a recognition of natural reality beyond the binary of 
genitals. 
The patriarchy of sex is active within law. It legitimates and allows the continuity 
of certain discourses on the subject, such as women as the sole reproductive subject, 
mothers and the symbolism attached to them, or women with no sexuality or a 
restricted sexuality. It contains an implicit hierarchy that permeates sexuality, 
valuing heterosexuality over homosexuality or other sexual orientations. 
Acknowledging the multitude of bodies means going beyond the artificial neutrality 
of the universal subject; this acknowledgment will carry with it the dissolution of 
patriarchy. It also implies a different understanding of difference. It entails changing 
the departure point of feminist analysis still permeated by patriarchal knowledge. In 
law, the dichotomy of subjective versus objective still plays an important role. We 
will need to acknowledge that this objectivity is probably nothing more than another 
representation of the subjective. Patriarchy has informed our conception of objective 
nature, and it has been transposed into law under the veil of gender. 
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7 QUEERING THE SUBJECT: THE 
TIME FOR REVOLUTION  
Feminism revealed the nature of the discourses that went into defining the subject897 
and the role of law in constituting bodies. Indeed, feminism claims that the universal 
modern neutral subject never existed in law898; in fact, this subject was always male.  
Drucilla Cornell and other postmodern feminists suggest the use of 
deconstruction899 to reveal the sex of the modern subject for which law is made.900 
The inclusion of women did not end up achieving a non-sexed legal subject, as a 
close reading of law still shows that women are depicted as women, with all their 
inherited specificities. These female specificities devises women as weaker subjects 
in need of protection, as mothers and reproducers. This depiction corresponds to the 
essentialist belief in the existence of certain unmovable attributes that are 
constitutive of all members of a sex group.   
Law legitimizes and keeps alive the discursive subject with essentialist attributes. 
The feminist use of deconstruction tries to unmask the discursive gendered features 
used in the construction of the subject901, in order to then reconstruct a non-gendered 
subject. However, the feminist discourse ultimately maintains an essentialist subject 
 
 
897  Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews; Other Writings . 1972-1977 
(Gordon Colin ed, Pantheon Books 1980).  
898  The person of law, the legal subject, personhood—all terms naming the legal person—
are part of the universal modern subject. For the ambiguity of these terms and the 
distinctions between them, see the thesis of Visa Kurki, ‘A Theory of Legal Personality’ 
(Cambridge 2017). In this thesis, I use “legal person” to mean the human legal person, 
excluding the non-human approach. 
899  Drucilla Cornell in Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and 
the Law (Rowman & Littlefield 1999). 
900  Chris Lloyd, ‘Ce Qui Arrive: Deconstruction, Invention and the Legal Subject of R V 
R’ (2012) 37 Australian Feminist Law Journal 65; Sheila Duncan, ‘Law as Literature: 
Deconstructing the Legal Text’ (1994) 5 Law and Critique 3; Sara Ahmed, 
‘Deconstruction and Law’s Other: Towards a Feminist Theory of Embodied Legal 
Rights’ (1995) 4 Social & Legal Studies 55. 
901  A controversial debate over the usefulness of deconstruction has arisen in feminism, 
between those in favor and those against its use. The main critique of deconstruction is 
its focus on the destruction of the subject. 
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as its political subject. The “tendency to work with simple opposition (male and 
female; masculine and feminine) which feminism often condemns and yet 
reproduces in the very act of condemnation”902 limits the depiction of the subject. 
Postmodern feminists such as Butler and Grosz, hoping to destabilize the rule of 
sex, focused on the body. The body is fundamentally subjected to power relations, 
in which some bodies are included and others excluded. The problem is that this 
ontological nature is embedded in an essentialist view that ends up ruling the process 
of deconstruction-construction, affecting the representation of the legal person, 
which hardly escapes from the rule of sex. The question is: Why, despite the 
postmodern feminist discourse, does the law accept neither the diversity of women 
nor a postmodern subject? Does the concept of gender play a role in this?  
In this chapter, I first look at the role of essentialism, which affects both the legal 
subject and the deconstructive-reconstructive feminist strategy applied to the subject. 
As Naffine Ngaire posits, “[T]he personhood and the sex of women remain in tension 
in law”.903  
After this, I highlight the encounter of two different problems that intersect 
within the feminist discourse, and which call for different strategies and concepts to 
produce positive changes. Discrimination against the category of woman/women and 
the binary of sex are sustained by the sex/gender relation and the concept of gender. 
7.1 The Role of Essentialism in Preserving the 
Subject 
The feminist discourse on women’s liberation appears to be two-faced. Fighting 
discrimination because of gender still reconfirms the inherent responsibilities of 
women. For example, motherhood implies duties, and sexuality is treated as a 
woman’s responsibility, even though in reality, of course, heterosexual sex takes 
place between a man and a woman.904 Why does this happen?  
The gender rebellion feminists found the totalizing, essentialist905 metanarrative 
of gender reform and gender resistance to be a weakness of feminist discourse that 
 
 
902  Lloyd (n 902) 1. 
903  Ngaire Naffine, ‘Women and the Cast of Legal Persons’ in Jackie Jones and others 
(eds), Gender, Sexualities and Law (Routledge 2011) 1. 
904  We should stop talking about privilege and subordinated positions, and instead talk 
about stereotypes concerning responsibilities or obligations. In the public and private 
realm, the focus should not be on achieving rights but rather on recognizing where 
responsibilities are fixed. The public sphere is the male domain; the private sphere is 
still considered a privileged area of women. 
905  The idea behind essentialism is the belief that there are attributes or features that are 
constitutive of all members of a group. 
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hampered progress.906 In this analysis, essentialism appeared as a main source of the 
problem in the feminist metanarrative.907  
M. A. Ntumy states that essence according to essentialist thinking is “the set of 
fundamental attributes which are necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing to 
be [considered] a thing of that type.”908 Approaching this general definition from a 
feminist perspective, essentialism as applied to women has three main 
manifestations:909 (1) woman as a ‘natural category’; (2) a false universalism that 
privileges the experience of a certain group of white, middle-class women910; and (3) 
the definition of woman given by men and accepted as valid.911Essentialism in 
Feminism 
In the feminist debate about essentialism, the relation between sex and gender takes 
on a central role,912 as Elizabeth Spelman claims: “Being a ‘woman’ is not the same 
thing as, or reducible to, being a ‘female.’ ‘Women’ are what females of the human 
species become, or are supposed to become, through learning how to think, act, and 
live in certain ways”.913 In this line stands Robin West’s work Jurisprudence and 
gender, in which she claims that masculinity is implied in the representation of the 
 
 
906  Donna Jeanne Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature 
(Routledge 1991) 155; Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, ‘Social Criticism without 
Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism’ (1989) Social Text 
83.  
907  Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking : Feminism, Nature & Difference (Routledge 1989).  
908  M.A. Ntumy, Essentialism and the Search for the Essence of Law, 18 Melanesian Law 
Journal. 64, 64 (1990) cited by Jane Wong, ‘Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate 
in Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate and Beyond, The’ (1998) 5 Women & Law 
Journal, 273–274. 
909  Bartlett includes a fourth manifestation, gender imperialism, in Bartlett (n 211). For 
these definitions, see also Susan Moller Okin, ‘Gender Inequality and Cultural 
Differences’ (1994) 22 Political Theory 5; Angela P Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581. 
910  Heyes recognizes four types of essentialism in Cressida J Heyes, Line Drawings: 
Defining Women Through Feminist Practice (Cornell University Press 2000). 
911  Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (n 
337). 
912  The essentialist vs. antiessentialist debate in feminism has been very prolific. See 
Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought 
(Beacon Press 1988); Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed (eds), The Essential Difference 
(First Edit, Indiana University Press 1994); Patricia A Cain, ‘Feminism and the Limits 
of Equality’ (1989) 24 Ga. L. Rev. 803; Jaime Nubiola, ‘Esencialismo, Diferencia 
Sexual y Lenguaje’ (2000) 23 Humanitas 155; Suzanne B Goldberg, ‘On Making Anti-
Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court’ (2002) 81 Oregon Law 
Review 629; Archana Parashar, ‘Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal 
Feminism’ (1993) 6 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 328; Hunter (n 
829).Wong (n 910).  
913  Spelman (n 914) 158. 
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liberal individual, while the inclusion of femininity would create a relational 
approach instead. West’s theory brings with it a belief in essential feminine values 
that differ from masculine ones. Drucilla Cornell’s analysis of Robin West’s theory 
claims that West “clearly maps the feminine onto femaleness”. 914 West addresses 
the relation between the cultural and the biological in a way that parallels the 
female/feminine relation. Although West’s and Spelman’s approaches seem to be 
different, both still fall into the trap of essentialism. Robin West’s theory contains an 
implicit essentialism, accepting the power of biology by attributing essential features 
to women that constitute their femininity. Her approach reifies the power of sex as a 
determining factor, while gender is set aside as a complement to sex. The universal 
concept of woman sustains a symbolic truth in which biology has played and still 
plays an important role. Spelman’s focus on the power of culture over biology, 
however, when she states that culture is the driver in the process of becoming, still 
accepts the existence of a pre-given woman or womanhood. 
On the anti-essentialist side of the debate, Harris and Cornell support the concept 
of a multiple consciousness915 flowing from different women’s experiences.916 Both 
scholars reject the idea that these experiences rely on a universal concept of woman; 
however, both fall into the trap of essentialism as well. Both subscribe to the gender 
rebellion strategy, which rejects the existence of a category of woman, accepting, 
however, the existence of a pre-given category of women.  
There is an essentialist androcentrism that survives in every approach. Patricia 
Cain claims that feminist theory is built on exclusions, thus repeating the mistake of 
androcentrism. Cain stresses that West’s theory of connectivity related to the 
motherhood experience does not apply to all women—for instance, lesbians, or those 
 
 
914  Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (n 
337). 
915  Harris defines multiple consciousness as the idea that the self is composed of different 
features of identity. Harris (n 911). 
916  Regarding experience, it is also important to acknowledge the suggestion of Maria 
Drakopoulou, who addresses the lack of legal scholars questioning “what an experience 
is exactly, how one is formed, why it is accepted as valid source of knowledge; and, 
why it enjoys such a privileged status within feminism”. She highlights how the 
feminist concept of experience is a phenomenological one, as it refers to self-
experience. The problem, as she points out, occurs because “this understanding of 
experience recognizes it as a key source of knowledge, but the synthesis of ‘data’ it 
bears is essentially confined to a self-oriented subjectivity: a consciousness in which 
the meaning of the experience of all that exists is constituted”. In Maria Drakopoulou, 
‘Clio’s Forgotten Consciousness: History and the Question of Feminist Critique in 
Law’ (2013) 38 Australian Feminist Law Journal 3. 
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who decide not to or cannot have children.917 Even if Cain’s critique of essentialism 
is valid, she also falls into the essentialist trap by advocating lesbian theory and 
arguing that lesbians cannot recognize themselves in feminist theory. This argument, 
as Jane Wong points out, reveals another form of essentialism that believes in a 
lesbian essence and demands that another theory be developed for lesbians.918 The 
implicit acceptance of a lesbian essence makes them different from heterosexual 
women. The essence is not set in biology but in sexual orientation.  
All approaches seem to be influenced by an essentialist perspective in one way 
or another. The consequence is the perpetuation of the category of woman, which 
seems to have won the debate. This is, as Preciado claims in Manifiesto Contra 
sexual, the result of a fear of what it would really mean to destroy the subject: “la 
abolición de los privilegios sociales y económicos derivados de la condición 
masculina o femenina -supuestamente natural- de los cuerpos parlantes en el marco 
del régimen heterocentrado”919 (the abolition of the social and economic privileges 
ascribed to the masculine or feminine condition – supposedly grounded in nature – 
of the speaking bodies in the framework of the heterocentric regime).  
7.1.1.1 The Role of Cathexis, False Consciousness, or Ideological 
Determination 
There is a connection between gender and what has been variously called, in 
different disciplines and contexts, cathexis, ideological determination, or false 
consciousness; all of these three terms try to depict the influence of culture and social 
forces on our behaviors and beliefs.  
Chodorow claims that women psychologically embrace their role and perpetuate 
it through the education of their children.920 During the 1970s, the second-wave 
feminist movement, with a focus on equality, centered its efforts on making labour 
markets accessible to women and rarely questioned women’s responsibilities for 
their children and family. Transformation and reform of the law and the public 
sphere has not changed the responsibilities assigned to them in the private sphere. 
For example, in The Feminine Mystique, the liberal feminist leader Betty Friedan 
omitted domestic and family areas in her review of places where gender oppression 
takes place. Later, in The Second Stage, she rectified this, recognizing how her lack 
 
 
917  Cain refers to lesbians; however, there are many women who do not feel or have a 
special connectivity with other women, as West defended, just because of being 
women. See also Cain, ‘Feminism and the Limits of Equality’ (n 914). 
918  Wong (n 910). 
919  Preciado (n 17) 30. 
920  Chodorow (n 350).  
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of analysis of the domestic and family spheres had ultimately led to the creation of 
the ‘superwoman’, or the woman with the ‘double shift’.921 
This failure to transform domestic responsibilities can be explained using 
theories of power in which patriarchy plays a main role, and also by examining the 
role of cathexis, ideological determination or false consciousness.922 ‘False 
consciousness’ is the term most often used to define the claim that women’s choices 
are part of, and assimilated to, gender ideology. This term was used by Engels to 
address how the subordinate class willfully accepts the ideology of the ruling class 
even if this ideology does not benefit them. Oppressed group behavior perpetuates 
the patterns of their oppression and their behavior. The fact that the oppressed group 
sees their actions as freely chosen is a product of their internalization. “Cathexis” is 
the English translation of Freud’s term Besetzung. Raewyn Connell923 refers to 
‘cathexis’ as an affective component of relationships. She uses the term to refer to 
“a psychic charge or instinctual energy being attached to a mental object, i.e, an idea 
or image…. It may also be hostile, not only affectionate. It may also be hostile and 
affectionate at the same time, i.e., ambivalent”. 
‘False consciousness’ or ‘ideological determination’ has been part of the feminist 
debate, especially for radical feminists when answering critiques of sexuality. 
Gender resistance (mainly radical feminism) criticized the gender reform movement 
because of its ideological determination regarding women’s sexuality.924 In the case 
of The Feminine Mystique, ‘ideological determination’925 explains the lack of 
analysis of the domestic sphere in that work. At that time the confrontation was 
between the category of woman and the category of man. On both sides there was 
an accepted essential feature, sex.  
Sex is so deeply internalized that it falls within the net of ideological 
determination and is thus reflected in gender roles. During the ’70s, the concept of 
 
 
921  Betty Friedan, The Second Stage : With a New Introduction (Harvard University Press 
1998). 
922  This term is used by Marxist sociologists. Kathryn Abrams, ‘Ideology and Women’s 
Choices’ (1989) 24 Georgia Law Review 761, 24. For Cathesis Raewyn W Connell, 
Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics (John Wiley & Sons 2014). 
The term cathexis is also  used by Deleuze and Guattari in the El Anti-Edipo making a 
distinction that differentiates The preconscious cathexis of interest from  
the unconscious cathexis of desire. See ‘EL ANTIEDIPO’ 
<http://lavachequilit.typepad.com/files/deleuze-guattari---the-anti-oedipus.pdf>. 
923  Raewyn Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person, and Sexual Politics 
(Stanford University Press 1987). 
924  MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (n 363). 
925  Ideological determination is used in feminism to explain the attitudes of society and 
women toward certain roles and stereotypes. It is the accepted rule imposed by the 
dominant group. A good description of ideological determination is found in Abrams 
(n 924). 
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gender was not in use; the concept of ideological determination, however, was in 
use, and it can be pointed to as a way to refer to the cultural construction of sex roles. 
Indeed, the notion of ideological determination might be applied to explain what 
gender is and how it is experienced. The ideological determination explanation, 
however, was rejected by gender reform feminism and barely recognized by society 
or by women in their daily lives. Biological determination was the main target. The 
social construction or patriarchal system behind this biological determination would 
not be recognized until the appearance of gender resistance feminist movements.  
Nevertheless, we could argue that women largely recognize how they have been 
directed in their choices by an internalized sense of responsibility to their families. 
This feeling appears when women realize they are seen as the only responsible figure 
in their family.926 Women feel responsible for providing care and attention to their 
family, and this translates into caregiving action on their part. We might argue as 
well that for many feminist currents, the ethics of care that defines the nurturing side 
of women is not seen as part of gender but rather as an essence that defines the 
category of woman.  
The ideological determination, or what is defined as gender, works in 
conjunction with sex to decide what needs to be defined as (bad) gender or (good) 
gender. The outcome is a discourse of women’s rights that works to facilitate the 
balance between work and family, sometimes including the State as a service 
provider of ‘feminine obligations’.927 Feminism, even when trying to revalue the 
feminine, excludes men and others, and focuses solely on women’s rights. In a way, 
it would seem that feminine traits were not of enough value to be normative and 
legally binding for men as well. This is evidenced in the case of same-sex couples or 
single fathers who under many laws still suffer the effect of women’s rights when 
having a family.928 As a result, the gendered sexual dichotomy implies a hidden 
 
 
926  Arlie Russell Hochschild and Anne Machung, The Second Shift : Working Parents and 
the Revolution at Home (Penguin 2012).  
927  This is the case in Nordic feminism, for example. The Scandinavian feminist discourse 
might have been considered an exception, as it had been successful in achieving 
women’s social and political integration. However, it also insists on retaining woman 
as a subject, and in Scandinavia they have failed to contest many situations in which 
the woman is still protected as a woman. See the examples given related to Finland’s 
imposition of maternity leave or military service. The State has been chosen as the 
provider of services that would ease the entrance of women into the public sphere. 
Notwithstanding, there are big differences among all the Scandinavian countries. See 
Hege Skjeie and Birte Siim, ‘Scandinavian Feminist Debates on Citizenship’ (2000) 21 
International Political Science Review 345. Reba Beth Weise, ‘Feminism in 
Scandinavia’ (1990) 20 Off Our Backs  5. 
928  https://elpais.com/politica/2016/10/20/actualidad/1476971361_784773.html; 
https://elpais.com/politica/2016/08/11/actualidad/1470925415_110614.html 
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essentialism grounded in normative gendered roles and behaviours that become an 
invisible constraint to real autonomy. One is not born a woman but becomes one—
and law takes an active part in this process. Law limits experiences to fit within the 
norm, thus legitimizing the meaning of woman by legitimizing definitions of 
feminine and masculine rights and obligations and bestowing women with the 
feminine ones. In other words, this goes on to affect or mold what women’s actual 
experiences in the world are thus using women’s real, current experiences as the 
basis for further judgments should be done cautiously. 
Why do women repeat the mistakes that they recognize in others? Why do they 
defend diversity and still accept the notion of an essential womanhood? There is a 
complex combination of factors, and we should recognize among them the hidden 
accepted gendered femininity, which is difficult to fight since it is legitimized by all 
discourses. Irigaray already gave us a clue to this when she said that “woman has no 
unconscious except the one man gives her. Mastery clearly acknowledges itself, 
except that no one notices it”.929 
The sexual division, as Bourdieu explains, is adopted through premises that are 
believed to be natural and incorporated into the symbolic game of language and 
accepted custom. Therefore, the State, the Church, education, the law and every 
aspect of our lives are symbolic configurations that perpetuate and reaffirm sexual 
difference as the rule.930 The natural body has a central role in the construction of 
these discourses. We should also question, then, whether we are not just another 
biopolitical symbolic configuration—our sex, our gender, our sexuality—hidden in 
the ideological determination. Bourdieu explains how this ideological determination, 
cathexis, or false consciousness works in society without being noticed. The habitus, 
Bourdieu’s main concept, dictates the internalization of social structures.931 Certain 
norms, such as gender norms, are not imposed but are still followed because they are 
accepted, uncontested values, principles or customs.932 Bourdieu, in The Force of 
Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, and Tuori, in Critical Legal 
Positivism, claim that the tyranny of values is embedded in the deep legal layers, 
which are the most difficult and the slowest to change933 because of the unseen 
cathexis hidden inside them. The feminist concept of gender (meaning women, sex 
or the cultural construction of sex within the binary) appertains to the legally 
 
 
929  Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not Mine (Cornell University Press 1985) 93,94.  
930  Bourdieu, La domination masculine (n 522) 84. 
931  As explained by Bourdieu, the habitus is “embodied history, internalized as a second 
nature and so forgotten as history - the active presence of the whole past of which it is 
the product… spontaneity without consciousness or will”. In Pierre Bourdieu, The 
Logic of Practice (Stanford University Press 1990) 55. 
932  This is biopower in action; see chapter 2. 
933  Tuori (n 549) 310.  
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transmitted tyranny of values, and the problem, as Tuori says, comes “if legal 
regulation encroaches on the strong values on which individuals’ and groups’ 
identities are based. Clear examples of restrictions that strong values impose - or, at 
least, should impose - on legal regulations can be found, for instance, in the field of 
sexual identity or family forms”. 934 These values reach the surface level in basic 
rights – for example, women’s specific rights – reaffirming moral principles and 
legal values. These values are the ones constituting the habitus and the world that 
surrounds us, which we accept unconsciously, despite their artificial nature, because 
of the implicit effect of cathexis.935 
The body is arguably one of the core elements affected by cathexis or ideological 
determination. This is highlighted by Elisabeth Grosz, who says, “All bodies must 
be male or female, and the particularities, specificities and differences of each need 
to be recognised and represented in specific terms”.936 Feminism takes a side and 
creates a political discourse to safeguard and recognize the specificities of the female 
body, which serves as the grounds for womanhood. 
Law accepts this strategy that keeps the patriarchal order in place. Indeed, the 
concept of gender is part of the false consciousness, cathexis or ideological 
determination. Its natural foundation is not contested and not even recognized as part 
of the problem. The concept of gender becomes the cultural “good player” while sex 
plays the role of the natural “bad player”. The effect of gender or the cultural 
construction of sex is embedded in us. Every aspect of our lives happens in a 
gendered context; in fact, we face a difficult task in exposing gendered contexts, as 
on many occasions they are naturalized as ‘the normal,’ or as womanhood, or as 
experience. 
The relation between sex and gender has informed the construction of women, 
but it seems that it did not apply to men. The male normative standard has not been 
assumed to be gendered, but is still kept as the norm.937 The gendered construction 
to be fought is assumed to be that of woman. The paradox is that the acceptance of 
the normative male standard alongside the new non-gendered feminine norm has 
only included women in law or in society as women, or under an appeal to gender.  
 
 
934  ibid. 
935  We might say that these values are the core center of biopower. 
936  Elizabeth A Grosz, ‘The Challenge to Academia’ in Carol Pateman and Elizabeth Grosz 
(eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory, (Routledge Revivals 1986) 
139. 
937  This statement is made regarding a general group of population and activists and 
scholars in several fields, although there are some exceptions. For example, it is 
important to note that scholars researching in the field of masculinities and men’s 
studies have addressed the relation between gender and men. 
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In this way, both men and women are represented in law through the discourse 
that constructs the subject. Subjects find satisfaction in their position when it fits 
with what is expected of their gender. Cathexis dictates how women comply with 
their responsibilities, such as ‘appropriate’ sexual behavior, family, and work. Even 
today, cathexis is still the most hidden and difficult factor to unmask. Cathexis gives 
satisfaction, which makes it harder to reveal the damage it does. The pleasurable 
aspect of cathexis is, in fact, part of what Bourdieu identified as the symbolic 
violence that makes inequalities acceptable and legitimate, and in many cases even 
desirable.938  
7.1.1.2 The Role of Essentialism (Cathexis) in Reshaping Law 
The feminist discourse is far from being the same as queering. This discourse 
contains an essentialist element that is fixed and linked to the concept of sex/gender 
and womanhood. Keeping women as the political subject has sustained the binary as 
well as an essentialist view of sex that is transposed to the sex/gender system, 
whether sex and gender are considered to be opposed or are confused with each 
other.939 Therefore, as previously noted, the feminist need for a specific political 
subject makes feminism fall into the trap of essentialism, or, something that Gayatri 
Spivak defends, strategic essentialism, even if it rejects the existence of a universal 
womanhood. 
The obtaining of women’s rights was grounded in the acceptance of women as a 
group that shared common experiences and needs based on the social construction 
of what it means to be a woman. Maternity leave, an example of women’s 
experiences, makes women undesirable as working professionals during their fertile 
years, causing them to be seen only as potential mothers on future leave. Such a view 
does not contemplate the diversity that exists within the group, given that there are 
women who do not want to or cannot become mothers. These women cannot escape 
the essential notion of womanhood that implies that all women are potential mothers. 
The control of women’s sexuality remains intact; women must be responsible about 
 
 
938  Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (John B Thompson ed, Harvard 
University Press 1991). 
939  Despite this general approach, it is important to note that there are feminists who 
question the category of woman, such as Linda Alcoff, Denise Riley and Donna 
Haraway. There are other feminists who try to overcome the binary of sex, such as de 
Lauretis and Butler. Hanna McCan offers a good analysis of this subject. See Hannah 
McCann, ‘Epistemology of the Subject: Queer Theory’s Challenge to Feminist 
Sociology’ (2016) 44 Women’s Studies Quarterly 224.   
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their sexuality and aware of the possibility of pregnancy.940 This is an implicit 
imbalance accepted by law, causing pregnancy to be seen as a ‘woman’s problem’.941 
The sexual responsibility attached to women eliminates the reproductive obligations 
of men and, in a way, their active role in procreation.  
Thus, sexual liberation is accompanied by responsibilities, and in law those 
responsibilities are the sole preserve of women, not of men.942 Child custody in 
divorce usually relies on the woman; shared custody is ‘optional’ for men, who 
maintain only their financial responsibilities to the family as ‘providers’.  
Western legal culture expects women to take on all procreative responsibilities 
and justifies it as the protection of women’s rights. Sexual responsibility is also 
related to the understanding of bodily pleasure. Sex is associated with both pleasure 
and procreative needs. However, this desire and these procreative needs are biased, 
as they are defined following the male norm—for example, up until the study by 
Masters and Johnson, the belief was that women had no sexual pleasure but only 
procreative needs. This is also evidenced in the discourse on prostitution, which 
focuses on women and generally hides men’s part in the phenomenon,943 protecting 
heterosexuality and men’s ‘sexual needs’. Moreover, same-sex parents need to 
choose to be ascribed to one or another sex to benefit from maternal or paternal 
rights.  
Carol Smart praised non-legal strategies when she defined the harm that law may 
provoke as juridogenic.944 She warned of the harm of just “adding” women into law 
while accepting the androcentric side of law. As Smart foresaw, though, the harm 
does not lie in using legal strategies per se—Smart later recognized the actual 
capacity of law to bring about changes. Rather, harm can result from the particular 
way in which we use legal strategies and law in general—for example, if we do so 
while replicating essentialist beliefs about sex and gender that keep society 
performing normative gendered customs.945  
 
 
940  Curiously, to date, there is no male contraceptive pill, and research on contraception 
has been limited to female reproduction, largely ignoring the role of men in 
reproduction. 
941  See also chapter 3. 
942  It is important to note that in many countries this responsibility is also accompanied by 
the total restriction of abortion. 
943  Martha Fineman explains how Florence Kelley and the National Consumers League 
adopted a “female standard in employment law that finally worked against women’s 
interest”. Martha Albertson Fineman, Transcending the Boundaries of Law - 
Generations of Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge 2011). 
944  Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (n 336) 8. 
945  One example is the custom of adopting the husband’s surname in many Western 
countries. 
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Margaret Davies claims, in accordance with Smart, that inclusion is not 
necessarily achieved by “formal inclusion”, because “it is possible to be included in 
a category while still being excluded – one can be included formally and literally, 
yet still be disempowered, marginalised, silenced and in practice disenfranchised”.946 
As Smart and Davies highlight, the strategy of formal inclusion has not been a total 
success, in that the gender-neutral law maintains sex differences in contemporary 
legal systems. For example, the law differentiates between maternal and paternal 
leave, not only in giving preponderance to maternal leave but also in regulating when 
pregnant women should stop working. This evidences an interplay between law and 
a reading of the private and public spheres in which the links between each sphere 
and its corresponding subjects survive. For instance, women still seem to be 
protected in Finnish positive law with regard to military duties, in that males are 
called up for military service whereas women apply on a voluntary basis. This 
example casts doubt on whether the legal changes were in fact intended to make the 
law neutral with regard to women’s experiences, given that they seem to 
accommodate women in male standards while still maintaining their ‘protection’. 
Women are equals in the public sphere, except they are still treated as being in need 
of protection as they do not naturally belong to it. Moreover, women are included in 
law as woman. 
Despite the questions and critiques I have raised, this does not mean that the 
achievements of feminism were in vain. On the contrary, they have been necessary 
steps to reveal the wrongs in law and society. Thanks to feminist approaches to law, 
women today are in a better situation than they once were.947 The fight is not over, 
though; on the contrary, feminism must continue to struggle to achieve fairer laws 
and to dismantle symbolic violence.  
The standpoint represented by the gender revolution movement should be the 
place from which to continue. Unveiling the ideological determination or false 
consciousness appears to be the most sensible strategy. The current meaning of the 
concept of gender, as used by feminism, is permeated with symbolic violence. 
Gender used as a substitute for woman or as the cultural construction of sex keeps 
the political subject of feminism alive, but it also keeps alive the binary that 
legitimizes essentialism. 
 
 
946  Davies, ‘Exclusion and the Identity of Law’ (n 403). 
947  Akanksha Vashisth and Avinash Kumar describe the evolution of the feminist 
movement and its impact on transforming the position of women in society. Akanksha 
Vashisth and Avinash Kumar, ‘The Evolution of Feminism: Comparison of Adaptation 
and By-Product Concepts’ (2014) 24 Journal of Human Behavior in the Social 
Environment 267. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to take a broader treatment of the subject of discussion 
at hand by asking the outlaw question and not only the woman question.948This 
means asking not about women but about of all those not included in the sex/gender 
dichotomy. Expanding the disputed subject will reveal gendered beliefs in everyday 
life, including the lack of neutrality in law.949 Finally, if we widen the woman 
question to all subjects, it will also give us an insight into who our possible allies 
might be in fighting the gender ideology that constrains everybody’s choices in life.  
Feminist methodology, together with the new insights of gender revolution, will 
no doubt take feminism further, and new ways will be found to deal with the new 
ungendered—and possibly unsexed—legal subject. These possible strategies first 
need to acknowledge the different problematics surrounding the legal subject and the 
feminist discourse in order to find specific strategies for each problem. 
By the late 1980s Joan Scott950 was already saying that feminism needs a theory 
“that will let us think in terms of pluralities and diversities rather than of unities and 
universals… We need theory that will enable us to articulate alternative ways of 
thinking about (and thus acting upon) gender without either simply reversing the old 
hierarchies or confirming them”. She identified the need for a shift in feminist 
thinking, and now, thirty years later, we are still talking about the need for a new 
theory and new transgressive policies, but few transgressive changes have actually 
been made.951 It seems that our internalized assumptions are too powerful and do not 
allow us to move forward into a real revolution that changes our view of nature and 
the categories framed by it. We should question the use of the concept of gender and 
the concept of womanhood, woman, or women, as this cathexis or false 
consciousness or ideological determination partly lies in these concepts that we still 
accept as the normal. We should question the subject. Acknowledging the role of 
culture in sex is not enough as long as we accept the beliefs that rule the sexes. 
Embracing the neutral language of gender does not imply that our internalized 
assumptions will disappear; on the contrary, as I will analyze in the next sections, it 
only obscures the domination and oppression of women without helping to solve 
these problems. By embracing gender, people thought they were doing away with 
sex, but the sexed subject is still alive.  
 
 
948  Ben Golder, ‘Rethinking the Subject of Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory: Towards 
a Feminist Foucaultian Jurisprudence’ (2004) 8 Southern Cross University Law 
Review. 73. 
949  Understood here as the neutrality that allows everybody to be represented and included.  
950  Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist 
Theory for Feminism’ (n 373) 33. 
951  Same-sex marriage can be seen as a transgressive action, although one might say that 
this is an achievement of homosexual males in privileged positions rather than an 
achievement of feminism.  
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7.2 Deconstruction and Feminism 
Deconstruction in feminism952 analyses953, dissects, and questions the meaning of 
being or becoming a woman and unveils how power operates. Deconstruction serves 
“to not naturalize what isn’t natural, to not assume that what is conditioned by 
history, institutions or society is natural”.954  
According to Laura Palazzini’s definition, deconstruction “is configured as a 
methodology for reading the categories of traditional metaphysics, which aims to 
highlight the gaps, fractures, discontinuities and ideological structures in place of the 
alleged unity and uniqueness of intrinsic meaning. To deconstruct means to capture 
the dissonances and paradoxes that undermine the claim to the all-encompassing and 
comprehensive dream of systematic theorization”.955 Deconstruction does not 
destroy anything, it just analyses how inclusions and exclusions are envisioned in 
accepted hierarchies.956 Feminist deconstruction focuses on the power of gender 
structures, aiming to overcome the imposed hierarchy between men and women.  
Catharine R. Stimpson, in the ’80s, already referred to feminist activity as 
deconstructive and reconstructive.957 The feminist scholar Nancy Fraser highlights 
the need for deconstruction and reconstruction in feminism in order to achieve the 
“destabilization of meaning and projection of utopian hope”.958 Jane Wong points 
out that “deconstruction requires alternative perspectives,”959 and the alternative 
suggested by Cornell is a new system that would hinder the perpetuation of the old 
 
 
952  The use of deconstruction as a tool becomes a feminist issue, and the debate it provokes 
between its defenders and opponents is an extension of the tensions between Anglo-
Saxon and French cultures. Deconstruction belongs to Derrida and it follows French 
philosophy, thus attracting strong opposition from Anglo-Saxon lines of thought. Pam 
Papadelos, From Revolution to Deconstruction: Exploring Feminist Theory and 
Practice in Australia (Peter Lang 2010); De Lauretis (n 216); Kate Nash, ‘The Feminist 
Production of Knowledge: Is Deconstruction a Practice for Women?’ (1994) 47 
Feminist Review 65.  
953  Deconstruction is a postmodern tool that has had a central role in the process of 
reconstruction of concepts, see Ellen K Feder, Mary C Rawlinson and Emily Zakin, 
Derrida and Feminism: Recasting the Question of Woman (Psychology Press 1997).  
954  See Derrida’s explanation in the documentary “Derrida”, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=K_ujk4vld9A. 
955  Palazzani (n 180).  
956  In feminism, deconstruction is the tool used by postmodern movements; however, 
feminism began to deconstruct from the moment feminists started questioning the male-
centred approach. See Nash (n 954).  
957  Catharine R Stimpson, ‘Feminism and Feminist Criticism’ (1983) 24 The 
Massachusetts Review 272. 
958  Nancy Fraser, ‘False Antitheses: A Response to Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler’ in 
Judith Butler and others (eds), Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, 
(Routledge 1995). 
959  Wong (n 910) 288. 
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system.960 Reconstructing the system, Cornell claims, would allow for an affirmation 
of the feminine.961 However, the question for us to decide is which notion of the 
feminine is our reference, as the experience of the feminine varies from one woman 
to another. Therefore, in agreement with Jane Wong, writing and rewriting the reality 
of women entails redefining the category of woman, and this will always necessarily 
exclude someone.962 Calhoun963 outlines a reconstructive process meant to obtain a 
subject that is truly broad enough to not include discriminatory criteria.964 
7.2.1 The Subject in the Process of Deconstruction – 
Reconstruction 
The process of feminist deconstruction of the subject, as Drucilla Cornell posits, focuses 
on identity and hierarchies.965 Feminist deconstruction allows for a division between 
those scholars who are interested in using deconstruction to unveil phallocentrism and 
those who use it to redefine the subject.966 For these two aims, deconstruction seemed 
the best strategy to some967 and the worst to others.968 As Cheshire Calhoun explains, 
“[T]he feminist project has not been the elimination of the category ‘woman’. Instead 
the project has been one of reconstructing that category”. 969  
The debate between Butler and Benhabib about the Cartesian subject970 and its 
relation to sex and gender illustrates the questioning of the subject in the process of 
 
 
960  ibid. 
961  Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (n 
337).  
962  Wong (n 910) 288.  
963  Calhoun reveals the absence of gays and lesbians, and any sexual orientation other than 
heterosexuality, from the feminist discourse. The political subject framed by 
heterosexuality is slowly expanded to allow for a discussion of homosexuality in the 
discourse. Therefore, it is important to note that the binary stays intact, as there is still 
no recognition of the possibility of other sexes or genders. See Cheshire Calhoun and 
Seyla Benhabib, ‘Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in 
Contemporary Ethics.’ (1994) 91 The Journal of Philosophy 426. 
964  Cheshire Calhoun, Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet : Lesbian and 
Gay Displacement: Lesbian and Gay Displacement (Oxford University Press 2000) 32. 
965  Drucilla Cornell, ‘Gender, Sex, and Equivalent Rights’ in Judith Butler and Joan 
Wallach Scott (eds), Feminists Theorize the Political (Routledge 1992). 
966  Papadelos (n 954). 
967  Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (n 
337).  
968  Nash (n 954). 
969  Calhoun (n 966) 32.  
970  Calhoun and Benhabib (n 965); Butler, ‘Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the 
Question of Postmodernism’ (n 383).Benhabib (n 392); Butler, ‘Contingent 
Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism’ (n 383). 
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deconstruction and reconstruction. For Benhabib, the Cartesian subject is necessary 
in order to maintain a subject within the framework of identity politics based on 
similarities. On the other side, feminists such as Butler encourage the dissolution of 
the Cartesian subject to overcome gender. Therefore, there is a sharp division 
between those who expand the category of woman and those who deconstruct the 
category of woman.971 
However, Butler’s and Benhabib’s strategies find no place in law, which still 
ignores diversity, as Margaret Davies claims: “It is difficult to see law as radically 
diverse when it so often seems to speak with a single voice and from a very limited 
range of perspectives”.972  
7.2.1.1 Reconstructing the subject in feminism 
Calhoun claims that feminism is merely reconstructing its self-understood female 
subject in a two-phased feminist project. The first phase is reconstructing the 
category ‘woman’ from the perspective of masculine and feminine traits by 
redefining, rejecting or revaluing these traits. The second phase is “reconstructing 
the category ‘woman’ employed within feminism itself”. This second phase, as 
Calhoun posits, “has required the postulate of multiple categories of ‘woman’ to 
capture the intersection of gender with other political identities”.973  
The reconstruction of the subject was carried out when the concept of gender had 
become important, and so this concept ended up having influence on the 
reconstructive process. Thus we might ask, as Ali Miller has questioned, who or what 
person is figured (imagined, addressed, elaborated, and maintained) with the use of 
the word gender?974 Indeed, we should combine Miller’s question with another: Who 
or what person is reconstructed according to the relation of feminism to the concept 
of gender? And how does this reconstruction affect the depiction of the person before 
the law?  
Gender reform leaves the existing universal modern subject without arguing with 
it. The subject of law is the abstract, universal modern subject who in fact is the modern 
Cartesian male with a male body. Gender resistance focuses on the category of woman 
and includes the woman’s body in law. Gender resistance feminists elicit the new 
feminine legal subject. They deconstruct the gendered subject and the outcome is two 
Cartesian modern subjects: the male and the female. Nevertheless, the public body still 
seems to be the male and the private body the female. The hierarchies within law still 
 
 
971  Golder (n 950). 
972  Davies, ‘Feminism and the Idea of Law’ (n 823). 
973  Calhoun (n 966).  
974  Miller (n 210) 837. 
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need to be overcome. Gender rebellion deconstructs the gendered subject to construct 
diversity. The expected result was the postmodern subject; however, a sexed embodied 
subject appears instead. The difference between this subject and previous subjects is 
the focus on identity and the acceptance of different sexual orientations, ethnicities, 
age, classes, etc. Gender revolution deconstructs gendered subjects based on the 
premise that any construction of gender implies ‘doing gender’ and therefore interferes 
with the inclusion of “others” in the man-woman dyad. This movement seeks a Queer 
legal subject, which is still not reflected in law.  
The failure to achieve a postmodern subject in law is, Ben Golder explains, due 
to “the practical difficulties inherent in applying a deconstructive feminist critique 
to the modernist discourse of the Law (the unhappy marriage of ‘postmodern 
feminism’ and ‘legal theory’)”.975 Golder claims that using deconstructive strategies 
requires a reconstruction adapted to the modern discourse of the law.976 The resulting 
subject is always limited by the modern subject framework, in which sex has an 
important say.977 This is evidenced in the lack of a reconstructive project in feminism 
that moves towards a postmodern subject, a lack that also constrains the real 
possibilities of queering the subject. 
7.2.1.2 The role of the body in the reconstruction of the subject 
The subject of the law is a Cartesian subject: Man978 with mind and body. In law the 
depiction of the subject is constrained to embodied reason.979 In the case of women, 
the abstract Cartesian subject becomes a body that rules over the mind. This is 
paradoxical: as Sara Ahmed explains, despite the disembodiment of the male in law 
to construct the universal abstract subject and the association of the body with the 
feminine, the body of the law is male. As she explains, the male body was always 
there but internalized and accepted, “a body which is so comfortable we needn’t 
know it was there, a body which is simply a home for a mind, and doesn’t interrupt 
it, confuse it, deceive it with irrationalism, or bleeding, or pregnancy”.980 The body 
 
 
975  Golder (n 950). 
976  ibid. 
977  For instance, Drucilla Cornell’s or Irigaray’s proposal of writing and rewriting 
femininity. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and 
the Law (n 337); Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (n 13). 
978  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archeology of the Human Sciences 
(Psychology Press 2002). The man is described by Foucault as rational, bounded, 
integral, sovereign, and self-aware. This is the subject to whom rights and citizenship 
are granted.  
979  Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary 
Philosophy. (Routledge 1991). 
980  Ahmed (n 902) 56.  
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inscribed in the subject of the law is the bearer of rights and the citizen who signs 
the social contract with the State. 
The feminist discourse fighting the normative male body of the law achieves the 
recognition of a feminine body as a bearer of rights. As Sarah Ahmed explains, 
“Gender hence names the discursive regime (including law) which produces bodies, 
where subjects become bodies, and where bodies become sexually differentiated”.981 
The use of the female body to reconstruct the subject legitimizes the binary of sex. 
The reconstruction of an empowered female body implies acceptance of the sexed 
gender ascribed to the bodies that define the subject. It makes it possible to change 
the female subject position within the discourse while maintaining its essence. Sex 
is blurred together with gender, hindering the elimination or total deconstruction of 
the binary. Sex is gender; however, the body remains sexed within the binary and 
constructed in conjunction with other discourses: “It is gender that enables us to see 
biological sex”.982 
The sexed Cartesian person unveiled by the gender resistance movement 
survives in law; however, the normative male body has been broadened to include 
the female body. The legal person distinguishes now between two different bodies. 
This is highlighted by Kathleen Lahey, who points out the role of our biological 
human nature in sexing the legal person despite the general discourse on the abstract 
legal person.983 It is difficult to deconstruct the Cartesian subject and reconstruct a 
queer subject as long as we continue to use the language of “mind” and “body”; the 
implication is that we have to find a new vocabulary that doesn’t deal in the concepts 
“mind” and “body”. As Nicola Lacey claims, the Cartesian vocabulary only allows 
a reductive movement from body to mind or from mind to body with no chance of a 
more holistic view. The role of language, as addressed in chapter 2, becomes evident 
in this problem because, as she also explains, there is no language with which to 
express our deconstructive understandings.984 
Therefore, the process of deconstruction-reconstruction is framed by the 
normative binary of sex. On one side, the law demands the abstract universal 
Cartesian subject who does not exist. On the other side, feminism demands a woman 
as subject. The analysis of both demands using deconstruction reveals the entrenched 
 
 
981  ibid 58. 
982  Stevi Jackson, ‘Sexuality, Heterosexuality and Gender Hierarchy: Getting Our 
Priorities Straight - Research Database, The University of York’ in Chrys Ingraham 
(ed), Thinking Straight: The Power, the Promise and the Paradox of Heterosexuality 
(Routledge 2004).  
983  Kathleen Ann Lahey, Are We ‘persons’ yet? : Law and Sexuality in Canada (University 
of Toronto Press 1999). 
984  Nicola Lacey, ‘On the Subject of Sexing the Subject’ in Naffine Ngaire and Rosemary 
J Owens (eds), Sexing the subject (North Ryde 1997) 73. 
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binaries that sustain the hierarchies. These three actors, gender, feminism and law, 
collude and create the tension that sabotages the overcoming of the binary and the 
hoped-for effects of the expansion from woman to women in law. Moreover, none 
of these deconstructive attempts has achieved a strategy capable of Queering the 
subject.  
The impediments to attaining the postmodern person are evidenced in the 
survival of a sexed legal subject, as examined in the following sections. In the next 
section, I continue with an analysis of the legal person, looking for the sites where 
the legal subject is hindering the possibilities of queering the subject.  
7.3 The Legal Person 
The legal person refers to the bearer of rights and duties in law, a fictional device 
depicted in law rather than a natural person or human being. Ngaire Naffine 
highlights the importance of asking “who and what counts as a person in law and 
who does not: who can act and why some can do more than others”.985 The question 
is one of who it is that possesses legal personality, legal personhood, legal identity 
or legal status, and whom the law is conceived for. The depiction and understanding 
of who is given the status of legal person has been part of a timeless debate986 in 
which feminism had an important say and managed to reveal who the ontological 
subject hidden in the abstract subject of law was.987 In this debate Naffine’s project 
takes a central role as she gives us a hint about the role of law in defining who we 
truly are.  
7.3.1 Constructing the Legal Person 
For Naffine, the legal person is a pure legal device, making it susceptible to being 
made and remade, as it doesn’t need to have a sex. However, Katherine Lahey 
addresses the legal person differently, as a human being whose human nature 
bestows him (her) with certain rights, an approach that emphasizes the relation 
between the natural person and the legal person.988 Both approaches are valid 
because Lahey’s legal subject shouldn’t need a sex either if it is understood as a 
 
 
985  Ngaire Naffine, ‘Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible 
Subjects’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 346. 
986  There is a debate around the meaning and reading of the concept of person that runs in 
parallel to the concept of legal reason; for the problematics around these two concepts, 
see Ngaire Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life : Philosophy, Religion, Darwin, and the 
Legal Person (Hart Pub 2009). 
987  Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject (North Ryde 1997). 
988  Lahey (n 985). 
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neutral universal autonomous individual who is bestowed with rights and duties. 
Nevertheless, as unveiled by feminism, this subject’s sex is ‘he,’ and the legal person 
is the device sexing us.989 
Naffine uses a concise classification of the typologies of the legal person and 
legal personhood to understand the interplay among the different discourses that 
construct the subject. She identifies three types of personhood that correspond to 
three types of legal person. She names them P1, the Cheshire Cat or legalist 
approach; P2, the any reasonable creature in being or naturalist-religious approach; 
and P3, the responsible subject or rationalist approach.990  
P1L, the Cheshire Cat or legalist legal person, is understood as an abstract 
fictional legal device, with no sex or body. This is a mere abstraction of law that does 
not need to be a natural person. It is a formal capacity to bear rights and duties as 
part of the legal relations associated with the abstract liberal modern person of law, 
but without the obligation of possessing reason. In this type, things, legal creations 
such as companies, or animals can be considered as legal persons. 
P2N, the any reasonable creature in being or naturalist-religionist type, 
considers that every human becomes a legal person from birth. To be a legal person 
only requires that one be alive. It is justified by the biological and metaphysical 
definition of human. The human being is imbued with a spiritual or religious 
dimension in which reason does not have a main role. This type constitutes the 
natural and sacred person. In Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin, 
and the Legal Person, Naffine separates the religionist (sacred beings) and naturalist 
(sentient beings) approaches. 
P3R, the responsible or rationalist subject, is similar to P1L but with the 
additional requirement of reason to be assigned legal competency. As Naffine 
explains, the P3R type, in opposition to P1L, implies a moral being and active 
subject. It is understood as a mental (mind/reason-based) rather than biological 
subject. However, as Naffine posits, this type, which is supposedly void of biological 
implications, still implies the existence of biological pre-given matter that serves as 
the basis for the mind. The P3 Reason type builds upon the biological natural human 
being that serves as the pattern for the P2 Natural person. In sum, both types establish 
the natural as pre-given. 
 
 
989  Naffine and Owens (n 989). 
990  In her article “Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects,” 
Naffine refers to three different types of legal personality, naming them as P-1, P-2 and 
P-3. Then in Women and the Cast for Legal persons and in the Law’s Meaning of Life, 
she refers to four ways of approaching to the legal subject as Legalism, Rationalism, 
Religionism and Naturalism. Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life : Philosophy, Religion, 
Darwin, and the Legal Person (n 988); Naffine, ‘Who Are Law’s Persons? From 
Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects’ (n 987).  
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The definition of P3R resembles the Cartesian person analysed in feminism, the 
conception in which the legal person appears as he and women are explicitly 
rejected, implying the ancient hierarchy of reason between women and men. This 
fact proves Naffine’s assertion that the feature these three types of legal personhood 
share is their patriarchal foundation.991 In her analysis, she posits that women are not 
included in the category of legal persons under the explicit definition of women. 
Today one might disagree, as by now women are legal persons explicitly defined as 
woman, thanks to the intertwining of legal and feminist discourses.  
Thanks to the feminist insights into women and law, the subject now depicted in 
law reflects a combination of the feminist and traditional legal discourses. The 
woman in law is the subject pushed for by feminist discourse, and the traditional 
subject is the one framed by the binary of sex/gender. The feminist subject results in 
what I will name the essentialist gendered legal subject and the traditional inherited 
subject results in the sexed legal subject. Both of these subjects reflect the feminist 
discourse’s difficulties in overcoming the binary and achieving a postmodern 
subject.  
7.3.2 A Gendered or a Sexed Legal Subject 
Is the subject of law gendered or sexed? Feminism posited that the legal person is 
not truly neutral but rather sexed and gendered, thus challenging the category of 
woman as represented in society and in law. These challenges to the subject and the 
patriarchal roots that construct it oblige us to question not only who the law is for 
but also what man and what woman are and represented by law. Feminists answer 
this question by including diversity within women. However, I argue that this 
diversity within women is only theoretical, because if we assume that the category 
of woman is now recognized as women, the question remains: Which women are the 
person represented in law?  
Maria Drakopoulou offers the response that “we remain confronted with having 
to fit the diversity of women’s experience into the straitjacket of a unitary legal 
subject”.992 In sum, the only woman represented is still the natural woman.  
 
 
991  It is important to note that Naffine relies on an understanding of legal persons as right 
holders, as discussed by Meyerson. See Denise Meyerson, ‘Persons and Their Rights 
in Law and Morality’ (2010) 6 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy. 
992  Maria Drakopoulou, ‘The Ethic of Care, Female Subjectivity and Feminist Legal 
Scholarship’ (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 199, 200.  
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7.3.3 Sexing the Modern Subject of Law 993 
The justifications behind the sexing of the subject of law are determined by 
mainstream jurisprudence. These justifications are “truths” accepted as acts of nature 
rather than culture. Unveiling the cultural roots of these “truths”, MacKinnon and 
Lacey argue for the role law plays in sexing the subject and the importance of finding 
out the exact moment when this happens. Others such as Davies994, Naffine, and 
Butler understand that sexing the subject “implies an act of theory”995 in which sex 
also becomes discursive. 
Therefore, the sexing process has been met by the feminist fight to include 
women in law as a non-devalued sex. The question is whether women become legal 
persons as real women or as discursive women still defined through the patriarchal 
lens.  
7.3.3.1 The natural person as the pattern of the legal person 
The confrontation of legal person versus natural being creates the P2Naturalist-
Religionist type of legal person widely accepted in general jurisprudence. The roles 
of the male and the female in society are reflected in law, performing a naturalization 
of sex and the subject. As Carol Smart claims, “[T]he category of ‘woman’ has been 
constructed as a specific object for legal and social policy… a Woman who is 
simultaneously brought into being and subjected to specific modes of regulation 
because of characteristics designated as natural within the discursive act of her very 
construction”.996 Despite the changes throughout history of the social representation 
of the category of woman, issues such as the woman as mother or women’s sexuality 
seem to remain untouched, and women as an unchanged category still appear to be 
the specific object of legal and social policy.997  
Ngaire Naffine’s aforementioned typology of the legal person evidences the 
interplay between the abstract and the natural metaphysical person. Naffine says of 
this relation between the legal and natural worlds, “It may seem to suggest some sort 
of simple or crude correspondence between the legal order (and law’s population of 
legal persons) and the natural or social or human order (natural or moral persons) 
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outside of law”.998 She highlights legal practitioners’ role in reinforcing this relation 
between the natural and legal. For legal practitioners, “the legal task is always to 
determine, represent and respect that real nature; that the real natural person should 
fully and accurately sound in law”.999 The effect of the concordance between the 
legal and the natural is evidenced in the P2N and P3R types, in which the nature of 
the human being and the attributes that make him human are ascribed to the category 
of person or personhood. In both approaches the legal and the natural intertwine and 
the cultural/natural meshes with the legal to legitimize an established way of life. 
This relation between the natural and the legal is based in a natural body 
constructed in discourse—a body limited to a division into two types that confront 
each other as opposites. The artificial divide of sex is legitimized by the legal person. 
In law itself, women’s sexual and reproductive capacities are controlled and 
oppressed, in Smart’s words, “because of the threat that this supposedly ‘natural’ 
woman would otherwise pose to the moral and social order”.1000 
7.3.3.2 The role of the history of law 
Maria Drakopoulou pointed out the importance of, and lack of interest on the part of 
the different feminist approaches in, “incorporating historical analysis in their critical 
enterprise… [C]ritical inquiry is limited to the negative effects law has upon 
women’s social being, rather than concentrating upon law itself”.1001 A historical 
analysis of the legal person, however, would shed light upon the way in which the 
concept of the person1002 merged with the concept of the legal person, unmasking the 
sexing and elucidating the construction of women as legal persons.1003  
How can we fight gender using gender? The only way to find answers is by 
tracing back (i.e., performing a historical analysis of) the concept of the person and 
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its intersection with sex and gender in order to unveil the discourses, values and 
interests that created and constructed the natural person in law. The modern law of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries governs sexuality, motherhood, and 
marriage,1004 all topics already regulated by law since ancient times. This is an 
important fact, since the dynamic of different legal representation for men and 
women has been similar in ancient and modern times.1005 The sexual attributes 
(genitals), along with the possession of property, were core factors when 
categorizing people, with the purpose of safeguarding property. In ancient times, the 
protected good was property, and in modern times, while property was still protected, 
heterosexuality became more important in order to protect and control procreation, 
and by extension the transmission of property.1006 In both cases women were seen as 
property and also as the main means of transferring it. Therefore, there was seen to 
be a need to control and restrict women, under the veil of protecting them.1007 
Moreover, the legal person is delimited by the biopolitical construction of the sex 
binary. The reading of the body, as described in chapter 5, gives a clue about bodies’ 
role in constructing the abstract legal person. The body rules the pre-given biological 
matter that determines the subject. The creation of the legal person is one of the core 
acts of law, as it decides who can act in law and who cannot.  
A historical perspective makes it possible to address the abstract individual in 
law, which in fact is not all that abstract but rather becomes materialized by being 
sexed. The person in law, as mentioned earlier, is constructed based on the 
understanding of the natural person. Law defends the abstract person, whereas, in 
fact, the person is the natural sexed person—first the male, later joined by the female.  
Naffine’s typology helps us understand the links between the representation of 
the woman in ancient and modern times. The ancient legal person can be linked to 
the P1L and P2N types, while from modern times on, once influenced by the 
Cartesian notion of the person that informs the P3 type, it became the sum of all of 
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them: P1L + P2N + reason =P3. The biopolitical tools interact with language to 
construct an accepted reality. The P1L type, supposedly void of cultural influence, 
is influenced by the discourse that constructs the P2N type (biopower, biopolitical), 
crystallizing in medieval times as a specific legal subject. Then, in the transition from 
medieval to modern times, the P3 rationalist approach imports the legal subject from 
the previous tradition and combines this tradition with the new requirement of reason 
to construct the rational modern legal person.  
To understand how the two different types of legal person, P1 and P2, 
intertwined, or how P2N informed P3R—as, for example, in the notion that women 
were non-rational beings—requires unmasking inherited and re-modernized 
socioeconomic and political values, principles, beliefs, and customs. The accepted 
values and beliefs affect the construction of the category of woman, which also 
informs the legal person. Maria Drakopoulou answers these questions to a certain 
extent when she says, “[I]t was in the reception and study of the past record, in the 
examples of virtue and evil it contained, that the ‘truth’ of an eternal female nature 
resided”.1008  
Historical analysis might help us understand how the natural and modern/rational 
values that inform law construct the legal person and how the addition of P1L + P2N 
to make P3R occurs. It might also help us understand the legal purposes that 
influenced the construction of a particular legal subject because, as Naffine claims, 
“for the legalist, law is always engaged in a process of construction of its subject for 
legal purposes”.1009 
A feminist analysis of legal personhood following Naffine’s typology shows 
how the P2N and P3R types are embedded in the binary framework that produces 
exclusions. These two types imply the imposition of the human form and reason on 
the legal person, which for a long time justified the exclusion of women. The P3R 
type is a paradox in itself, as the exclusion of women was justified based on their 
supposed lack of reason, yet later the P3R requirement of the capacity of reason 
would justify the inclusion of women as reasonable beings. The abstractness of the 
P1L type, with no specific requirements, allows the inclusion of women as equals to 
men. As Naffine explains, the understanding of the legal person from the P1L 
standpoint allowed the addition of women to law. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that despite the positive aspects of the P1L type, which appears as the ideal from 
which to reconstruct a neutral subject, this type still emerges from patriarchal 
foundations. This is explained by Naffine, who highlights the role of language in the 
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construction of the P1L type. She refers to the metaphysical meaning of the person 
as part of legal language.1010 The problematic comes from the patriarchal roots of 
beliefs, accepted truths, and language that configure this approach.  
This argument can be also transposed to the language of gender, whose 
expansion beyond the binary is constrained by the patriarchal foundation. The 
foundational binary of sex represents a power discourse that informs legal gender. 
Henceforth, in accordance with Naffine, the P1L approach might be suitable for use 
in expanding the legal subject and de-sexing or de-essentializing it, rather than the 
P2R or P3R types. However, patriarchal foundations and gendered legal language 
still restrict its legalistic character.  
7.3.4 The Feminist Role in the Construction of the 
Essentialist Modern Legal Person 
The previous analyses of essentialism can be transposed to the legal person. The 
implicit essentialism of the feminist discourse on the subject is adopted by law, as 
Harris explains: “Just as law itself, in trying to speak for all persons, ends up 
silencing those without power, feminist legal theory is in danger of silencing those 
who have traditionally been kept from speaking or who have been ignored when they 
speak.”1011  
Two culturally constructed discourses, one about woman and the other about 
sex/gender, intertwine with law and dictate who we are and how we have to live. As 
Naffine explains, the feminist strategy of feminization has been legitimized and 
affects the legal person.1012 The law establishes a truth about the concept of woman 
and produces an essentialized idea of ‘woman’ as someone who is still in need of 
protection and still plays a main role as mother and wife.1013  This outcome is the 
same among different feminist theories. Law also establishes a truth about the 
category of man as strong, reasonable, powerful, and a provider. These are the 
essentialist features that have also informed the construction of the legal person. 
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The P2N and P3R types of legal person are grounded in natural beliefs about the 
biological person, women’s reason, and religious and modern values that inform the 
construction of society and the legal subject. This is reflected in the tension between 
woman and legal personhood,1014 while on the other hand, there is no tension 
between man and legal personhood. 
Ngaire Naffine explains that the depiction of women as non-reasonable beings 
seems to be the rule. This is evidenced in the absence or restriction of the right to 
control one’s body in many jurisdictions today. Laws depict women as lacking the 
necessary reason to exercise rational self-government. Naffine addresses the case of 
pregnancy, in which women are mostly represented as weak persons (irrational) who 
need the State to decide for them. As an example, Naffine addresses the prohibition 
on pregnant women refusing medical treatment and the right to abortion; to these 
examples we might add the statutory imposition of maternal leave before birth. The 
managing of the body is, as Naffine explains, a site in which women’s reason is never 
seen as paralleling that of men.  
Naffine questions whether a feminist jurisprudence that is incapable of being 
inclusive, as the law does not work similarly for all groups, is really an achievement. 
Although some groups within the larger category of women may benefit from 
feminist-inspired legal reforms, other groups of women are left out. The female legal 
person is not women but rather the woman. The artificial essentialist woman is kept 
alive by the feminist discourse. The problem with feminist jurisprudence, as Naffine 
points out, is the reproduction of the mistakes already made by mainstream legal 
theory as it aims at a meta-theory, or general theory for all. Feminist jurisprudence, 
in trying to shift the subject from the neutral man to the ideal woman, reified the 
definition of woman given by male jurisprudence. 
Following De Lauretis, the feminist discourse imprisons the subject within a 
vicious circle in which essentialism seems to have an important say. The 
imprisonment of the subject is reflected in the status of legal person. The maleness 
of law substitutes male truth for female truth. Both truths coexist in law, creating a 
depiction of male and female legal persons.  
Feminist discourse, although at times apparently opposing it, has fundamentally 
supported the notion of a gendered essentialist modern legal subject. Feminists have 
supported the female modern legal subject as a subject that can comply with the 
requirements of the P2Natural and P3Rationalist approaches. Feminism has accepted 
the gendered sexed subject—despite the fact that gender rebellion, in its discourse at 
least, rejected such a subject—without realizing that it was contributing to other 
forms of discrimination. Rosemary Hunter has pointed out that feminism has 
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repeated the same “solipsism” it has criticized: “mainstream feminists referred to a 
purportedly universal white/western/middle-class/heterosexual female subject,”1015 
and accordingly, the same ‘female subject’ was transposed into law and conceived 
as the legal person. Hunter is probably referring to the lack of representation of other 
women who don’t fit the subject she describes and to the essentialization of unique 
womanhood, but what she says might also apply to the reduction of the subject to 
the category of woman.  
Gender reform and gender resistance fall into ‘assimilationism’ or 
‘essentialism’, as described by Patricia A. Cain: “[M]ost feminist legal theorists, by 
focusing on sameness and difference, have fallen into either the assimilationist trap 
(all women are the same as men / all women are the same) or the essentialist trap (all 
women are different from men in one essential way / all women are different, but 
what counts is their essential commonality)”.1016 
7.4 Towards the Postmodern Subject 
The concept of gender, as shown in chapter 2, does not provide an adequate linguistic 
framework for dealing with the subject or even with legal strategies to achieve 
equality. The achievement of equality (formal and substantive) implies the 
disappearance of gender and the construction of a new neutral or universal subject. 
But then, what is understood as neutrality? Is it represented by the individual, 
rational, neutral, abstract male (or female) modern subject, or by the individual, 
neutral, de-sexed postmodern subject? Both can be considered neutral, even if they 
still produce exclusions. The subject of modern law is intentionally neutral in order 
to overcome differences (even if it does not succeed, as evidenced by feminism), and 
the feminist current that sexes the subject tries to extend the law’s subject to one 
“pregnant with meaning”.1017 The legal person appears as a core source of exclusion 
and discrimination even after feminist attempts to fight discrimination. 
The legal person is an area of law that the feminist and gender perspective has 
contested in only limited ways.1018 The feminist analysis of the legal person only 
focused on this person’s implicit maleness. Feminist insights introduced gender and 
revealed the male gendering of the normative person, but the legal person still 
continues to be sexed and essentialized. We, human beings, are now all considered 
legal persons but our sex still plays an important role in our status before the law. 
All human beings are sexed before the law and, as such, bestowed with rights and 
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obligations.1019 These rights can be specially identified as sexed (or gendered) when 
they refer to family or sexuality issues, all areas in which same-sex couples, 
transgender people, transsexuals, and intersex people encounter exclusions unless 
they identify themselves as belonging to one sex category. The sex of the legal 
subject they ascribe to, and not its gender, is what defines them. 
The different feminist strategies to avoid sexing can be classified as follows: one 
focuses on women’s interests, and the other focuses on degendering sex categories. 
However, in both strategies the meaning of biological sex remained unchanged. 
Feminism started a revolution that prioritized the interests of women. This 
revolution was only completed halfway, as Kaplan implies: “In a revolution there 
are basically only three things one can do with those individuals or groups who are 
identified as oppressors: kill them, force them to leave, or force them to undergo 
ideological re-education.”1020 Feminism did not take any of these actions; it merely 
began a unidirectional action toward change, focusing solely on women’s rights and 
interests. This focus has maintained women in their role of mothers and caregivers, 
legitimized with the specific rights that allow them to bear the entirety of family and 
caregiving responsibilities. Those who prioritized women’s interests did not foresee 
the exclusion of “other” subjects or the fact that the normative binary, and feminist 
concepts of sex and gender as opposing poles, would stay fixed. The women’s 
strategy did not entail a revolution because it left the gendered systems and 
structures, upon which the construction of our world is based, untouched. 
The subject of the political feminist discourse has become the female legal 
subject, perpetuating what was criticized in feminism in the ’70s: forcing women to 
hold on to their gendered responsibilities while also assuming new ones to make 
them equal to men and liberate them from male oppression. The unidirectional 
change helped to shift the focus from male values in society towards female values, 
maintaining sex and gender within a binary.  
Margaret Davies explains how Butler’s notion of fluid identity should minimize 
the need for a unique political subject (women).1021 However, gender rebellion does 
not accept fluidity beyond the binary; rather, it maintains this fluidity within the 
boundaries represented by the masculine and the feminine, in order to keep its 
political subject intact. As Judith Lorber says, “[M]ost sociological research assumes 
that each person has one sex, one sexuality, and one gender, congruent with each 
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other and fixed for life”.1022 Sadly, this is also the assumption made by law when 
depicting its subjects. Even gender rebellion treats each person as having one single 
sex or gender, although they might accept different sexualities.  
The feminist strategy was needed, but now we need another advance that might 
come from envisaging the ways in which a postmodern subject might enter law. The 
alliance between gender and feminism has shed light on the cultural grounds of sex 
and on how gender (culture) has affected the construction of roles, stereotypes and 
discourses. However, it has not found a way to radically change the perceptions or 
discourses that inform society. Donna Haraway offers a different strategy in 
“queering what counts as nature”. She explains how this might help: “Queering 
specific normalized categories is not for the easy frisson of transgression, but for the 
hope for liveable worlds”.1023 The “neutrality” implicit in the term gender prevents 
queering and reiterates the essentialism imbued in nature, which also constructs the 
legal person. The concept of gender has made it possible to queer sexuality while 
maintaining sex within the normative binary.  
The essentialism implicit in feminist discourse and in the concept of gender does 
not allow us to depict the multiple. Gender revolution represents the first steps 
toward breaking the power of the implicit essentialism, even though it is still 
constrained by biological nature. We should start thinking about strategies that 
would help in “queering nature”, as Donna Haraway proposed, and also queering 
the law. This is a strategy already envisaged by gender revolution, but which has 
hardly materialized at all in law. The postmodern subject still has not found its place 
either in feminism or in law. 
7.4.1 Feminism and Gender: Sabotaging the Postmodern 
Subject in Law 
As Margaret Davies explains, “The postmodern view of the subject is of a 
fragmented, inessential entity fully situated (and not merely influenced) within 
discursive structures: identity has no essential core, it is rather produced within 
complex linguistic, cultural, and political environments”.1024 Naffine quotes Tur’s 
claim about the relational nature of the legal person: “There is no general law of 
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persons, but rather, a series of rules concerning relationships and liabilities”.1025 In 
both approaches the focus is on the role of discourse and power in constructing the 
subjects and their relations. The notion of gender plays an important role in making 
the reality of these relations seem neutral and obscuring the patriarchal power that 
constructs them1026. The focus on relations and identities is ruled by the framework 
provided by bodies. Nature constructs the legal person framed within the binary of 
sex. Moving forward to a broader inclusive approach would imply a different legal 
person. This new legal person should be framed as the postmodern subject, which is 
currently absent in law; such a goal seems difficult to achieve while maintaining the 
present feminist, legal and gendered discourses. 
7.4.2 The Role of Gender 
The concept of gender and its relation to sex rules the binary that continues to make 
queers1027 and outlaws into invisible subjects. Non-binary persons are obliged to 
choose a legal gender within the binary to become legal persons. This compulsory 
choice that allows no option beyond female and male evidences the close relation 
between gender and sex that is legitimized by law. Nonetheless, queer and intersex 
subjects evidence the need for a postmodern subject that is not framed by the 
sex/gender relation and able to include everybody. The postmodern subject, when 
fluid and abstract, would allow an independent choice of sex/gender. The 
postmodern subject would entail the acceptance of the multitude of subjects.  
The postmodern subject broadens the relation between sex and gender beyond 
the binary. A broader relation is implicit in the gender rebellion approaches to the 
concept of gender. However, the subject must fit into the jacket of the sexed legal 
subject to acquire rights and obligations.  
The power of gender in constructing the subject is recognized in feminism—for 
instance, when Kate Millett, in Sexual Politics, explains her vision of the total 
elimination of gender as the solution to the oppression of women: “Social caste 
supersedes all other forms of inegalitarianism: racial, political, or economic, and 
unless the clinging to male supremacy as a birth right is ﬁnally forgone, all systems 
of oppression will continue to function simply by virtue of their logical and 
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emotional mandate in the primary human situation”.1028 She understands gender as 
the cultural imposition of roles and she proposes a construction similar to 
Firestone’s: the creation of an androgynous person.  
Firestone’s and Millett’s proposals represent a feminist attempt to overcome the 
binary and acknowledge the possibility of a neutral, universal subject in law. This is 
justified, as Rosemary Tong writes, because Millett believed in the need for “the 
elimination of a sexual double standard that permits men but not women to 
experiment with sex, and the inauguration of a dual-parenting system that gives 
fathers and mothers equal child-rearing responsibilities”.1029 Nevertheless, this 
proposal is not a panacea. The androgynous discourse of the 1990s leaves the 
dichotomy of sex and gender untouched. Firestone’s and Millet’s androgynous 
person is one step closer to a genderless being, but, as Judith Lorber explains, “the 
concept of androgyny is not adequate to encompass these ambiguities because 
androgyny assumes fairly clear masculine and feminine attributes that can be 
amalgamated—without changing them. Today’s gender ambiguities are much more 
complex”.1030 Many of the androgynous models rely on the existing gendered 
pattern. Therefore, the androgynous person, when transferred to law, cannot 
eliminate all traces of biological essentialism. This was the most nearly successful 
attempt to destroy gender, but it did not succeed – what failed?  
Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J. Owens posit that the construction of the law’s 
subject “turns the spotlight onto men, and how the law has interpreted them”1031. 
However, in the reconstruction of the subject, feminism still focuses solely on 
women and retains many of the gendered roles ascribed to women. Millett’s proposal 
seems to be a logical starting point from which to break the binary.  
In the androgynous person, however, the binary is implicit. The problematic 
caused by any type of binary is that it creates the possibility of reconstructing 
hierarchies. Linda Alcoff gives us the answer when she posits, “The only way to 
break out of this structure, and in fact to subvert the structure itself, is to assert total 
difference to be that which cannot be pinned down or subjugated within a 
dichotomous hierarchy.”1032 Constructing a hierarchy requires the definition of 
groups that can be ordered, with one group superior to the other. However, the 
impossibility of grouping would entail the impossibility of constructing hierarchies. 
Individuality implies that every single agent is different from any other agent; 
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everybody is different from everybody. In such a case, group hierarchies cannot be 
constructed. The only possible hierarchy would be diluted within the multitude. 
However, the different feminist strategies—for instance, equality/difference 
strategies—still rely on a concept of difference that, even if it attempts to break the 
hierarchy, is framed in a binary.  
7.4.3 The Role of Feminism 
Another encouraging discourse that seemed to potentially lead toward a postmodern 
subject was the feminist discourse on diversity.1033 Butler opened a path to diversity 
when she questioned “the presumed universality and unity of the subject of 
feminism”.1034 She broke away from previous feminisms by claiming that it is not 
possible to give a definition of woman without falling into limited normative 
requirements that those who wish to be recognized as women must comply with.1035 
However, as already explained by Jenny Coleman, feminism has always been about 
diversity, as it “had never only been about women’s gains and empowerment. 
Feminism was about the bigger picture, about social relations and systematic 
injustices. Feminism searches for equality for all; it searches for a fair society where 
men and women can freely make their choices”.1036 Inclusiveness is foregrounded 
here, but Coleman’s claim to want equality ‘for all’ is undermined by her use of the 
binary ‘men and women’. Coleman’s statement demonstrates how feminism’s idea 
of inclusiveness maintains the binary worldview that allows women to keep their 
‘feminine’ role or identity. This binary is reflected in the legal person.  
The feminist solution is the feminization of the legal subject, which assumes the 
natural category of sex and the social aspect of gender. This feminization of the legal 
person is far from creating the postmodern legal person, as it still reproduces a 
gendered discourse. Davies thinks that there is a difference between saying that the 
subject of law is gendered and saying that the subject of law is sexed. In both 
situations, whether law is gendered or sexed, there is a social construction involved, 
and so there is no difference between one statement and the other. Indeed, such a 
view is in line with Butler’s argument about the discursive nature of the subject of 
law, which claims that the sexed person of law is as much a fiction as the gendered 
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subject. The outcome is that not only the cultural is political; the natural is political 
as well.1037 Transposed to the law’s subject, this means that the sexed legal subject 
that feminism has included is just as gendered as the previous one. As Margaret 
Davies says, “[T]he fragmented perceptions, experiences, practices and interactions 
of legal subjects bring diversity, materiality and alternative logics into the interior of 
our image of law. This image of legal diversity is eschewed both by conventional 
legal images of coherence and predictability as well as by some feminist and critical 
discourses which emphasise hegemonic inclusion (masculinity, heterosexuality, 
whiteness) and exclusion (female, LGBTI, and non-white identities)”.1038  
7.5 The Twofold Problem: The Category of Women 
and the Gender Binary 
The gender rebellion and revolution stances have been labelled ineffective, given 
their problem in being implemented or codified in law. This inefficacy translates into 
a general belief in their inability to propose a theory or tool for the required 
change.1039  
As described in chapter 3, gender revolution proposes a genderless society as the 
best contender for successfully constructing a postmodern subject.  Christine Delphy 
also suggests, “Perhaps we shall only really be able to think about gender on the day 
when we can imagine non-gender”.1040 Therefore, creating a genderless society 
seems to be the logical next step. 
But is it possible to have a genderless society? Indeed, if sex is as artificial as 
gender, should we not envisage a society that is both sexless and genderless? 
Furthermore—and this is the most difficult question—will this proposition be 
accepted in the law? Finally, what is the strategy to follow?  
Bringing about a revolution that creates a genderless or sexless society would 
entail killing the subject—not only the female subject but the male as well. Both 
subjects are imbued with gender and sex, and if we are to free ourselves, we no 
longer need either of them. The other aspect of the revolution would entail 
overcoming the binary of sex implicit in the gender discourse. This would also mean 
the effective acceptation of sex and gender as effects of culture. Fighting 
discrimination, gender, sexism or sexual difference cannot be reduced to only one 
strategy.  
 
 
1037  Davies, ‘Taking the inside out: Sex and Gender in the Legal Subject’ (n 377). 
1038  Davies, ‘Feminism and the Idea of Law’ (n 823). 
1039  W Courtena Daum, ‘Point Break: Abandoning the Wave Metaphor and the Politics of 
Division’ (2010) 2 MP: An Online Feminist Journal. 
1040  Delphy, ‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’ (n 198) 9. 
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The required strategy is complex, as it has to tackle two different issues: one 
regarding women, violence against women, and the cultural roles and stereotypes 
ascribed to the category woman/women, and another regarding the cultural 
construction of the subject within a normative binary that produces exclusions. 
Violence and discrimination cannot be addressed with the same strategies that we 
use to address the construction of the binary that excludes others and causes the 
normalization of roles. Nevertheless, it appears contradictory to say that we need two 
different strategies, because the binary is still the origin of both problematics. 
Women suffer specific discrimination and the binary of sex produces exclusions; 
meanwhile, both the binary and the category of woman (and, we should add, the 
category of man) reinforce each other, reifying gendered beliefs.  
7.5.1 The Category Woman – Killing the Subject 
Killing the subject seems to be in complete opposition to feminist interests. This 
proposal confronts the feminist discourse and the defence of women as subjects. 
Some feminists have argued that denying the existence of women as a group implies 
undermining feminism. On the other hand, the focus on women as a group means 
that feminism sees things from a unidirectional perspective, excluding other 
dimensions—male, transgender, transsexual, etc.—that take part in gender 
relations.v  
Does this mean that we need to go ahead and eliminate the category of woman? 
The answer is not simple, for we both need and don’t need the category. This may 
sound ambivalent, but the reality is that there is still symbolism attached to the 
category that produces discrimination, oppression and domination. Keeping the 
category implies accepting it as real and accepting the binary. 
Looking for an answer, Margaret Davies starts out by saying that 
“postmodernism should not necessarily be understood as a complete rejection of the 
notion of women’s identity as women, or of the structural basis of power. It is rather 
a rejection of any totalistic view of identity and patriarchy, and an attempt to fracture 
what might otherwise be seen as intractable obstacles to the generation of new 
meanings for gender and gender relationships”.1041 In agreement with her, the total 
rejection of the category of woman is not necessary. Feminism still rightly claims 
the need for a political subject. At the risk of being called essentialist, I would say 
that the category woman must be maintained as a political subject. Nevertheless, first 
comes the acknowledgment that ‘woman/women’ are constructed categories, and 
with that in mind, we acknowledge that “the concept of women is absolutely 
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indispensable to the feminist project”. The concept of woman/women is full of 
meaning, entailing oppression, domination and discrimination. To overcome this 
meaning, the category of sufferers (woman/women) needs to be visualized. The 
concept of woman should be accepted, not with the definition of those who have 
certain physical or biological characteristics that are female, but rather with the 
definition of those who have been or are considered women and thus dominated and 
oppressed. This is a category of woman that is not based on a certain essence, but 
rather on how society treats what it defines or understands as the category woman. 
Changing the perspective from which we define the category woman can help us 
understand the socio-political and historical influences on the definition of the 
category of woman, and thus to be aware of its ‘artificiality’.1042  
We must agree with the need for women as political subjects. To fight the 
symbolism and the location of the category of woman and to dissolve the category 
itself are two actions that address different, yet at the same time related, problems. 
The feminist focus was on displacing the male norm as the standard by recognizing 
the female norm. However, this strategy does not acknowledge that all that the 
category of woman represents is a patriarchal constructed fiction; instead it accepts 
the category of woman as real. A practical example of this problem is found in 
CEDAW, which was criticized for depicting a unitary definition of woman. The 
terms woman/women, in fact a patriarchal fiction, are still pervasive in law and in 
society. The hidden power of patriarchy perpetuates a patriarchal constructed 
category as real.  
On the other hand, Gunnarsson claims that “through collective struggle we may 
be able to change the very structure of which our position as women is part, but 
without a category that can take this positioning into account, such a struggle will 
not be possible”.1043 The irony is that the negative aspects linked to the category of 
woman/women will survive as long it exists. This fiction cannot die as long as the 
subject is obliged to choose a sex within the binary, because the same binary reifies 
the category. It implies the real existence of something called “woman,” and this 
concept cannot die as long as the legal person is depicted as a woman, reifying the 
category.  
Choosing to be a woman or having it imposed on one comes with a normative 
feminine essence that is attached to the body. Choosing to be a different woman, thus 
still being part of the group women, does not entail the elimination of the feminine 
essence. The mere act of choosing, as well as the insistent defence of women as 
political subjects of feminism, implies an act of essentialism. 
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Accepting the category of woman obliges us to live following certain rules that 
are not even real. Lena Gunnarsson’s intention of transforming the abstract into 
reality while still acknowledging the differences between both realms might be 
effective, as “we can seek to use them [i.e., the differences] effectively without any 
expectation that they will correspond to this lived reality in any clear-cut sense”.1044 
Gunnarsson’s strategy helps to acknowledge the existence of the abstract category 
of woman, which is now the real one in law and society. This category of woman is 
what feminism has denounced as a problem for all “women” who have been 
artificially located within it. The problem is, as previously analysed, the meaning 
ascribed to the category, a meaning that entails a disadvantageous position and 
certain duties. The beliefs, representations and symbols attached to the category 
construct the essence that is attached to this category alongside the oppression, 
domination and discrimination. Violence against women because of being women it 
is grounded in the artificial construction of women as non-rational, as property, as 
someone to possess, and as someone to dominate. Perpetrators of this violence 
believe in the definition given to the category woman and they feel the right to punish 
them. To effectively address the many forms of women’s discrimination, oppression 
and domination, the historical category of woman must be recognized while 
simultaneously we must try to overcome this very same category. 
7.5.2 The Binary of Sex 
The binary hinders the rejection of the totalistic view of identity and of patriarchy.1045 
The gender rebellion and gender revolution approaches, described in chapter 3, mark 
a shift in the relation between sex and gender. Gender revolution accepts the non-
dichotomous character of sex by merging gender with sex. This means recognizing 
the binary of sex as constructed and as a result of culture. 
As previously explained, the use of deconstruction in the name of gender 
rebellion illustrates the dangers of reconstruction from the standpoint of “woman,” 
defined as “the opposite” of the (male) legal subject. Moreover, we see the iteration 
of the normative sexed body in the reconstruction process. Reconstruction within the 
binary entails the rejection of other categories outside it, thereby participating in the 
limited framework that denies the inclusion of the others located in the margins. 
Hence, the new strategies to overcome this problematic come from the dissident 
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voices who reject the construction of a new subject within the binary. This proposal, 
initiated within the gender rebellion framework, paved the way for the elimination 
of gender, or sex, but strategies for putting it into practice were not developed. The 
reconstruction eventually took place, and a diverse woman was constructed, 
maintaining the binary of diverse women versus diverse men.  
Intersex and transsexual embodiment challenge the female-male dichotomy also 
attached to the relation between sex and gender. This challenge helps to subvert the 
traditionalism and biologism of the legal discourse, statically grounded in the binary 
of sex/gender. Non-conforming bodies provide an opportunity to understand the 
limitative power of gender and sex, unfurling the possibilities of a post-gender era 
in which categories are eliminated to allow multiplicity. There is also a dark side to 
this, as Monro claims1046, for transsexuality can also serve as another way to reify 
the binary. Nevertheless, transsexuality questions the immutability of sex, and 
intersexuals challenge the legal discourse on the binary of sex. They evidence the 
way in which law rejects the recognition of other possibilities beyond the binary. 
They highlight the political foundations of the architecture of the body. And so, do 
we need sex and gender in law when they mean that not all subjects can be 
recognized?  
It appears that the only revolutionary action comes from gender revolution. 
Gender revolution reveals the exclusionary effects of the concept of gender; thus, the 
subsequent strategy should be to think about how to give birth to a subject that might 
embody not the diversity but the multiplicity of beings. The acceptance of a broader 
version of diversity helps to shake the foundations of the sex and gender dichotomy 
and also leads to a new understanding of the individual that takes into account the 
existence of ‘outcasts’. As Monro puts it: “People whose sex/gender identity is fluid, 
or other than male and female, challenge the ontological assumption that sex/gender 
falls into binary categories.”1047 It is time to queer the subject and queer equality.  
Seidman has proposed a shift from “‘homosexuality’ to sexualities” to represent 
the multiplicity of sexual choices.1048 This brings us back to Deleuze’s rhizomatic 
approach to difference. The multiplicity of sexualities should be combined with a 
multiplicity of bodies that would destroy the opposing binaries. This is a way to 
expand the representation of a person beyond identities or subjectivities, as it would 
also imply broadening the representation of the body beyond the binary. It helps to 
break the sex binary and readdress difference as a multiplicity. This strategy 
supposes moving beyond the equality/difference debate delimited by the binary. 
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Equality needs to be guaranteed to all possibilities and not only to one or another 
sex. Breaking the binary will affect the legal person by widening the 
individualization of the subject. Lahey advocated a greater individualization, 
defending the need for a legal individualism that would prevent law from ascribing 
rights and duties based on our sex, gender and sexuality.1049 In accordance with a 
universal diversity, a continuum of identities exists and biological confrontation 
dissolves.1050  
In the ’90s, Francisco Valdes had already proposed an alliance between queer 
and feminist theories.1051 Both are subversive, interdisciplinary, part of the academic 
discourse but also connected to political activism. Both challenge and problematize 
the relation between sex, gender and sexuality and try to dismantle the existing 
structures.1052 In this alliance, queer and feminist theory can work together as 
complementary approaches, the need for both of which we recognize, as both tackle 
similar yet separate problems. Feminism fights against the discrimination, 
oppression and domination that accompany the category of woman, and the other 
fights the reification of sex roles that produces the binary of sex and excludes those 
who do not fit into normative sex.  
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CONCLUSION 
Gender reform and gender resistance are similar in their understanding of gender as 
a fixed dichotomy. The main difference is whether the proposed pattern of 
construction is male- or female-centred. Gender reform feminism has been criticized 
for assuming that women’s equality implies achieving male standards and therefore 
using masculine values as its guiding principle. On the other hand, the aim of gender 
resistance feminism is to construct gender equality based on feminine values, which 
keeps women attached to assumptions about the female role. Therefore, the 
sex/gender relation reifies the separate roles and reconstructs the binary.  
Gender rebellion seeks diversity and expands the category of woman to women. 
This position accepts the diversity inherent within the category of women, but still 
recognizes this category in opposition to the subject of men. Feminism aims to 
dismantle the masculine norm and maintain the feminine subject. However, keeping 
the subject alive entails an existing definition of women. To determine the basic 
essence that defines women as a group, the focus rests on sex. The biological defines 
a woman as such. Sex is the body, the “biological given”. Despite the increasing use 
of the concept of gender, sex plays the primary part in defining a woman. Despite 
the inclusion of the notion of gender, which makes it possible to recognize the 
cultural construction of what is considered nature, the body’s nature remains 
unchanged, defining the identity of womanhood or manhood. This shows that, 
despite the confusion of sex and gender, sex is still the ruling foundation. 
Feminism has influenced how law reads its subjects and bestows them with 
rights and obligations. Nevertheless, in all the different discourses in law, the legal 
person is sexed and essentialized to fit into the pattern designed for the modern legal 
person. Patriarchy is implicit in the understanding of the subject, the body and the 
concept of gender. All of them converge in the legal person. All modern concepts, 
values and principles configure the modern subject. The sexed essentialist legal 
subject remains uncontested and unchallenged, accepted and legitimized as truth. 
The modern subject has remained intact despite postmodern discourse. We might 
say that modern values are so internalized that they survive the postmodern critique. 
The paradox, however, is the way in which feminist discourse, despite contesting the 
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notion of the liberal person, reproduces the normative universal person with a 
different sex: the female normative universal person. 
Biopower becomes bio-gender: the power shifts from sex to gender, which acts 
as a neutral regulator of sex. The concept of gender is introduced in the discourses, 
bringing in neutrality. Sex camouflages itself in gender, consenting to a broadening 
of the ways of expressing femininity and masculinity, yet still preserving the modern 
foundations of power. The way forward can only be through the elimination of the 
modern foundations that frame the concepts within the binary of Western thought. It 
is necessary to reformulate the person to include the many really existing people who 
have been relegated to the realm of the abnormal. The sex and gender binary has 
obliged us to live and communicate in the world within a limited framework. This is 
the case with legal gender: Do we need to be questioned about our legal gender? 
What is the law referring to when it asks for it? Is law asking for our social expression 
or our genitals? Legal sex/gender1053 imposes an unnecessary requisite, demanding 
that we choose one or the other. Do we not have better technological means to 
recognize and identify people? The insistence on legal gender—when more 
advanced tools for recognition already exist, such as, for example, digital 
fingerprints—maintains a modern society in a postmodern world.  
A gender revolution in which the sexed subject disappears seems to be very far 
off still. A first step might come from queering the law. The question should be how 
the law might become queer. For that, moving beyond the debate about equality 
versus difference seems to be fundamental. This debate cannot advance without 
liberating the concept of equality from its modern jacket. Stripping equality of its 
modern jacket entails first queering equality. The different acceptations of the term 
gender should lead us to the inclusion of all subjects, but the insistence of some 
gender revolution scholars on using the concept of sexual difference gives a hint of 
the problems in law. The answer might come from acknowledging the real 
multiplicity of people, which will help to eliminate the binary that sustains the eternal 
loop of sex and gender. Therefore, in attempting to queer law we should 
acknowledge the power of nature embedded in the body. We should find out how to 
apply a new materialist analysis to the subject of law. 
The way forward is found in the legal acceptation of the postmodern legal subject 
and the overcoming of the essentialism of the modern liberal discourse. Gender 
revolution offers a range of ideas that could open up new paths leading to the 
inclusion of all people, and to the dissolution of sex or gender as main categories in 
order to disrupt the binary subject. 
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8 RECONSIDERING SEX AND 
GENDER: THE FUTURE 
In the previous chapters we analyzed and described how the development of feminist 
theory was affected by the inclusion of the concept of gender; some feminist groups 
rejected sex as an inadequate analytical category, while gender became the preferred 
category of analysis, one that emphasized the cultural construction of discrimination. 
As we saw in chapter 4, the concept of gender is slowly being introduced into 
positive law. Yet we can see that currently its usage differs between English-
speaking and non-English-speaking Western countries. 
In chapter 3, the description of the various legal feminist strands showed how all 
feminist approaches have looked for sources of oppression and discrimination and 
found that law is one of the leading actors in creating them. The various legal 
feminist strands denounce the impartial appearance of law and try to fight this to 
accommodate their own specific requirements. These approaches have also sought 
strategies that might help attain a neutral, objective, and universal law. Such insights 
into law have now reached the stage where feminist jurisprudence can be considered 
an established field of knowledge. They recognize the existence of male foundations 
in the construction of law. Law pretends to be universal but is secretly sexed as male; 
therefore, one cannot talk about universality, neutrality, or diversity. The subject is 
the abstract masculinized pre-modern legal subject that becomes the possessor of the 
modern legal values of rationality, neutrality, and universality. As de Lauretis has 
stated, law is a “technology of gender”.1054 Law creates and constructs gendered 
subjects while claiming to follow core values of rationality, universality, and 
neutrality. 
Recalling the feminist classification in chapter 3, we can acknowledge the 
different strategies developed by the various feminist strands ranging from equality 
to equity or difference. Gender reform feminism believed that if women were 
accepted in law in a position that was neither subordinate nor discriminated against, 
this would rectify the lack of neutrality. However, as described in previous chapters, 
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the gender reform strategy failed: the incorporation of women into law did not solve 
the problem of discrimination.1055 The achievement of formal equality was not 
enough. Law is sexed, and when this is the case, the chances of achieving formal 
equality are reduced, as evidenced by the different rights and responsibilities of its 
subjects according to sex.1056 Even if positive law may look neutral at first sight, it 
is not, and the application and interpretation of law is not neutral.  
Consequently, an alternative strategy came from gender resistance, which 
outlined the importance of difference and argued that the supposed neutrality and 
universality of law do not account for the particular needs of women. Moreover, it 
critiqued the hidden maleness of law, which attempted to assimilate women into 
male values and undermined the value of the female part of the hierarchy.1057 Gender 
resistance cast light on the false neutrality and universality of law, demonstrating 
that the normative understanding of modern law and its values is neither impartial 
nor universal. Gender resistance thus was able to evidence the absence of feminine 
values and femininity in general from law, and it attempted to make changes to 
include these feminine values and femininity in law.  
Both gender reform and gender resistance provided the seed for the new insights 
of gender rebellion, which built on the previous analyses of law. Gender rebellion 
expanded research into law so as to include the implicit diversity that existed but 
remained hidden by the power of the rational, the neutral and the universal. 
Particularities are not addressed in law, for law only accepts the general abstract 
person. The strategy of gender rebellion rejects the universality, rationality, and 
neutrality of law and focuses on the periphery to illuminate the existence of the 
particular. Gender rebellion takes up positions on the margins, investigating 
particular exceptions—the private and the other—to which women have always been 
relegated.1058 Gender rebellion claims that gender is the source of discrimination, 
aligning the concepts of gender and sex with sexual orientation. This new integration 
of gender with both sex and sexual orientation reveals the diversity within groups.  
Gender revolution acknowledges the power of law in the construction of gender 
as a binary system whose natural hierarchies and values are based in the sex binary 
that has always ruled the world. The law is biased and produces biased subjects, 
hampering their full agency, constraining their choices, and obliging them to 
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embrace the normative sexed legal subject. The gender revolution approach 
acknowledged one of the law’s main consequences: the exclusion of subjects. The 
real neutrality and universality of law will only be found through the acceptance of 
multiplicity. In this line, a post-gender approach breaks the binary imposed by the 
relation of sex and gender. The future path forward entails finding a way in which to 
recognize multiple bodies without imposing the sexed abstract universal person of 
modernism.  
8.1 Law’s Legitimization of Exclusions 
Law causes harm by discarding all those who do not belong to the binary.1059 The 
tool used to legitimize exclusions is the compulsory choice of a legal gender. The 
legal classification that is generally called legal gender harms those who do not 
identify with their sex at birth or those who trouble the binary, such as intersex 
persons. Genderqueer people are not yet recognizable to the law, and they are forced 
to choose a fixed identity within the binary. Cisgender persons are not free either; 
they too are obliged to conform to the normativity of sex. They are compelled to 
make their choice within the two established representations of the body. The law’s 
discourse acts as a form of violence, forcing the mutilation of bodies to fit the 
requirements of law.1060  
In the attempt to be inclusive, law applies the same strategy to every person, not 
only to women and men, but also to transgender people. As Dylan Vade has 
explained, “the law paints a specific picture of transgender people, a picture in which 
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all transgender people look the same”.1061 Law portrays transgender persons as either 
male to female (MTF) or female to male (FTM), with the highest visibility given to 
the first category, even if many transgender people differ from those two labels.1062 
Law deploys its strategy for dealing with transgender people by forcing them to adapt 
to its definitions of what constitutes a real woman and a real man.1063  
The concept of gender in law is associated with the decisions people are allowed 
to make in areas such as marriage, procreation, family, and employment. The way in 
which law authorizes the relations of its subjects in these matters influences how the 
concept of gender is understood. We are currently locked within the sex/gender 
system, which rules identities, maintains order and generates inequalities.  
8.2 Toward a Post-Gender Approach? 
The juridical narrative is a restrictive discourse that, based in the foundations of law, 
acts as a choreographer of performances.1064 In other words, the juridical discourse 
is the script that tells subjects how they should perform in order to fit into society. 
The universal legal subject appears to be abstract and disembodied, and this sustains 
the exclusion of all others who do not fit within the normative abstract legal 
categories. Performativity is involved in reinforcing societal norms, but it may also 
disturb the relationship between the law and its legal subjects, by acknowledging 
that the legal subject is produced through discourse. But it is necessary to understand 
the role of discourse in the construction and performance of the subjects in order to 
challenge the normative with subversive acts that are powerful enough to disturb the 
naturalized discourse surrounding the sex and gender performance.1065 We need to 
understand how gender lies at the root of the normative discourses about women and 
men if we are to be able to disrupt these discourses. Once we accept that gender 
filters the discourse, it is possible to break the natural roots with which law reifies 
the binary that governs our norms and behaviours. 
From the 1960s onward, some gender resistance scholars have advocated a post-
gender society that would move past the limitations of the strategies of gender 
equality by intertwining the feminine with the masculine equally. These scholars 
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advocate for new kinds of behaviors in which masculine and feminine attributes 
meet.1066 In her book The Lenses of Gender, Sandra Bem claimed that androgyny 
would help to blur together the concepts of masculinity and femininity until they 
reached a point where neither would be clearly represented.1067  
Other feminists such as Lorber, Risman, and Sherwood have also foreseen the 
need for a world beyond gender to achieve equality. Their approach focuses on 
gender as an organizational structure, challenging its correlation with biological sex 
but ultimately not challenging the binary itself. For them, the post-gender approach 
lies in ‘degendering strategies’, meaning that instead of socializing girls to care less 
or to embrace male gender values, boys should be socialized to embrace female-
gendered values. The proposed strategies aim to transgress the binary, but they still 
involve travel between the two normalized sexes and still understand gender as the 
cultural construction of sex.1068 This approach, if it remains within the limits of the 
binary, accepts the proposal of the genderqueer category claimed by authors from 
different disciplines, such as Cary Gabriel Costello, Rocko Bulldagger1069, Cris 
Mayo1070, and Riki Anne Wilchins.1071 Genderqueer persons explore the fluid 
possibilities of expressing gender, differentiating themselves from the category of 
transgender people, who transition only once and end up fitting into one of the 
established categories. Genderqueerness arises as a transgressive approach to gender 
that works through external expressions of gender without changes of biological sex. 
Genderqueer persons do not consider themselves masculine, feminine, or 
transsexual. Still, the use of the term gender constrains their possibilities to the 
binary evoked by the term. Moreover, in relation to sex, they are still constrained by 
a sexual binary that obliges them to legally choose which sex they belong to.1072  
Another post-gender approach has been presented by George Dvorsky and James 
Hughes, who propose that we “confront the limits of a social constructionist account 
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of gender and sexuality”.1073 For Dvorsky and Hughes, a post-gender approach is 
possible because of new technologies that expand the possibilities of human 
reproduction. Similarly, Donna Haraway has highlighted the problems of an 
exclusive focus on gender that obscures the reality of the body as a site of 
knowledge.1074 The answer, according to her, is the creation of the cyborg, a 
“cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction”.1075 The cyborg, from a Deleuzian perspective, is one 
example of the multiplicity of bodies, as “it has no truck with bisexuality, preoedipal 
symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a 
final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity”.1076 However, 
Haraway approaches the cyborg as one body, which obscures the possibilities of 
acknowledging multiple differences between different cyborg bodies. Summing up 
“the cyborg” as one body is just as essentialist as summing up “the man” or “the 
woman.” 
Haraway claims that the cyborg creates the possibility of overcoming the static 
nature of sex, which is defined by genitals and transposed to gender. The cyborg 
helps us to imagine gender as fluid and hinders the categorization of people in two 
categories. However, in addition to the essentialism implicit in the depiction of a 
single cyborg body, another difficulty1077 appears when we attempt to transpose the 
cyborg into law. The law demonstrates a refusal to acknowledge differences except 
based on oppositional divisions into two. One could think of this refusal as 
paradoxical, given that society boasts about law’s neutrality, specifically its gender 
neutrality and the formal equality of gender it supposedly upholds. 
Braidotti also advocates the dissolution of all sexed identities based on the 
gender opposition. Her position might be defined as a post-gender approach to the 
subject. She foresees that “sexual polarizations and gender-dichotomy are rejected 
as the prototype of the dualistic reduction of difference to a sub-category of 
Being.”1078 She also refers to Deleuze’s aim “to go beyond gender as being dispersed, 
not binary; multiple, not dualistic; interconnected, not dialectical; and in a constant 
flux, not fixed”.1079 However, her project, grounded in Irigaray’s philosophy, aims 
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for the total elimination of sexual difference, allowing women to still be women.1080 
In fact, Irigaray, who denounced the foundations of the liberal legal subject, also 
made the criticism that the neutral subject produced the exclusion of women. 
Nonetheless, she seems keen to keep the binary intact, for she says, “Without doubt, 
the most appropriate content for the universal is sexual difference. Indeed, this 
content is both real and universal. Sexual difference is an immediate natural given 
and it is a real and irreducible component of the universal. The whole human kind is 
composed of women and men and nothing else.”1081 The final phrase, “men and 
women and nothing else”1082 shows the extent to which Irigaray, and probably most 
of the feminists of difference, accepted the binary.1083 
A post-gender approach, however, must entail both molar and molecular politics. 
Deleuze and Guattari identify the molar as the fixed and the molecular as the fluid, 
presenting both terms not in a binary opposition but in an overlapping position. We 
can analyse the subject from the molar and molecular perspectives and try to use this 
analysis to break the binaries of thought. Deleuze and Guattari explain the molar and 
the molecular in relation to movement. The organism1084 is depicted as fixed and 
without movement—thus molar—while the body without organs is molecular, and 
is responsible for the process of becoming. The molar and molecular can be 
compared to macro and micro politics: the molecular addresses the individual while 
the molar addresses the society as a whole. These are two different locations and two 
different movements. The molar produces a reiterative movement coming from the 
organization as a whole, while the molecular produces a ceaseless becoming that can 
be compared to a continuous and…and…and…and…, which is always in 
movement. 
Deleuze and Guattari identify women’s politics with the molecular.1085 This is 
explained by Claire Colebrook: “because the girl must become a woman, she is 
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invoked as the becoming of becoming…. Man is traditionally defined as being: as 
the self-evident ground of a politics of identity and recognition. Woman, as his other, 
offers the opening of becoming; and the girl thus functions as a way of thinking 
woman, not as a complementary being, but as the instability that surrounds any 
being”.1086 Becoming is a process of change that changes behaviors, feelings and 
desires. However, for Deleuze and Guattari, the position of the molecular does not 
oppose the molar, and thus the subject women, which is identified as molecular, is 
not located in a position of doubling of or opposition to man. The subject woman is 
identified as the starting point of the process of becoming; This subject is the 
movement itself. Becoming woman is a linear process but at the same time a 
regressive and circular one, affecting everything and everybody. Becoming woman 
is a continuous process that has no end, because whoever or whatever someone or 
something was in the past, they are never the same in the present, and they won’t be 
the same in the next moment. We become different from ourselves at every moment 
of the process of becoming.  
The process of becoming, as imagined by Deleuze and Guattari, is one that goes 
beyond the binary. It does not imply reinstating categories but rather is a way to move 
past binaries. Then, as Maria Jose Binetti explains, understanding the act of becoming 
woman outside the binary implies elevating sexual difference to the level of a radical 
ontological difference, allowing a multiplicity of sexualities and a multiplicity of 
becoming. This becoming beyond the binary can be explained through the concept of 
the rhizome. The movement that comes from the molecular takes a rhizomatic form 
because in a rhizome there are ceaseless lines of flight. This movement is what Deleuze 
and Guattari refer to as molecular politics or molecularization.  
The use of molar politics understood as society wide politics represented by 
feminist politics doesn’t seem to be the most successful way of achieving the 
recognition of women because, as Batra claims, it “is a kind of concession, not a real 
transformation, and it is even possible that such a concession could further entrench 
the gender structure”.1087 Molar politics is necessary but not sufficient. It restricts the 
elimination of the binary because it foresees not a multiple movement but a linear 
one that leaves intact the opposition between the molar and the molecular. Feminism 
has shown that knowledge needs to be questioned as do predetermined truths. This 
questioning, however, cannot be situated within the limits of a specific subject. 
Feminism and the use of molar politics keeps knowledge within the categories of 
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woman and man, constraining the possibility of transindividual politics, which is 
actually what Deleuze and Guattari intend with molecular politics.  
Therefore, the most productive option might be to embrace the proliferation of 
bodies from a trans-individual perspective, discarding the unique female or male 
subject. If we take molar and molecular politics together as part of a rhizomatic 
relationship, this would entail the recognition of multiplicity.1088 The outcome of a 
rhizomatic movement is a unique subject. The unique subject is one of the multiple 
others.1089 All subjects are the others of others, and each subject represents one single 
example of the multiple possibilities. Every subject will engender a line of flight in 
its process of becoming,1090 and this means that there is no possibility of maintaining 
a fixed binary of sex or gender. The line of flight creates a new singularity that 
applies to only one single example. Therefore, sex and gender cannot be replicated 
in the same way in every becoming, because there is always an individual line of 
flight that hinders an exact reiteration.  
The core of the problem is not only the cultural construction of gender in a 
hierarchy or the imposition of roles; rather, as Deleuze and Guattari showed, “the 
question is not, or not only, that of the organism, history, and subject of enunciation 
that oppose masculine to feminine in the great dualism machines. The question is 
fundamentally that of the body – the body they steal from us in order to fabricate 
opposable organisms”.1091 This line of thought is followed by Moira Gatens, who 
suggests how the use of gender “engenders a neutralization of sexual difference and 
sexual politics”.1092 This neutralization leaves sex differences—which actually 
means the body—outside of the sources of discrimination.1093  
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Different disciplines already acknowledge the presence of genderqueer 
individuals; however, law still seems to be ignoring them. Transgender or 
transsexual people are recognized in law insofar as they assign themselves to one or 
the other sex. This problem extends to intersex persons, who are not recognized in 
law until they are assigned to one side of the binary. Genderqueer persons are in 
between; they are fluid and dynamic. Their bodies have no place in law unless they 
choose to belong to a normative sex; they represent the exclusions of law of non-
normative sex, as law, with its need for static fixed categories, refuses to deal with 
them.  
Returning to the feminist discourse analysed in the previous chapters, feminism 
claims that a genuinely neutral subject of law would not help women who encounter 
specific problems because of their sex. This is true, but men, transsexuals, and 
transgender persons also encounter specific problems because of their gender or sex. 
The post-gender approach does not try to deny the existence of difference; on the 
contrary, it tries to multiply the differences beyond the dichotomy of two. The post-
gender approach tries to distance itself from the descriptive power of sex and gender.  
In the realm of law, a post-gender approach in which nature is dissolved seems 
unattainable. Law needs a natural truth on which to ground its justifications. Sandra 
Bem, acknowledging society’s need to rely on nature, has shifted her proposal away 
from the total elimination of gender, which would reduce the dangers of nature as it 
would imply the elimination of sex, to a post-gender view in which nature still plays 
a primary role.1094 In this post-gender approach, the natural might still be valid. I am 
referring to a bare nature unfiltered by gender. The filtering by gender allows 
patriarchy to deploy its power by reducing the multitude to the binary. A bare nature, 
in which the multitude of bodies is recognized as part of nature, would allow the 
proliferation of sex categories. As Nelly Outshoorn claims, the sciences have given 
enough evidence for us to abandon the binary model of sex.1095  
Eliminating gender would not eliminate inequalities. However, representing the 
full multitude of subjects would allow us to avoid the exclusion of sex outlaws and to 
blur the roles ascribed to the binary. The obstacle to eliminating gender is the insistence 
on maintaining the categories of sex and gender as the main categories of analysis in 
theories of subjectivity, identity and sexual difference.1096 As Graham Mayeda 
explains, “[L]aw has conflated gender identity with biological sex, or perhaps it has 
ignored gender identity altogether, preferring instead to make sex and not gender a 
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legal category”.1097 The multitude cannot be represented by the terms sex and gender, 
as these terms rely on the symbolism of the binary. New concepts are needed to 
transcend the ascription of roles to sex and gender, and to name the multitude.1098  
8.3 Time for Change 
According to Maria Drakopoulou, if feminism is to “be true to itself, to its original 
purpose, aspirations and hopes, the initial fault-finding stage of feminist critique 
must therefore be followed by propositions for change”.1099 Such propositions for 
change have been one of the aims of feminism, which has offered many different 
strategies in the search for equality. 
CLS did indeed break the rules by challenging sacred beliefs about law, but it 
did not propose drastic changes that would have required a change of “consciousness 
and ideology from the grounds,” as posited by Margaret Davies.1100 Once we free 
ourselves from the subconscious aspects of our relationships and also from 
ideologies and false consciousness, the possibilities are endless, not limited to one 
specific new theory. I advocate the power to be found in the CLS or FemCrit analysis 
of law, although these two movements have been strongly criticized for not 
suggesting a solution. Does this mean that I simply want to criticize and evade 
making any kind of contribution? Not at all.  
Following the previous insights provided by CLS and FemCrits, it is possible to 
move forward and destabilise the normativity that frames the materiality of sex. 
Gendered law will continue to insist on the binary of sex to which its subjects are 
assigned; however, as the new materialist scholar Grear claims, “it seems necessary 
to allow the ontic materiality of the body itself a role in the destabilisation of the 
binary”.1101  
8.3.1 Overcoming the Binary of Sex through Language 
In the ’90s, the gender rebellion movement highlighted the way in which language 
had become a primary agent in the fight against discrimination, believing that efforts 
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to achieve a neutral language would help overcome discrimination. Along these 
lines, scholars from different countries came up with proposals for neutral language 
that would avoid the use of sexed pronouns.  
In France, the philosopher Thierry Hoquet has proposed the use of the term “Ille” 
to refer to subject in any and all genders. As he explains, “Quand on parle d’un 
collectif humain multigenré, fait d’hommes, de femmes, et de quantités d’autres 
genres, on peut dire «illes», simplement pour dire: «quel que soit votre genre, que 
vous soyez il, elle, l’un et l’autre, ni l’un ni l’autre, ou parfois l’un parfois l’autre”.1102 
This might apply when referring to a cyborg. It might also imply a way to overcome 
the dualism implicit in our thought.1103 In Sweden, a new pronoun, “hen,” has 
appeared in the dictionary in addition to he and she. This is highlighted by NPR, 
citing The Guardian: “The pronoun is used to refer to a person without revealing 
their gender — either because it is unknown, because the person is transgender, or 
the speaker or writer deems the gender to be superfluous information.”1104  
In English, neutral pronouns have been created—ze, meaning “he/she,” and hir, 
meaning “his/her”—in order to challenge the sex binary imposed by the language. 
The scholars using this terminology try to provide trans and intersex people with 
alternatives to express themselves without limits.1105 Other attempts have come from 
the queer movements, such as the use of the noun womyn in order to avoid the 
presence of the word man within it. The intention, as the Womyn’s centre web page 
explains, is that “in spelling womyn with a ‘Y’, [they] recognize that womyn have 
diverse and different identities and roles which are not all defined by a relationship 
to men (or dictionaries!).”1106 These new concepts help to overcome the binary of 
sex implicit in the language and to blur the expected representations imposed by this 
binary.  
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8.3.2 Overcoming the Binary of Sex in Law 
Regarding law, Dianne Otto makes a proposal to overcome the binary of sex, which 
she thinks creates a hierarchy in power relations. She has been searching for a 
solution in the realm of human rights law, which ultimately might be transposed to 
law in general—what she calls a re-scripting of gender in human rights law. She 
proposes to dismantle the binary of sex, and “if the persistent hierarchies produced 
by dualistic gendered subjectivities – protective and vulnerable, rescuing and 
injured, autonomous and dependent – are to be displaced, gender must be re-scripted 
as something other than a dichotomy; as multiplicitous rather than as dualistic”.1107 
Otto’s proposal lies within the boundaries of the post-gender, as she wants to 
denaturalize sex and gender, and ultimately make them disappear.  
The problem with her strategy is her detachment of sex and gender from body 
parts. She doesn’t treat them as having bodily attachments and thus misses 
something crucial. The attachment of sex and gender to the genitals hinders an 
understanding of them beyond the binary. However, detachment from the body has 
denied the construction of embodied identity and subjectivity. Otto claims that it 
is necessary to acknowledge the way in which human beings are constituted by the 
multiplicity “of ideas and practices that are culturally associated with masculinity 
and femininity, rather than predetermined by biology as either ‘male’ or 
‘female’”.1108 Otto dismisses the role of the body. She is aware of the general need 
to recognize the body, but from the perspective of diversity; Otto’s approach is far 
from the acknowledgment of multiplicity, and this still hinders the overcoming of 
the binary. Otto’s proposal takes into account Butler’s and Braidotti’s proposals 
regarding diversity and multiplicity. She follows Butler in her proposal of 
dissolving gender and Braidotti in her proposal of multiplicity. However, Otto’s 
proposal still undermines the power of the body.  
Amid these proposals I try to look for a different one. I propose to eliminate the 
terms gender and sex because of their tricky use and connotations. This does not 
mean eliminating sex or gender or saying that they do not exist, because in fact they 
do exist and are traits of our body. Eliminating the terms gender and sex to reflect 
sexual difference and all related issues might allow us to break the binary. My 
proposal is to rethink sex and gender without sex and gender to achieve the real trans-
individual thought and multiplicity aimed at by Deleuze and Guattari.  
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8.3.3 Eliminating the Concept of Gender: Another Strategy 
In the words of Palazzani, “Gender as a social construction is a ‘compulsory mask’ 
imposed from above, depending on the creation of social hierarchy: it is a fictional 
construction, without any basis or foundation. There is nothing either in front or 
behind: indeed, power hides behind. Nature is only presumed, it also being 
constructed by power just as society”.1109 Indeed, as I concluded in chapter 6, 
patriarchal power hides within the supposedly neutral concept of gender. 
The use of the term gender comes from society’s insistence on defining what it 
means to be a woman or a man. As was pointed out in chapter 7, women’s studies 
try to understand the meaning of being a woman and the field of masculinity studies 
explores the meaning of being a man. Feminism has gone on revising the meaning 
of woman and the accompanying concept of femininity. It has tried to allow women 
to be women without being the unprivileged party. But what if one does not want to 
be categorized either as a woman or a man? The reality is that this is not an option.  
This stubbornness in maintaining categories is shared by Leslie Pearlman in her 
approach to the situation of transsexuals. Pearlman defends the need to keep the 
concepts of sex and gender separated in order to cater to the uniqueness of 
transsexuals.1110 However, would it not be easier if everybody, and not just 
transsexuals, wasn’t obliged to comply with the normative categories? Sex and 
gender, whether as separate or conflated entities, maintain the binary intact. Either 
way, there is a circular relation between the categories that prevents us from breaking 
free of the biological. 
The elimination of the concept of gender is advocated by many defenders of post-
gender thinking —for instance, Sandra Bem and Jeff Hearn, who claim that the best 
solution is to eliminate the concept of gender. Does this mean that we eliminate sex 
and any references to biology? Not really. As Sandra Bem explains, the natural is 
real and needed. The fact that the body is part of biology cannot be denied. Anna 
Grear understands the importance of the body: “Foregrounding embodiment, by 
contrast, means taking embodied particularity seriously as a feature of 
universality”.1111  
We need the natural in order to depict the real biology of bodies, a biology that 
goes beyond the imposed binary. However, we need to take a different approach to 
the natural in order to avoid the particular natural connotations attached to sex and 
gender. It is not a matter of accepting or rejecting the natural; it is a matter of what 
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kind of naturalness we accept, and how this naturalness is linked to the concepts of 
sex and gender—one cannot deny the biological aspects of every person. The 
acceptance of the role of the body puts embodiment front and centre. Embodiment 
can be central to the concept of the universal human, as it “[invites us] to imagine a 
‘concrete universal’; a universal filled with bodies in all their variety, capacities, 
incapacities and context-responsiveness and affectability.”1112  
8.4 Imagining New Concepts: Time for GENEX 
Therefore, as concluded in chapter 5, the real source of the continuing discrimination 
against and lack of equality for women and other non-normative people is the reading 
and understanding of the body and how it relates to the concepts of sex and gender. 
The traditional understanding of the body is the pillar on which the construction of 
sex, gender and sexuality relies. Nelly Oudshoorm follows other science scholars 
such as Ruth Bleier, Ruth Hubbard, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Helen Longino in 
defending the view that our perception of the body is influenced by the language 
provided by the biomedical sciences, which goes for scientists themselves as well: 
“Consequently, the assumption that the biomedical sciences are the providers of 
objective knowledge about the ‘true nature’ of the body could be rejected’”.1113 
Scientists don’t just create scientific language, they’re also influenced and biased by 
the preexisting scientific language.   
The influence of scientific language in our day-to-day life and knowledge 
obstructs the possibilities of expanding categories beyond the accepted notions of 
sex and gender and of going beyond the natural; this also hinders the possibility of 
depicting a concrete universal person in a way that shows awareness of the general 
need to recognize the body, but takes into account multiple bodies from the 
perspective of diversity. Both terms, sex and gender, imply a naturalness that derives 
from the reproductive functions and genitals. Therefore, it is necessary to find terms 
that, sustaining the natural as part of their definition, are able to redefine the natural 
in a way that accepts multiplicity. We need to find a term that allows us to accept the 
existence of multiple bodies. Indeed, the sexed body is “not the immutable binary 
‘given’ that law presupposes and then insists upon from birth (with emphasis) while 
(inconsistently) excising/submerging the body”.1114 
Therefore, instead of referring to sex or gender, terms that will always reify the 
binary, I propose the use of a different concept that represents the proliferation of 
bodies and their social expressions, the multiplicity of being or the multitude. In this 
 
 
1112  Grear (n 228). 
1113  Oudshoorn (n 22).  
1114  Jones and others (n 397) 47.  
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attempt, I propose “genex” as a new term that can be used to express discrimination 
because of sex, gender, sexual orientation, and any other kind of intersectional traits 
that produce exclusion. This is an idea similar to Jeff Hearn’s concept of gex.1115 He 
defines this new concept as “a shorthand for gender/sex, [which] takes seriously the 
complex intersections of gender, sex and sexuality, rather than assuming that gender 
is a cultural construction of pre-existing sex, in this context the male sex”.1116 He 
proposes the term coming from the field of masculinities, while I come from a 
context focused on the female sex. This is a curious coincidence: we both depart 
from different points, but arrive at the same place.  
It is important to explain that this term, genex, is not the same as sex, gender, 
sexual orientation, identity or any other trait that can make people to be categorized 
in groups. This term is created to go beyond those concepts and to express the person 
itself as a whole to allow the the approach to difference from a multiple perspective. 
Genex can be define as meaning embodiment and identity as a whole. The person 
furthers away from the Cartesian approach towards a rather monist one.  Using this 
term aims to express a broader sense of embodiment able to take into account the 
multiple differences that conform a person alongside the psychological aspects, or 
actions they perform and construct their identity.  There are no defined categories of 
“genex”; you can’t say, “I am an [X] or a [Y].” You can only say, “That person is 
being discriminated against on the basis of genex,” but there is no further way to 
define “what their genex is”. It is a way to undermine sex, gender and sexual 
orientation, or any other trait that might be discriminated against, as no one will be 
recognizable on its own and no one will be superior over the others in a hierarchy. 
Of course, it will require a different mindset to avoid any association with sex, 
gender, or sexual orientation. This would likely be difficult to achieve at first; 
however, continuous use might help with the forgetting of the old terms and 
concepts.  
We should try not to categorize people, not to create boxes: doing so always 
excludes somebody. Nonetheless, the law urges that the sex or gender of a person be 
known, and it expects an answer within the binary. We could replace the terms sex 
and gender with a new term such as genex when we want to refer to any issue related 
to sex, gender or sexuality. There would be no definition of positive identity at all in 
terms of sex, gender, man, woman, etc. We would not talk anymore about sex, 
sexuality or gender; we would talk about genex, which allows us to address identity 
and the body using an abstract and undefined category. Of course we cannot ask 
what a person’s genex is, but we can refer to discrimination against genex. This 
would imply making changes in law such that intersectionality becomes part of the 
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subject. Recognizing a real intersectional subject makes it possible to address 
difference from a multiple perspective and reconceptualize the legal person as 
universal and unsexed. 
Do we really need sex and gender categories? No, not really, but in the case that 
law still obliges us to categorize, we might begin by using many other possibilities, 
such as variable, fixed, transitioning, ambiguous, or indeterminate, so as to overcome 
binary thinking. These different categories would permit us to distance the concepts 
of man and woman from their inherited symbolism, as well as including trans*, 
intersex, or genderqueer persons, without invoking the binary. Defining ourselves as 
ambiguous or transitioning would permit us to blur the categories of man and 
woman. I need to admit that this is not optimal; the optimal situation would be not 
to categorize at all. These categories might be used at first as a transitioning time 
when still the binary of sex is difficult to overcome. These new categories in a way 
relate to the previous conceptions of sex and gender; however, they might serve to 
help us move forward to a real genex. Indeed, it seems difficult to categorized any 
person within any group if we refer to genex. A term that helps to overcome the 
binary would also aid in managing to treat the “universal subject of law not as 
sexually differentiated in a dichotomous sense but as sexually variegated and 
mutable”.1117 It would allow us to discard the power of the genitals in the definition 
of sex. Instead of focusing on the difference between two opposites, it focuses on the 
recognition of multiple different possibilities of being.  
What about the specific issue of women, transgender people, and intersex 
people? The source of the violence and discrimination they experience lies in the 
obligation to follow certain sexed norms. This source is not gender but patriarchy, 
which in the end is the same. The violence everybody suffers is grounded in 
patriarchal organizing principles, relations, institutions, etc., which are also the 
source of the binary. Patriarchal culture underlies all of the beliefs that still govern 
our lives and rule our institutions. Patriarchy is not a source of violence only against 
women; it is also a source of violence against all those who do not accept its 
inherited, uncontested truths. Revealing the source of our culture will help us 
overcome modern patriarchal values and embrace a postmodern world—a shift that 
our institutions, particularly law, try to resist.  
  
 
 
1117  Grear (n 228) 49. 
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CONCLUSION 
Feminism, gender, and law, the three musketeers of the 20th century—“all for one, 
one for all”—have been engaged in an arduous fight to stop discrimination against 
women—or should I say against sex discrimination? Or… should I be politically 
correct and say gender discrimination? Despite the evident problems with the term 
and concept of gender, its use also has many positive effects. It is possible to say that 
the negative effects of the concept were seen after the concept achieved its aim of 
informing society about the constructive power of culture.  
The reality is that, as of now, the conservative use of gender in law and the 
confusion around sex, gender, and feminism have hindered the transformation of the 
law into a real non-discriminatory structure. It is evident that the “three 
musketeers”—feminism, gender, and law—have combined forces in their analysis 
and their great effort to improve society by fighting inequality and discrimination. 
However, with regard to law, this effort has stalled when the contestation of sex and 
gender binaries is at stake: law has not adapted easily to this new truth. Regarding 
women, we witness how their specificities become embedded within the masculine 
norm, and even if one is aware of the general need to recognize the body, this occurs 
from the perspective of diversity. 
The problems with the use of gender  
The concept of gender can be analysed from two different standpoints: as a 
construction related to sex and as a political category. Analysis shows that gender in 
relation to sex and gender as a political category are interlocked. The relation 
between sex and gender converts sex into a status that is just as political as gender. 
Gender can be used as a political category that reflects the concept of sex, or it can 
be used to refer to an identity, sometimes defined in relation to sex and sometimes 
in relation to identity or women. The concept of gender deploys its political tentacles, 
adapting itself to a context or situation through its multiple interpretations.  
Therefore, looking at the intersections between the different understandings and 
uses of gender may help us solve the two problems signaled throughout this thesis: 
(1) women as subjects who are discriminated against, and (2) the survival of the 
binary of sex that produces exclusions and reinforces categories. The shared feature 
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of these two problems is their origin in social constructions, but they cannot be 
fought with the same strategy. Using the concept of gender to attack both problems 
produces a paradoxical situation in which the binary of sex reproduces the fictional 
categories of gender constructed by sex—man/manhood and woman/womanhood—
while making their cultural roots invisible.  
Law, gender and feminism play a primary role in contributing to this situation. 
Law represents a field of battle where sex and gender have a presence and where 
feminism enters to criticize the foundations on which the truths of law are built. 
While the sole concern was once the inclusion of women in law, later analysis from 
a gender perspective broadened the political subject. The alliance between gender 
and feminism obliged legal systems to recognize the existence women. The 
broadening of the political subject also implies the transformation of law and all 
discourses to include the “outcasts” who truly represent diversity.  
The concept of gender was deployed through a set of conceptual tools with which 
feminism could change society’s beliefs about the “nature” of women. Subsequently, 
the alliance between gender and feminism was supposed to be a powerful force 
toward constructing a revolutionary theory, strong enough to crack the hierarchical 
system of patriarchy. Patriarchy is a system grounded in the natural truths that 
framed the legal limitations of women in law and society, justifying the natural 
separation of spheres according to the sexes. The challenge to the “objectivity of 
nature” triggered the collapse of many normative beliefs about women’s inferiority 
and began to allow for the inclusion of other people who do not fit into the normative 
gender binary model, the so-called outlaws.  
Sex/gender categorization has been disrupted by the bodies that transgress the 
normative body. These deviant bodies challenge the natural truth of sex legitimized 
by law. However, to maintain this truth, law legitimates the mutilation of bodies, as 
in the case of aesthetic or intersex surgery to help a subject conform with the 
accepted notion of sex. The possibility that bodies might live outside normative sex 
or be represented in law does not exist.  
The different solutions are, then, the following: (1) to use gender without 
specifying what we mean by it, thus leaving room for interpretation; (2) to use gender 
and specify what we mean by it, thus fixing positions and probably producing 
exclusion; (3) not to use it, instead choosing to use alternative terms such as cultural 
imposition of sex, social sex or cultural sex; or (4) to look for new terms such as 
GENEX.  
Woman vs gender 
Despite the evident reasons for dissolving the binary, there is still a need for woman 
as a specific political subject. Therefore, the use of gender needs to be accompanied 
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by another strategy, as we are fighting two problems: (1) the symbolism attached to 
the meaning of woman, womanhood, female, and femininity; and (2) the exclusion 
of many other subjects because of the normative binary. The proposal of recognizing 
the multiplicity of bodies might help to find a suitable strategy for including without 
exclusion. Recognizing the multiplicity of bodies will allow an ‘embodied 
spectrum’, rather than a disembodied hybridity.1118 This strategy, envisioned by 
Anna Grear, would permit us to retain the political concepts related to the female 
and male that allow us to envisage the sources of obstacles to the achievement of 
real freedom of choice and equality—for instance, law. 
The recognition of the many kinds of women and other subjects beyond the 
binary of sex or gender is a feminist achievement. However, it is obvious that gender 
does not refer only to women, just as “the sex” is not only male or female. Expressing 
the relation between gender and sex beyond the binary requires one to think in new 
terms. However, certain inherited notions, such as masculinity and femininity, are 
still attached to oppression and discrimination. We must face the inherited meanings 
attached to the woman and man of the ontological subject while constructing new 
symbolisms to represent the multiplicity.  
This means that in law we need to queer the subject, a queering that will integrate 
the intersectional subject into law. To do this, we can use a new term that helps us to 
overcome the natural and political limitations imposed by the old ones. However, 
there are still many occasions when it is necessary to use straightforward terms such 
as woman, womanhood or femininity to visualize the subject. The laws fighting 
discrimination or VAW should avoid using overly neutral language—i.e., not to say 
“gender violence” if really referring to patriarchal violence against women. Violence 
against women is attached to the discursive category of woman, to femininity, and 
to all that represents womanhood. It is about what the body and sex represent. A man 
externally identified as a woman can be attacked for what he represents; intersex 
persons identified by others as women can be attacked for what they represent; a 
transsexual identified by others, or by him- or herself, as a woman can be attacked 
for what he/she represents. If we obscure these cases with the term gender, the real 
problem, the symbolism attached to woman, femininity or womanhood is hidden.  
The problem of the binary of sex, however, needs another strategy: it needs new 
terms such as genex that avoid the identification of two sexes and two genders. This 
would also help to broaden the understanding and depiction of the body beyond the 
genitals. The rule of genitals must be overcome if people are to make truly free 
choices. A multiplicity of bodies exists that is currently constrained to fit a sexual 
binary of only two options. The modern foundations of sex are fading. The binary of 
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sex cannot be sustained without imposing unjustified bodily mutilations. Science is 
aligning with other disciplines in defending the existence of more than two sexes, 
and law too will admit this at some point. 
In sum, the term gender can neither fight the binary nor fight VAW or women’s 
discrimination. The term gender hides the symbolism culturally ascribed to the sexes 
beneath a veneer of neutrality and keeps the binary intact. Discrimination against 
women and the binary of sex are two independent yet interlocked issues that need to 
be fought independently of each other. The problem is not gender; it is culture and 
the way we construct knowledge, truths and beliefs.  Because it is not all about 
gender; really, it isn’t even all about sex , it is all about genitals. Indeed, it seems that 
the criteria for defining and distinguishing people ultimately come down to genitals. 
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